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This thesis is about the human aspects of online banking safe-
ty and security. End users are a central link in the information 
security chain, for online banking too. Despite technical se-
curity measures, security codes sometimes unintentionally 
fall into the hands of perpetrators, for instance, through suc-
cessful phishing and malware attacks. This allows perpetra-
tors to steal money from private and corporate bank accounts. 
Therefore, it is important to make end users resilient when 
online, in an effort to combat these attacks on online banking.
This thesis presents several studies that contribute to making 
end users online resilient and is divided into two empirical 
parts. The first part describes four studies that investigated 
risk perceptions and online banking fraud victimization. The 
second part describes four studies that investigated precau-
tionary online behaviour and how that behaviour can be in-
fluenced for the better. Researchers in the field of behavioural 
information security and practitioners in the field of security 
education, training and awareness can use the insights from 
this thesis in their line of work, to examine the issues more 
thoroughly and to maximize the effectiveness of security 
campaigns respectively.
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1.1 Introduction 
‘Computer insecurity is inevitable. Technology can foil most of the casual 
attacks. Laws can deter, or at least prosecute, most criminals. But attacks will 
fall through the cracks. Networks will be hacked. Fraud will be committed. 
Money will be lost.’ This somewhat dark image of the digital society painted by 
Bruce Schneier (2000, p. 367) – an internationally renowned security 
technologist – is a reality that we will have to accept. However, we can 
contribute to making this dark reality somewhat brighter. An important 
contribution lies in making the weakest link in information security more secure. 
This thesis contributes to this effort in the context of online banking by studying 
fraud cases and the role of end users. More explicitly, the overall objective of the 
studies presented in this thesis is to find ways to improve the safety and 
security of online banking from an end-user perspective.1 
The world we live in is becoming more networked and connected (Van Dijk, 
2012). Services offered to customers, such as retail and government services, 
are increasingly provided online. This also counts for banking services, the 
context of this study. The digital revolution offers opportunities to end users in 
numerous ways. However, these advantages can be overshadowed by insecurity 
and fear of threats, such as the risk of losing money and privacy infringements. 
Technological advances do not always result in better security in technical 
environments (Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, & Ferguson, 2010). The internet 
was not designed with security in mind, it was designed for utility only (Purkait, 
Kumar De, & Suar, 2014). This ‘utility’ is, however, also used or misused by 
perpetrators, and so internet users fall victim (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Van 
Wilsem, 2011b), which may consequently lead to all kinds of harm. 
Harm is not only done to individuals. Security issues, such as data breaches, 
distributed denial-of-service-attacks2 or compromised systems, can also have 
negative effects on businesses, the economy and society at large. Besides 
financial damages, the effects of cyberattacks may lead to reputational damage 
and loss of goodwill and trust. Therefore, online safety and security are vital 
aspects in the digital society. 
Ensuring online safety and security is not an easy task, however, as it can easily 
be compromised – either accidentally or deliberately (Furnell & Clarke, 2012). 
                                               
1 This study is one of four studies in the Dutch Research Program on Safety and Security 
of Online Banking. This program is outlined in Appendix I. 
2 A distributed denial-of-service-attack or DDoS-attack is a deliberate attack by which 
massive amounts of data are sent to block their intended users’ access to systems, 
networks or services (Van der Hulst & Neve, 2008). 
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Perpetrators can use a range of tools in deliberate attacks, of which two are 
central to this thesis: phishing and malware attacks. Reports of such attacks are 
frequently mentioned in the news, both within and beyond the online banking 
context. An example of the former is a news story about perpetrators being 
arrested in Amsterdam who stole over 400,000 euros by means of phishing 
attacks.3 An example of the latter is a news message describing that a spear-
phishing attack was used as a preparatory act trying to influence the American 
presidential election in 2016.4 
In terms of the safety of online banking, banks obviously have an important role 
in securing this online service. However, cyberattacks form a societal problem, 
which means that responsibility cannot be attributed to banks only (NVB, 2013). 
Hence, combatting cyberattacks requires a joint approach where multiple 
organisations, such as internet service providers, telecommunications companies 
and governmental agencies, bundle their forces. End users also play an 
important role. Moreover, end users are considered to be the Achilles heel for 
achieving online security (Furnell, Jusoh, & Katsabas, 2006; Liang & Xue, 2010; 
Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). Therefore, it is important for end users to become 
online resilient and ‘bend’ with these developments. This is necessary to stop 
people from ‘breaking’ and potentially becoming victims of online banking fraud. 
When thinking about cyberattacks and cybersecurity, it is obvious to make 
associations with technical issues, such as technical security measures and fraud 
prevention and detection systems. This is, for example, also evident in the 
European Commission’s cybersecurity strategy, which has a strong focus on 
technical aspects (EC, 2013). As far back as in 2001, Sasse, Brostoff, and 
Weirich (2001) observed that human aspects of information security are easily 
ignored, while humans are perceived to be the weakest link in the information 
security chain. However, as of late, human aspects gain more attention, because 
security fundamentally affects more people (Furnell & Clarke, 2012). 
Furthermore, a great portion of cyberattacks are targeting end users (Furnell & 
Clarke, 2012). As a consequence, end users often cause security breaches, for 
example, when they are persuaded to click on a hyperlink in a phishing e-mail, 
enter personal information on a phishing website or open an infected attachment 
                                               
3 Nu.nl (2016). Amsterdamse phishing-bende stal ruim vier ton via internetbankieren 
[Amsterdam phishing gang stole more than 400,000 euros through online banking]. 
Retrieved from http://www.nu.nl/amsterdam/4284493/amsterdamse-phishing-bende-stal-
ruim-vier-ton-via-internetbankieren.html 
4 Lipton. E., Sanger, D. E., & Shane, S. (2016). The perfect weapon: How Russian 
cyberpower invaded the U.S. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/ 
politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html?_r=0 
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(Hong, 2012; Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010). Human 
factors, such as cognitive abilities and risk perceptions, impact end-user 
behaviour, which in turn influences the effectiveness of information security 
(Parsons et al., 2010; Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009). Besides, end users are the ones 
that interact with computer or information systems, making the human factor an 
important issue by definition. Although a multidisciplinary perspective is needed 
to cope with online threats and vulnerabilities – as these often have 
multidimensional characteristics – this thesis adopts an end-user perspective on 
the safety and security of online banking.5 This study accordingly falls within the 
domain of behavioural information security research, which is part of the 
broader information security field (Crossler et al., 2013). 
Another reason to focus on end users is that technical security alone is not 
capable of guaranteeing the safety of online banking (Arachchilage & Love, 
2014; Furnell & Clarke, 2012; Herath & Rao, 2009). Although basic security 
hygiene should be a precondition before interacting online and provides to a 
certain extent a barrier against technical attacks (NCTV, 2013), it cannot always 
prevent an end user from contracting a malware infection, nor can it prevent an 
end user from disclosing sensitive information to a perpetrator when persuaded 
to do so. Davinson and Sillence (2014) state in this regard that end users play 
an integral role in reducing succesfull fraudulent cyberattacks. How far end user 
responsibility should go is not under discussion in this thesis. The bottom line is 
that end users should be able to cope with threats aimed at online banking. 
In sum, this thesis provides insight into the perceptions of end users regarding 
online banking safety, security and fraud victimization, and into the human 
aspects that influence end users so that they are cautious when online. 
Currently, not much work has been done on studying the human aspects of 
behaving cautiously when online and protecting end users from cyberattacks 
(Arachchilage & Love, 2014). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, the 
context of the thesis is introduced. Section 1.3 continues with the goals and 
research questions that are central to this thesis. In Section 1.4, the scope and 
theoretical foundations are emphasised. Section 1.5 presents the relevance of 
                                               
5 A focus on the end user consequently means that less attention is paid to the cyber 
resilience of financial institutions (DNB, 2016) or the (technical) preconditions of safety 
and security of online banking, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability (the C.I.A. 
triangle), quality management systems (e.g., ISO 27001) and the internal and external 
security systems banks have in place and their design and usability, such as fraud 
detection systems and two-factor authentication. 
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the different studies conducted for this thesis. Finally, the content of the thesis 
is presented in Section 1.6. 
1.2 Context 
In this section, the subjects of the thesis are presented in more detail. First, the 
broader context of online banking is introduced (Section 1.2.1). Second, the 
narrower context of online banking fraud is highlighted (Section 1.2.2). 
1.2.1 Online banking 
One of the major innovative developments of recent times is the internet. The 
internet offers many opportunities to people as they can, for instance, 
communicate and do business with one another 24/7. For banks, the internet 
has provided opportunities to expand their services. With digital payments in 
general – and specifically online banking – banks created an alternative in which 
banking activities take place. This alternative makes it possible for people to 
arrange banking activities in a faster, cheaper way in any place at any time, as 
long as an internet connection is available.6 Thus, online banking refers to 
banking via the internet using a device selected by the customer, including 
desktop and laptop computers, smartphones and tablets. In the context of this 
study, online banking is limited to online payments, online transfers and 
checking the account balance online.7 
Compared to the traditional ways of arranging banking activities, online banking 
has some unique characteristics. Yousafzai, Pallister, and Foxall (2003) indicate 
that online banking is characterised by (a) an extensive use of technology; (b) a 
distant and impersonal online environment; and (c) an implicit uncertainty of 
using an open technology infrastructure for financial transactions. Where the 
relation between the bank and its customers might have been closer in the past 
(human-to-human), now this relationship is characterised by a separation of 
place and time (human via system-to-system). These characteristics are also 
applicable to the broader e-commerce spectrum as opposed to traditional 
commerce (Pavlou, 2003). 
The results presented in this thesis are applicable to the Dutch online banking 
situation and may not necessarily be generalisable to other countries. In 1997, 
only a few years after the first public internet service provider was founded in 
the Netherlands, online banking via the World Wide Web was introduced in the 
                                               
6 Note that other forms of digital payment systems, such as counter payments (at physical 
stores), cash withdrawals from ATMs, and digital currencies are outside the scope of this 
study. 
7 Note that other activities that might fall under the scope of online banking, such as 
investments, mortgages and insurances, are outside the scope of this study. 
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Netherlands.8 Twenty years later, 85% of the Dutch population aged 16 and 
over make use of this service (Eurostat, 2016). It seems, however, that the age 
group 65 years and over is lagging behind in the uptake of online banking with 
44% users.9 Together with the Nordic countries, the Netherlands is one of the 
frontrunners when it comes to the adoption of online banking. 
The large adoption rate can be explained by several reasons. For the Dutch 
context, an important reason lies in the internet coverage rate, which is high in 
the Netherlands. In 2015, 91% of all households had access to the internet 
(CBS, 2016a). The adoption of online banking is also helped by banks that have 
closed down local bank offices10 and that discourage the analogue ways of 
conducting banking businesses because they have stopped offering those 
services or have raised the costs.11 In this respect, online banking adoption may 
be evaluated as a fait accompli. General indicators for online banking adoption – 
which are also relevant outside the Dutch context – include the previously 
mentioned unique characteristics of online banking that appeal to many people. 
Additionally, there are also customer-specific factors that affect the adoption of 
this self-service technology, for instance, having an optimistic attitude towards 
technology and the individual’s innovativeness (Yousafzai & Yani-de-Soriano, 
2012). 
End users can install banking apps to access their bank accounts on mobile 
devices (smartphone and tablet). This is often referred to as mobile banking, a 
form of online banking that has been introduced in the Netherlands in 2011.12 In 
2016, around five years after its introduction, 63% of the Dutch population used 
mobile banking.13 Although mobile banking comprises some differences, such as 
downscaled authentication, less functionality and physical places where bank 
                                               
8 Grinsven, L. van (1997). Rabo eerste in race naar het net [Rabobank first in race to the 
internet]. Retrieved from http://www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/rabo-eerste-in-race-naar-
het-net~a487746/ 
9 Unie KBO (2015). Ruim een miljoen senioren bankiert nog niet online [More than one 
million seniors are not yet banking online]. Retrieved from http://www.uniekbo.nl/nieuws/ 
default.asp?page=detail&id=1329 
10 Den Hollander, E. & Vogels, P. (2014). De bank? Daar komt bijna geen mens meer (The 
bank? Almost no one goes there anymore). Retrieved from http://www.ad.nl/economie/ 
de-bank-daar-komt-bijna-geen-mens-meer~a799627f/ 
11 Hofs, Y. (2012). Nooit meer een acceptgiro [Never an acceptance giro again]. Retrieved 
from http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/nooit-meer-een-acceptgiro~a3283088/ 
12 Banken.nl (2011). ING lanceert Mobiel Bankieren app voor smartphone [ING launches 
mobile banking app for smartphones]. Retrieved from http://www.banken.nl/nieuws/4/ 
ing-lanceert-mobiel-bankieren -app-voor-smartphone-en-tablet 
13 ING (2017). Mobile banking, shopping and payments to surge in the next 12 months. 
Retrieved from https://www.ezonomics.com/pdf/Mobile_Banking_release_FINAL.pdf 
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accounts may be accessed, no distinction is made between online and mobile 
banking in this thesis because they both involve similar uncertainties and risks, 
such as cybercriminals attacking mobile networks and intercepting personal 
information or using malware to obtain credentials (Zhou, 2012). However, as it 
stands now, online banking on mobile platforms is not attacked as often as 
online banking on desktop and laptop systems.14 
1.2.2 Online banking fraud 
According to the Dutch Banking Association, Dutch banks provide high levels of 
security for their products and services (NVB, 2013). This is necessary in order 
for digital payment systems15 to operate as safely and smoothly as possible. 
Moreover, (digital) payment systems are considered one of the critical 
infrastructures of our society. An attack on these infrastructures may cause 
social disruption (Van der Hulst & Neve, 2008). When such attacks are carried 
out using information and communication technology they are called 
cyberattacks or cybercrime. The World Economic Forum evaluates cybercrime as 
the third most serious global risk considering the combination of its likelihood 
and impact, after fiscal crises and structural unemployment or 
underemployment (WEF, 2016). 
The Dutch Banking Association defines two types of cybercrime with regard to 
digital payment systems: (1) targeted at negatively influencing the availability of 
digital payment systems; and (2) targeted at fraud with online banking and/or 
debit cards (NVB, 2013). Because this study concentrates on end users, the 
former is not taken into account and the focus is on the latter, more specifically 
on online banking fraud.16 
Online banking fraud is part of the increasing extent, frequency and diversity of 
cybercrime. These events, combined with a rise in the use of electronic systems 
to store personal data, make information security an important asset in the 21st 
century. Therefore, it is imperative to better understand the effectiveness of 
security measures, but also laws, policies and strategies that deal with 
protecting and combatting cybercrime, and the motivations and crime scripts of 
cybercriminals. Although the idea of tricking people for financial profit is not 
                                               
14 Interview with a security architect from a Dutch bank (personal communication, April 
23, 2014). 
15 A payment system is a ‘set of instruments, procedures, and rules for the transfer of 
funds between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity 
operating the arrangement’ (Bank for International Settlements, 2012), retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d00b.htm?&selection=49&scope=CPMI&c=a&base=term 
16 Note that other relevant crimes targeting end users, such as skimming and debit card 
fraud, are outside the scope of this thesis. 
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new, the characteristics of the internet make it more convenient for perpetrators 
(Furnell, 2008a). Williams (2015, p. 56) argues that online fraud is ‘the most 
prevalent acquisitive crime in Europe.’ The types of online banking fraud 
relevant in this thesis are limited to phishing and malware attacks.17 
Phishing – a type of social engineering – is the process of retrieving personal 
information using deception through impersonation (Lastdrager, 2014). Phishing 
often starts with a deceitful e-mail, but also fake websites and fraudulent phone 
calls are applied to intercept user credentials. Malware – a type of technical 
engineering – is the infection of a computer system with malicious software, 
including viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spyware, for the purposes of 
carrying out the harmful intentions of an attacker (Moser, Kruegel, & Kirda, 
2007). Examples of financial malware include Zeus, SkyEye and Citadel 
(Marinos, 2013). The aim of the perpetrator is to deceive the end user or the 
system used for online banking in order to obtain user credentials and/or to gain 
control over end users’ devices. Perpetrators use these credentials to access a 
victim’s online bank account and to validate money transfers on behalf of the 
victim. In short, the issues regarding the safety and security of online banking 
are limited to the integrity of transactions. 
A sensitive issue regarding phishing and malware attacks on online banking is 
that security is compromised on the customer side. From a technological 
perspective, the bank’s capabilities and control end at a given point. For 
example, banks cannot control end users’ behaviours or their devices and 
infrastructure. From the perspective of making the online banking customer 
more resilient, the relevant questions then concern how to encourage them to 
take precautionary measures within their own domain, and to what extent that 
can be expected from customers, as some measures might be complicated and 
technical. Another important question is how to ensure that customers are 
cautious and alert in their behaviour, and continue to be so, also with regard to 
new developments and types of attack on online banking. These questions are 
relevant because customers or end users form an essential link in the 
information security chain. 
During the preparation phase of this research project, attacks on online banking 
were targeted more at end user than at banks.18 That end users are attacked 
more often nowadays does not mean that banks are not targets anymore. 
Consider, for example, the theft of a billion dollars by hacker group Carbanak in 
                                               
17 Note that both attack types can also be combined in a single attack (Aaron, 2010). 
18 De Volkskrant (2013). Bankoverval komt nauwelijks nog voor [Bank robberies hardly 
occur anymore]. Retrieved from http://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/bankoverval-komt-
nauwelijks-nog-voor~a3393520/ 
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2015.19 In this phase, the number of reports about online banking fraud made 
by the Dutch Banking Association was at its highest level, with respectively 35.0 
and 34.8 million euros of direct financial damages in 2011 and 2012.  
Since 2013, the reported fraud figures have been declining in the Netherlands.20 
Various sources report that this decline is due the banks doing a good job in 
detecting fraudulent attacks in their systems and customers who are more 
aware of such attacks.21 Furthermore, online banking fraud can be considered a 
marginal issue when placing it in perspective. In the Netherlands, about 3 billion 
transactions are made using online banking. These transactions represent a total 
value of 3,200 billion euros (NVB, 2013). Also compared with indications of 
other fraud types in the Netherlands (PwC, 2013), such as bankruptcy fraud 
(1,300 million euros), insurance fraud (900 million euros) and investment fraud 
(500 million euros), online banking fraud may seem to be a minor issue. 
Although the fraud figures tend to decline, and the amounts that are stolen are 
relatively small, the cybercrimes that are studied are still a considerable problem 
that internet users need to deal with both within and beyond the scope of online 
banking (APWG, 2015). In the United Kingdom, for example, online banking 
fraud figures have increased from 2011 onwards.22 Examples of Dutch 
organisations whose names are misused in phishing attacks besides banks 
include Bol.com,23 PostNL24 and Booking.com,25 but also government bodies 
                                               
19 Infosecurity Magazine (2015). Miljard dollar gestolen in grootste digitale bankroof aller 
tijden [One billion dollars stolen in biggest digital bank robbery ever]. Retrieved from 
http://infosecuritymagazine.nl/2015/02/15/miljard-dollar-gestolen-in-grootste-digitale-
bankroof-aller-tijde/ 
20 Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (2016). Veiligheid en fraude [Safety and fraud]. 
Retrieved from https://www.nvb.nl/feiten-cijfers/992/veiligheid-fraude.html 
21 Financieel Dagblad (2015). Bank en consument dringen samen cybercrime terug [Banks 
and customers curb cybercrime together]. Retrieved from https://fd.nl/economie-
politiek/1102358/bank-en-consument-dringen-samen-cybercrime-terug 
22 Financial Fraud Action UK (2016). Fraud the facts 2016: The definitive overview of 
payment industry fraud. Retrieved from https://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Fraud-the-Facts-A5-final.pdf 
23 Security.nl (2015). Bol.com waarschuwt voor nepmails [Bol.com warns about fake e-
mails]. Retrieved from https://www.security.nl/posting/451688/Bol_com+waarschuwt+ 
voor+nep-mails 
24 NOS (2014). PostNL-phishers: Kwart miljoen euro buit [PostNL phishers: Quarter-million 
euros looted]. Retrieved from http://nos.nl/artikel/2000220-postnl-phishers-kwart-
miljoen-euro-buit.html 
25 NOS (2014). 10.000 klanten Booking.com slachtoffer phishing [10,000 Booking.com 
customers victimised by phishing]. Retrieved from http://nos.nl/artikel/2010287-10-000-
klanten-booking-com-slachtoffer-phishing.html 
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such as the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration26 and the Central Fine 
Collection Agency (CJIB).27 The Fraud Helpdesk stated that, in 2015, Dutch 
internet users reported 123,000 phishing e-mails and damages amounting to 
822,000 euros were suffered by nearly 500 victims.28 The Dutch National Cyber 
Security Centre also notes that phishing and malware are still important issues 
in the Netherlands (NCSC, 2015). Hence, studying how to make end users more 
resilient against such attacks remains an important priority. 
1.3 Objectives and research questions 
The objective of this study is to improve the safety and security of online 
banking from an end-user perspective. In other words, it deals with the question 
of, and consequently how, online banking fraud victimization can be reduced. 
The central question is formulated as follows: To what extent can the safety and 
security of online banking be improved from an end-user perspective? In order 
to achieve the research objective, i.e., to answer the central research question, 
the following subdivision was made: (1) studying end-user perceptions of the 
safety and security of online banking; (2) studying online banking fraud 
victimization and coping mechanisms; and (3) studying precautionary online 
behaviour and motivations for that behaviour. Each part adopts its own main 
research question and sub-questions that contribute to answering the central 
research question. 
1: What are the perceptions of end users regarding the safety and security of 
online banking? 
a. What are the perceptions of end users regarding threats to online 
banking? 
b. What factors determine end-users’ risk perceptions of threats to online 
banking? 
c. To what extent do end users trust online banking? 
d. How are end users confronted with online banking threats? 
  
                                               
26 Telegraaf (2016). Belastingdienst waarschuwt voor phishing [Dutch Tax and Customs 
Administration warns about phishing]. Retrieved from http://www.telegraaf.nl/dft/geld/ 
belasting/25305262/__Belastingdienst_waarschuwt_voor_phishing__.html 
27 NOS (2014). CJIB: Betaal nepverkeersboete niet [CJIB: Do not pay fake traffic fine]. 
Retrieved from http://nos.nl/artikel/667735-cjib-betaal-nepverkeersboete-niet.html 
28 Fraudehelpdesk (2016). Verdubbeling slachtoffers internetoplichting [Number of online 
scam victims doubles]. Retrieved from https://www.fraudehelpdesk.nl/nieuws/ 
verdubbeling-slachtoffers-internetoplichting/ 
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2: How can online banking fraud victimization be explained from an end-user 
perspective? 
a. How and why do end users become victims of online banking fraud? 
b. What end-user characteristics can be identified that increase the chance 
of online banking fraud victimization? 
c. What are the effects and impact of online banking fraud victimization? 
d. How do victims cope with online banking fraud victimization? 
 
3: How can precautionary online behaviour of end users be explained and 
improved? 
a. What theoretical models can explain precautionary online behaviour? 
b. What are the predictors of precautionary online behaviour? 
c. To what extent do the predictors of precautionary online behaviour differ 
between subgroups (gender, age, and education level)? 
d. To what extent can predictors of precautionary online behaviour be 
influenced in order to improve end-user behaviour? 
 
This thesis embraces various research methods that are used to study the 
research problems in question. In Table 1.1, a method matrix is presented which 
visually demonstrates the research methods that are used to answer the sub-
questions. Besides the methods outlined below, which are described in more 
detail in the following chapters, each study started with a careful examination of 
the literature. In addition, interviews were conducted with fourteen key figures 
from the banking sector and police organisation at the start of the project. These 
were used to familiarise with the context at hand, but they were not processed 
for the purposes of the thesis. 
Table 1.1: Method matrix 
Research 
questions 
 
 Methods 
Survey 
private 
customers 
(N = 1,200) 
Case 
analyses 
bank files 
(N = 600) 
Interview 
fraud 
victims 
(N = 30) 
Survey 
corporate 
customers 
(N = 1,622) 
Experiment 
internet 
users 
(N = 768) 
1a-1d X     
2a  X    
2b-2d   X   
3a-3b X   X  
3c X     
3d     X 
 
Note that although end users are primarily limited to private customers of banks 
or internet users in general, corporate customers are included in some of the 
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studies that are presented later on. The rationale was that about 50% of 
financial damages due to online banking fraud is caused through attacking 
corporate customers.29 Corporate customers mainly comprised self-employed 
entrepreneurs and in a few instances small and medium-sized enterprises, 
foundations and associations. This target group is becoming more of a target for 
cybercrime as they deal with larger sums of money than private customers and 
often lack the financial capacity that larger businesses have to hire cybersecurity 
professionals.30 
The rationale to only include self-employed entrepreneurs and smaller 
enterprises is that the behavioural component is key. Primarily focusing on these 
types of customers gave the best guarantee that research participants from a 
corporate background were responsible for managing (i.e., implementing and 
maintaining or outsourcing) their information security and conducting their 
online banking activities. With larger businesses, it would be more difficult to 
study user behaviour or to target the right person in the first place, as it is often 
not clear from an external perspective which employee is responsible for what 
actions. Moreover, larger businesses often have other types of relationships with 
their bank and also use other types of services. 
1.4 Scope and theoretical foundations 
The overall objective of the studies presented in this thesis is to enhance the 
online resilience of online banking users. As stated earlier, to achieve this 
objective lessons can be learned from how end users think about threats; cases 
in which things have gone wrong, i.e., end users being victimised; how victims 
cope with incidents; and by understanding how end users can be motivated to 
behave cautiously when online. Although these aspects are related, they are 
also distinct in their own respects as will be explained later. In order to maintain 
overall clarity, the empirical section of this thesis is divided into two parts. Part I 
deals with end-users’ perceptions about online banking fraud and victimization 
of online banking fraud, whereas Part II deals with precautionary online 
behaviour. As stated by Furnell and Clarke (2012, p. 984), ‘In order to address 
the human aspects of security it is necessary to consider both the related 
threats […] as well as people-focused safeguards […].’ 
Although choosing multiple perspectives may seem extensive, it is deemed 
necessary. As Parsons et al. (2010, p. II) put it, how end users interact with 
                                               
29 Steering committee of the Dutch Research Program on Safety and Security of Online 
Banking (personal communication, July 23, 2013). 
30 Algemeen Dagblad (2013). Diefstal via internet nekt zzp’er [Theft over the internet 
disastrous for self-employed entrepreneur]. Retrieved from http://www.ad.nl/tv-en-
radio/diefstal-via-internet-nekt-zzp-er~ae01f40c/ 
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information systems and how decisions are made regarding information security 
is ‘certainly a very dynamic and complex issue’. This means that many factors 
need to be taken into account; this has been done in this thesis without making 
the whole too broad or unfocused. The theoretical foundations and concepts that 
are introduced in the subsequent sections are defined and elaborated in more 
detail in the chapters that follow in order to avoid repetition. 
1.4.1 Part I: Risk perception and online banking fraud victimization 
The central themes of Part I are risk perception; behaviour leading to online 
banking fraud victimization; victim characteristics; and coping with victimization. 
Insight into these aspects is important in the fight against cybercrime. 
More than 30 years ago, Johnson and Tversky (1983) wrote that society was 
engaged in assessing, managing and controlling risk as never before. This 
observation still applies and extends across all layers of society (Garland, 2003). 
Risk – which can be defined as ‘a systematic way of dealing with hazards and 
insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itself’ (Beck, 1992, p. 21) 
–‎ is a fundamental aspect of modern society (Beck, 1992; Jackson, Allum, & 
Gaskell, 2005), and the same applies to the internet. In Chapter 2, risk 
perceptions in relation to online banking fraud victimization are studied. 
To study risk, two perspectives can broadly be taken: the revealed preferences 
approach of Starr (1969) and the expressed preferences approach of Fischhoff, 
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs (1978). The first approach takes a 
positivist perspective, a rational or deductive means to evaluate risk. The second 
approach takes a social constructivist perspective, which evaluates risks based 
on perceptions and values, and is an inductive means. It seems that in the 
context of cybersecurity, the first perspective is often adopted, see for example 
the Dutch cybersecurity assessment reports (NCSC, 2015; 2016), whereas, it is 
– at least in this context – more appropriate to study risk within the second 
approach. 
The underlying reason to study (subjective) perceptions of risks regarding online 
banking is the focus of this thesis: the human factor. Moreover, objective reality 
is of limited importance because perceptions are by definition not rational 
(Pleysier, 2011). Also, objective reality is not pertinent for the behaviour that 
end users demonstrate, which corresponds to the Thomas theorem: ‘If men 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’ (Merton, 1968, p. 
475). Thus, the perceptions that end users have of risks associated with online 
banking primarily determine the extent to which they will interact with it. 
Additionally, it will give an indication of the level of trust people have in this 
online service. Low levels of trust in online banking (because of crime) can be 
harmful to the economy and society at large. Francis Fukuyama’s illustrative 
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quote from his 1995 book Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity 
backs up this claim, ‘Widespread distrust in a society […] imposes a kind of tax 
on all forms of economic activity, a tax that high-trust societies do not have to 
pay’. 
Because trust seems to be an important factor in online banking, this factor is 
included in this thesis. Not only is it important for the initial and continued 
acceptance of this online service (Beldad, De Jong, & Steehouder, 2010; 
Yousafzai et al., 2003), it is also a necessary aspect regarding uncertainties that 
are attributed to financial transaction in general and online transactions more 
specifically (Grabner-Kräuter & Faullant, 2008). However, trust is a broad 
concept that needs to be narrowed down. This is quite difficult as different 
disciplines tend to define it differently (Beldad et al., 2010; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995; Yousafzai et al., 2003). A further complicating factor is that 
other terms are used as well when referring to trust. Some prefer terms like 
confidence or perceived trustworthiness in the context of information systems 
(Cheshire, Antin, & Churchill, 2010) or reliance and dependence in terms of 
objects and processes (Shneiderman, 2000). 
This thesis adopts the concept of trust, because this term is often applied in user 
studies on online banking and is limited to trust in online banking: ‘a 
psychological state which leads to the willingness of customer to perform 
banking transactions on the Internet, expecting that the bank will fulfil its 
obligations, irrespective of customer’s ability to monitor or control bank’s 
actions’ (Yousafzai et al., 2003, p. 849). This definition is based on the work of 
Mayer et al. (1995) and Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998) and 
includes two fundamental elements that are in line with most definitions of trust: 
(1) it is viewed as the acceptance of being exposed to risk; and (2) it is viewed 
as an expectation of certain behaviour by another party. The antecedents of 
trust are not studied in this thesis; see for example the work of Beldad et al. 
(2010) on this topic. 
Learning more about how victimization takes place (Chapter 3) and about victim 
characteristics (Chapter 4) may lead to more knowledge on how to effectively 
prevent online banking fraud. After all, although online banking fraud schemes 
contain some technical aspects, human factors play a prominent role in such 
schemes. Perpetrators, for example, focus on vulnerable human characteristics 
and use deception tactics to obtain sensitive data (Parrish Jr, Bailey, & Courtney, 
2009). Thus, human factors may explain why some people fall for fraudulent 
schemes while others do not (Jones, Towse, & Race, 2015; Parrish Jr et al., 
2009), an issue that will be dealt with in this thesis. 
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Whereas Chapter 3 takes a grounded approach to study the phenomena of 
interest, Chapter 4 builds on the theoretical frameworks of the routine activity 
approach and protection motivation theory. The basic premise of the routine 
activity approach is that victimization depends on a motivated offender, a 
suitable target and the absence of capable guardians in a convergence of time 
and space (Cohen & Felson, 1979).31 An attempt is made to extract target 
suitability from victims’ characteristics and (protective) behaviours. Protection 
motivation theory, a social cognitive model that predicts precautionary 
behaviour (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000) is used as a framework to provide 
possible additional indicators that reflect target suitability by examining capable 
guardians. 
The final study in Part I deals with how victims cope with phishing and malware 
victimization (Chapter 5) and takes coping theory as a theoretical foundation. 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984, p. 141) give a technical definition of coping: 
‘constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific external 
and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources 
of the person.’ Coping can take place before, during and after events (Beaudry & 
Pinsonneault, 2005). In this chapter, the focus is on what takes place after the 
events. 
Attention for the coping process is important because people (who have been 
victimised) should become resilient to (future) attacks on their online banking. 
For victims to achieve this state, they first have to recover adequately from the 
incident. In order to understand what victims need to recover from, attention is 
first paid to the effects and impact or harm that is done to the victims. Levi and 
Burrows (2008) address the issue that it is difficult to agree on terms that 
express harm. This thesis adopts a comprehensive view on harm, meaning that 
it addresses the effect on thoughts and feelings, measurable financial costs, 
response costs and secondary victimization effects instigated by the handling of 
the incident. 
Similar to the essence of protection motivation theory – which is described in 
greater detail in the following section – cognitive appraisal processes are of 
great importance in coping theory. It is evident that individuals and groups of 
people differ in their reactions when confronted with comparable events. For 
instance, one might deny that something bad had occurred, while another may 
become angry or depressed when confronted with a fraudulent attack. By taking 
into account cognitive processes – which intervene between the negative event 
and the reaction – variations in interpretations and reactions of individuals to 
                                               
31 Like most studies that adopt the routine activity approach, this thesis excludes offenders 
(Williams, 2015). 
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online banking fraud victimization can be understood (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). These authors argue that the context in which an incident has taken 
place is included in this interpretation, as the psychological situation is ‘a 
product of the interplay of both environment and personal factors’ (p. 23). 
Although this study does not explicitly address contextual factors, these are 
implicitly present in the stories of the victims. 
1.4.2 Part II: Precautionary online behaviour 
The central themes of Part II are motivations for precautionary behaviour and 
how that behaviour can be influenced. Precautionary behaviour is aimed at 
reducing the vulnerability and severity of security incidents and refers to both 
the adoption of security technologies and conscious care behaviour (Ng et al., 
2009; Rhee et al., 2009). Note that the latter can be related to promoting 
protective actions or limiting risky actions. 
End users that are victimised may feel the urge to protect themselves in order to 
prevent being victimised again in the future. It is, however, important to 
motivate end users to protect themselves against online threats before 
becoming a victim. Indeed, no one wants to be victim of online banking fraud, or 
crimes in general. End users can protect themselves against online banking 
fraud by taking precautionary measures. An important question is how such 
behaviour can be encouraged. 
In this thesis, precautionary online behaviour is operationalised as (a) adherence 
to the safety rules of online banking by private end users (Chapters 6 and 7); 
(b) technical and personal coping measures of self-employed entrepreneurs 
(Chapter 8); and (c) the online information-sharing behaviour of internet users 
(Chapter 9). Knowledge on these issues may contribute to strengthening the 
most important link in the safety and security of online banking, i.e., to increase 
the online resilience of end users, that is, to make them better able to protect 
themselves against online banking fraud. As opposed to a focus on coping after 
online banking fraud incidents in Part I, coping theory is now applied to the 
situation before online banking fraud has occurred (i.e., threat anticipation and 
action). 
The leading theoretical framework that is adopted to study precautionary online 
behaviour is protection motivation theory (PMT), originally developed by Rogers 
(1975). Later revisions of PMT resulted in a broad spectrum of factors that 
initiate the cognitive processes that are central to PMT (Norman, Boer, & Seydel, 
2005), i.e., threat appraisal and coping appraisal. These factors are labelled as 
sources of information, and include environmental factors (verbal persuasion 
and observational learning) and intrapersonal factors (personality variables and 
prior experience) (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). Cognitive mediating 
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processes were also added, such as the evaluation of one’s self-efficacy (Maddux 
& Rogers, 1983). 
Another theory that plays a role in this thesis regarding predicting precautionary 
behaviour is the reasoned action approach (RAA) of Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). 
This model is an extension of the earlier theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). This approach 
identifies intentional behaviour to be an important predictor of actual behaviour, 
with the addition that one has actual behavioural control, formed by one’s actual 
skills and abilities, and environmental factors. Intentional behaviour is predicted 
by attitude towards the behaviour, social norms and perceived behavioural 
control. Perceived behavioural control is further differentiated within this thesis 
in two distinct factors, namely self-efficacy (also part of PMT) and locus of 
control. 
Whereas the first three studies in Part II focus on predicting precautionary 
behaviour and can in that sense be evaluated as exploratory studies, the final 
study focuses on how to influence that behaviour. In order to influence 
behaviour, an experimental study was conducted on fear appeals: ‘informative 
communication(s) about a threat to an individual’s well-being’ (Milne et al., 
2000, p. 107) that also contain information on efficacy and how to stimulate 
perceptions of it. The extent to which fear appeals raise perceived threat and 
increase perceived efficacy of a recommended response is tested, in this case by 
being vigilant about sharing personal information online to reduce vulnerability 
to phishing attacks. 
1.5 Relevance 
In this section, the practical and theoretical relevance of the studies included in 
this thesis are highlighted. An explanation is given for why these studies have 
been conducted. 
1.5.1 Scientific relevance 
Knowledge on information security behaviour or precautionary online behaviour 
of end users is far from complete. Theory based empirical research is thus 
scarce in this domain (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; Liang & Xue, 2010). 
Considering the end user to be the weakest link in information security (Moore & 
Anderson, 2011), a socio-technical or behavioural approach on security is 
required (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Anderson and Agarwal (2010, p. 613) 
state in this regard ‘[…] despite an acknowledgement of the importance of 
individual behavior and a recent interest in behavioral security research, there is 
limited understanding of what drives home computer users to behave in a 
secure manner online, and even less insight into how to influence their 
behavior.’ Therefore, it is important to understand how end users behave and 
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what determines how this behaviour can be adjusted for the purposes of online 
safety. 
Considering Part I of this thesis, more insight will be given into end-user 
perceptions of the safety and security of online banking. Research on end-user 
perceptions of cybercrimes in general is lacking (Garg, Huber, Camp, & 
Connelly, 2012) as are insights into the influence of cybercrime victimization on 
these perceptions (Henson, Reyns, & Fisher, 2013; Jackson et al., 2005). It is 
important to study end-user perceptions as these affect decision-making and 
consequent behaviour (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Thus, in order to 
understand how end users respond to online banking fraud attacks, it is crucial 
to first evaluate how they perceive online security and threats aimed at online 
banking. Additionally, it is important to find out what the determinants are for 
these perceptions. Thus, theoretical knowledge is advanced on end-user 
perceptions of cybercrime. 
This thesis contributes to insights into online fraud victimization and predictor 
variables for victimization, which is also lacking (Ngo & Paternoster, 2011). 
Moreover, relatively speaking, much attention is paid in the literature to the 
technical side of online fraud (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Leukfeldt, 2017), while a 
more cognitive behavioural or psychological approach may make an important 
contribution to understanding and explaining online fraud victimization 
(Wiederhold, 2014). In the literature, different explanations are given on how 
and why end users become victims of fraudulent attacks (Hong, 2012). The 
value of this thesis is to find out – using data from actual cases, i.e., fraud cases 
that are registered by a bank – whether similar or new explanations can be 
found for the Dutch (online banking) context. In addition, answers to the how 
and why questions are needed in order to develop effective measures against 
online banking fraud (Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). 
Besides providing insight into the how and why, it is also interesting to find out 
whether certain victim characteristics may have influenced their chances of 
being victimised. Several studies have been conducted to find out whether the 
routine activity approach offers an explanation for cybercrime victimization 
(Bossler & Holt, 2009; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; 
Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 2010; Pratt et al., 2010; Van Wilsem, 2011a, 2011b). 
These studies show, for example, that people who are online more often, open 
attachments, click on pop-ups, use online banking, make purchases online and 
have out-dated anti-virus software are more vulnerable to online fraud 
victimization. 
However, results regarding target suitability and absence of guardians are mixed 
(Bossler & Holt, 2009; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Williams, 2015). Leukfeldt’s 
 Chapter 1 
 
27 
(2014, 2015) empirical studies on phishing and malware – also the main 
cybercrimes studied in this thesis – failed to identify such characteristics, with 
the exception of spending more time online, and carrying out various kinds of 
activities which increased the risk of a malware infection. This calls for a 
qualitative study to provide more insight. Information gleaned during interviews 
is believed to be valuable for understanding actual motivations and the 
behaviour of individuals (Crossler et al., 2013). Therefore, a qualitative study 
has been conducted to find out whether explanatory factors can be identified 
that lead to online banking fraud victimization. 
The final study in Part I concerns coping with victimization. In this study, the 
effects and impact of online banking fraud victimization are examined first; 
these are topics that are not frequently addressed in cybercrime literature. Then 
coping mechanisms are studied, which is important because identifying factors 
that contribute to crime adaption is crucial for victims’ well-being (Green, Choi, 
& Kane, 2010). 
A coping approach is also applied in Part II of this thesis, but there it is tailored 
to threat anticipation and action. Although this approach is adopted in various 
academic disciplines, such as health psychology and consumer psychology, it is 
quite novel in the domain of information security (Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012). 
Furthermore, relatively little is known about end-user security behaviours and 
how to encourage it (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 
2015; Liang & Xue, 2010; Rhee et al., 2009). In addition, little is known about 
the use of technologies for financial transactions (Davinson & Sillence, 2014). 
Theoretical models that encourage precautionary behaviour in an information 
security context are lacking and behavioural models have only recently been 
applied to this field of research (Davinson & Sillence, 2014). Consequently, it is 
still uncertain whether, and if so, which interventions are successful in 
promoting precautionary behaviour. By adopting protection motivation theory 
(PMT) and including a number of additional factors from the reasoned action 
approach (RAA), a theoretical basis is created to test this for online banking, 
which has not been done in earlier studies. In addition, an important 
contribution lies in how PMT is applied within the context of this study, which will 
be elaborated below. According to Anderson and Agarwal (2010), it is important 
to take into account additional, context-specific factors that may contribute to 
behavioural change, in this case online banking. 
Most information security studies that adopted the PMT framework neglect some 
parts of the theory. An example of this is intrapersonal resources, such as earlier 
experiences (Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). Norman et al. (2005) stress the 
importance of studying earlier experiences as these can be important predictors 
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of future behaviour. One type of earlier experiences included in this thesis is 
habit. Habit theory assumes that many actions are taken without thinking deeply 
about them, and that actions are performed because individuals are accustomed 
to them (Vance et al., 2012). Liang and Xue (2009) indicate that people are 
motivated to repeat previous actions that led to positive outcomes and avoid 
behaviour that led to negative outcomes. 
Another type of earlier experiences that is considered within this thesis is 
internet experience. Earlier experiences with a website or online activities may 
affect end users’ choices regarding safety and security issues (Chen & Bansal, 
2010). A final type of earlier experiences is prior victimization. People who have 
been victimised tend to strongly believe that they may be victimised again in the 
future, whereas non-victims do not (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). This 
may possibly influence their processes of taking precautionary measures, which 
West (2008) confirms when he argues that, in general, security becomes a 
priority only when people have problems with it. Therefore, prior victimization is 
included in the research framework. 
The other intrapersonal source that is associated with PMT is personality 
variables. Such variables include self-control, propensity to trust, propensity to 
take risks and personality traits such as openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. For the sake of 
limiting the scope of research, these factors are not taken into account. 
Moreover, it is important to keep the theoretical framework as parsimonious as 
possible. 
As previously mentioned, factors from the RAA are taken into account (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2010); these are attitude towards behaviour, social norms and 
perceived behaviour control – which, in this thesis, is split into self-efficacy 
(already present in PMT) and locus of control. The importance of attitude 
towards behaviour is often demonstrated in information system studies 
(Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). Another contribution lies in including 
social norms, as this is an aspect often neglected in information systems 
research (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). Locus of control is deemed important to 
the issue of end-user responsibility for the safety and security of online banking. 
End users may attribute this responsibility (to a certain extent) to themselves, 
or they may attribute (most) responsibility to the bank that provides this online 
service. Furthermore, this construct is viewed as an important aspect in the 
prevention of threats (Workman et al., 2008). 
This thesis tests how PMT performs uniquely in relation to RAA in predicting 
behavioural intentions and vice versa. Furthermore, PMT and RAA are tested in 
an integrated fashion. These endeavours are applied to advance theoretical 
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knowledge and to pursue maximum effectiveness (Lippke & Ziegelmann, 2008; 
Sommestad, Karlzén, & Hallberg, 2015). Although these models in themselves 
have been extensively tested, this is not the case in the information security 
context. Testing this will help researchers to make informed decisions about 
which model to adopt in similar contexts. Moreover, the results on precautionary 
behavioural intentions are compared in terms of different demographic 
variables, i.e., gender, age and education level. This aspect is often neglected, 
but it is important to further differentiate the findings (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & 
Sarstedt, 2014). 
Another factor that seems important to the online banking context is perceptions 
on bank reimbursement policies or perceived financial compensation if fraud 
occurs. Although such policies (partly) remove the risk of losing money, they do 
not affect how the underlying risks are perceived. Thus, perceived financial 
compensation is no antecedent of perceived risk (Chellappa & Pavlou, 2002), 
rather it is a potential surrogate for information security. When customers 
assume that reimbursement follows victimization by definition, they may be 
discouraged to take action. Conversely, if customers believe that they will have 
to pay for some or all of the financial damages themselves, it is expected that 
they will be motivated to take precautionary measures. 
A final factor that is also included as a possible predictor variable that may have 
influence one’s motivation to act cautiously online is trust in online banking. 
More specifically, trust is linked to the end-user’s threat appraisal. Therefore, 
trust is adopted as an additional variable that may explain risk perception (Das 
& Teng, 2004). Note that this factor plays a role in both Part I and Part II of this 
thesis. 
Another valuable contribution that this thesis offers is that it also addresses the 
information security behaviour of self-employed entrepreneurs. This is important 
since small businesses represent a vulnerable target group with potentially 
limited resources to fight the increasing threat of cybercrime. The importance of 
helping self-employed entrepreneurs in this area cannot be understated. 
Although research into human aspects of information security is increasing, the 
body of literature on this target group is limited.32 
Finally, a contribution lies in the fact that the studies contained in this thesis are 
not descriptive only; one of them is also aimed at improving precautionary 
behaviour. Another part of PMT often neglected in information security studies is 
                                               
32 Although it is recognised that end-user behaviour in a corporate setting may be affected 
by organisational culture and the (security) climate in which they occur (Parsons et al., 
2010), this thesis does not focus on those contextual or environmental factors per se. 
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environmental factors. This thesis contributes to this by conducting an 
experimental study of fear appeals on end-users’ protection motivation. The 
effects of fear appeals on precautionary behaviour are not evident because some 
studies report that fear appeals do work (Witte & Allen, 2000), while others 
report that fear appeals produce counterproductive results (Peters, Ruiter, & 
Kok, 2013). This thesis contributes to the understanding of the effectiveness of 
fear appeals in precautionary online behaviour. 
Although PMT is also used as the main theoretical model for this study, it is 
extended with the attitude variable, both as an outcome measure and a 
predictor for precautionary behaviour. Furthermore, the study focuses on two 
types of outcome, which is deemed important (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & 
Polak, 2015), namely message acceptance or danger control – which refers to 
outcomes like attitude, intentions and behaviours – and message rejection or 
fear control, which refers to outcomes like avoidance, reactance and denial. The 
inspiration to complement the PMT framework in this matter comes from the 
parallel process model (Leventhal, 1970), the extended parallel process model 
(Witte, 1992) and the stage model of processing of fear-arousing 
communications (Das, De Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; De Hoog, Stroebe, & De Wit, 
2005). In addition, intentional behaviour as well as (self-reported) actual 
behaviour are studied. Studying intentions only is considered a drawback in 
studies on human behaviour (Boss et al., 2015; Crossler et al., 2013). 
1.5.2 Practical relevance 
The study results will increase our understanding of online banking fraud 
victimization processes and factors contributing to victimization. It will also 
increase our understanding of the precautionary online behaviour of end users. 
When causes for victimization and motivations for safe behaviour are better 
understood, targeted measures can be taken to enhance end-users’ online 
resilience. The findings thus present opportunities to increase the safety and 
security of online banking from an end-user perspective, for example, by 
applying the findings to the design of an awareness campaign for safe online 
banking. 
Resilient end users have various characteristics. They are aware of threats 
aimed at online banking, try to prevent threats from manifesting in harm, and 
take necessary actions when confronted with a threat. If a certain threat could 
not have been avoided despite all actions, it is important that end users 
recognise or detect it as soon as possible. When a threat is quickly noticed, 
negative consequences may be mitigated or possibly be avoided entirely. Thus, 
end users must be able to identify threats, to protect themselves against these 
threats, to detect threats when they cannot be avoided, and to recover from 
harm inflicted by the threat. In other words, resilience is not only about 
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eliminating threats but also about managing them. Eliminating threats 
altogether is an illusion because there is no such thing as one hundred per cent 
security. Resilience goes further than self-perceptions on competence. It also 
deals with active engagement in a certain environment and being able to exert 
influence (Zimmerman, 1995). 
Online resilience, especially with regard to online banking, is of crucial 
importance since end users are attributed with more responsibility in keeping 
online banking safe and secure (Anderson, 2007; Davinson & Sillence, 2014). 
Moreover, this study started with the presumption that mistakes made by end 
users are often the main cause for online banking fraud victimization, which this 
thesis will also prove to a certain extent. Thus, there is a practical goal in 
emphasising this link. 
In the first place, online resilience is important to end users themselves, beyond 
the online banking context too. Although financial damages due to online 
banking fraud may be diminishing, phishing as well as malware attacks are still 
a relevant problem that leads to victimization, which can have serious 
consequences. Apart from the monetary aspect, this kind of victimization can 
also have a range of psychological and emotional effects, which will be 
demonstrated later. Furthermore, it may even lead to identity theft with all its 
possible consequences (Hutchings & Hayes, 2009). In addition, according to 
Kritzinger and Von Solms (2010) it is essential that internet users understand 
risks; it is important to protect information and to be aware of the consequences 
when things go wrong. Overestimating risks may lead to people not using 
certain products or services. If risks are underestimated, it could encourage 
people to behave carelessly (Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011). 
Resilient end users also have practical value for banks. When end users are 
better able to protect themselves, it should lead to further minimising online 
banking fraud victimization. This means that a focus on detection, repression 
and correction could shift to prevention. In other words, there should be a shift 
from stopping attacks to preventing attacks. The fewer end users are victimised, 
the less impact this has on the trust end users have in and the image end users 
have of online banking. Indeed, online banking fraud not only leads to financial 
losses or reduced psychological wellbeing, harm is also felt in terms of losing 
trust in digital payment systems (CPB, 2016). According to Statistics 
Netherlands, 17% of Dutch internet users occasionally refused to use online 
banking services because they were concerned with online safety (CBS, 2015b). 
Furthermore, actions to undo the damage caused by fraudulent attacks are 
reduced, for example reimbursing the victim, blocking and unblocking bank 
accounts, call centre costs, et cetera. In the end, the police force can benefit 
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from this as well, as less capacity will be needed for investigating and solving 
these types of crime. 
Moreover, the study results will make clear which aspects can be addressed in 
order to motivate end users to behave safely and securely online, and what their 
current perceptions are on threats and safety measures. This is important for 
marketing and communication specialists as well as for bank employees who are 
responsible for designing security systems. Uncertainty and risk are difficult to 
evaluate for customers. For security system designers it is important to 
understand how end users make decisions regarding security and how they 
evaluate them (West, 2008). ‘The most elegant and intuitively designed 
interface does not improve security if users ignore warnings, choose poor 
settings, or unintentionally subvert corporate policies’ (West, 2008, p. 34). 
The financial sector at large and banks in particular have an important role to 
play in informing and educating customers about phishing attacks (Purkait, 
2012). In the Netherlands, the financial sector takes responsibility in this regard 
as they tackle this issue in several awareness campaigns. In their 
communications, which are targeted at all online banking customers, banks 
advise their customers to hang up the phone when fake security topics are 
discussed, to click away phishing e-mails and illegitimate websites and to call 
the bank when they do not trust the situation they are in. Recently, they added 
to their communications that customers should not send their debit card by 
traditional mail, as perpetrators had deployed a different modus operandi to gain 
access to customers’ bank accounts. Banks also inform their customers in their 
terms and conditions about behaving safely and securely when banking online 
and through security warnings on the online banking website or app. This 
research aims to contribute to these efforts. 
In academic research, efforts have also been made in educating and training end 
users about phishing, such as the serious games PhishGuru and Anti-Phishing 
Phil (Kumaraguru et al., 2010). Although both efforts showed that the research 
participants’ phishing detection skills improved, a considerable number of 
individuals were still left vulnerable to a phishing attack (17.5% and 31%). 
Moreover, the effects do not necessarily last over time. However, there is some 
evidence that if end users are more resilient there are fewer successful 
cyberattacks (Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, & Butavicius, 2012; 
Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010). 
End users must understand the importance of security measures and 
precautionary behaviour in protecting themselves against fraudulent attacks. 
Security education, training and awareness (also known as SETA) are therefore 
important. However, despite the priorities and efforts of governments, academia 
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and other organisations to combat such attacks and to warn end users, 
victimization still takes place. Liang and Xue (2010) state that a cognitive 
behavioural research perspective can contribute to effective security programs. 
This thesis tested a possible direction in encouraging internet user to behave 
safely online. This study provides insight into the effects of fear appeals on 
limiting vulnerability to phishing attacks by being vigilant when sharing personal 
information online. 
1.6 Contents of the thesis 
This thesis continues with Part I (Chapters 2 to 5). In Chapter 2, a survey study 
on risk perceptions regarding online banking fraud is presented. Chapters 3 and 
4 deal with how and why end users become victims of online banking fraud and 
what end-user characteristics increase the chance of victimization. These 
qualitative studies provide insight into these matters by analysing actual cases 
and by analysing interviews with victims. In Chapter 5, the victim interviews are 
analysed a second time to provide insight into how victims cope with online 
banking fraud victimization. Thereafter, Part II will be discussed (Chapters 6 to 
9). Chapters 6 and 7 quantitatively study end-user motivations for precautionary 
online behaviour. In the former chapter, protection motivation theory, the 
reasoned action approach and a combination of the two are tested. In the latter 
chapter, the combined model is complemented with additional variables and is 
more thoroughly corroborated. In Chapter 8, protection motivation theory is 
used as a framework to explain the precautionary online behaviour of self-
employed entrepreneurs. Whereas the focus of the previous chapters is on 
explaining behaviour, Chapter 9 focuses on improving it. More precisely, a study 
is presented on improving precautionary online behaviour using fear appeals.33 
Finally, the research questions will be answered in Chapter 10. Furthermore, all 
the contents will be discussed in a comprehensive manner, overall limitations 
will be addressed, and theoretical and practical implications will be elaborated. 
  
                                               
33 Note that Chapters 2 to 9 are a collection of previously published papers, with two 
having the status of ‘submitted’ (Chapters 6 and 9). To do justice to the authors that have 
co-authored the papers, words like ‘we’ and ‘our’ have been retained. With the contents of 
these chapters being the same as how they were published, some adjustments were 
made. These concern the consistent use of British English, the use of the APA guidelines, 
numbering and naming of headings, referrals and the integration of tables (that were 
otherwise published in [online] appendixes). One exception, however, is Chapter 4, where 
context was additionally provided to the quotations. Also note that Chapter 2 is a 
translation of a paper published in a Dutch journal. 
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2.1 Introduction 
More than 90% of households in the Netherlands have access to the internet 
(Statline, 2016b). Internet access is a convenience that many people enjoy, for 
instance, for staying in touch and when doing shopping. A disadvantage of the 
digital revolution is that people have become more dependent on technology, 
and more vulnerable to security incidents too (Furnell, Bryant, & Phippen, 
2007). Thus, adequate information security is an essential requirement in 
today’s society, for instance, to ensure that sensitive information does not fall 
into the hands of people with malicious intent. 
This study focuses on a specific online service, namely online banking. Online 
banking gives users access to various banking services via the internet. These 
services include being able to check balances and pay bills, services that are 
used a great deal in the Netherlands. Eighty-five per cent of the Dutch 
population who are sixteen years and above use these services (Eurostat, 
2016). Online banking offers users convenience and flexibility when carrying out 
financial transactions (Davinson & Sillence, 2014). 
However, online banking also has a downside. Whereas in the past, banks used 
to get physically robbed, criminals these days use phishing or banking malware 
to get their hands on users’ login details and security codes, which they can then 
use to steal money from the corresponding bank accounts. Phishing is an 
attempt at scamming (Section 326 of the Dutch Criminal Code): the perpetrator 
tries to persuade someone to part with their information using digital means and 
deception (often via e-mail), in order to gain unlawful advantage by doing so. 
Malware is a contraction of ‘malicious software’ and a catch-all term for harmful 
software like viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spyware. Phishing and malware 
are the most common kinds of threats that online banking users in the 
Netherlands face. These two threats are central to this study. 
This study specifically discusses the perceptions that users have of these 
threats. According to Johnson and Tversky (1983) and Slovic (1987), it is 
important to map perceptions that people have when it comes to security, and 
to understand these perceptions. Perceptions of hazards and risks affect the way 
people make decisions and therefore their behaviour (Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010). The same applies to online banking (Cunningham, Gerlach, & Harper, 
2005; Jansen & Van Schaik, 2016; Yousafzai, Pallister, & Foxall, 2003). 
Consequently, to understand how people react to attacks on online banking, we 
should investigate how they view their online security and attacks on it. For this 
reason, this study looks specifically at risk perception. In addition, research into 
risk perception facilitates the design of risk communication and mitigation 
technologies (Garg & Camp, 2012). 
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For online banking, risk perception could be interpreted as the perceived 
potential for loss if the service is used (Yousafzai et al., 2003). We talk of 
perceptions because people often rely on an intuitive opinion that they have of 
risk (Slovic, 1987). Risks in this sense are a social construct; people base risks 
on emotionally loaded value judgements and also on cognitive claims (Garland, 
2003) that do not necessarily correspond with reality. 
The objective of this study is to gain an understanding of the risk perception that 
users have about online banking fraud, and to shed light on factors that 
influence that perception. Based on this, the central question is: What is the 
nature of the risk perception that users have of online banking fraud and how is 
this perception formed? Only little research has been done into perceived risks 
of the online domain (Garg, Huber, Camp, & Connelly, 2012). This study 
attempts to address this shortage. In addition to this, little is known about the 
effect that cybercrime victimization has on the way risk perception is formed 
(Henson, Reyns, & Fisher, 2013; Jackson, Allum, & Gaskell, 2005). This study 
contributes to what we know about perceived risk of the online domain by 
including online banking fraud victimization as a possible explanatory variable 
for risk perception. 
2.2 Theory 
Risk perception can be studied from various approaches. Two important ones 
are the revealed preferences approach developed by Starr (1969) and the 
expressed preferences approach that Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, and 
Combs (1978) advocate. Slovic and Peters (2006) interpret these two 
approaches as ‘risk as analysis’ and ‘risk as feelings’. The former is based on 
logic, reasoning and scientific deliberations, and the latter on instinctive and 
intuitive opinions. This means, for instance, that academics assign a different 
meaning to risk than laymen do (Slovic, 1987). 
In our study, we use the expressed preferences approach as the basic premise 
because we are studying end-user perceptions. This approach takes into 
consideration that end users do not have all the information they need and that 
they cannot use the information that they have as effectively as possible. This 
subjective alternative also plays a fundamental role in various theoretical models 
(e.g., Rogers [1975]), for instance, in order to get a better understanding of 
behaviour in relation to information security (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang 
& Xue, 2010). 
2.2.1 Predictors of risk perception 
In common parlance, risk is defined as the possibility of loss, damage, 
disadvantage or destruction (Garland, 2003). In a more theoretical sense, risk 
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can be considered to be a measure for exposure to danger, expressed in 
likelihood (perceived vulnerability or probability) and the extent of the loss 
(perceived severity or impact) (Garland, 2003; Jackson et al., 2005; Liang & 
Xue, 2010). 
Those who study risk perception, including Griffin, Neuwirth, Dunwoody, and 
Giese (2004), Slovic (1987) and Vlaev, Chater, and Stewart (2009), 
demonstrate that risk perception has a multi-dimensional character. In addition 
to perceived vulnerability and perceived severity, Griffin et al. also mention 
personal control and institutional trust as predictors of risk perception. According 
to them, personal control is a self-assessment of the degree of control over the 
susceptibility to damage if the risk becomes reality. Furthermore, institutional 
trust concerns the extent to which an individual considers other parties to be 
capable of ensuring that the individual will not be negatively affected by the 
threat in question. If the perceived control of one’s own safety and the degree 
institutional trust are high, risk perception will be lower (Griffin et al., 2004). 
From the more general ‘fear of crime’ literature, we learn that there is a link 
between risk perception and fear. For this reason, we draw from this literature 
to find out more about the potential effect that victimization has on risk 
perception. Henson et al. (2013), for instance, claim that individuals who have 
fallen victim to a particular offence (personal experience) suffer from higher 
levels of fear with respect to that offence than non-victims do. Their 
victimization has evidently affected their perception. In addition to personal 
experience, the social environment and the media may have a predictive effect 
on perceived risk and fear (Hale, 1996; Henson et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 
2005; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). This is also referred to as ‘indirect 
victimization’ or ‘vicarious experience’. 
For the sake of completeness, this study also investigates the effect of 
demographic variables. Previous research has shown that the demographic 
variables of gender, age, level of education and work status have a predictive 
effect on risk perception (Bronfman, Cifuentes, & Gutiérrez, 2008; Savage, 
1993). These variables also play a predictive role in the fear of crime literature. 
For instance, women, older people, the less highly educated and those on low 
incomes generally report higher levels of fear of crime than their counterparts 
(Hale, 1996), even though these groups, objectively speaking, are the least 
likely to fall victim to crime (Pleysier, 2011). As far as age is concerned, several 
studies found the opposite effect, namely that younger people are more afraid of 
(certain kinds of) crime (Henson et al., 2013; Jackson, 2009). 
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The literature also mentions other factors that apparently influence risk 
perception. Fischhoff et al. (1978) describe nine dimensions of risk in the 
psychometric paradigm. In addition to the dimensions of risk control and the 
severity of the consequences that we have already discussed, they identify: the 
voluntariness of risk, the timeliness of the impact, expert knowledge about the 
risk, the knowledge that lay experts have about the risk, how new the risk is, 
whether it affects one person/system or several people/systems, and whether it 
is a risk that the person has learnt to live with, or one that the person fears. 
Cultural aspects, attitudes, risk sensitivity and specific fears may also affect the 
way that people perceive risks (Sjöberg, 2000). These factors could not be 
included in our analyses due to the limitations of the dataset that we based our 
secondary analysis on. We will return to this in our discussion of the findings. 
2.2.2 Implications of risk perception 
An important discovery in the field of psychology that Tversky and Kahneman 
made in 1974 was that people use heuristics (intuitive judgements) to lend 
significance to uncertainties (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). While these gut feelings 
may hold true in some cases, in others they lead to stubborn prejudices that 
have implications for risk assessment. 
Research into objective and subjective opinions about threats has revealed that 
human thinking is subject to prejudices (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982). 
For instance, the frequency of infrequent events is often overestimated and the 
frequency of frequent events is often underestimated. In addition, 
overestimation is most likely to occur for dramatic or sensational incidents, while 
unspectacular incidents are mainly underestimated. Huang, Rau, Salvendy, Gao, 
and Zhou (2011) claim that knowledge is a key factor in the gap between 
perceived security and the actual security of a system. A lack of knowledge is 
often the reason for under- or overestimating a system’s level of security. 
If the perceived risk is higher or lower than the actual risk, it may have negative 
consequences. Overestimating the risks can lead to people not using certain 
products or services for no good reason. ‘Not using’ online banking in the Dutch 
context is virtually inconceivable because there are very few options available. 
What might happen, however, is that online banking is used less often (for 
instance, people may avoid using it for online purchases). If the risk is 
underestimated, it may encourage people to behave unsafely (Huang et al., 
2011). 
2.3 Method 
This study involved the secondary analysis of a dataset that was used for 
research into motivations for precautionary online behaviour by those who use 
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online banking (Jansen & Van Schaik, 2016). An online survey was conducted for 
this in mid-2015. The survey was based on literature research and it was pre-
tested both qualitatively and quantitatively. For the current study, 
supplementary literature research was conducted to hone the theoretical 
framework. 
The dependent variable risk perception is central to this study. We examined the 
extent to which the dependent variable is affected by the following independent 
variables: perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, locus of control, trust in 
online banking, and direct and indirect experience of victimization (personal, the 
social environment and the media). The demographic attributes of gender, age, 
level of education and work status were included as control variables. 
Locus of control may be internal or external. Internal locus of control means that 
people believe that they themselves have control of certain eventualities; while 
with external locus of control people attribute it to fate or they lay the 
responsibility elsewhere (Rotter, 1966; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008), for 
instance, with the bank. Trust in online banking is considered to be ‘a 
psychological state which leads to the willingness of customers to perform 
banking transactions on the Internet, expecting that the bank will fulfil its 
obligations, irrespective of customer’s ability to monitor or control bank’s 
actions’ (Yousafzai et al., 2003, p. 849). Studies into the adoption of online 
banking have shown that the perceived level of risk decreases in line with an 
increase in the level of trust in online banking (Davinson & Sillence, 2014; 
Yousafzai, Pallister, & Foxall, 2009). Locus of control and trust in online banking 
are closely aligned with the constructs of personal control and institutional trust 
(see Section 2.2.1). 
The variables are based on existing scales and were measured using three 
statements that the participants could answer on a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The questions about 
the perceived level of risk were based on Grabner-Kräuter and Faullant (2008); 
the questions about perceived vulnerability and perceived severity were taken 
from Witte (1996); the locus of control questions were based on Workman et al. 
(2008); and the questions about trust were taken from Yousafzai et al. (2009). 
To measure victimization, descriptions of phishing and malware were first given 
to the participants, after which they were asked about the extent to which they 
had heard (from their own social environment and the media) of people falling 
victim to these threats. Participants were then asked whether they themselves 
had fallen victim to these threats in the previous five years. At the end of the 
questionnaire, participants were asked to complete their demographic details. 
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2.3.1 Participants 
An external online panel recruitment firm wrote to and recruited the 
participants. In total, 1,850 people viewed the questionnaire online. Of these, 
614 viewed the questionnaire but either did not complete it or did not complete 
it fully. We were not able to obtain additional information about the background 
characteristics of these people. Thirty-six people were excluded from further 
participation after the first screening questions because they did not belong to 
the target population: 14 of them have tasked someone else with the 
management of their online banking; and the remaining 22 did not use online 
banking services. 
In total, 1,200 participants completed the questionnaire in full. Of the 
participants, 54.8% were female and 45.2% were male. The average age of the 
participants was 49 years (SD = 14.5) and the education levels were categorised 
as high (52.5%), medium (32.3%) and low (15.2%). Regarding work status, the 
participants were either employed (53.9%), entrepreneurs/self-employed 
(6.9%), retired (18.8%) or had another status (20.3%), for instance, they were 
students or seeking employment. In total, 56.9% can be considered as 
belonging to the working population. This group consisted of entrepreneurs/self-
employed and people who were in salaried employment for twelve hours per 
week or more. 
Because we did not have any figures about the total population in the 
Netherlands that uses online banking, we compared the participants’ background 
characteristics with those of the population in the Netherlands as a whole. It is 
not possible to determine exactly how representative the participants are of the 
population in the Netherlands that uses online banking. The figures presented 
are therefore indicative. 
Women are somewhat over-represented in the dataset, and men are slightly 
under-represented (p < .01). The distribution of the population in the 
Netherlands is 50.5% female and 49.5% male (Statline, 2015).34 In comparison 
with the population in the Netherlands, the age category up to 30 years is 
under-represented in our database (p < .001) (Statline, 2016a).35 Highly 
educated participants are over-represented and less highly educated participants 
are under-represented in our dataset (p < .001). According to Statline (2013), 
the distribution of education levels in 2012 was high (28.6%), medium (40.7%) 
                                               
34 Calculation based on 2015 as the reference date, total population in the Netherlands. 
35 Calculation based on 2016 as the reference date, population aged from 20 to 80 in the 
Netherlands. 
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and low (30.7%).36 Taken across the entire working population in the 
Netherlands, the percentage that belongs to the working population is 64.8% 
(CBS, 2015a).37 This percentage is significantly higher than the percentage in 
our dataset (p < .001). 
2.3.2 Data analysis 
We used SPSS (Version 23) for the descriptive analyses. To determine the 
extent to which the predictive variables influence risk perception, we used path 
analysis (partial-least-squares path-modelling [PLS]). This analysis method is 
suitable for exploratory research and is designed to maximise the amount of 
explained variance (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). The explanatory 
analysis was carried out using the statistical software program SmartPLS 2.0 
(Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). We used a standard PLS bootstrap procedure (N 
= 5,000), as recommended by Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics (2009), to test 
the significance of the parameters in the structural model. The structural model 
represents the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. 
In addition to the structural model, PLS provides a measurement model that we 
first evaluated. This gave us insight into the extent to which the data fulfilled the 
requirements for the analysis method that we applied. The component loadings 
of the individual items were sufficiently high (≥ 0.70) in the corresponding 
construct and significant lower than the other constructs, which provides 
evidence for the unidimensionality of the items (Henseler et al., (2009), see 
Table 2.1. The reliability of the constructs was assessed based on the composite 
reliability coefficient. All the constructs were sufficiently reliable (≥ 0.70): risk 
perception (0.88), perceived vulnerability (0.88), perceived severity (0.90), 
locus of control (0.84) and trust in online banking (0.89). 
  
                                               
36 Calculation based on 2012 as the reference date, population aged from 15 to 65 in the 
Netherlands. 
37 Calculation based on 2015 as the reference date (first quarter), population aged from 15 
to 65 in the Netherlands. 
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Table 2.1: Component loadings 
 PR PV PS LoC TR 
PR1 0.85 0.60 0.32 -0.22 -0.38 
PR2 0.81 0.67 0.22 -0.28 -0.37 
PR3 0.87 0.61 0.31 -0.29 -0.41 
PV1 0.63 0.88 0.18 -0.26 -0.33 
PV2 0.69 0.90 0.23 -0.28 -0.35 
PV3 0.55 0.73 0.21 -0.19 -0.24 
PS1 0.27 0.22 0.87 0.08 -0.08 
PS2 0.20 0.13 0.83 0.10 -0.03 
PS3 0.37 0.26 0.91 0.04 -0.13 
LoC1 -0.27 -0.26 0.13 0.83 0.40 
LoC2 -0.28 -0.27 0.03 0.81 0.39 
LoC3 -0.20 -0.17 0.02 0.77 0.34 
TR1 -0.45 -0.35 -0.12 0.41 0.91 
TR2 -0.29 -0.26 -0.02 0.45 0.79 
TR3 -0.41 -0.33 -0.11 0.35 0.85 
Note. PR: perceived risk. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. LoC: locus of 
control. TR: trust in online banking. 
Convergent validity – the degree to which items in the same construct are 
related (Hair et al., 2014) – was assessed based on the average variance 
extracted (AVE). The AVE for all the constructs, with the exception of locus of 
control, was higher than the limit of 0.70: risk perception (0.72), perceived 
vulnerability (0.71), perceived severity (0.76), locus of control (0.64) and trust 
in online banking (0.71). We kept locus of control in the analyses because 
variance in the items of locus of control could be explained to a greater rather 
than a lesser extent (value ≥ 0.50). Discriminant validity – the extent to which a 
construct differs from the other constructs (Hair et al., 2014) – was determined 
by analysing the square root of the AVE. The corresponding value of the result 
must be greater than the correlations with the other constructs (Fornell-Larcker 
criterion). All the values met this criterion; see Table 2.2. Additional SPSS 
analyses did not reveal any multicollinearity issues. This means that the 
predictive variables did not correlate significantly with one another. 
Table 2.2: Coefficients of discriminant validity 
 01 02 03 04 05 
01 Risk perception 0.85     
02 Perceived vulnerability 0.75 0.84    
03 Perceived severity 0.34 0.25 0.87   
04 Locus of control -0.31 -0.29 0.08 0.80  
05 Trust in online banking -0.46 -0.37 -0.10 0.47 0.85 
Note. Off-diagonal values are correlations. Diagonal values are square root of average 
extracted variances. 
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The independent variables for phishing and malware victimization were 
combined and dichotomised (0 = no, 1 = yes). The correlations between these 
variables and risk perception are: victimization experienced by the participant 
him- or herself (0.08), victimization in the social environment (-0.02) and 
victimization reported in the media (-0.13). The demographic attributes were 
coded as follows: gender (0 = female, 1 = male), age (in years), level of 
education (1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high) and work status (0 = unemployed 
working population, 1 = employed working population). The correlations 
between demographic variables and risk perception were as follows: gender (-
0.09), age (-0.02), level of education (-0.14) and work status (-0.05). Given the 
exploratory nature of this study, we included the abovementioned variables in 
the analysis, despite the low correlation with the dependent variables. 
2.4 Results 
Before we consider the results of the path analysis, we will first discuss the 
perceptions that users have of the risks and security of online banking, and the 
extent to which they have had to deal with phishing and malware victimization. 
2.4.1 Perceptions of risk and security 
The responses that participants gave for statements about risk perception and 
the predictors of risk perception are given in Table 2.3. We see that the 
percentage of participants that consider online banking to be risky, and of those 
who think it likely that they will fall victim to online banking fraud is low. For 
comparison purposes, another statement was included, stating that other people 
have a good chance of falling victim to this kind of fraud. Of the participants, 
37.6% agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, whereas 16.2% disagreed 
or strongly disagreed with it. Participants largely agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement that online banking fraud can have a major impact. As a general 
rule, participants agreed or strongly agreed that they can control the security of 
their online banking (a high score on the locus of control scale indicates internal 
locus of control). Finally, participants indicated that they mainly trust the online 
banking system. This is reflected in the fact that more than half of the 
participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statements in question. 
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Table 2.3: Item-scores (in percentages), means and standard deviations (N = 1,200) 
Construct Items 1 2 3 4 5 
Risk 
perception 
(M = 2.6, 
SD = 0.79) 
I am afraid of being victimized by 
online banking fraud 
11.1 35.7 36.3 13.9 3.0 
I believe it can rather easily happen 
that criminals steal money during 
online banking sessions 
11.9 43.9 34.0 8.3 1.9 
I am afraid that others can access my 
online bank account without my 
permission 
8.0 36.7 33.4 18.8 3.2 
Perceived 
vulnerability 
(M = 2.7, 
SD = 0.71) 
I am at risk for being victimized by 
online banking fraud 
9.4 43.2 41.2 5.3 1.0 
It is likely that I will become victim of 
online banking fraud 
11.8 40.6 39.2 7.0 1.4 
It is possible that I will become victim 
of online banking fraud 
3.8 24.3 39.8 28.0 4.1 
Perceived 
severity 
(M = 4.0, 
SD = 0.76) 
I believe that online banking fraud is a 
severe problem 
1.3 3.7 20.8 41.6 32.8 
I believe that online banking fraud is a 
serious problem 
0.5 4.0 17.4 47.3 30.8 
I believe that online banking fraud is a 
significant problem 
0.5 7.8 24.2 43.0 24.6 
Locus of 
control 
(M = 4.0, 
SD = 0.72) 
Keeping online banking safe is within 
my control 
0.9 1.6 13.5 47.6 36.4 
I believe that it is within my control to 
protect myself against online banking 
fraud 
1.3 4.2 17.4 44.6 32.6 
The primary responsibility for 
protecting me against online banking 
fraud belongs to me 
2.3 6.9 22.3 37.2 31.3 
Trust in 
online 
banking 
(M = 3.7, 
SD = 0.70) 
I trust online banking 2.1 4.7 28.7 54.0 10.5 
I trust my bank 1.9 4.5 22.7 51.1 19.8 
I trust the internet for banking 
transactions 
2.1 6.3 32.4 51.4 7.8 
Note. 1–5: totally disagree – totally agree. M: mean. SD: standard deviation. 
2.4.2 Victimization 
Of the participants, 16.3% knew of someone in their own environment, such as 
relatives, members of the family, friends or colleagues, that had fallen victim to 
phishing. For malware, this percentage was 21.5%. All in all, 29.6% (N = 355) 
of the participants knew of someone in their environment who had fallen victim 
to one or both kinds of online banking fraud. More than half of the participants 
(69.1% for phishing and 52.1% for malware) said that they did not know of any 
victims in their own environment, but had heard of them via the media. In total, 
three quarters of the participants said that they had heard of this victimization in 
the media (75.6%, N = 907). Respectively 8.8% and 15.1% indicated that they 
did not know of anyone, nor had they ever heard or read anything about online 
banking fraud victimization in the media. The remaining participants, 5.8% and 
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11.3% respectively, indicated that they did not know whether they knew of 
anyone or had heard about it. 
We define direct victimization as concerning participants who had fallen victim in 
the previous five years after they had parted with information in response to a 
phishing attack and/or had had a malware infection that targeted online banking 
in this period of time. In both cases, the victims need not necessarily have lost 
money. Section 51a of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedures refers to 
victimization in the event of financial loss or other damage if it is the direct 
consequence of a criminal offence, for instance information theft and/or a 
successful malware infection. 
In response to the question of whether they themselves had been confronted 
with phishing, 46.8% answered in the negative. A total of 4.1% were not sure. 
This means that 49.1% (N = 589) had been confronted with phishing at some 
point. By far the majority of these had received phishing e-mails (N = 569) at 
some point in time. Some of them were called by phone and asked to disclose 
information (N = 82) or had inadvertently ended up on a phishing website (N = 
27). Of that 49.1%, 71.0% (N = 418) indicated that at least one of the phishing 
encounters concerned online banking. In total, 2.4% admitted that they had 
parted with information as a consequence of a phishing attack in the previous 
five years (N = 10). These ten were considered to be victims in this study. Of 
these, six people indicated that the attack had taken place in the previous 
twelve months, and three of the ten said that money had been taken out of their 
bank account. 
In response to the question of whether they themselves had been confronted 
with malware in the previous five years, 57.8% answered in the negative. In 
total, 24.8% were not sure. The percentage of participants who had been 
confronted with a malware infection on a device that they used for online 
banking was 17.4 (N = 209). Of the reported malware infections, 9.6% targeted 
internet banking (N = 20). These twenty participants were considered to be 
victims in this study. Ten participants reported that the infection had taken place 
in the previous twelve months, and seven of the twenty said that money had 
been taken out of their bank account. 
Despite the fact that a considerable portion of the participants had had to deal 
with threats targeting online banking, we were only able to identify ten phishing 
and twenty malware victims. Three of them were victims of both kinds, which 
gives us a total of 27 individual victims (2.3%). Victimization occurs among men 
and women alike, among all education levels and among all age categories. 
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2.4.3 Predicting risk perception 
We used path analysis to evaluate the extent to which the independent variables 
predicted the dependent variable risk perception. The results of this analysis are 
given in the structural model, see Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Test results of the structural model 
Dependent 
variable 
R2 Predictor variables Beta Standard 
error 
ta 
Risk perception 0.64 Perceived vulnerability 0.61 0.02 26.62 
  Perceived severity 0.17 0.02 8.49 
  Locus of control -0.05 0.02 2.41 
  Trust in online banking -0.18 0.03 7.40 
  Victimization (self) 0.03 0.02 1.87 
  Victimization (environment) -0.04 0.02 2.25 
  Victimization (media) -0.04 0.02 2.09 
  Gender -0.05 0.02 2.44 
  Age -0.06 0.02 2.89 
  Level of education -0.07 0.02 3.90 
  Work status -0.02 0.02 1.18 
Note. The values in bold are significant (t ≥ 1.96 [α = .05], t ≥ 2.57 [α = .01]). 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000. 
The structural model shows us that 64% of the variance for risk perception can 
be explained (R2 = .64). The strongest predictor for risk perception is the 
perceived vulnerability of online banking fraud. We interpret the effect size as 
suggested by Cohen (1988): small (.02), moderate (.15) and large (.35). Two 
predictors that contribute moderately are the perceived severity of online 
banking fraud and the level of trust in online banking, whereby the latter reflects 
a negative correlation with risk perception. Internal locus of control is also 
characterised by a negative correlation, but is not as strong as an explanatory 
variable. Two marginally significant (negative) links were found for victimization. 
Demographic variables do little to explain variance, but gender, age and level of 
education are statistically significant. 
2.5 Conclusion and discussion 
Our study shows that online banking users do not consider online banking fraud 
to be a major risk. The same applies to the likelihood of falling victim to this 
kind of crime. Users estimate their own chances of falling victim to it to be lower 
than the chances that other people might. That people tend to underestimate 
their own risks and overestimate the risks that others face corresponds to what 
is known about this phenomenon in the literature (Workman et al., 2008). As 
opposed to this, the impact of online banking fraud is estimated to be high. 
Participants have a reasonable amount of trust in online banking, and tend to 
think that there are not many risks associated with online banking fraud. That is 
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all very well, but it brings potential danger in its wake. The literature that uses 
‘risk as feelings’ as its basic premise has shown that there is a correlation 
between risk perception and communicating the advantages of a (high-risk) 
activity (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). The greater the 
advantage, the lower the perception of risk and vice versa. It is therefore 
important for banks to strike a good balance between the convenience of their 
services, on the one hand, and their security, on the other hand. This applies not 
only to use of these services, but also to communications about these services. 
Indeed, underestimating risks can encourage people to behave unsafely, and 
that ultimately increases the risk. Hale (1996), for instance, argues that it is a 
good thing that people have some degree of concern when it comes to crime, so 
that they guard against it. 
Participants had little direct experience with online banking fraud victimization. 
There were ten phishing and twenty malware victims; in total, there were 27 
individual victims, i.e., 2.3% of the participants. These kinds of percentages 
come as no surprise if we compare them to figures from Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS, 2015b): around 6% of the population in the Netherlands had been 
confronted with malware involving the loss of information, and around 3% with 
online fraud. The difference with our research is that the figures published by 
Statistics Netherlands were aimed at general online issues, whereas our figures 
only related to online banking. 
When discussing victimization issues, it is important to note that participants 
may not have noticed phishing and malware attacks. It is conceivable that 
malware may have embedded itself in the end-users’ systems without them 
being aware of it, for instance, because virus scanners failed to pick it up. 
Participants may also have forgotten certain incidents because the questions 
related to the previous five years. Therefore, it may well be that the percentage 
of phishing and malware victims is in fact higher. 
The structural model shows that the predictive variables in the literature are 
significant in terms of what was predicted. This means that if users assess the 
vulnerability (large effect) and the severity (moderate effect) to be significant, 
their perceived level of risk will be higher. It also means that if users have a 
great deal of trust in online banking (moderate effect) and if they think that they 
themselves control the security of online banking (small effect), their perceived 
level of risk is lower. 
Victim variables hardly affect the explained variance of risk perception. Direct 
victimization does not have a significant predictive effect. This is contra-
intuitive. That we did not find a significant correlation presumably has to do with 
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the ‘perceived vulnarability’ variable. This variable correlates significantly with 
risk perception, although the correlation level is acceptable according to the 
Fornell-Larcker criterion. If we do not take this predictor into consideration in 
the structural model, then we see that victimization experienced by the 
participants themselves does have a significant positive effect on risk 
perception. The impact of victimization experienced by the participants 
themselves therefore seems to be explained away by perceived vulnerability. 
This, however, does not alter the conclusion of the study, because the impact of 
victimization on the explained variance of risk perception remains limited in that 
case too. 
Indirect victimization has a marginal effect, but in an unexpected way. That 
experience with victimization in the social environment reduces the perceived 
level of risk may be explained by the fact that participants hear stories from 
victims about how they were fully compensated for their loss. Another possibility 
is that they had been given an explanation about how the attack took place and, 
because of this, participants were better prepared. As a result, they were 
inclined to estimate the risk to be lower. In their research, Henson et al. (2013) 
also discovered a significant negative correlation between fear and indirect 
victimization. The possible explanation that they put forward is that victims tend 
to trivialise their experience, or to not take it seriously, which may affect the 
perceptions that participants have. The negative correlation between media 
reports and risk perception may be due to advertising campaigns in which users 
are offered a perspective for action that contributes to the security of online 
banking, which in turn may lead to people thinking that they are running less 
risk. Alternatively, people may estimate the risk to be low because the claim 
amounts that are told about are relatively small. Research that will explore these 
questions in greater depth is required to find out whether the assumptions 
presented above are correct. 
In line with the literature, demographic variables alone add little to the 
explained variance of risk perception, but are statistically significant (Bronfman 
et al., 2008). An exception to this is work status. Women, young people and 
those with lower levels of education have higher levels of risk perception for 
online banking fraud than men, older people and those with higher levels of 
education. That women and those with lower levels of education score higher in 
this regard corresponds with what is known from the literature. The current 
study revealed that young people perceive the risk of online banking fraud to be 
higher than older people do, while generally speaking older people often report 
higher levels of risk perception. That said, Henson et al. (2013) conclude that 
age is not a consistent predictor of risk perception. It is possible that the 
‘perceived vulnerability’ variable may affect the predictive effect of age. If we 
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remove this variable, it becomes apparent that age no longer plays a role as a 
significant predictor. 
Although 64% of the variance in risk perception is explained, additional research 
is needed to find out which other variables influence risk perception. An option is 
to take the dimensions from the psychometric paradigm (Fischhoff et al., 1978) 
as the basic premise (see Section 2.2.1). A basis for this can be found in the 
work that Garg and Camp (2012) have done in which they applied the 
psychometric paradigm to online risks. Additional dimensions may contribute to 
the explained variance of risk perception. Also, variables that focus more on the 
human factor may contribute, for instance, risk sensitivity and risk appetite. We 
were not able to take these kinds of variables into consideration in this study 
because of the limitations in the dataset that we used to carry out the secondary 
analysis. 
Because the risk of online banking fraud cannot be ruled out, it is important to 
continue to invest in the ability of online banking users to defend themselves, 
for instance, by informing them about the risks and the options that they have 
to combat these risks. Our results indicate that it would be useful when 
communicating with users to take perceived vulnerability into consideration, 
because this variable has the most impact on risk perception. This means that 
the objective of the communication should not be that everyone thinks that 
online banking is 100% safe. That may encourage or exacerbate unsafe 
behaviour. Instead it is important that users be made sufficiently aware of the 
risks they face so that they are on guard and take appropriate measures for a 
safe online banking experience. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to shed light on the circumstances around bank 
customers being victimized in phishing and malware attacks and how these 
attacks manifest in practice. Based on this information, we try to find evidence 
for new and/or existing fraud mitigation strategies to cope with threats aimed at 
online banking. 
Phishing and malware attacks are the most common crimes regarding online 
banking fraud in the Netherlands (NVB, 2013). ‘Phishing is a scalable act of 
deception whereby impersonation is used to obtain information from a target’ 
(Lastdrager, 2014, p. 8). In case of online banking, information refers to 
credentials and security codes. Fraudsters use false e-mails and fake websites 
portrayed as genuine sites of banks to gather information (Hong, 2012; Nhan, 
Kinkade, & Burns, 2009). Social engineering techniques that are used include 
using names of credible organizations or current events in combination with 
statements appealing to fear, threat, urgency or excitement, to influence people 
to react (Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011). Malware is an 
umbrella term for malicious software such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses and 
spyware. With this kind of software, criminals are able to steal digital data or 
gain control over a customer’s computer and, for example, manipulate what a 
customer sees on his screen. When criminals have obtained the right 
information, they are able to steal money from customers’ bank accounts. 
This study contributes to literature by examining user behaviour in a distinctive 
way, namely by studying fraud cases that are registered by a bank. The 
outcomes can help professionals and scholars to advance interventions 
promoting safe online banking behaviour or raising awareness, which ultimately 
lead to a decrease of online banking fraud. As Downs, Holbrook, and Cranor 
(2006, p. 79) put it ‘in order to develop tools that will be effective in combating 
these schemes, we first must know how and why people fall for them’. 
We begin with a brief overview of related work in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we 
describe the data. Section 3.4 continues with the results. Customer behaviour 
regarding phishing and malware victimization is presented. In Section 3.5, we 
present our conclusions, reflect on them and formulate recommendations for 
fraud mitigation strategies. Furthermore, the limitations of our study and ideas 
for future research are discussed. 
3.2 Theory 
There are broadly two perspectives that are used to study topics like phishing 
(Vishwanath et al., 2011). The first is a computer sciences perspective focusing 
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on technological fixes that automate the detection of phishing e-mails or alert 
users (Abbasi, Zhang, Zimbra, Chen, & Nunamaker Jr, 2010; Ludl, McAllister, 
Kirda, & Kruegel, 2007; Wu, Miller, & Garfinkel, 2006). The second is a social 
sciences perspective focusing on individuals (Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, 
Cranor, & Hong, 2010). Research has shown that (technical) security alone is 
not sufficient for safe online banking. Customers who are using these services 
are also an important factor (Davinson & Sillence, 2014; Hong, 2012; Liang & 
Xue, 2010; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009), or as Rhee, Kim, and Ryu (2009, p. 
816) state ‘The ultimate success of information security depends on appropriate 
information security practice behaviours by the end users’. Therefore, the 
behaviour of customers leading to victimization is examined. 
While some researchers study elements of fraudulent messages (Chang & 
Chong, 2010; Jakobsson, 2007), how people process security indicators 
(Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Tsow & Jakobsson, 2007), what strategies 
individuals choose to protect themselves against phishing (Downs et al., 2006) 
and factors concerning (susceptibility to) victimization (Bossler & Holt, 2009; 
Leukfeldt, 2014; Vishwanath et al., 2011), we try to find answers how and why 
customers fall for phishing and malware schemes by analysing fraud cases that 
are registered internally by banks. Thus, instead of studying predetermined 
constructs, we take a grounded approach and reflect on the information 
provided by victims. This information is registered in an incident database of a 
Dutch bank. By means of studying bank data, we are able to unravel the 
fraudulent interaction processes, which might provide evidence for fraud 
mitigation strategies. 
3.3 Method 
For this study, case analysis was used. From April 28 to June 2, 2014, we had 
access to an incident database in a fraud department of a bank in the 
Netherlands. The database contains information about phishing and malware 
incidents related to online banking. The bank where this study took place was 
cooperative, but under the condition that it remains anonymous. Therefore, we 
refer to ‘the bank’ instead of using the name of the bank and to ‘security codes’ 
instead of the exact wording of the bank. Security codes – also known as ‘one 
time passwords’ – are codes that are used to log in to the online banking 
website and to make electronic payments. These codes can, for example, be 
created by a code calculator or are sent from the bank to the mobile phone of 
the customer. 
This study is both exploratory and descriptive. Prior to data collection, we 
explored what kind of data was available in the database. Based on this 
exploration, we developed a case study protocol and a codebook in order to 
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constructively gather data and for reliability purposes. Examples of topics we 
distinguished were: modus operandi, contents of fraudulent messages and 
customer behaviour leading to victimization. During the analyses, we assigned 
specific labels to the data in order to make narrower descriptions of the 
phenomena. In case of customer behaviour, for example, we labelled: clicking 
on a link, giving away security codes, entering personal details, et cetera. In 
order to test for construct validity, key informants of the bank reviewed our 
draft research report. 
We managed to find the cases by using the search fields of the database. The 
keyword ‘phishing’ was used in order to obtain phishing cases and the keyword 
‘trojan’ for malware cases, as these are the keywords bank employees use to 
register these incidents. Our investigation resulted in 300 phishing and 300 
malware cases. For each type of fraud, 100 cases were randomly selected from 
the years 2011, 2012 and 2013. Based on the total number of cases per year, a 
calculation was made to determine which cases should be selected, for instance, 
every 20th of 2,000 cases. When the initially chosen case did not include any 
information or was incorrect (for example, phishing instead of malware), the 
following case was selected. The data from the cases were anonymized and 
manually copied from the incident database and pasted or transcribed in 
Microsoft Excel. 
Although we attempted to obtain a random selection of cases, some relevant 
cases may have been ruled out in advance. Phishing and malware cases that 
were not registered by bank employees under the keywords ‘phishing’ and 
‘trojan’ had no chance to be selected. Moreover, the hits were polluted; the 
results for phishing contained malware cases and vice versa. This means that 
statements cannot be made about the exact number of phishing and malware 
cases. Consequently, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the possible 
increase or decrease in the number of fraud cases. 
We obtained data about the modus operandi in half of the phishing cases and in 
two of five malware cases. Although standardized protocols were used for 
gathering information, certain bank employees described cases more thoroughly 
or were more incisive in tracing the problem than others. In some cases, no 
information was available on how the incident had occurred. This leaves the 
question how the employee did know how to label the incident. We believe that 
the employee had more details at the time, but did not record it in the incident 
database. These are important caveats to the data collected. 
Of the 600 cases we analysed, 84% (N = 504) belong to a private account and 
16% (N = 95) to a corporate account. In one phishing case, it remains unknown 
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to what type of account it is attached. For the private accounts, it was possible 
to register additional details, i.e., type of account holder and year of birth. Since 
we have no background information on the bank’s customer population, only the 
distributions are described. The private bank accounts were owned by men 
(42%), women (24%), and multiple persons (31%). In 3% of cases, the type of 
private account holder is unknown. The birth year of the account holder was 
registered in 327 cases (only for male and female account holders). The age is 
calculated by subtracting the year of birth from the year in which the incident 
took place. The age of the victims ranges from 3 to 92 years, with a mean age 
of 49 and a standard deviation of 17 years. In some cases, a bank account was 
managed by someone else, such as a parent in the case of a three-year old 
victim. 
3.4 Results 
In this section, the results are presented. Customer behaviour leading to 
phishing victimization is described, which is followed by a description how 
customers were victimized by malware attacks. The anatomy of both attack 
types is the same and is in line with the description of Hong (2012). The 
fraudulent process starts with the potential victim receiving an e-mail, a 
telephone call or malware. Then, the victim takes the suggested action, such as 
visiting a false website and entering credentials. Finally, the stolen information is 
monetized by the fraudster. 
3.4.1 Customer behaviour and phishing victimization 
150 of 300 phishing cases provided detailed information about the modus 
operandi. In the remaining phishing cases, no additional information about the 
modus operandi was available. 
Main types of phishing attacks 
Phishing is mainly attempted using e-mails that are distributed in the name of 
the bank. Customers were often directed to a phishing website that was similar 
to that of the bank, for example by clicking on a link in the e-mail. This was the 
most common form of phishing in our study (N = 100). Customers entered 
personal information on this website and were then led to the real website of the 
bank. Text box 3.1 gives an example of an individual reacting to a false e-mail. 
The text boxes are representative transcriptions of the main fraud types. 
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Text box 3.1: Private customer, male, 74 years 
The account of this customer was managed by a female attendant. This woman 
received an e-mail which she believed was from the Abuse Desk of the bank, 
stating that the account of the customer was locked for protection purposes, due 
to illegal activities on the account, and could be unlocked via a link in the e-mail. 
In case of non-compliance, the bank would be obliged to restrict online banking 
functionality. The woman clicked on the link and filled out various details, 
including a security code, because she was under the impression that it was 
some sort of verification. A day later, the woman noticed that a fraudulent 
transfer of 2,000 euros had been made. 
 
In 46 cases, we know that the victim has been called by a fraudster, which (by 
definition) can be considered a distinctive modus operandi next to phishing. In 
29 of 46 cases, it was explicitly mentioned that victims were phished before they 
were called. During the phone call, fraudsters often mentioned that they work 
for the bank and then tell a story that seems credible to the customer. 
Occasionally, fraudsters mentioned that the customer should not use online 
banking for at least two hours, for instance, due to the processing of certain 
operations. Text box 3.2 presents a phishing instance in which a customer is 
called by a fictional bank employee. 
Text box 3.2: Private customer, joint account 
The customer received a phishing e-mail stating that the bank had programmed 
a new web application meeting today’s safety requirements in accordance with 
European directives. However, they claimed that they had received an error 
message concerning the account of the customer. This error could easily be 
solved by downloading the update page that was attached to the e-mail. The 
customer completed this procedure by opening the attachment, selecting 
multiple items and entering personal details, including phone number and 
account number. The next day, the customer was called by he thought was his 
bank. The fraudster wanted to go through the procedure step-by-step which the 
customer had carried out the day before. During this call, the fraudster obtained 
not only personal information of the customer, but also several security codes. 
The day after, the customer was called by the actual bank, which wanted to 
confirm a transfer of 13,500 euros. 
 
Cooperating with phishing schemes 
In 27 of 150 cases, no information was found on customer behaviour leading to 
phishing victimization. Although most customers explained that they responded 
to the instructions of fraudsters, some mentioned that they never received 
phishing e-mails nor entered or shared personal details or security codes (N = 
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28). In these cases, phishing victimization still has taken place. We do not know 
if these customers were truly unaware of this, if they tried to hide this, or if the 
phishing attempt has taken place by a different modus operandi. In the 
remaining 95 cases, we obtained details about the role of the customer in the 
fraud process. In some case descriptions, more than one detail was included. 
Customers shared information with fraudsters ranging from personal data (N = 
55) to security codes (N = 42) and performed actions such as clicking on a link 
(N = 36) and actions which were stated in the phishing e-mail or given by the 
fraudster during a telephone conversation (N = 20). 
Phishing victims trusted the messages fraudsters send to them. The messages 
appeared to be sent from the bank and the content seemed reliable. 
Furthermore, victims reported that the design of the message resembled that of 
their bank, for example, the bank’s logo was visible and similar fonts and colours 
were used. The false websites, resembling those of the bank, were also 
perceived trustworthy by the victims. 
The reasons why customers responded to a message or cooperated with a 
fraudster were diverse. Fraudsters used several techniques to trick customers 
into sharing personal information or security codes. In 68 cases, we know the 
topic fraudsters addressed. They often addressed topics related to the security 
of online banking (N = 36), topics related to the bank account (N = 16) and 
topics related to customer verification (N = 9). Examples include the need to 
change log-in codes, to verify the bank account, and to perform actions due to 
illegal activities that have taken place on the account. In some cases, the 
message was threatening or mandatory in nature, for instance by stating that 
the customer was obliged to perform an action. In seven cases, different topics 
were addressed, such as cancelling an online payment. The customer in question 
never ordered the particular product and therefore followed the instructions 
given by the fraudsters. One case appeared to be a targeted attack (i.e., spear-
phishing), because the customer was asked to make changes due to a change of 
treasurer. 
We believe that customers did not suspect that something was wrong. They 
were reassured by the message they read, by safety signs on a website, such as 
a closed padlock, or by the answers provided by the fraudster via telephone. In 
some cases, filling out personal information was just the first step in the 
phishing process. Various e-mails contained a message that the customer would 
be called. Some customers who were insecure about the phone call asked the 
fraudster questions (N = 9). A private customer, for example, asked how he or 
she could be sure that the bank was calling. The caller asked the customer to 
name a date and confirmed which transfers and payments were made on that 
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particular day, which made the customer trust the intentions of the caller. In 
another case, the caller could name the account number of the employer of a 
customer and answered other questions perfectly. Some customers gave away 
security codes because the conversation with the fraudster was perceived 
pleasant and trustworthy. 
Several customers had a certain reference (N = 15). In five cases, the customer 
received a fraudulent message which was referred to in the telephone 
conversation with the fraudster. Another example we observed was fraudsters 
making use of developments in the banking industry, for instance the transition 
to IBAN. (As of August 1st 2014, the Netherlands has adopted the IBAN – 
International Bank Account Number – system for domestic payments). Such 
phishing messages were perceived to be genuine, because the topic gained 
frequent attention in the news. In two cases, customers mentioned that they 
were not suspecting anything because they believed they were participating in a 
research project on security by the bank. In one case, a private customer 
mentioned that he assumed that the fraudulent message referred to a security 
alert he had been receiving for some time on his computer. Another customer 
stated that he thought the message corresponded with a recent change of the 
online banking log-in screen. 
Furthermore, we noticed that three customers were not attentive during the 
fraud process or did not properly process the fraudulent messages. In one case, 
a customer noticed afterwards that the phishing e-mail was not directed to him 
personally and was sent from a peculiar e-mail address. The other two cases are 
examples of not reading thoroughly what was stated in the message. 
It also became apparent that when customers performed particular actions, 
initiated by phishing messages or telephone calls, they felt uncomfortable (N = 
11). We observed this both during and shortly after the fraudulent activity had 
taken place. In one case, a fraudster reported to the customer that things were 
not working and terminated the connection. This left the customer with an 
unpleasant feeling which made him call his bank. Other customers reported that 
they had a suspicious feeling after the call was ended or after completing an 
action. In some cases, they immediately called the bank and in other cases they 
first checked their account balance. Additionally, we found that a conversation 
with one’s partner or another family member made the customer question the 
authenticity of the conversation (N = 4). 
Other reasons why customers contacted the bank include that they noticed an 
unfamiliar payment and/or that the amount on their account balance did not 
make sense (N = 20) or that they could not log in to their online bank account 
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and/or were unable to perform transactions (N = 7). Based on the story of the 
customer and the expertise of the bank, it became clear that it was a phishing 
attempt. 
3.4.2 Customer behaviour and malware victimization 
We could distil information about the modus operandi in 168 of 300 malware 
cases. The remaining 132 malware cases did not include additional information 
about the type of malware (attack) used by fraudsters. 
Main types of malware attacks 
Malware victimization concerns the infection of the device a customer uses for 
online banking. By means of the installed malware, fraudsters were able to 
manipulate the online banking session of a customer. Manipulation mainly refers 
to injecting additional input fields, for example to retrieve a telephone number 
or security code, and to placing fraudulent transfers or altering genuine transfers 
to one or more beneficiaries in the transfer list. In other cases, fraudsters were 
able to obtain full access to the online bank account(s) of customers. In most of 
the malware cases (N = 108), customers responded to a pop-up window when 
visiting the website of the bank (see Text box 3.3 for an example). 
Text box 3.3: Private customer, male, 59 years 
After the login-procedure on the bank’s website, a pop-up appeared. The pop-up 
had the same look as the bank’s website and contained a message that the PC 
of the customer would be checked: ‘We will check your system. This may take 
some time’ (translated from Dutch). According to the customer, this check took 
about 30 seconds and then he received another pop-up. The customer needed to 
enter a security code to confirm that the check was completed. The customer 
entered the code, made a few transactions and logged out. The next day, the 
customer logged in to his online bank account and noticed that an amount of 
nearly 1,500 euros was missing. 
 
The second most common type of malware victimization (N = 16), which we 
observed for the first time in 2013 and only within the private customer group, 
was that customers needed to install a malicious app on their mobile phones. In 
these cases, customers also had malware on their computer. These customers 
received a message to install the malicious app in combination with instructions, 
for example by clicking on a link or by scanning a QR-code. Of these victims, 
four mentioned that they needed to fill out the brand and type of their phone. 
Additionally, six victims mentioned that after the installation of the app, they 
needed to enter a code on the banking website. In Text box 3.4, an example is 
given of a victim who had to install a malicious app. 
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Text box 3.4: Private customer, female, 34 years 
The customer logged in to the online banking website on the laptop of her 
boyfriend. Within a few seconds, a request appeared to install an app on her 
phone called ‘[bank name] certificate’. This was required in order to prevent 
fraud. Her phone number was already partly filled in. Only the last three digits 
needed to be entered, which she did. Two minutes later, the customer received 
a message on her phone including a link to download the app. The customer 
complied and was directed to a screen stating that she should allow the 
installing of apps from unknown sources, which she accepted. Then a log-in 
screen appeared where she chose a username and password. Thereafter, an 
activation code appeared which the customer entered on the bank’s website. 
The customer logged in to her bank account, checked her balance, and logged 
out. Two days later, the customer checked her balance via an online banking 
app and detected that an amount of 1,300 euros was reserved. 
 
In 44 cases, it was described in general terms that customers were victimized by 
means of a Trojan or a virus. Sometimes a specific type of malware was 
registered, such as a Zeus infection. Although we have some understanding of 
how customers were victimized, we have no information on how the malware 
infection was established. 
Cooperating with malware schemes 
In 24 of 168 cases, no information was found on customer behaviour leading to 
malware victimization. Although most customers explained that they responded 
to the instructions on their screens, some mentioned that they did not enter or 
share personal details or security codes, or that they could not remember doing 
so (N = 25). In these cases, however, they were still victimized. We do not 
know if these customers were truly unaware or if they tried to obscure it. In 119 
malware cases, more specific information was available about the role of the 
customer in the fraud process. In some case descriptions, more than one detail 
was included. Information customers shared with fraudsters ranges from 
security codes (N = 85) to personal information (N = 19). Actions customers 
performed ranges from installing a malicious application on a mobile phone (N = 
16) to logging in to online banking from a compromised device (N = 2). 
Victims generally trusted the messages fraudsters sent to them because they 
were formatted in the style of the bank and the content seemed reliable to 
them. In 105 cases, we know the topic of the fraudulent message. Fraudsters 
often responded to the security of online banking (N = 49). They used different 
excuses to trick customers into filling out personal information or security codes. 
Examples of security related topics include (additional) security checks, 
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improving or updating the security of the online banking system, and warnings, 
e.g., that the online banking program was not properly closed the last time it 
was used. The second and third most common messages were that a security 
code needed to be entered in order to proceed with the log-in procedure (N = 
30) and to verify the customer’s identity (N = 20). In six cases, another topic 
was addressed, such as letting a customer make a try-out wire transfer. 
We believe that victims did not suspect that something was wrong, because they 
were under the assumption that they performed actions commissioned by their 
bank and were reassured by the message they read. At other times, customers 
made reassurances themselves, for instance by checking whether the connection 
with the bank’s website was secured (N = 7). Some customers had some sort of 
reference (N = 3). A private customer reported responding to a pop-up window 
because at an earlier moment she had witnessed that the bank was performing 
maintenance on its website. Another customer assumed that there was a new 
form of security on the online banking website because she had received a letter 
from the bank about the security of online banking a week before. These 
customers linked both events to each other. Another example was a message 
that began with ‘as is known from the news’. 
The reasons why customers responded to a message were diverse. Frequently, 
customers did this because they wanted to make sure that online banking was 
safe and/or make use of the bank’s website. The latter could only be achieved 
when performing the actions as stated on the screen. One customer reported 
that he entered a security code, because the pop-up window could not be closed 
before this was done. According to this customer, not being able to close the 
pop-up was a confirmation of the authenticity of the screen. In one case, the 
tone of the message was threatening to the customer; when not filling in a 
security code the bank account would be blocked. 
We also noticed that several customers were not alert while performing 
transactions or checking information (N = 7). Some customers stated that they 
did not read well what was presented on their screen. A private customer 
received an instruction, after reacting to a pop-up, which stated that an amount 
of approximately 800 euros would be transferred. The customer was, in her own 
words, too distracted to process the content of the message properly and 
entered the code. Moreover, reasons like being in a hurry and dealing with 
certain life events, such as the death of a family member, played a role. A 
private customer wanted to know what her balance was. Because she was in a 
hurry, she followed the instructions on the screen and entered a security code. 
Half an hour later, she was called by the bank with the question if it was her 
intent to transfer 1,800 euros to a bank account in a foreign country. 
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Furthermore, we observed that customers justified abnormalities when 
encountering them in the online banking process (N = 6). For example, a 
customer wanted to make an online payment of over 600 euros. The customer 
received an instruction with a security code for a payment of approximately 200 
euros. The customer thought that this amount was perhaps a down payment, 
entered the code, and a fraudulent payment was completed. Another example is 
a customer who entered a security code after logging in to the bank’s website. 
Although the customer was somewhat surprised that a security code needed to 
be entered at that stage, he or she was also assuming that the bank was 
attempting to improve security. 
In other cases, customers were not aware that they were doing anything wrong. 
Such cases include Trojans that use overlay functionality (N = 19), by which 
original output is covered by manipulated output. Examples of malware by which 
an overlay was used are fraudulent payments that were not set off against the 
account balance, fraudulent payments that were not visible on the payment 
summary screen and a combination of both. A clear example is seen in three 
cases in which corporate customers were under the assumption that they were 
transferring money to the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration, which was in 
fact visible on their screens, while in reality these amounts were transferred to a 
third party. 
It also became apparent that when customers performed particular actions, due 
to the malware infection, they felt uncomfortable (N = 4). We observed this in 
the case descriptions both during and shortly after the fraudulent activity had 
taken place. This uncomfortable feeling by customers was motivated by an 
abnormality in the online banking procedure, such as entering a security code 
before logging in or before a payment procedure was started. Customers who 
experienced such feelings during the action they performed did, however, still 
continue the action. Because customers were struck by uncertainty (afterwards), 
they decided to contact their bank. 
Other reasons why customers contacted the bank include that they noticed an 
unfamiliar payment and/or that the amount on their account balance did not 
make sense (N = 48) or that they could not log in to their online bank account 
and/or were unable to perform transactions (N = 12). Based on the story of the 
customer and the expertise of the bank, it became clear that it was a case of 
(attempted) fraud. 
Once customers understood what had happened, they often realized that there 
had been signs that indicated something could be wrong. These customers 
reported that their online banking actions deviated from the normal process (N 
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= 17), for instance the log-in procedure took longer and security codes needed 
to be entered at a different stage, that unexpected output appeared on the 
screen during online banking sessions (N = 13), for example the screen turned 
vague, dark, grey, or white, and that the computer was running slow or crashed 
(N = 12). 
3.5 Conclusion and discussion 
In this section, the conclusions of this chapter are presented. We also discuss 
the findings and make suggestions for new and/or existing fraud mitigation 
strategies. First, conclusions regarding phishing are presented, which are 
followed by conclusions about malware attacks. Third, transcending conclusions 
are offered, which count for both phishing and malware. Forth, the main 
conclusions are addressed. Finally, we describe the limitations of this study and 
provide suggestions for future research. 
3.5.1 Phishing victimization 
Phishing victims often responded to a false e-mail, were called by a fraudster, or 
were tricked by a combination of these methods. 
From psychological literature it is known that it cannot be expected that 
individuals judge messages in full detail in order to find markers for fraud; they 
are more likely to rely on judgmental heuristics in evaluating the content and 
authenticity of messages (Chang & Chong, 2010). A drawback of relying on such 
visual heuristics is that customers can easily be misled (Claessens, Dem, De 
Cock, Preneel, & Vandewalle, 2002). Luo, Zhang, Burd, and Seazzu (2012) 
mention that individuals might become accustomed to such characteristics when 
banks themselves send e-mails to their customers. The attacks we studied were 
thus successful in exploiting human cognitive biases (Luo et al., 2012), i.e., 
creating inaccurate mental models (Downs et al., 2006). We recommend banks 
to avoid sending e-mails to the private e-mail accounts of their customers. Such 
messages should rather be send to a customer’s online banking environment, as 
is already adopted by some banks. In any case, banks should not include 
attachments or hyperlinks in their messages, as customers are prone to clicking 
on these. It can be questioned whether banks will adopt this recommendation, 
because of commercial purposes. Although customers could be trained in 
checking legitimacy aspects of e-mails, such as sender information and hyperlink 
destination (by mouse-over), it is in our opinion not realistic to hold customers 
responsible for making errors in this regard when banks continue sending such 
messages. Technical solutions could be of assistance as well, such as e-mail 
filters and blacklists (Hong, 2012; Ludl et al., 2007), but these solutions do 
provide certain drawbacks, e.g., false positives and usability issues. 
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Victims who responded to a phishing e-mail were often led to a phishing 
website. Several victims reported to have checked for safety signs on the 
website. However, this seems to be an ineffective strategy. Not only because 
these signs can be easily manipulated and the typical user is unable to 
determine the validity of certificates (Jakobsson, 2007), but also because most 
users ignore such signs (Dhamija et al., 2006). Individuals who have learned 
looking for safety indicators are likely to be victimized by fraud scams that spoof 
these indicators (Downs et al., 2006). Nevertheless, several websites, including 
those of banks, do present recommendations to customers in this regard. We 
think that it might be more fruitful to explore the possibilities of embedded 
training – within the online banking environment – as this can effectively teach 
individuals how to avoid phishing attacks (Jansson & Von Solms, 2013; 
Kumaraguru et al., 2010). 
In some cases, there was direct contact between the customer and the fraudster 
by means of a telephone conversation. This form of contact was believed 
trustworthy by the victims. This is probably due to that fraudsters present 
themselves as reputable individuals working for the bank of the victim, i.e., the 
representativeness heuristic (Chang & Chong, 2010), which is known from 
literature gains trust (Nhan et al., 2009), or because the means of 
communication occurred on an independent channel (Jakobsson, 2007). 
Fraudsters also gained trust by answering questions some customers asked 
them and because they knew all kinds of personal details, as personalization 
creates trust (Jakobsson, 2007). This makes it difficult for customers not to trust 
the intentions of the fraudster. We believe that customers should be educated 
about these schemes in general and more specifically about the use of security 
codes. Customers are aware of not sharing their PIN code of their debit or credit 
cards. However, a great number of people have not realized yet that security 
codes should be kept secret as well. Furthermore, customers should learn to call 
back the bank when they receive a phone call about security topics. 
3.5.2 Malware victimization 
The two most common forms of malware victimization were that customers 
responded to a pop-up window and that they installed a malicious app on their 
mobile phones. The latter form is also supplemented with a malware infection on 
a computer. Malware attacks could as well be instigated by technological 
loopholes or have taken on the form of a key logger. This implies that malware 
attacks could also have taken place in other ways than we have described. 
However, we found no hard evidence for these suggestions in our data. Perhaps 
this is due to that such attacks are less visible to customers and, therefore, are 
unlikely to be explicitly reported. 
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A difference between the malware and phishing incidents is the type of contact 
between the customer and the fraudster. With malware, the contact was digital 
only, while in the phishing cases there was largely direct contact between the 
victim and fraudster. Furthermore, certain victims mentioned that they had no 
idea how they were victimized. Therefore, it is difficult to formulate 
recommendations for interventions that combat malware threats. This is 
especially the case since we have no information on which operating systems 
victims were running, whether anti-virus software was installed, et cetera. 
It became apparent that customers occasionally had an active role concerning 
malware victimization. This means that the malware infection in itself was not 
the sole cause for victimization. Therefore, we recommend banks to make their 
customers not only aware of malware threats in general, but also aware of more 
specific fraudulent schemes which are using pop-ups and malicious apps on 
mobile phones. Nevertheless, other customers did not notice anything regarding 
the malware attack. This implies that an important role is also reserved to the 
fraud detection systems of banks. 
3.5.3 Transcending conclusions about online banking fraud victimization 
Victims responded similarly in phishing and malware cases. The messages were 
perceived professional and concerned a topic of interest to and believed by the 
customer. This implies that customers have had two indicators to avoid the 
fraudulent activity, namely by checking the lay-out and the content of the 
message. We conclude that victims responded to the fraudulent messages 
because they appealed to trust and authority. 
Responses of customers included sharing personal data like phone numbers and 
security codes. The reasons why customers responded were diverse, but did not 
differ between phishing and malware. The reasons we encountered in both 
phishing and malware cases are that they were reassured, they had a certain 
reference, they could otherwise not make use of online banking functionality, 
they were not alert, and they justified abnormalities. This is consistent with the 
findings of Jakobsson (2007) who states that individuals judge relevance before 
authenticity. They are also in line with the results of Vishwanath et al. (2011) 
who state that the main reasons why individuals get phished are that they do 
not adequately process information, which is further influenced by one’s media 
use habits. Another study has shown that individuals base their judgments on a 
messages narrative strength (Tsow & Jakobsson, 2007). It is also known that 
individuals set aside their concerns, when benefits are made explicit (Davinson & 
Sillence, 2014). An alternative possibility is that these customers found it 
difficult to grasp the specific security issue mechanisms (Dhamija et al., 2006), 
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and therefore complied with what they saw on their screen. Thus, the reasons 
for responding include both cognitive and motivational processes. 
The above holds that customers should only make use of online banking when 
things are exactly going as expected. The smallest anomaly should be enough to 
warn customers to terminate their banking activities. In this regard, Vishwanath 
et al. (2011) mention that individuals should develop safe rituals, since they 
cannot be fully alert at all times. Examples include reading and responding to 
personal e-mail on fixed moments and using different e-mail addresses for 
different purposes. 
In all attack types, it became apparent that customers got an uncomfortable 
feeling both during and shortly after the fraudulent activity. This suggests that 
some customers acted against their own better judgment. Prevention programs 
could pay attention to that customers should trust their instincts when it comes 
to these kinds of scams. Moreover, they should be made aware of the various 
trust indicators that fraudsters abuse. 
We observed that fraudsters responded to both technical developments, such as 
using malware on mobile phones and using QR codes, and developments in the 
banking industry which can be addressed in fraudulent messages. The latter 
could be considered availability heuristic (Chang & Chong, 2010). We believe 
that it is important to educate customers about such developments, about new 
techniques that are applied by fraudsters and about the cognitive influences that 
are involved in the fraud (Chang & Chong, 2010). 
Finally, we observed in some cases that although customers quickly alerted the 
bank when they saw an anomaly or discovered that money was missing, the 
bank could not always stop the transaction and/or retrieve (all) the money. 
Therefore, it could be wise for banks to consider implementing a delay in wire 
transfers, for example transfers above a certain amount. 
3.5.4 Main conclusions 
In light of the above, we conclude that the behaviour of customers in the 
fraudulent process entails giving away information such as security codes. They 
do so because they go along with a fraudulent story and because they are not 
sufficiently suspicious. Thus, customers often actively participate in the offences 
of which they become victim. Another main conclusion is that customers not 
always trusted the intention of the fraudster, but were mentally unable to stop 
the process. These customers still shared information and then understood that 
they did something they should not have done. 
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What we observe here is that, if the attempted fraud resembles or is in line with 
the image customers have of reality (i.e., their mental model), then the chance 
increases to fall victim to fraud. The challenge for banks is to create such an 
image of reality for online banking that no story can adjust that. This can only 
be achieved when the image of reality is simple and kept constant. We believe 
that customers are then better able to detect anomalies and will, accordingly, be 
less likely to cooperate when they are prompted by a new, false signal. 
Online banking customers should thus be able to cope with phishing and 
malware attacks. Creating a stable reality is one solution that may contribute to 
this. Furthermore, it is essential that customers are capable of understanding 
the threats of online banking as well as recognizing and trying to prevent them. 
A fruitful area for further exploration might be the coping approach. This 
approach is supported by various scientific disciplines, such as health and 
consumer psychology, but is relatively new in the field of information systems 
(Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012). We recommend applying coping theories, such as 
protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975), to study the extent to which 
customers protect themselves against online banking threats and what 
motivates them to do so. In such models, an important place is devoted to risk 
perceptions. 
3.5.5 Limitations 
The first limitation is that our study was conducted at one bank. In order to 
draw stronger conclusions, it would be better to perform a similar study at 
different banks. Each bank has, for example, its own specific customer 
authentication techniques and methods of providing security codes. 
More data about victim characteristics and the customer population of the bank 
were desirable in order to draw conclusions about the kind of customers that 
were victimized. In addition, no data was found on characteristics of corporate 
customers. Hence, we do not know whether these customers typically consist of 
self-employed entrepreneurs and small businesses, which may have no IT-
department, or larger companies with more capital and in what sector they 
operate. 
Furthermore, the distinction between phishing and malware may be arbitrary. 
During conversations with fraud researchers at the bank, it became clear, for 
example, that a combination of phishing (social engineering) and malware 
(technical engineering) is becoming a more common method to commit fraud. 
However, we found no evidence for this statement. Future research into more 
recent cases might reveal this hybrid attack type. 
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Finally, the findings should be interpreted with some caution. In half of the 
phishing cases and two in five malware cases, we are reasonably confident what 
transpired. This means that in over fifty per cent of all cases we are not certain. 
This is partly because we distilled cases by means of a tool used for other 
purposes than scientific research. Information is only imported in the tool when 
the bank employee considers it to be relevant. Although we obtained information 
in a rather unique way, it should be stressed that the data are not complete. 
3.5.6 Future research 
The aim of the study was to identify the role customers play in the process of 
phishing and malware victimization and to find evidence for possible prevention 
strategies. Different research methods can be used to tackle this aim. The 
method we used is case analysis. Although this study presents some new 
insights, also new questions arise. 
It became clear that victims observed the communications of fraudsters as 
expressions of their own bank. This is due to the design and content of a 
particular message. In some cases, we detected that life events caused a 
decrease in alertness. It is interesting to further investigate contextual factors 
that influence victimization, also with regard to prevention. 
The question remains whether, and if so how, phishing and malware 
victimization can be reduced. Although banking fraud will continue to be an arms 
race and probably will never be solved (Hong, 2012), it is important to find ways 
to prevent phishing and malware victimization as much as possible. Thus, there 
appears to be a need to educate online banking customers about how to avoid 
the fraudulent schemes presented in this study. We understand that customer 
behaviour plays an important part. When individuals become more aware of the 
nature of these fraudulent schemes, they are better situated to evade becoming 
victims (Nhan et al., 2009). 
In addition, it is interesting to investigate what measures customers take to 
protect themselves and why they do so. Do customers in general and more 
specifically victims protect themselves adequately against online banking threats 
and how (awareness, skills, online safety cues, security software)? It is possible 
that such issues affect customer behaviour and the chance to be victimized. 
Therefore, these as well as other factors should be investigated in future 
studies. 
A final opportunity for future research is studying if and how online banking 
behaviour of victims has changed over time. Perhaps these customers have 
adjusted or altered their online banking strategies, as they have learned from 
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the incident. These insights can be used for designing interventions. Designing 
relevant interventions, however, will be a challenge because fraud tactics are 
ever-changing, see also Downs et al. (2006). 
The possibilities for future research that are presented in this section can be 
addressed by conducting interviews with actual phishing and malware victims. 
Crossler et al. (2013) mention that interviews are valuable because it is an 
effective method to better understand the real motivations and behaviour of 
individuals. To understand which behaviours are most relevant, also in 
comparison to bank customers who were not victimized, a questionnaire is 
recommended. This allows to quantitatively substantiating what factors affect 
online banking fraud. This could also be achieved by analysing actual end-user 
behaviour of online banking. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes an in-depth analysis into the behaviour and 
characteristics of bank customers leading to victimization caused by phishing 
and malware attacks, the most common crimes involving online banking fraud in 
the Netherlands (NVB, 2013). Phishing is ‘a scalable act of deception whereby 
impersonation is used to obtain information from a target’ (Lastdrager, 2014, p. 
8). Malware is the infection of a computer by malicious software, which includes 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spyware. In both cases, the aim of the 
fraudsters is to deceive the customer or the system used for online banking in 
order to obtain user credentials and/or to gain control over customers’ devices. 
Fraudster use user credentials to access a victim’s online bank account and to 
validate money transfers on behalf of the victim. Phishing and malware scams, 
however, are significant across the world and go beyond the online banking 
context. The Anti-Phishing Working Group reported in their Phishing Activities 
Trends Report of Q4 2014 that nearly 200,000 unique phishing reports were 
submitted to them and that an average of 255,000 new malware threats – 
including variants – emerged each day (APWG, 2015). 
A number of recent studies try to shed light on how and why people fall victim to 
these crimes and others do not (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; 
Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011). Jansen and Leukfeldt (2015), 
for example, carried out an exploratory study into how customers become 
victims of online banking fraud and demonstrate that customers have a specific 
role in their own victimization. Customers provide fraudsters with information, 
such as credentials, which fraudsters can use to steal money from their bank 
accounts. A study into phishing victimization shows that everybody is at risk 
when it comes to this type of crime (Leukfeldt, 2014). Additionally, Leukfeldt 
(2015) claims that this also largely holds for malware victimization; merely 
spending more time online, carrying out various kinds of activities, increased the 
risk of a malware infection. 
Both of Leukfeldt’s studies (2014, 2015) – which are based on an online survey 
– conclude that in-depth studies are necessary to increase knowledge about why 
customers are victimized. It is not sufficiently clear if certain individuals are 
more prone to being at risk for online banking fraud than others, and how it can 
be explained. Therefore, this study qualitatively explores, by means of 
interviews, what factors explain online banking fraud victimization. Crossler et 
al. (2013) mention that the interview is a valuable method to better understand 
the actual motivations and behaviour of individuals. 
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4.2 Theory 
For this study, two theoretical perspectives are in place. First, we take a routine 
activity approach (Cohen & Felson, 1979) to study victim characteristics and 
behaviours that influence victimization. This approach is also central to the 
studies of Leukfeldt (2014, 2015) making it possible to assess whether our 
qualitative study has added value to the quantitative studies in this context. The 
routine activity approach holds that victimization is influenced by a combination 
of a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian 
in a convergence of time and space. We study the two latter aspects of routine 
activity approach, namely the suitability of targets and the capability of their 
guardians. Guardians can, for example, be technical security measures such as 
anti-virus software. 
Over time, elements regarding suitability have been added to the routine activity 
approach. Two acronyms that often emerge are CRAVED, which stands for 
concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable and disposable and VIVA, 
which stands for value, inertia, visibility and accessibility. Sutton (2009) 
compared the two acronyms and concluded that they deal with identical 
attributes. Furthermore, he argues that VIVA elements relate to characteristics 
that attract attention, while the additional elements of CRAVED are related to 
characteristics that make an object attractive for criminals. As this chapter is 
about characteristics of victims that make them appeal to a motivated offender, 
we adopt the VIVA acronym. 
Value means that fraudsters are interested in individuals who, for the purposes 
of online banking, have large sums of money in their bank account. Cybercrime 
studies have shown a correlation between victimization of identity theft and 
households with higher incomes (Anderson, 2006; Harrell & Langton, 2013). We 
have excluded inertia from our study because, in the context of cybercrime, it 
refers to the volume of data and technological specifications of computer 
systems (Yar, 2005). Visibility is operationalized as online activities. Cybercrime 
studies show that such activities, such as downloading and spending time on 
social media, make targets become suitable since these increase visibility 
(Bossler & Holt, 2009; Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Pratt, Holtfreter, & Reisig, 
2010). Lastly, accessibility refers to weaknesses in software that can be used by 
fraudsters to attack customers. Although these three factors do explain 
victimization for some cybercrimes, Leukfeldt’s (2015) study did not provide 
evidence for this related to online banking fraud victimization. We assess this 
outcome by using a more in-depth methodology. 
The routine activity approach is used in numerous studies (Bossler & Holt, 2009; 
Hutchings & Hayes, 2009; Ngo & Paternoster, 2011; Pratt et al., 2010; Reyns, 
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Henson, & Fisher, 2011; Van Wilsem, 2011a; 2011b). However, a critical note 
we need to make relates to an issue introduced by Yar (2005) who argues that it 
is problematic to convert the routine activity approach from real space to 
cyberspace. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) show that the significant impact of the 
routine activity theory elements differs greatly between different types of 
cybercrime. Therefore, we applied the interview method in order to overcome 
the issue of relying too much on analytic truths that is, measuring a limited 
number of predetermined items. 
Protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1975), henceforth PMT, is used as the 
second theoretical perspective. PMT is a social cognitive theory that predicts 
behaviour (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000) and seems applicable to online 
banking (Jansen, 2015). In PMT, two cognitive processes are central: threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal. The first process evaluates vulnerability to and 
the impact of a threat. This is continued by the second process that evaluates 
possible strategies to cope with a threat. This evaluation is based on response 
efficacy, self-efficacy and response costs. Both processes influence protection 
motivation, i.e., the intention of taking measures to protect online banking. We 
assume that not taking adequate protective measures, or not having capable 
guardians in place, might influence victimization. To be more precise, we do not 
qualitatively test PMT, rather its constructs are used as possible additional 
indicators explaining online banking fraud victimization. 
4.3 Method 
We conducted 30 semi-structured interviews with online banking fraud victims. 
The goal was to unravel how and why they became victims of online banking 
fraud. The interviews took place between October 2014 and April 2015, were 
recorded using a digital voice recorder and lasted 52 minutes on average. 
Sample questions include: What is your experience with online banking? How did 
the phishing/malware incident unfold? Do you have any idea why you were 
targeted? What protective measures did you have in place to prevent 
phishing/malware attacks from occurring? 
Participants were recruited based on a selection of 65 police reports from the 
northern (N = 31) and southern (N = 34) regions of the Netherlands. A liaison 
officer working for the Dutch police first contacted the victims by telephone to 
inform them about our study and ask their permission to be approached to 
participate in an anonymized interview. Of the northern cases, seventeen 
participants agreed to be interviewed, five declined the request and nine were 
not reached. Of the southern cases, twelve participants agreed to be 
interviewed, four declined the request and two were not reached. The remaining 
sixteen interview candidates were not contacted because we gathered sufficient 
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data to complete the study. One participant was recruited via a liaison officer at 
the Fraud Helpdesk, a national organization for answering questions and 
collecting reports about fraud. 
We interviewed seventeen phishing and thirteen malware victims. The mean age 
of the participants was 59 years (SD = 17) and ranged from 23 to 89 years. 
Thirteen participants were female and seventeen were male. Participants had 
different levels of education; low (N = 3), medium (N = 15) and high (N = 12). 
Most of them can be considered to be experienced users of online banking, 
having used it for at least five years (N = 23) and using it on a daily or weekly 
basis (N = 21). 
For phishing, we interviewed sixteen private customers and one corporate 
customer (treasurer of a foundation). Malware victims consisted of one private 
customer and twelve corporate customers (e.g., self-employed entrepreneurs 
and small and medium-sized enterprises). In two malware cases, we did not 
speak with the actual victim. In one case, we interviewed the partner of the 
victim and in the other case the supervisor of the employee who was victimized. 
We have, however, included the information they provided because both were 
closely involved in handling the incidents. We believe that their stories 
contribute to studying the research problem. The private and corporate bank 
accounts were held at different banks in the Netherlands. 
The recorded interviews were first transcribed. The transcriptions were directly 
sorted into the conceptual categories we defined prior to the study. In order to 
analyse the interview data, we used QualiCoder (Version 0.5), a type of 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software. The data within the initial 
categories were labelled with analytical codes to separate the data into 
theoretical themes (Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton-Nicholls, & Ormston, 2014). 
After that, we reviewed the data extracts. A short summary of the interviews is 
provided in Appendix II. 
The results of private and corporate customers are presented together because 
there is no clear distinction between their stories. In nine interviews, we 
discussed whether corporate customers behave differently with respect to online 
banking when engaging in work-related banking activities as opposed to their 
private use of online banking services. Three participants mentioned that their 
private and corporate use of online banking is the same. One of them 
mentioned, “In both cases, you deal with money. In either case, it would be a 
shame when something goes wrong” (interview 19). Six participants mentioned 
minor differences. Differences regarding corporate use of online banking include 
dealing with larger amounts of money, using online banking more frequently and 
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using an accountancy system. One participant mentioned being less precise 
when verifying individual payment details in a business context, “It should be 
consistent with bookkeeping” (interview 21). 
4.4 Results 
In the following sections, we present frequencies of particular views or 
experiences of participants. However, we do not claim that this provides a 
representative image of all online banking fraud victims since that is not the 
objective of the current study nor is it possible using this method. Rather, 
enumeration provides insight into how phenomena may vary among 
participants. 
4.4.1 Anatomy of phishing and malware attacks 
The anatomy of the phishing attacks described by the participants is in line with 
what is known from literature (Hong, 2012; Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2015). An 
attack starts with a potential victim receiving an e-mail or phone call designed to 
deceive them. Then, the potential victim takes the suggested action, such as 
giving away user credentials, which is followed by the fraudster using the stolen 
information to obtain money. 
Of the twelve participants who received a phishing e-mail as point of entry for 
the scam, nine were called afterwards in order to obtain additional information. 
The contents of the e-mails were related to security and authentication issues 
surrounding online banking. In total, thirteen victims were called by a fraudster, 
four of whom believed this to be the starting point of the scam. The content of 
the phone calls focused on security as well, sometimes accompanied by the 
caller mentioning that the recipient should check or complete a procedure that 
was put in motion by the recipient of the call through an e-mail response. One 
phishing victim was unaware of how his information was phished. The 
participant, however, mentioned being aware of the numerous places where 
people’s personal information is stored, “You have to leave your personal data 
everywhere” (interview 7). In addition, phishing victims often reported that the 
fraudulent story was perceived to be trustworthy and/or that they just were not 
alert enough to counter the scam. 
Malware attacks take place using a similar three-stage approach, except that no 
direct interaction between the victim and fraudster was required. Interestingly, 
victims themselves were unable to reconstruct the fraud process. Six victims 
reported not having noticed anything when the attack was carried out. The 
online banking process proceeded in the way they were accustomed to. A 
participant stated, “There was nothing out of the ordinary. Nothing in particular 
which makes you think ‘Huh?’ afterwards” (interview 28). 
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Seven malware victims reported having observed an anomaly, of whom four 
mentioned having seen a glitch on their screen. The remaining victims indicated 
that the browser stopped operating, that the payment instruction disappeared 
and that there were problems logging in. One of these victims indicated that the 
anomaly occurred “quite some time” before the actual incident took place. The 
participants who observed an anomaly did not, however, relate these events to 
a malware attack. One participant stated, “It is associated with the inscrutable 
ways of the internet. […] It is science fiction to me” (interview 25). 
We are able to make the claim about the anatomy; however, since the malware 
attacks were part of an investigation completed by the Dutch police. The Dutch 
police completed an investigation of a series of malware attacks in which 
infected websites were used to automatically install malware on the customers’ 
device when visiting these websites (Leukfeldt, Kleemans, & Stol, 2017). When 
the customer transferred money online using the compromised device, the 
largest transfer was modified. The amount was split into two, whereby one 
amount was sent to the original recipient and one amount to the bank account 
of a money mule, a person responsible for transferring illegally acquired money 
to fraudsters. The customer approved the transaction because the fraudulent 
modification was not visible on screen. Moreover, the fraudulent transfer was 
hidden in the payment summary screen. It could only be observed when logging 
on to the online bank account with a device that was not infected with malware. 
4.4.2 Suitability factors 
Suitability factors from the routine activity approach do not seem to have any 
influence on victimization. Hence, the majority of victims think that the fraudster 
selected them randomly. A malware victim added that thinking this way is 
possibly for the best, “Otherwise you might believe that someone is watching 
over your shoulder all the time” (interview 30). A phishing victim mentioned that 
she had the feeling not being chosen for who she is, but because she belongs, 
“to a club of fools who have clicked on a link” (interview 6). 
Most victims do not relate value to victimization. A phishing victim said, “I do 
not consider myself to be a perfect victim. There are people with much higher 
amounts of money in their bank accounts that it would have been better to pick” 
(interview 3). However, one phishing victim and three malware victims think 
that the value criterion might be related to victimization. The phishing victim 
may be targeted because of where she lives, i.e., suburb and type of house. The 
malware victims considered value to be a possibility, since their businesses deal 
with large cash flows. 
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We could not directly find any evidence for the visibility criterion being a risk 
factor. One malware victim opted that he might have accessed an unsecure 
website. Two phishing victims mentioned that they never logged out of their 
online banking sessions, but instead clicked away the window. However, they 
were not certain whether this had anything to do with their victimization. 
During the time of the incident, all participants were using a desktop computer 
or laptop for their online banking activities. Except for two Apple users, all 
participants used some version of Microsoft Windows. Most participants were not 
aware of any weaknesses in their technical infrastructure that may have led to 
victimization. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the accessibility criterion is of 
importance. Two phishing victims stated, however, that this could be a 
possibility. One participant mentioned that his security subscription needed to be 
extended and one suspected that his computer had been hacked. Two malware 
victims also linked a security flaw to victimization. One of these victims 
explained that one of the business computers was not equipped with anti-virus 
software. The other mentioned that it could be associated with a Java update he 
continuously declined to install. He stated, “A message from Java constantly 
appeared on my screen wanting me to install an update. I have never clicked on 
this message because Java sounded like something illegal” (interview 29). 
However, all four participants were not sure if the security issue they mentioned 
is the (true) cause of victimization. 
Some participants came up with other reasons for why they might be considered 
a suitable target. Several phishing victims indicated that their (older) age might 
be a possible explanatory factor. Additionally, two phishing victims pointed out 
that they became suitable targets after the incident had occurred. Both had the 
idea that they were in a ‘victim database’, because at a later date, they became 
scam targets again. One of them said, “Maybe I am on a list of interesting 
addresses where there is something to be had” (interview 8). 
We asked participants if they thought that a similar incident would happen again 
in the future in order to assess whether they considered themselves to be 
suitable targets now they have been victimized. Five phishing victims were 
adamant that it would never happen again. A participant stated, “I have learned 
the hard way” (interview 3). The other twelve mentioned hoping or expecting 
that it would never happen again. Some of these participants indicated, 
however, that there is always a possibility. 
Malware victims responded similarly. Nine participants indicated that the 
chances of being victimized again are slim, but do exist. A participant replied, “It 
is the same as winning a lottery. There is a small chance that it will happen 
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again, but it is possible” (interview 19). The remaining four participants were not 
able to give an explicit answer. One participant blamed the obscureness of the 
incident for this. The others stated that if it can happen once, it can happen 
again, “It is a fifty-fifty chance” (interviews 21 and 26). 
4.4.3 Capable guardians and protective factors 
Because we did not find strong support for the suitability factors explaining 
victimization, we will now examine the extent to which capable guardians were 
in place. In this study, we define ‘capable guardians’ as the precautionary 
behaviour of participants regarding the safety and security of online banking. 
Where appropriate, results regarding capable guardians are supplemented by 
statements from PMT. 
Before asking participants what protective measures they took, we first asked to 
what extent they were aware of the threat that they were victimized by prior to 
the incident. Nine participants indicated that they were not aware of phishing 
prior to the incident, or stated that they were unfamiliar with the modus 
operandi used to scam them. A phishing victim indicated that he was, “not in a 
position to know there could be something wrong” (interview 5) because he 
believed that his bank did not inform him about the threat. Five participants 
reported that they were aware of the existence of phishing. However, four of 
them also mentioned not knowing how phishing schemes manifest in practice. In 
the case of malware, five victims knew they could be victimized in such a 
fashion, although some were under the assumption that it would not happen to 
them. One participant mentioned, “The same is true for burglaries; you always 
think it will happen to someone else” (interview 24). Furthermore, six malware 
participants indicated not having heard of the threat they fell victim to. This 
topic was not discussed in the interview sessions with the remaining four 
participants. 
We went on to ask participants how they protect themselves against threats 
aimed at online banking. We did so using an open-ended question first and 
second by letting participants fill out a list with protective measures. In general, 
most participants take precautions to keep online banking safe and secure. 
Protective measures that were mentioned most are: having good security on the 
device for online banking (N = 21), such as anti-virus software and the latest 
updates, checking the money transfer details before finalizing the transfer (N = 
8), deleting suspicious e-mails or e-mails from unknown sources (N = 6), and 
checking whether the internet connection with the bank’s website is secure (N = 
5), for example by checking for https and a closed padlock. On the open-ended 
question, three participants indicated that they did not take any measures. A 
phishing victim said, “When I am using online banking services, I do not 
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immediately think about crime. I have no idea how I should protect myself 
against it” (interview 14). 
After answering the open-ended question, participants could score their use of 
protective measures that we presented to them with ‘yes’, ‘no’ and ‘do not 
know’. The measures we included were based on uniform safety rules for online 
banking, which are defined in the general terms and conditions of all banks in 
the Netherlands. These rules and subsequent responses are as follows: (a) keep 
you security codes secret (N = 29); (b) make sure your debit card is not used 
by other persons (N = 26); (c) secure the devices you use for online banking 
properly (N = 29); (d) check your bank account information at least every two 
weeks (N = 29); and (e) report incidents directly to your bank (N = 30). 
Although most participants indicated that they comply with the rules set by 
banks, most phishing victims admitted that they had been negligent once with 
respect to sharing security codes. 
The participants were also asked why they take protective measures. Twelve 
participants indicated that the measures they take effectively assist in protecting 
them against fraud or that they hope that they do so. A malware victim stated, 
“I think I am maximally protected. However, there is always a risk. There is no 
such thing as one hundred per cent security” (interview 25). A phishing victim 
added, “If criminals really want something, they will probably achieve their goal. 
However, you should not open the door for them. I believe that I have locked 
the front and back doors” (interview 10). Participants also mentioned that they 
like to act according to the rules (N = 3), and to take the bank’s terms and 
conditions into account so that they can get reimbursed (N = 2). Other 
participants did not have a clue whether the measures are effective in protecting 
them against online banking fraud, often because they do not know how security 
works. One phishing victim questioned the efficacy of protective measures, “In 
some instances, only one password is needed. The security is much too limited” 
(interview 6). 
Another means to gain insight into participants’ perceptions on response efficacy 
is to ask them if they could have prevented the incident. Five phishing victims 
thought that the incident could not have been prevented. One participant 
indicated, for example, that he took the same actions and measures before, 
during and after the incident. Another participant mentioned, “There are always 
moments when you just are not alert and that is when something can happen. 
This is not exclusive to online banking, it is true for a lot of other things” 
(interview 5). 
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Other phishing victims mentioned that the incident may have been prevented if 
they had been more alert when reading the phishing e-mail, if they had not 
performed the actions fraudsters asked them to, if they had listened to their 
instincts, if they had been aware that banks do not conduct such procedures via 
e-mail and if they had been aware of the level of sophistication of criminal 
schemes. In addition, a participant indicated that it is a difficult issue, “People 
are insecure, vulnerable, do not know exactly what the procedures are. When a 
message appears about IBAN [International Bank Account Number, which had 
just been introduced for domestic payments in the Netherlands], for example, 
things can easily go wrong” (interview 17). 
Because it was unclear to most malware victims how the incident had happened, 
they were virtually unanimous that they did not know whether the incident could 
have been avoided (N = 9). Additionally, participants reported not having 
received any feedback from the police or their bank on how the incident 
unfolded. Two malware victims mentioned that installing a (better) virus scanner 
might have prevented the incident. Another participant mentioned that installing 
software updates might have made a difference, and yet another one stated that 
she may have been able to prevent the incident if she had checked whether the 
internet connection between her device and the bank was secure. 
Eight participants experienced response costs when taking protective measures 
due to lack of knowledge and/or low self-efficacy when taking precautionary 
measures. Some mentioned that security is just too complex for them. Two 
illustrations of this given by phishing victims, “Someone needs to tell me exactly 
what to do, for example, where to click for software updates. I do not know 
much about computers, which makes it difficult. You are already down 0-1” 
(interview 1). And, “I wrote down everything on paper in order to arrange 
security. This is due to my age: one day you know it, the next you do not. It 
does not stick” (interview 15). 
It is noteworthy that sixteen participants indicated that they had security 
assistance available or that they completely outsourced security, for example, to 
a family member or a security company. These participants do so because they 
believe that they have no knowledge or not enough about security-related 
issues, or because they lack the necessary skills. Outsourcing security is a 
means to overcome the barriers or response costs they experienced. 
Consequently, these participants completely trust that their security is well 
organized and so they feel safe. Two illustrations by malware victims, “I do not 
know what is done in order to secure my PC, but I am confident that it is good” 
(interview 23). And, “I imagine I am safe because I use a corporate security 
package provided by [provider]. I trust it completely” (interview 20). Three 
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participants consider protective measures a hassle, annoying or irritating. 
However, half of the participants claim to experience no response costs that 
hinder the usage of protective measures; it is part of their routine. A malware 
victim added, “You need to be alert, like in traffic. Then you also have to pay 
attention to red lights and putout your hand when you turn” (interview 29). 
Another malware victim stated that he is willing to adopt additional measures if 
necessary, “I am not bothered by it. I prefer to make a little more effort 
knowing it is safe” (interview 27). 
In sum, capable guardians are in place in most cases, with the exception of four 
instances as reported in the suitability factors section. However, some 
participants mentioned difficulties with regard to the PMT variables of response 
efficacy, self-efficacy and response costs. 
4.5 Conclusion and discussion 
The current application of the routine activity approach is not adequate for 
distinguishing characteristics and behaviours of participants that explain why 
they have been contacted and/or have become victims of online banking fraud. 
This is atypical since most cybercrime studies paint a different picture 
(Anderson, 2006; Bossler & Holt, 2009; Pratt et al., 2010). However, it is in line 
with the results of Leukfeldt (2015). Our study concurs with his statement that it 
seems that everyone is at risk. 
The above holds that for online banking fraud: there is simply no such a thing as 
a suitable target. Becoming a victim appears to be simply a coincidence in this 
regard, a contextual phenomenon. Victimization seems to occur because 
fraudsters continually adjust their modus operandi according to recent events, 
because they gain the trust of customers or because customers simply do not 
pay sufficient attention. Ngo and Paternoster (2011) claim that the routine 
activity approach is perhaps not the best framework for studying online threat 
victimization at the individual level. If we challenge this conclusion, the question 
then is what does make these people suitable targets? Future research could 
make use of different research approaches or theoretical perspectives. Studying 
customers’ actual computer and internet behaviour, for example by analysing 
log files, might provide evidence for what makes them suitable targets or 
increases their chances of becoming fraud victims. Another possibility is to use 
other predictor variables in quantitative studies, for example personality factors 
from the Big Five Inventory. 
For phishing, additional possibilities for future research might involve studying in 
which databases or on which social network sites victims’ e-mail addresses are 
stored. Perhaps phishing victims were targeted because fraudsters obtained 
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personal information by buying e-mail addresses used for spam mailings or by 
hacking certain databases that are poorly protected. If this is the case, updating 
the security of databases could provide a barrier to stop fraudsters from 
obtaining these details. After all, this is how the crime script for phishing often 
starts. Another possibility for preventing phishing e-mails from appearing in 
people’s inboxes includes technical solutions, like e-mail filters. However, 
accuracy and usability are challenges for these (Hong, 2012). 
We do know, based on police intelligence, that most devices of malware victims 
were automatically contaminated with malware when visiting ordinary websites 
with outdated security. This raises the question of whether customers are the 
right unit of analyses or the right target group for interventions to counter 
malware victimization. Maybe we should target website owners and hosting 
companies in our efforts to reduce malware victimization. 
Regarding protective measures, we found that malware victims generally take 
adequate measures to protect the security of their technical infrastructure. Our 
study found no concrete evidence that malware victims were grossly negligent 
about security, except for two participants: one who had outdated software and 
one who had no anti-virus software. Therefore, it is not possible to provide 
recommendations for improving security on the customer side – apart from 
having basic security software installed (Choi, 2008) and making sure all 
software packages are up to date. This backs the recommendation we presented 
above about debating the issue of which actors should be addressed in 
combating malware attacks. Having said that, in this study we rely on self-
reports. It might be interesting for future research to study the actual devices of 
customers – including those who have been victimized – to establish how they 
are secured. 
Phishing victims were negligent because they gave security codes to fraudsters. 
We believe that awareness about this threat can be raised further. In addition, 
online banking processes should be more transparent, e.g., customers need to 
know what security codes entail and what happens when they fall into the wrong 
hands. Although a third of the participants were aware of threats, they often did 
not know how these threats manifest in practice. We believe that if customers 
are more aware of threats, they will recognize them more easily and take 
actions accordingly. Experimental research could provide evidence for this 
suggestion. Furthermore, banks and police could play a role here, for example, 
by providing victims with feedback on how the attack unfolded. If victims do not 
understand what had happened, it is difficult for them to prevent bad things 
from happening again. 
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What also became clear is that participants were unable to properly assess the 
effectiveness of measures to mitigate threats. Although it may be difficult to 
prove a measure’s efficacy, it is important to not only communicate to the 
customer what to do and how to do it, but also what a certain measure aims to 
address. Hence, PMT posits that response efficacy is an important predictor for 
precautionary behaviour. Because security is a difficult and obscure subject for 
many participants, communication about this subject must be expressed as 
simply as possible. When customers understand the need for protective 
measures and gain more insight into the underlying principles, we expect that 
they will be more willing to apply these measures. 
While most participants perceived no response costs or barriers to taking 
measures, we noticed that a number of participants found it difficult to do so, 
often because of a lack of knowledge and self-efficacy or skills. Therefore, it is 
important to train customers how to apply security measures. Although some 
participants mentioned having outsourced security, they are still the ones that 
perform transactions and money transfers. Furthermore, training is important 
since customers are attributed with more responsibility regarding safety and 
security of online banking (Anderson, 2007; Davinson & Sillence, 2014). This is 
illustrated by the fact that some of the phishing victims were not reimbursed by 
their bank. This raises the question of whether customers can be held 
responsible when something goes wrong if they are not properly taught how to 
apply protective measures. 
The challenge lies in what is the most effective way to train customers. It would 
seem obvious to offer courses on safe online banking. In the Netherlands, we 
note that various banks and special interest groups already offer such courses. 
Moreover, a special website has been set up to warn customers about online 
threats and to tell them how to deal with these threats 
(www.veiligbankieren.nl). Banks could also consider letting their customers take 
a test in order to see whether they are capable of using online banking safely. 
However, this recommendation is probably not realistic since it is more cost-
effective for banks to offer online banking instead of traditional banking 
methods. Besides, banks would not be keen to lose customers to other banks 
that do not implement tests. Therefore, a more effective way would be to 
explore using embedded training (Jansson & Von Solms, 2013; Kumaraguru, 
Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2010) that is integrated within the online 
banking environments. This way customers receive relevant information in a 
relevant place and on a relevant time, namely when they are actually using 
online banking – without interrupting the payment process too much needless to 
say. It is claimed that learning is more meaningful when rooted in the social and 
physical context in which it is used (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989). It is also 
 Chapter 4 
 
85 
important to periodically repeat this kind of training. Research on 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) skills retention, for example, shows that 
not only participants’ skills, but also their knowledge, already decrease after a 
two-month interval (Einspruch, Lynch, Aufderheide, Nichol, & Becker, 2007). 
Although a smooth online banking experience is critical, it is essential to identify 
the best solution for educating and training customers. Future research may 
seek evidence for this suggestion. Furthermore, it is important to answer the 
question of whose responsibility it is. Is it a duty for banks in particular because 
they offer online banking services? Or is it a problem for society – one that falls 
within the scope of online safety and security in general – and one that the 
government should be dealing with? 
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5.1 Introduction 
The advances of technology provide opportunities for individuals, such as 
business and leisure activities, but they also offers opportunities for criminals to 
commit crime (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Van Wilsem, 2011b). In 2015, 5% of Dutch 
citizens aged 15 and over were victims of hacking, 4% of marketplace fraud and 
1% of identity fraud (CBS, 2016b). Furthermore, the Crime Survey for England 
and Wales reports 3.6 million fraud incidents in the year prior to the study. Of 
these, 1.9 million were cyber-related. Additionally, about 2.0 million computer 
misuse incidents were reported, including malware and unauthorized access to 
personal information (ONS, 2016). Cybercrime therefore poses serious risks to 
society. Besides financial damages, the effects of cybercrime may lead to 
reputational damage and loss of goodwill and trust. 
Because a substantial number of people have to deal with these types of crime, 
it is important to gain insight into their effects and impact on victims. However, 
victim perspectives on cybercrime are an underexposed topic in the literature. In 
addition, we need to understand whether victims adequately recover from or 
effectively cope with cybercrime incidents. Green, Choi, and Kane (2010) stress 
that a better understanding of factors related to adaption after a crime event is 
crucial, primarily for victims’ well-being. We contribute to this understanding for 
a particular type of cybercrime, namely online banking fraud. 
This chapter deals with online banking fraud victimization and how victims 
recover from it. More specifically, we study the effects – financial, psychological, 
emotional and secondary victimization – and impact of phishing and malware 
attacks on online banking customers, two common fraudulent schemes affecting 
online banking in the Netherlands (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). Phishing is the 
process that uses deception, i.e., impersonation, to retrieve personal information 
(Lastdrager, 2014). Phishing often starts with a deceptive e-mail, but fake 
websites and fraudulent phone calls are also used to intercept user credentials. 
Malware is defined as malicious software designed to infect a device, including 
viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spyware. In this case, the malware targets 
online banking. Although malware can be considered a type of technical 
engineering, in some cases human action is necessary for such an attack to 
succeed, for example, by opening an infected attachment in an e-mail. 
Research that considers online and offline fraud and the psychological impact on 
its victims is scarce (Button, Nicholls, Kerr, & Owen, 2014b; Schoepfer & 
Piquero, 2009; Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). When online fraud is studied, the 
focus is often on prevalence, financial impact and victim characteristics (Kunst & 
Van Dijk, 2009). Moreover, there is little research available that involves 
 Chapter 5 
 
89 
speaking with online fraud victims about their experiences (Cross, Richards, & 
Smith, 2016). 
Button, Lewis, and Tapley (2014a) argue that the public perception of (online) 
fraud is often that of a victimless or low-impact crime, instigated for example by 
credit card fraud, in which victims tend to be financially compensated for their 
losses, or fraud committed against larger companies who have adequate 
resources to compensate for the damages. However, they exposed this as a 
myth by showing that some of the fraud victims that they interviewed and 
surveyed reported devastating impacts. The fraud scams that they investigated 
include identity fraud, boiler room fraud, investment fraud and lottery fraud. We 
contribute to literature by studying the consequences of and recovery from 
online banking fraud victimization. 
We believe that insight into cognitive and behavioural coping responses that 
fraud victims use might present opportunities for online fraud prevention. 
Extensive research on these aspects is currently lacking in the cybercrime 
domain. We take a critical (victimology) angle to broaden the scope of analysis 
to include a consideration of harm rather than crime, and social justice rather 
than criminal justice (McLaughlin & Muncie, 2005). Whereas criminal law is 
about doing justice, victims are interested in coping with injustice or the harm 
that is done to them. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, the 
theoretical background is outlined. We describe what is known in the literature 
about the effects and impact of crime and coping strategies related to 
victimization. Section 5.3 covers the methodology adopted in the current study 
and the results are presented in Section 5.4. The limitations and discussion are 
the central themes of Section 5.5. This section ends with some concluding 
remarks. In sum, our study tries to answer the following research questions: 
RQ1: What are the financial, psychological and emotional effects of online 
banking fraud victimization? 
RQ2: What are the secondary victimization effects of online banking fraud 
victimization? 
RQ3: What impact does online banking fraud have on its victims? 
RQ4: What are the cognitive and behavioural coping responses to online banking 
fraud victimization? 
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5.2 Theory 
The background literature provides theoretical insight into the effects and impact 
of crimes and coping strategies to deal with the effects and impact of crimes. 
This information will be used to reflect on our findings. Because the topic of 
interest belongs to a small field of work, the literature review was broadened to 
more general crime and victimization studies. 
5.2.1 Effects and impact of victimization 
Dignan (2005) describes victimization as a highly complex process as it is made 
up of at least three different elements, two of which are discussed at the end of 
this section. The first element that he describes is the interaction between the 
victim and the offender, and the effects from that interaction or from the offence 
itself. Crime in general can have several possible effects on victims. The effects 
can be divided into the following categories: physical effects, financial effects 
(both direct and indirect), psychological and emotional effects (both short term 
and long term) and effects on social relationships (Dignan, 2005; Lamet & 
Wittebrood, 2009; Shapland & Hall, 2007) and are also applicable to online fraud 
victimization (Button et al., 2014a; Cross et al., 2016). Furthermore, the effects 
can be felt by the social environment of the victim (indirect victimization), such 
as family, friends and colleagues (Shapland & Hall, 2007). 
A wide range of possible effects of crime victimization – both online and offline – 
are reported in the literature. Such effects include distress, irritation, anxiety, 
concentration problems, sleeping trouble, lowered self-esteem, posttraumatic 
stress disorder and losing trust, for example, in online commerce (Cross et al., 
2016; DeValve, 2005; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012; Sharp, Shreve-Neiger, 
Fremouw, Kane, & Hutton, 2003). Additionally, victims lose the perception that 
they are invulnerable to victimization (Frieze, Hymer, & Greenberg, 1987). It is, 
however, difficult to accurately describe the precise effects of certain types of 
crime as they can be similar to one another (Shapland & Hall, 2007). Schoepfer 
and Piquero (2009), for example, point out that victims of fraud – which can be 
considered as a type of non-violent financial crime – experience similar effects to 
those felt by victims of violent street crimes. Thus, fraud crimes may also have 
serious consequences for victims. 
Dignan (2005) makes an important distinction between effects and impact. 
According to him, impact relates to the perceived intensity of the effects plus 
their duration from a victim’s (subjective) viewpoint. The precise effects and 
impact of victimization may differ from crime to crime, but can also differ for the 
same crimes, prompted by individual characteristics, including age, gender and 
income (Button, et al., 2014a; Gale & Coupe, 2005; Lamet & Wittebrood, 2009). 
Women, for example, often experience more or more severe psychological 
 Chapter 5 
 
91 
consequences than men, at least for offline financial crimes (Gale & Coupe, 
2005; Lamet & Wittebrood, 2009). Shapland and Hall (2007) also mention that 
domestic circumstances and certain life events can have an influence on how the 
effects of victimization are perceived. They conclude that it is ‘extremely difficult 
to predict which individual victim will suffer which effects to what extent’ (p. 
179). 
Green et al. (2010) argue that victims make adjustments to the effects of crime 
on a continuous basis. Frieze et al. (1987) distinguish between immediate, 
short-term and long-term reactions. According to them, the first stage lasts from 
hours to days and reactions typically include numbness, disorientation, denial, 
disbelief and helplessness. The second stage lasts from three to eight months 
and includes fluctuations in feelings, such as from fear to anger, from sadness to 
elation and from self-pity to guilt. In the last stage, the victims resolve the 
trauma they have experienced by adopting successful coping strategies. 
However, Frieze et al. (1987) also argue that long-term effects can be 
problematic for the victim’s well-being, for instance, leading to depression, fear, 
guilt, low self-esteem and relationship difficulties, which has also been 
demonstrated in more recent studies (Denkers & Winkel, 1998; Hanslmaier, 
2013). A study on white-collar crime victims by Shover, Fox, and Mills (1994) 
reports, for instance, that victims suffered from psychological and financial harm 
even years after the incident. For online fraud victimization, anecdotal evidence 
is provided by a study of Cross et al. (2016) that reports long-term emotional 
effects of some of the victims they interviewed. 
The second and third elements Dignan (2005) identifies are victims’ reactions to 
the offence, and interactions of victims with other parties as a consequence of 
the offence. The former relates to changes in self-perception, attitudes and 
behavioural responses; these changes are examined in greater detail in the next 
section. Within the current context, the latter deals with organizations such as 
banks and criminal justice agencies. Any negative impacts resulting from these 
interactions can be labelled as secondary victimization. These include not being 
treated properly when reporting the incident, inappropriate disclosure of status 
information, careless handling of sensitive information and poor functioning of 
criminal justice (Kunst & Van Dijk, 2009). Secondary victimization is important 
to consider, as it can worsen the harm felt by victims (Cross et al., 2016) and 
hinder the victims’ recovery from crime (Wemmers, 2013). 
5.2.2 Coping with victimization 
After an individual has been victimized and experienced some of the effects as 
explained in the previous section, he or she has to invest effort to overcome the 
situation. For this study, we use the coping approach as a framework to describe 
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these efforts. Lazarus and Folkman (1984, p. 141) define coping as ‘constantly 
changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or 
internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the 
person’. In other words, coping is a dynamic process of dealing with situations in 
which an individual is confronted with fear, stress or threat. In the current 
context, we define coping as cognitive and behavioural responses against online 
banking fraud and its impact, resulting in psychosocial adaptation to the 
stressful event. How stressful an event is depends on an individual’s cognitive 
appraisal. 
The coping process starts after two appraisal processes, which Lazarus and 
Folkman, (1984) refer to as primary appraisal and secondary appraisal. In short, 
appraisal processes comprise evaluations of the significance of what is 
happening in relation to one’s well-being. These evaluations are affected by 
personal and situational factors and are often subjective in nature, because 
individuals do not always have access to full information. Basic outcomes that 
are affected by appraisal and coping processes are functioning in work and social 
life, morale or life satisfaction and somatic health (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
In the primary appraisal process, an individual evaluates why and to what extent 
the person-environment relationship is stressful (i.e., harm/loss, threat and 
challenge). Note that a situation is not always evaluated as stressful; it can also 
be evaluated as irrelevant or benign-positive, respectively having no effect on or 
enhancing a person’s psychological well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). When 
the situation is perceived stressful, an individual evaluates the options of how to 
deal with it in the secondary appraisal process. This is quite a complex process 
in which individuals not only need to consider coping responses, but also the 
efficacy of the coping response, one’s self-efficacy related to performing the 
coping response and the possible costs of the response (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984; Maddux & Rogers, 1983). 
As our study deals with victims – who are already confronted with a stressful 
situation – we are mainly interested in the coping process. Note that coping can 
take place before (threat anticipation), during and after events (Beaudry & 
Pinsonneault, 2005). Frieze et al. (1987) divide coping strategies into cognitive 
and behavioural coping strategies. Another division that is made when dealing 
with stressful appraisal is problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Problem-focused coping aims to solve an undesirable situation by tackling the 
direct cause of a problem or threat. Lai, Li, and Hsieh (2012) identify two types 
of problem-focused coping in the information systems context: technological and 
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conventional coping. An example of the former is installing or updating anti-virus 
software to protect a device against future malware attacks. The latter deals 
with the behaviour that an individual displays without using technology, for 
example, checking the account balance for inconsistencies. Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) define these as strategies directed at the environment and strategies 
directed at the self. 
Emotion-focused coping aims to change undesirable feelings and emotions 
towards a problem or threat, such as stress, anger, fear, sadness and 
helplessness, without taking actions against the actual cause. Examples of 
emotion-focused coping include cognitive strategies such as avoidance, 
distancing and selective attention, and behavioural strategies such as 
meditating, seeking emotional support and having a drink (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Emotion-focused coping does not change the objective reality, but helps 
individuals to manage their emotions or control their emotional distress (Green 
et al., 2010), which is also important for effective coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). However, such strategies can lead to a false perception of reality (Liang 
& Xue, 2009). 
Emotion-focused coping is likely when an individual comes to the conclusion that 
nothing can be done about a situation, whereas problem-focused coping is more 
likely to be adopted when a situation is perceived to be changeable or 
controllable (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Liang and Xue (2009) state that 
rational individuals are likely to use problem-focused coping as a strategy 
because they probably have the required knowledge and the necessary skills to 
do so. If individuals, however, do not find a solution to mitigate a threat or if 
they adopt an ineffective measure (e.g., anti-virus software that cannot detect 
new variants of malware), then they will have to use an emotion-focused 
strategy in order to maintain adequate levels of psychological well-being. 
Furthermore, these strategies are not opposites per se; they may also 
complement each other. For example, installing anti-virus software is a problem-
focused strategy to mitigate malware attacks, but an emotion-focused strategy 
is applied as well, i.e., hoping that one will not contract a malware infection 
(Liang & Xue, 2009). Moreover, problem-focused and emotion-focused coping 
influence each other, which can be either facilitating or impeding (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). Thus, although the problem-focused strategy appears to be the 
preferred one – since taking actions against a threat or harm seems more 
meaningful than changing relational meanings (Liang & Xue, 2009) – emotion-
focused strategies are also very relevant for effective coping. 
The extent to which a victim is able to regulate emotions can result in the victim 
denying, nullifying or coping with victimization (Frieze et al., 1987). For coping 
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to be effective, it is important that individuals (in time) move beyond seeing 
themselves as a victim. The extent to which victims perceive themselves as 
victims depends on whether the situation is cognitively evaluated as a harmful 
stressor or not. According to Matthieu and Ivanoff (2006), a stressful event 
becomes a stressor when it is perceived to have a negative impact on one’s 
personal well-being. Thus, regardless of what is objectively defined as 
victimization, ‘victims’ may not subjectively perceive themselves that way. 
Indeed, what some may consider stressful may not apply to others. This is 
primarily down to one’s personal characteristics – some are more sensitive or 
vulnerable than others towards certain events – and the nature of the event 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
It is also important that victimization is recognized by others. This is, however, 
not always obvious, because the offence itself might be evaluated as a victimless 
crime (Button et al., 2014a). Additionally, victimization might not be recognized 
because of the perceptions people hold about what constitutes being a victim. 
The ‘ideal victim’, based on Nils Christie’s definition, is likely to be female, sick, 
very young, very old, or disabled (or a combination of these attributes) (Dignan, 
2005). When these attributes are not met, then the victim status will be less 
likely assigned, resulting in victims being given less recognition and/or being 
taken less seriously. In other words, the more innocent victims are perceived to 
be, the more likely it is for others to see them as victims. Similarly, if victims 
deviate from this image, i.e., when perceived to be not ‘ideal’, this will be less 
likely. 
Additionally, the circumstances play an important part in making an ideal victim 
according to Christie’s typology. When victimization is perceived unavoidable, 
people are more easily assigned the victim status. This is also the case when it 
is believed that victims engaged in practices they thought were legitimate and, 
therefore, can be considered blameless for what had happened. An unknown 
attacker, who is unambiguously evil, is also of significance. Finally, victim status 
is more easily assigned when victims display the right combination of power, 
influence and empathy (Dignan, 2005). The question is to what extent people 
believe online banking fraud victims to be truly innocent, as the victims – at 
least for phishing – adhered to what perpetrators demanded from them. The 
extent to which victims perceive themselves to be ‘victim’ and their perceptions 
on how others viewed them is, however, beyond the scope of the current study. 
Coping efforts not only involve cognitive adjustments, but also taking action. 
Behavioural actions include locating the perpetrator (and demanding the stolen 
goods or compensation for what was lost, but also retaliation for what was 
done), target hardening (e.g., self-defence lessons, being more cautious, 
 Chapter 5 
 
95 
installing alarm systems), avoiding social contacts (e.g., not leaving the home, 
moving to a new house, changing telephone number), seeking help from others 
(e.g., medical assistance, emotional support, assistance with physical tasks) and 
seeking help from the criminal justice system (Frieze et al., 1987). 
Button et al. (2014a) report changes in victims’ behaviour in a study of fraud. 
These include being more cautious when taking financial decisions, credit card 
usage and internet purchases, and being less trusting of others. It also leaded to 
positive changes towards the threat because victims became more security 
aware and attentive to fraud prevention. Regarding behavioural coping, two 
effective strategies found in a study on identity theft by Sharp et al. (2003) were 
taking actions to resolve the issue and talking to family and friends. The latter 
was found to be an effective means of coping for victims of other types of offline 
crime as well (DeValve, 2005; Frieze et al., 1987; Lamet & Wittebrood, 2009). 
Frieze et al. (1987) argue that social support is effective in protecting victims 
from different pathological states, making it a vital aspect of successful coping. 
The extent to which online banking fraud victims use this and other coping 
strategies – as well as the effects and impact they have experienced – are 
inventoried by means of interviews, which is presented next. 
5.3 Method 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the research method to study the 
effects and impact of and coping responses to online banking fraud victimization. 
A topic list was developed based on a literature review. Although we tackled all 
of the topics in the interviews, in each interview the structure was modified to 
best fit the experience of the participant. The interviews were conducted face-to-
face on a location decided by the interview participant. This was either at their 
home or at their working location. 
Our aim was to identify the effects and impact of online banking fraud incidents 
and the coping responses after the incident. The questions were newly 
developed for this study and included: What is your experience with online 
banking? What effects did the incident have on you? Did the incident result in 
emotional harm? Do you recall the amount that was stolen? Did your bank 
reimburse the financial damage? Have you taken new or additional 
precautionary measures since the incident? Furthermore, demographic 
characteristics of the participants were registered. During the interviews, 
participants were also asked about how the incident had unfolded, possible 
reasons for being targeted and what protective measures they had in place. 
Outcomes of these particular questions are described in the work of Jansen and 
Leukfeldt (2016). The interviews lasted 52 minutes on average and were 
recorded using a digital voice recorder. 
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The participants were selected based on police reports and were contacted by a 
liaison officer working for the Dutch police to inform them about the study and 
to obtain their consent for voluntary participation in an anonymized interview. Of 
the 65 police reports selected from the northern and southern regions of the 
Netherlands, 29 participants agreed to be interviewed, 9 declined the request 
and 11 were not reached. Possible participants in the remaining 16 cases were 
not contacted because we obtained sufficient data to complete our study. One 
participant was recruited via a liaison officer at the Fraud Helpdesk, bringing the 
total number of participants to 30. The Fraud Helpdesk is a national organization 
for answering questions and collecting reports about fraud. The participants 
were interviewed between October 2014 and April 2015. The participants that 
were recruited based on police files were victimized in the year prior to the 
interview. The participant that was recruited via the Fraud Helpdesk was 
victimized three years prior to the interview. In this study, participants were 
defined as victims when they actively or passively gave away their user 
credentials because of phishing or malware attacks. In addition, the reports 
were not made available to the researchers by these organizations, making it 
impossible to triangulate the data. 
The ages of participants ranged from 23 to 89 years (M = 59, SD = 17). 
Thirteen women and seventeen men were interviewed for this study. The 
distribution of their educational level – based on the grouping of Statistics 
Netherlands – was low (N = 3), medium (N = 15) and high (N = 12). The 
majority of participants were experienced users of online banking having used it 
for five years or more (N = 23) and using it at least once a week (N = 21). Their 
bank accounts were held at different banks in the Netherlands. In total, 
seventeen phishing victims and thirteen malware victims were interviewed – the 
cybercrimes of interest in this study. 
The victim sample included private as well as corporate customers. For phishing, 
the distribution was sixteen to one. For malware, the distribution was one to 
twelve. The corporate customers were primarily self-employed entrepreneurs 
and small and medium-sized enterprises. Two of the malware participants were 
not the actual victims. Instead, we spoke with the partner of a victim and a 
supervisor of an employee who was victimized. We decided to include their input 
in the analysis because their stories contained relevant information, for instance 
on the financial impact and on changes due to the incident. 
After the interviews were conducted, the recordings were transcribed and sorted 
into conceptual themes that we defined prior to the study. These were based on 
the research and interview questions, derived from general theoretical concepts, 
and include, for example, effects and impact. The interview data were analysed 
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using QualiCoder (Version 0.5), a type of computer-assisted qualitative data 
analysis software. Using this tool, we labelled the written information with 
analytical codes, which gave us the opportunity to separate the themes into 
more detailed categories (Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton-Nicholls & Ormston, 
2014), for example, psychological and emotional effects. Thereafter, the 
contents within these categories was gradually specified into codes, including, 
for example, feeling awful, stupid and disbelief. Finally, the output was manually 
recorded in a Microsoft Excel file, which can be shared upon request. A short 
summary of the interviews is provided in Appendix II. 
5.4 Results 
In the following sections, we present damage amounts (rounded up to hundreds 
of euros) and incidence of particular views or experiences of participants. We do 
not claim that we are providing a representative reflection of online banking 
fraud incidents. That is not possible using this interview method nor was it the 
objective of our study. Rather, it aims to provide insight into how coping 
phenomena vary among participants. Where possible, we make a distinction 
between the phishing and malware cases. Differences between phishing and 
malware are mentioned only when certain outcomes were reported for either 
one of the two fraudulent schemes. If only one participant mentioned a certain 
outcome, the response is not quantified, i.e., no N is indicated. Before we 
continue with the results, we provide a summary of a phishing and a malware 
case, because these give a good impression of what the interview participants 
have experienced. 
Phishing attack – A participant received a deceptive e-mail containing a message 
to execute a security update for online banking. She clicked on the hyperlink 
that was included in the e-mail which re-directed her to a false website where 
she entered some personal details. About two weeks later, she received a 
fraudulent phone call. During the telephone conversation, she followed the 
instructions of the caller and passed on user credentials by which the fraudster 
used to log in and make illegitimate bank transfers. 
Malware attack – A participant noticed at some point that the online banking 
screen “shook” briefly when being used (interview 30). At a later date, the 
participant wanted to transfer money to the Dutch Tax and Customs 
Administration. However, in the background, the transfer was split into two 
transfers (adding up to the same amount), of which the largest amount was sent 
to an unknown account and a smaller amount to the administration service. 
During the execution of that particular money transfer, the participant noticed 
nothing out of the ordinary. The split-up money transfer was not visible in the 
payment summary screen when using the compromised device. Based on an 
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investigation carried out by the Dutch police, we know that the malware was 
automatically installed on that particular device when visiting an infected 
website (Leukfeldt, Kleemans, & Stol, 2017). 
5.4.1 Financial impact 
Fifteen out of seventeen phishing victims reported that the incident caused 
financial damage. The total damage that these fifteen reported was 181,300 
euros (M = 12,100; Min. = 900; Max. = 50,000). Seven of them were fully 
reimbursed by their bank. Three were fully reimbursed less a mandatory own 
risk excess of 150 euros, which one of the participants called a “fine” (interview 
18). One participant received 1,000 euros from her bank, which was less than a 
third of the total damage of 3,600 euros. Four participants received no financial 
compensation, leaving a total damage of 58,700 euros. Two of the seventeen 
participants reported no financial damage, as their banks were able to 
immediately stop the fraudulent transfer. The amounts that the fraudsters were 
attempting to steal were 2,000 and “over 10,000” euros. 
We asked the participants who were not or not fully reimbursed about their 
opinion of this. The participant (interview 6) who got back 1,000 of 3,600 euros 
mentioned that, according to her emotional response, this amount was not 
proportionate. However, she thought that it may have been the maximum 
amount that could be refunded. In addition, she found the whole experience “a 
terrifying adventure” and so she made no further attempts to reclaim more 
money. “I was restless, frightened, tense. Maybe I should have stood up for 
myself?” Rationally, however, the participant stated that she does understand 
why she was not fully compensated. “Not intentionally, but unintentionally, I 
was as stupid or as trusting as one could be.” Because of the incident she had to 
cut her spending, for instance, by not going on holiday. 
The participants who were not compensated at all expressed different views. 
Three of them respected the fact that they did not receive any compensation, 
stating that it was their own fault. One of them mentioned, “I did it to myself. 
So be it. I cannot turn things back. It is just silly, silly, silly” (interview 12). The 
second participant said, “It is the same as when you drive though a red traffic 
light. Then you get fined; it is your own fault. And that is also true in this case” 
(interview 13). She tried to minimize the impact by stating that, “It could have 
been more [money].” The third participant stated that he understood that he 
made the error, although he thought that the bank could have done more to 
trace the suspects. 
The fourth participant (interview 15) who received no compensation was “very 
sorry” that she was not compensated, especially since “banks are so big.” She 
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felt that, because of the compulsory nature of online banking – “in particular for 
elderly people” – the bank could have shown more goodwill, also given the many 
years that she had been a customer of that particular bank. Her rationale was, 
however, that the bank could not compensate her “because there are perhaps 
too many [phishing] cases.” She also mentioned to have lost her security, i.e., 
having a monetary buffer, which affected her significantly. When talking about it 
with her husband, the impact was minimized for her because he made clear to 
her that they are still able to eat. 
Twelve of the thirteen malware victims reported that the incident caused 
financial damage. One participant did not mention the amount that was stolen. 
The other eleven participants reported a total damage of 52,800 euros (M = 
4,800; Min. = 1,000; Max. = 10,000). All twelve participants were fully 
reimbursed by their bank. One participant claimed, however, to have lost out on 
interest during the time that his money was not in his bank account. In one of 
the thirteen cases, there was no financial damage because the bank was able to 
block the fraudulent transfer immediately. The participant mentioned that the 
amount that the fraudsters were attempting to steal was about a monthly wage. 
5.4.2 Psychological and emotional impact 
Most participants reported that the event had at least some psychological and/or 
emotional impact on them. Four participants, however, expressed no 
psychological or emotional impact. The supervisor of a malware victim stated, 
“It is all in the game. It is part of life, running those risks. […] And, besides, it is 
only money. If physical violence was involved, then it would have real impact” 
(interview 28). Three of these four participants indicated that they would 
probably have assessed the impact differently if they had not been compensated 
by their bank. 
Eleven participants reported that the incident did have an impact, but that it was 
low. A malware victim mentioned that, “It is an administrative thing” (interview 
21). Although he still felt “screwed,” he did not worry about it, because he knew 
that the money would be back within a week. Another malware victim said, “You 
have a strange feeling, but nothing more. The intangible makes it difficult. With 
burglary, you see that things are broken and ransacked” (interview 23). Three 
phishing victims said that, although they did not experience any psychological or 
emotional impact or only to a small degree, they were annoyed by it. 
Some participants compared online banking fraud with burglary (N = 2), while 
others believed that a comparison with burglary is not possible (N = 5). On the 
one hand, a phishing victim stated, “Strange people just enter your private life, 
and that is the most disgusting part of it. It does not matter if it is on your 
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computer with money, or that people steal your belongings or are only sniffing 
around and turn things upside down. It just gets to you” (interview 2). On the 
other hand, the spouse of a malware victim mentioned, “Hacking into your 
computer is a totally different experience. Burglary at home is a violation of your 
privacy. In this case, it is a technical thing” (interview 25). 
Participants who experienced psychological and/or emotional effects said that, in 
general, they felt awful (N = 8), disbelief (N = 8), fear or shocked (N = 6), 
stressed or nervous (N = 6), cheated (N = 4) and insecure (N = 3). It also 
lowered their trust in banks and/or online banking (N = 8). An effect mentioned 
only by malware victims is being misunderstood (N = 2). Effects that only 
phishing victims mentioned included feeling stupid (N = 8), shame or 
embarrassment (N = 5), angry ( N = 2), devastated (N = 2), sadness and 
feelings that things are deprived. Phishing victims also stated that the incident 
lowered their levels of trust in themselves (N = 3) and in people in general (N = 
2). A participant pointed out that, “If you lose your trust, you lose more than 
your trust, you lose your certainties. […] I trust all people to be honest and 
open. That trust has been given a big blow. When I say that I could cry again, 
since I find it that terrible. I still suffer from it” (interview 12). 
Furthermore, phishing victims mentioned that the incident made them feel less 
safe online (N = 4) and offline. The participant who mentioned feeling unsafe 
both online and offline said that these feelings were linked to a previous life 
event in which she was cheated. “Those feelings came back through this 
phishing incident. It really knocked me off balance. It certainly took a month. I 
was just really scared” (interview 6). She reported that the incident also affected 
her sense of safety in her home. She asked herself whether the criminals who 
had scammed her might have obtained her physical address. She indicated 
having had sleepless nights, wondering whether people would sneak into her 
home. “You don’t know how far it may reach.” 
Other phishing victims also mentioned having suffered from physical effects. 
One participant (interview 17) spoke about having “a trauma” and mentioned 
also having suffered from sleepless nights. “This was less about the money 
aspect, but more about the stupidity.” The participant blamed himself that he 
fell for the scam. “You lose your self-confidence, because you can be so stupid.” 
Contrary to this statement, four participants stated that the incident was 
something that befell them. A malware victim indicated that, “You must make 
sure that you don’t blame yourself. You don’t have control over it” (interview 
30). 
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One of the phishing victims indicated that, “Its aftereffects are very bad. It has 
had a lot of impact and still makes me feel very sick” (interview 12). One 
aftereffect that she mentioned was that she experiences black outs from time to 
time. Another phishing victim claimed that she almost collapsed when the 
incident happened. She mentioned having had heart palpitations when the bank 
e-mailed her with the message that she would not be compensated for her 
financial losses. She felt terrible and could not believe it. During the process of 
getting her money back, she became very insecure. “When I was using online 
banking for the first time after the incident, I was shaking all over” (interview 
1). She reported being very anxious, mostly because she no longer felt in 
control. Furthermore, it influenced the work she is doing for a foundation. She is 
the treasurer of that particular foundation, but because of the incident she finds 
it terrifying and wants to resign from that role. “The idea that this [a successful 
phishing attack] would happen to me with other people’s money makes me feel 
sick.” Finally, a malware victim indicated that he was shivery using online 
banking after the incident, but that this feeling was subsiding as time passed. 
The duration or timeframe of the effects was also mentioned in some of the 
other interviews. In total, four phishing victims stated that the effects are still 
(partly) present. Participants indicated for example that, although the incident 
had happened a while ago, feelings of uncertainty or distrust, especially with 
regard to digital payments, still exist to this day. One participant mentioned that 
she is trying to get over it, which she is confident about, as “time heals all 
wounds” (interview 6). 
Seven participants reported that the impact goes away or at least goes into the 
background. A phishing victim reported that the impact lasted for two or three 
days. When things were back in order, she turned the page. Another phishing 
victim reported that feelings of shame and stupidity have subsided over time, 
but that it is not one of his favourite topics of conversation. “I don’t talk about 
this topic at parties. It was quite an impactful experience” (interview 3). Two 
others also mentioned not sharing the experience. 
Some, however, did (occasionally) talk about the incident within their social 
sphere (N = 13). Most did this for coping purposes, but five of them also did so 
to warn people about such schemes. In two out of thirteen cases, participants 
mentioned that the people they told about their experience tried to help them to 
get their money back and to locate the people responsible for the scam. Another 
participant indicated that the positive aspect was that her fellow residents from 
the elderly home and her family supported her really well, which helped her to 
cope with the incident. 
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5.4.3 Secondary impact 
Some of the participants reported that the negative event also had secondary 
impact. This was often related to the handling of the incident. Obvious ones 
were time loss due to reporting the incident to both the bank and the police, a 
blocked bank account and, consequently, not being able to having direct access 
to their own money. A malware victim indicated that the time between the 
incident and reimbursement of the bank was bothersome. “As a self-employed 
entrepreneur, you don’t feel like spending hours on phone calls with your bank 
during the day” (interview 9). One phishing victim mentioned, “Especially as you 
get older, you don’t want to be bothered by such things” (interview 4). Although 
this section mainly deals with negative experiences, nine participants explicitly 
mentioned adequate levels of expertise at the bank and/or the police and 
mentioned that they took it seriously and were understanding and helpful. One 
of them mentioned that this attitude was very reassuring. 
Other types of secondary impacts that were mentioned by participants from both 
fraudulent schemes included feeling mistreated (N = 6), bad communication (N 
= 4) and an uncooperative attitude (N = 3) on the part of banks. A phishing 
victim felt mistreated by her bank when reporting the incident. She got the 
impression that the bank employee sitting across her was thinking, “‘Oh, you are 
so stupid.’ He made that very clear” (interview 1). Participants also felt that they 
were being treated like the guilty one, or felt as though they needed to prove 
their innocence. 
All of the participants went to the police to file a report. In nineteen cases, 
participants were obliged or advised to do so by their bank. Eight reported 
having done so on their own initiative. Of the remaining three cases, we do not 
know what motivated them. Secondary impact related to the police were 
reported as follows: the police initially not wanting to or not having time to file 
the report (N = 5), having to wait for a few days (N = 3, in one case because 
the right person was unavailable), having to drive far to a police station and a 
lack of expertise that was displayed by the particular police officer. The 
participant of the latter case – a malware victim – stated, “The person who filed 
the report did not understand any of it. You cannot blame that person for not 
knowing everything, but the police can significantly improve in this regard” 
(interview 21). 
Two phishing victims mentioned that they received many payment reminders 
during the time their bank account was blocked, which they found annoying. 
Two malware victims mentioned having to settle things because of the 
fraudulent transfer. One of them needed to settle things with the Dutch Tax and 
Customs Administration, because the participant’s business received a formal 
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warning. She had to rectify things by reporting that the late payment was 
unintentional, that was due to a fraudulent attack. The other participant needed 
to settle things similarly with a DIY store. 
Finally, five participants indicated that either the police or their bank updated 
them about the incident. In two instances, it concerned a standard message that 
there were not enough leads to continue working on the case. In one instance, a 
malware victim mentioned being updated on the case by a police detective. This 
had a positive effect on the level of trust that something was actually being 
done. Some of the participants that mentioned not being updated made them 
feel they were being left in the dark or gave them the impression that nothing 
was done about their case. 
5.4.4 Behavioural change 
We asked participants whether they had changed their behaviour due to the 
incident in order to cope with the incident or to prevent future incidents. We 
have categorized behavioural change into three categories: (1) behavioural 
change related to devices used for online banking; (2) behavioural change 
related to online banking sessions; and (3) behavioural change beyond the 
online banking context. It is important to note that we have relied on self-
reported behavioural change. We have no additional data that provides support 
for what the participants told us. 
Behavioural change and devices 
Seven participants told us that they had installed an additional anti-virus or anti-
malware package, such as Malwarebytes and TDSSKiller. Four participants 
reported having changed their anti-virus software, of which one indicated that 
the device had no anti-virus software during the time of the incident. Another 
participant switched from a free package to a paid package, in order to prove to 
the bank that he is doing a good job. Three participants said that they updated 
their software more frequently. A phishing victim reported that her computer 
now updates every night and that she manually checks for updates once a week. 
This was not only due to the incident, she received messages from her bank 
stating that financial losses caused by phishing will not be reimbursed if software 
is out of date. 
Other changes that were mentioned more than once were no longer using the 
device that was used during the incident (N = 2) and buying a new computer (N 
= 2). The latter was only reported by malware victims. One of them mentioned 
that the police advised her to buy a new computer. This additionally led to the IT 
staff needing to reinstall all the (business) software. She mentioned, “We have 
no insurance for that” (interview 30). Changes that were mentioned once 
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included using a different web browser, switching from a Windows desktop to an 
Apple iPad (which was perceived to be safer) and replacing the hard drive of the 
compromised device with a new one. 
Behavioural change and online banking 
More than half of the participants indicated that they had become (extra) alert 
or more aware of phishing and malware attacks (N = 17). Participants also 
indicated that the incident was a good learning experience (N = 14). In addition, 
participants had changed their online banking practices. Being more 
careful/meticulous or taking more time to properly check what they are doing 
during online banking and online purchases (N = 8), checking the account 
balance more regularly (N = 7) and checking the security certificate (N = 7, 
e.g., https, closed padlock) were mentioned by both phishing and malware 
victims. 
Changes that were reported only by phishing victims include logging out of 
banking sessions instead of clicking away the window (N = 3), checking the web 
address (N = 2), using online banking less and traditional banking methods 
more when transferring money (N = 2) and not using online banking at home 
anymore. In this particular case, the participant visits a local bank once a month 
to conduct his banking activities. If he is not sure about something, he can ask a 
bank employee to help him. 
A new online banking practice that only malware victims mentioned was taking 
screen shots of their online banking activities (N = 2). One of them mentioned 
doing this, “To be able to prove that you are doing the right thing” (interview 
23). After about a year, both participants stopped doing this. Another participant 
mentioned that when she had to transfer large amounts of money, she would 
contact the bank by phone to find out if everything was in order. She attributed 
this to her insecurity that was caused by the incident. However, she soon 
stopped with this procedure, because it was not practical. 
Besides the duration of the new behaviours mentioned above, the timeframe of 
the new behaviour was also mentioned in a few other cases. Three malware 
victims mentioned that being extra alert or more careful was already waning. 
Two phishing victims who stated that they check to see if there is a closed 
padlock revealed that they do this less frequently now or not at all anymore. 
Finally, a phishing victim disclosed that she no longer checks the account 
balance regularly. 
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Behavioural change beyond online banking context 
One frequently mentioned change in the behaviour of phishing victims beyond 
the online banking context was that they became more suspicious about e-mails 
(N = 8), for example, not clicking on hyperlinks and checking whether e-mails 
are trustworthy. One also commented that it has become difficult to differentiate 
between legitimate and false e-mail messages. Other phishing victims 
mentioned to deleting all e-mails that are or seem to be sent by banks (N = 4). 
Two also commented that if the message is important, the bank would have sent 
a letter. 
Six phishing victims made changes to their bank accounts. Changes included 
removing the credit limit from the account (for overdraft protection), configuring 
the debit card so that it cannot be used abroad, receiving a different bank 
account number from the bank (because fraudsters carried out new phishing 
attempts), closing a savings account (because that particular account was 
protected by a password only, which seemed to be unsecure), opening a savings 
account at another bank (since the checking and savings accounts had the same 
numbers, which was perceived to be unsafe) and opening several bank accounts 
(where specific amounts of money can be deposited, leaving only a smaller 
amount in the checking account). In this particular case, the participant 
commented, “In this way, third parties cannot get to the big money” (interview 
16). 
Four phishing victims said that they are more on guard when using mobile 
phones and receiving telephone calls. Three of them mentioned that if the 
phone’s display does not show a number, they pick up the phone without stating 
their name or they do not answer it at all. The other participant got himself a 
new phone number. Furthermore, two participants intended to leave their bank, 
but did not follow through. 
Changes that were mentioned just once by phishing victims included not buying 
or signing anything anymore at the door, not writing down the PIN code in an 
agenda or on a piece of paper, not giving out their bank account number as 
readily as before and not going on the computer when feeling sad (for this 
participant, safety is embedded in sadness). A participant who was phished 
while being the treasurer of a foundation indicated that the foundation had 
invested in making its website more secure. 
Two malware victims commented that they had made changes beyond the 
online banking context. One of them mentioned that business procedures and 
protocols were carefully re-examined in order to make sure that incidents would 
be adequately prevented or detected as soon as possible. Another indicated not 
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sending information from business computers to the main business computer 
(used for online banking), i.e., not running any unnecessary risks. 
5.5 Conclusion and discussion 
Although we believe that our study provides a unique contribution to literature, 
our study has its limitations. First, the results are not generalizable for all online 
fraud victims. We focused on victims who suffered from online banking fraud 
only. Furthermore, the participants were selected from police files. Therefore, 
we do not know what the effects are on victims who did not report the crime or 
how they cope with such events. Reasons for non-reporting include, for 
example, not knowing to be defrauded, feeling partly responsible, feeling 
embarrassed and suffering low financial losses (Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009b). 
This limits generalizability, also because reporting rates are low. 
In 2015, for example, 2% of all hacking cases, 20% of marketplace fraud cases 
and 13% of identity fraud cases that Dutch people were confronted with were 
officially reported to the police (CBS, 2016b). Perhaps in-depth interviews that 
follow a crime survey could be a way to address this limitation. Moreover, some 
potential participants declined the request to be interviewed. Perhaps these 
victims did not participate because they perceived higher or more problematic 
psychological and emotional impact than those in the sample. Another possibility 
is that these victims were not affected at all, and therefore had no interest in 
participating. What becomes clear though is that victims vary in their 
characteristics and profiles. This concurs with previous research on fraud 
victimization (Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009a; Button et al., 2009b; Cross et al., 
2016). 
A possible limitation is related to the identification of psychological and 
emotional effects. Although we found that the participants talked openly about 
these and other subjects, the participants may have hidden some of these 
effects from the researchers because they felt too embarrassed about it. Dignan 
(2005) stresses that it is very difficult to measure such effects because the 
willingness and ability of people to talk about these issues, as well as about the 
experience itself, are highly subjective and partly cultural specific. This also 
counts for coping efforts because people are not always aware of what they are 
doing exactly (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The subjective nature of this study 
may therefore have led to the problem of method variance. Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984), however, nuance the problems of validation by stating that 
subjective reports allow researchers to learn more about coping than any other 
single source. In order to make outcomes more comparable, regardless of their 
subjective nature, we recommend using other specific assessment tools in future 
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studies, for instance, the ‘ways of coping’ checklist (see Lazarus and Folkman 
[1984]). However, this would require a more quantitative research approach. 
Finally, the current study adopts a retrospective approach, which has its 
limitations (Shapland & Hall, 2007). Participants may have forgotten certain 
details about the effects of online banking fraud and how they cope or coped 
with these. We have gained an impression of the short-term consequences, but 
we do not explicitly understand how victims’ coping strategies pay out in the 
long term. Some participants, for example, mentioned that they were already 
using some behavioural coping measures less frequently. It would be interesting 
to find out whether individuals are consistent or variable in their coping 
strategies, and what their overall coping style is, as opposed to our more 
contextual focus on coping efforts (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Indeed, coping is 
not a one-off activity. Future studies could benefit from a longitudinal approach. 
Studying the effects and impact that victims perceive, and their cognitive and 
behavioural responses at multiple points in time provide richer data with more 
potential, for example, to understand how perceived effects develop and to 
better guide a victim through the coping process. Further research may also 
benefit from investigating personal, psychological and contextual factors that 
affect coping efforts. 
The first research question we wanted to answer is: What are the financial, 
psychological and emotional effects of online banking fraud victimization? We 
start with the financial effects. Most participants experienced some financial 
damage – at least initially – from either phishing or malware victimization. Two 
thirds of the phishing victims and all malware victims whose bank accounts were 
affected were fully compensated for their financial losses. That all malware 
victims were fully compensated has probably more to do with the type of the 
offence, that is the obscureness of the malware attack, than with the 
observation that most were corporate customers. Imaginably, the circumstances 
surrounding malware victimization appeal to the ‘ideal victim’ typology. 
Five participants – all phishing victims – were not or to a minor extent 
compensated for their losses. Although the participants who suffered financial 
losses acknowledged that being victimized was to some extent due to their own 
wrongdoing, some expected more goodwill from their bank regarding 
compensation. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate the banks’ 
reimbursement policies on this matter: why are some phishing victims 
compensated, be it in full or not, while others are not? 
Besides the direct financial effects, indirect financial effects were also reported. 
These effects included loss of interest, buying a new device for online banking 
  
108 
and several types of loss of time that can be considered to have a monetary 
value, such as devoting more time to taking precautions (online) and going to a 
physical bank office to use banking services. Thus, the financial effects go 
further than only the (initial) damages caused by the fraudulent schemes. 
We will now turn to the psychological and emotional effects. The participants 
that mentioned that the event affected them psychologically and emotionally 
mentioned a range of effects, such as feeling awful, stupid, stressed, disbelief 
and fear. It also affected their levels of trust, including trust in banks and/or 
online banking, people and themselves. That such psychological and emotional 
effects follow victimization is consistent with other research on (online) fraud 
(Button et al., 2009a; Cross et al., 2016). Some participants even reported 
physical effects, such as having sleepless nights, getting heart palpitations, 
experiencing blackouts and feeling shivery or shaky when using online banking. 
We also found some evidence regarding the duration of the effects (Frieze et al., 
1987). Most participants mentioned that they had immediate reactions to the 
incident. The psychological and emotional effects were often at their most 
severe during this particular timeframe. Some of the participants mentioned that 
the effects subsided after a few days. Some, however, reported that the effects 
or impact experienced lasted from about a month to still being present at the 
time of the interview. This is a similar pattern that is observed for (offline) 
violent crimes (Dignan, 2005) as well as for different types of online fraud 
(Cross et al., 2016). 
The second research question was: To what extent do online banking fraud 
victims suffer from secondary victimization? Secondary victimization relates to 
negative effects other than those instigated by the incident itself. Negative 
effects often related to the way the incident was handled, such as time loss due 
to reporting the incident, not being able to access the bank account and feeling 
mistreated. Feeling mistreated has a negative influence on coping because it 
does not address the victims’ need for recognition. 
In addition, most participants mentioned that they did not receive feedback from 
either the bank or the police on the incident and how it was being handled. 
Frieze et al. (1987) argue that such information helps victims to relieve their 
fear and frustration, thus helping them in the coping process. In addition, 
victims may develop a positive attitude towards banks and the police instead of 
losing their trust and confidence in these organizations. The study of Button et 
al. (2009b) also found that fraud victims have a need for being held up-to-date 
on the process of the case. We believe that providing feedback, not only on the 
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status but also on how the incident happened, can help victims to develop more 
effective defence strategies against future attacks. 
Besides negative effects, some participants explicitly reported positive aspects in 
the handling procedure. They mentioned that bank employees and police officers 
took them seriously, were understanding and helpful, and had adequate levels of 
expertise for the situation. Again, banks and the police stand to gain a lot if they 
respond in this way, not only reputation-wise, but also when it comes to helping 
victims to recover properly from online banking fraud victimization. 
The third research question was: What impact does online banking fraud have 
on its victims? Although the financial ‘effects’ of online banking fraud could 
objectively be defined as quite severe, the participants did not claim that the 
incident had a devastating financial ‘impact’, which is sometimes the case for 
other fraud victims (Button et al., 2014a). Therefore, we conclude that the direct 
financial impact of online banking fraud victims is low, most notably because the 
majority of victims were compensated for their losses. This differs from other 
types of fraud, where it is often more difficult or even unlikely to get restituted 
(Button et al., 2009b). Remarkably, some of the participants who were not 
compensated at all also felt that the impact was low. Three participants had no 
financial damage to begin with. 
Regarding the psychological and emotional aspects, four participants said they 
felt no such impact. This was also mainly due to the fact that they were 
financially compensated for their losses, but also because online banking fraud 
was considered a technical or invisible phenomenon. These participants felt that 
their private lives had not been affected. About a third of the participants 
mentioned that the ‘impact’ of the fraudulent attack was low, but did express 
some psychological and emotional ‘effects’. 
Half of the respondents were – to some extent – overwhelmed by the situation. 
Thus, reimbursement could not prevent some of the participants from being 
psychologically or emotionally affected by the incident. Furthermore, we found 
some evidence that previous negative life events affected the impact of 
victimization. Our topic list, however, did not include questions about such 
events or prior victimization, which could be beneficial to add in future studies. 
Similarly, questions could be asked whether or not other accounts beyond 
banking were hacked, which may also have affected the impact experienced by 
participants. 
The final research question was formulated as follows: What are the cognitive 
and behavioural coping responses to online banking fraud victimization? 
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Regarding the participants who were not compensated, or not fully 
compensated, for their financial losses, we observed that they used a cognitive 
coping style of rationalizing it, thereby minimizing their victimization. They came 
up with an explanation that seemed to fit the situation in order to cope with the 
fact that they had lost their money. 
Cognitive coping strategies were also observed regarding the psychological and 
emotional effects of becoming an online banking fraud victim. Examples included 
being at ease with the situation because reimbursement procedures were 
understood, and viewing an incident as being something that is part of life. 
Some participants tried to create a ‘hypothetical, worse world’ scenario in order 
to cope with victimization (Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983), for example, by 
thinking that the stolen amount could have been higher or that it would have 
been worse if it had involved physical violence. These strategies are effective for 
reducing emotional distress, but ineffective for tackling the actual problem. 
Another cognitive coping response is that victims feel strengthened by the 
experience. Some indicated that the experience was a good lesson in that it 
made them wiser, which is also considered to be positive change in other studies 
(Button et al., 2014a; Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). Perhaps confronting online 
banking users with (controlled) phishing and malware attacks would be a good 
strategy as a way to teach them how to prevent such attacks. 
A strategy that makes coping difficult was observed in a participant who blamed 
himself for being victimized (Whitty & Buchanan, 2016). Although self-blame can 
be considered a maladaptive response, which could for instance lead to 
hopelessness and depression, it can also be considered an adaptive response if 
self-blame is considered to be behavioural. If victims are able to link their own 
actions to victimization, they can avoid future victimization by adjusting these 
actions. On the other hand, if victimization is linked to character, it gives victims 
less confidence in their perceptions of avoiding future victimization because 
personality is hard to change (Frieze et al., 1987). 
Some participants reported an opposite strategy towards self-blame, indicating 
that the incident was something that befell them, which helped them control 
their emotional state. In our opinion, this is not a strange – and perhaps the 
right – reaction, as the skills of fraudsters are often the reason why people fall 
for such scams. Individuals that are victimized are not stupid; they simply made 
a choice that was not a good one. For malware victims, it was out of their hands, 
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because their systems were infected automatically.38 For these victims, the 
cases remained unsolved; they do not know how their systems were infected 
nor how the fraudulent transfer(s) took place. They were surfing online in the 
wrong place, at the wrong time. In general, this did not cause any distress, most 
probably because all were reimbursed – which might have strengthened their 
belief that they could not help it. 
Respondents also applied behavioural coping mechanisms. The first behavioural 
coping mechanisms that they applied was reporting the incident to and seeking 
support from their bank. In addition, all participants filed a report with the police 
(which is logical given our selection procedure), either because the bank 
required them to or on their own initiative. 
Some participants also sought support from their social environment, which was 
assessed as an effective means of coping. This is also identified in the literature 
as one of the most effective means for successful coping (Frieze et al., 1987). 
One of the participants mentioned after the interview that the conversation had 
a healing effect on her, as she had not talked about it much. According to her, 
banks should provide aftercare in the form of having a conversation about the 
event after some time, helping victims to process it. Were banks to follow up on 
these incidents, it is essential that the person instigating the conversation 
adopts a supportive attitude, i.e., be unprejudiced, show empathy and 
understanding – not blame the victim, as the situation itself is difficult enough. 
However, it can remain a difficult topic to address for some time. Perhaps these 
participants are assuming that others might find them stupid or that they would 
be angry with them because of the financial loss. Indeed, according to Cross 
                                               
38 This study includes both phishing and malware attacks, because they are basically two 
types of the same crime. Leukfeldt, Kleemans, and Stol (2017), for example, show that 
not only the goal of phishing and malware attacks is the same (i.e., to steal money from 
online bank accounts), but that the modus operandi of both attack types is quite similar 
too (intercepting login credentials, intercepting one time transaction authentication codes, 
wiring the money to money mule accounts and cashing the money). The biggest difference 
is that the malware victims in this study were not actively engaged in providing 
perpetrators their credentials. However, being fully responsible or not, it is still relevant to 
find out how the malware attacks affected participants and how they recovered from it. 
Furthermore, we had no information on how well the victims were protected against 
malware attacks before conducting the interviews. Personal responsibility could have been 
an issue when we had found that malware victims, for instance, had poor security 
protection installed. Moreover, in other malware cases, victims were more personally 
responsible, for example, by responding to a malicious pop-up window (see e.g., Jansen 
and Leukfeldt [2015]). 
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(2015), there is a negative vibe surrounding online fraud victimization, although 
she found that phishing is a more acceptable type of fraud victimization, than, 
for instance, advance fee fraud and romance fraud. Whitty and Buchanan (2016) 
argue that negative or non-supportive responses from the social environment 
can be harmful for recovery. We found no evidence that online banking fraud 
victimization affected social relationships, nor did we find any leads indicating 
indirect victimization by people within the victims’ social environment. Perhaps 
this is the case, because the research participants were open to share these 
experiences with the people closest to them. Other fraud research has shown 
that when such events, for example, are kept secret the impact on partners and 
family members can be more severe (Button et al., 2014a). 
We also identified environmental strategies and strategies directed at the victims 
themselves. Environmental strategies included installing a different or additional 
anti-virus package and (more regularly) checking for software updates. A 
frequently mentioned strategy that was directed at the victims themselves was 
that participants became more alert to or aware of phishing and malware. Being 
more cautious after victimization is also found in the fraud studies of Button et 
al. (2009a; 2014a) and Cross et al. (2016). Online banking processes were also 
adjusted, such as being more meticulous or taking more time to check things, 
checking the security certificate and checking the account balance more 
regularly. Furthermore, we observed that some participants adopted avoidance 
behaviour, i.e., using (or wanting to use) online banking less and using 
traditional banking services more. 
Some of the abovementioned strategies can be considered to be problem-
focused coping, as they are intended to prevent an online banking fraud incident 
from happening again. However, these strategies could also be adopted as a 
means to control emotions, for example, making them feel more confident about 
online banking. It is therefore difficult to determine whether certain responses 
belong to problem-focused and/or emotion-focused coping strategies (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984), so we have not labelled them as such. Follow-up research is 
required to clarify in greater detail how these strategies work. 
Finally, we found that participants also performed behavioural coping strategies 
beyond the online banking context. One frequently mentioned example is that 
phishing victims reported being more concerned about or suspicious of e-mails. 
As a consequence, it was mentioned that it is often difficult to differentiate 
between legitimate and false e-mail messages. This is also observed by Wang, 
Chen, Herath, and Rao (2009), who note that phishing has a high impact on 
legitimate commercial e-mails. Other responses that phishing victims mentioned 
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more than once included making changes or restrictions regarding bank 
accounts and being more on guard when taking telephone calls. 
Concluding remarks 
We agree with Button et al. (2014a) that, similar to other types of fraud, online 
banking fraud cannot be considered a victimless crime, not even when the stolen 
money is reimbursed (see also Whitty and Buchanan [2016]). The effects and 
impact of such fraudulent schemes on victims should not be underestimated. 
Regardless of the financial costs associated with online banking fraud, losing 
trust (e.g., in online commerce and people in general) and declining levels of 
safety and security are a much higher price to pay. However, the extent to 
which an individual perceives these effects and impact differs significantly. For 
some it was a temporary inconvenience only and they managed to get over it, 
whereas for the other it was (and sometimes still is) an overwhelming 
experience that changed them; they became more attentive, alert and 
distrustful as a result. This means that individual differences should be 
acknowledged when helping victims to cope with their victimization. Hence, for 
help to be effective, one should take into account the interplay between personal 
characteristics and the environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). They went on 
to state that effective help can only be achieved if a process-oriented view is 
adopted. This would involve examining what happened and what is happening to 
that particular individual in terms of coping. 
This conclusion has implications for banks and law enforcement agencies. Banks 
primarily have to deal with the incident and the damage resulting from the 
incident. Banks could probably improve their services by recruiting dedicated 
personnel who devote attention to the victims’ coping process, employees who 
are able to assess how the victims’ coping process is unfolding and who can 
support these victims in that process. These employees could have contact with 
the victim at multiple points in time, depending on the specific needs of the 
victim. This may require a different set of skills than those that bank employees 
at fraud departments currently have. 
Another strategy might be to cooperate with ‘victim support’, a service that is 
provided to victims when they report a crime to the Dutch police. An important 
implication, also for law enforcement agencies, is that victims should be treated 
seriously and that the impact they experience goes further than the money 
aspect only. It is crucial to do this right on the first time victims come into 
contact with these agencies – when reporting the incident – because this might 
set the tone for the whole handling procedure. Moreover, as pointed out by 
Cross et al. (2016), a negative reporting experience can worsen the harm that 
victims already undergo. To evaluate whether this is done adequately and to 
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continually improve the support of victims, it is recommendable to map the 
customer experience in terms of fraud handling, which is already done by 
different banks in the Netherlands (personal communication, April 26, 2017). 
Conclusively, we have contributed to the literature by increasing insight into the 
effects and impact of phishing and malware attacks and enhancing the 
understanding of adaption after online banking fraud victimization. These 
aspects are currently lacking in studies on cybercrime. More thorough analysis of 
coping strategies is required to deepen insight into the phenomena described in 
our study. This is not only needed to advance theoretical knowledge on this 
topic, but also to further shape the supporting role that banks and law 
enforcement agencies have, as presented in the recommendations above. We 
need more information about the factors that cause stress, how coping 
strategies are chosen, which strategies are effective and which are not, and how 
these function over time. Some coping efforts seem to work for a while, but 
subside over time as they seem to hinder usability, cost too much time and 
some perhaps do not work at all. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Today, society is becoming increasingly networked and connected (Van Dijk, 
2012). As more services to customers are offered online, such as banking, 
government and health, security becomes increasingly important. Individuals, 
economy and society can be harmed when security is compromised, for 
example, by means of data breaches and distributed denial-of-service attacks. 
The Netherlands’ first National Cybersecurity Strategy states: (secure) IT is 
fundamental for our prosperity and well-being and essential for economic 
growth. This means that besides increasing the adoption and use of IT, it is 
equally important to ensure its safety and security (Dutch Ministry of Security 
and Justice, 2011). It is evident that societal issues, like cybersecurity, need to 
be addressed by different parties, such as internet service providers, telecom 
organisations and governmental agencies. However, it is equally important that 
end users behave in a secure fashion, as they play an essential role in 
safeguarding the online domain. Moreover, they are essential for achieving 
online security (Furnell, Jusoh, & Katsabas, 2006; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng, 
Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). 
The present study deals with the safety and security of online banking from an 
end-user perspective. Online banking is a means by which customers can access 
different kinds of banking services via the internet. By 2015, 85% of Dutch 
citizens of 16 years of age and over had adopted this service (Eurostat, 2016). 
However, as the internet also attracts criminals (Bossler & Holt, 2009; Van 
Wilsem, 2011b), online banking is not without risk. End users are, for example, 
confronted with phishing and malware attacks (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2015) – 
techniques fraudsters use to obtain user credentials to steal money from their 
bank accounts. Because banks cannot control their customers’ behaviour or the 
devices they use, it is important that end users are aware of threats aimed at 
online banking and are able to prevent them from manifesting in harm (Furnell 
& Clarke, 2012; Jansen, 2015). A challenge here is that although end users are 
ultimately responsible for their own online behaviour and the security of their 
devices, they often have insufficient knowledge or lack the tendency to protect 
themselves (Furnell, Tsaganidi, & Phippen, 2008) and are also not adequately 
aware of the online threats they are faced with (Kritzinger & Von Solms, 2010). 
Furthermore, an international phenomenon regarding online banking is a shift in 
responsibility towards the end user (Anderson, 2007; Davinson & Sillence, 
2014). On the one hand, this is not surprising because the safety and security of 
online banking cannot be addressed by banks alone. However, there is some 
debate on how far user responsibility should go, as online banking is a service 
that is pushed towards bank customers. It is not a voluntary choice in the sense 
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that traditional banking services are made more expensive and less accessible, 
for example, by closing local bank offices. Ultimately, a combination of technical, 
human and also legal aspects is required to ensure a safe online environment. 
To that extent, end users thus also have responsibilities regarding the safety 
and security of online banking. In this chapter, we study what motivates end 
users to protect themselves against online threats by analysing three social 
cognitive models. A better understanding of precautionary online behaviour is 
required to enhance safety and security from an end-user perspective. 
The current study evaluates three models in terms of their effectiveness in 
explaining precautionary online behaviour.39 We compare the protection 
motivation theory (PMT) (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975), the reasoned 
action approach (RAA) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010) and an integrated model which 
comprises PMT and RAA variables. Both PMT and RAA seem equally valuable in 
the present context and are discussed in more detail in Section 6.2. By testing 
individual and integrated models, we make two contributions: theoretical 
knowledge is advanced and maximum effectiveness is pursued (Lippke & 
Ziegelmann, 2008; Sommestad, Karlzén, & Hallberg, 2015). In addition, based 
upon Ifinedo’s (2012) work, we expect the integrated model to provide a more 
comprehensive account of the determinants of precautionary online behaviour. 
Our main interest is aimed at explaining variance rather than assessing the 
quality of the models (Prochaska, Wright, & Velicer, 2008). 
Both PMT and RAA (including RAA’s predecessors) have been tested extensively 
to predict numerous behavioural intentions and actual behaviours. However, to 
the best of our knowledge, they have neither been widely compared in the 
information security domain nor extensively tested in an integrated fashion. 
Comparison is needed to help researchers make informed decisions about the 
usefulness of social cognitive models in this area. Therefore, the aim of our 
study is to evaluate the usefulness of PMT and RAA in explaining precautionary 
online behaviour. In addition, our study advances the understanding of 
precautionary online behaviour, which is still limited (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; 
Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009). The results are useful for scholars and 
practitioners who want to study and improve online safety and security practices 
by end users in general, and safety and security in online banking in particular. 
                                               
39 In this chapter, precautionary online behaviour refers to the adherence to the safety 
rules of online banking and is operationalized as protection motivation, i.e., behavioural 
intentions. Note that these terms are used interchangeably. 
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6.2 Theory 
In this section, first, an overview of PMT (Section 6.2.1) and RAA (Section 6.2.2) 
is presented, complemented with definitions of the predictor variables and a set 
of hypotheses that are tested in this study. This is followed by a discussion of 
precautionary online behavioural intention, the target behaviour of our study 
(Section 6.2.3). 
6.2.1 Protection motivation theory 
To date, several models exist that try to explain and predict behaviour (Floyd, 
Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). In the information systems domain, extensive 
research is done on the adoption of technology. Examples of adoption theories 
include the technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989) and the unified theory of 
acceptance and use of technology (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). 
However, most of these studies focus on ‘beneficial technologies’, of which 
online banking can be considered an example. ‘Protective technologies’, which 
focus on preventing negative outcomes, are an under-studied subject in this 
area (Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009). Moreover, studies on precautionary 
online behaviour and on how such behaviour can be changed are scarce (Ng et 
al., 2009). As research has shown that significant difference exists between 
beneficial and protective technologies (Dinev & Hu, 2005), it seems that other 
theories than adoption theories might be more appropriate. 
We believe that PMT provides an appropriate theoretical background for the 
current study. The reasons for this are: first, the theory has been successfully 
applied to understand and predict the use of numerous protective measures 
(Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). Second, PMT has evolved over time into a 
powerful explanatory theory for precautionary behaviour (Floyd et al., 2000). 
Third, PMT includes the concept of risk, which is absent in adoption theories 
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Another important argument in favour of PMT, or 
its variants (e.g., threat control model [Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008], 
technology threat avoidance theory [Liang & Xue, 2009] and fear appeals model 
[Johnston & Warkentin, 2010]), is that they have recently been applied to the 
information security domain (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; 
Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). These studies have shown that PMT provides 
a useful framework for predicting precautionary online behaviour. This has been 
demonstrated for both home-computer users (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; 
Chenoweth et al., 2009; Crossler, 2010; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lai, Li, & 
Hsieh, 2012; Liang & Xue, 2010) and end users who operate within an 
organisational context (Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; 
Lee, 2011; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 2007; Vance et al., 2012; Workman 
et al., 2008; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2009). We also considered an 
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alternative, yet similar, theory: the health belief model (HBM) (Rosenstock, 
Stretcher, & Becker, 1988). This has been applied to information security issues 
previously as well (Davinson & Sillence, 2010; Ng et al., 2009). A primary 
difference between HBM and PMT is that HBM consists of a set of variables that 
have an effect on behaviour, while PMT arranges its predictor variables in 
cognitive processes that individuals apply to evaluate threats and coping 
measures (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1986; Weinstein, 1993). We therefore 
believe that the variables and processes included in PMT make this theory more 
suitable for improving our understanding of precautionary online behaviour than 
HBM. Finally, PMT is useful for developing interventions (Floyd et al., 2000), as it 
is viewed as a framework to develop and evaluate persuasive communications 
(Norman, Boer, & Seydel, 2005). 
According to PMT, end users are motivated to protect themselves based on 
threat appraisal and coping appraisal processes, implying that end users first 
evaluate possible threats and then possible coping strategies. These evaluations 
determine users’ protection motivation, in other words, their intention to 
proceed, continue or avoid a given behaviour (Floyd et al., 2000). ‘Protection 
motivation is an intervening variable that has the typical characteristics of a 
motive: it arouses, sustains and directs activity’ (Rogers, 1975, p. 98). 
Depending on the level of protection motivation aroused, end users will adopt an 
adaptive or maladaptive coping response. The former means that end users 
actually follow the recommended response, in this case, taking precautions. The 
latter holds that end users do not follow the recommended response, thereby 
potentially exposing themselves increasingly to online threats. 
In PMT, the threat appraisal process consists of perceived vulnerability and 
perceived severity. Crossler (2010) describes perceived vulnerability as the 
personal probability or likelihood of a security incident occurring, and perceived 
severity as the impact of consequences resulting from a security incident. The 
rewards-construct is also part of PMT’s threat appraisal process, but is often 
omitted (Milne et al., 2000) – also in our study – because the theoretical 
difference between a reward associated with not following the coping response 
and a response cost (part of the coping appraisal process) is in doubt (Abraham, 
Sheeran, Abrams, & Spears, 1994). Threat appraisal is a unique component in 
PMT that is not present in RAA. Based on the notions above, we can state our 
first two hypotheses as follows: 
H1. Perceived vulnerability positively influences precautionary online 
behavioural intention. 
H2. Perceived severity positively influences precautionary online behavioural 
intention. 
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The coping appraisal process includes an evaluation of the estimated coping 
strategies to avoid or minimise a threat. This process consists of response 
efficacy, self-efficacy and response costs. Milne et al. (2000) describe the first 
construct as the perceived effectiveness of a response in reducing a threat, the 
second as users’ belief about whether they are capable of performing the 
recommended response and the third as how costly performing the response will 
be to the user. Notably, we use a domain-specific interpretation of self-efficacy 
as proposed by Rhee, Kim, and Ryu (2009, p. 818), who term this ‘self-efficacy 
in information security’ as: ‘a belief in one’s capability to protect information and 
information systems from unauthorised disclosure, modification, loss, 
destruction and lack of availability’. Thus, we arrive at our next hypotheses: 
H3. Response efficacy positively influences precautionary online behavioural 
intention. 
H4. Self-efficacy positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention. 
H5. Response costs negatively influence precautionary online behavioural 
intention. 
6.2.2 Reasoned action approach 
Although specific theories are preferred when studying specific behaviour, more 
general theories for predicting human behaviour may contain variables that are 
important within the context that is being investigated. One such theory is RAA, 
which evolved from the popular theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975) and the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). The essence of 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2010) framework is that attitude towards behaviour, 
perceived norms and perceived behavioural control determine users’ intention to 
perform a given behaviour. It is assumed that behavioural intention predicts 
actual behaviour. Moreover, they believe that their approach is unified, 
accounting for any behaviour. Therefore, their approach should also be 
appropriate for information security behaviour. 
Attitude reflects a user’s positive or negative feelings towards performing the 
target behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). A positive attitude towards certain 
behaviour is considered to positively influence that behaviour. An additional 
rationale for adopting this construct is that its relation with intentional behaviour 
has been extensively tested and corroborated (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Based 
on these notions, we arrive at our sixth hypothesis: 
H6. A positive attitude positively influences precautionary online behavioural 
intention. 
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Perceived norms, unique in RAA compared to PMT, refer to perceived social 
pressure and are made up of injunctive norms – perceptions of what should or 
ought to be done – and descriptive norms – perceptions of whether others are 
performing the target behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). According to 
Anderson and Agarwal (2010), there has been a lack of attention to social 
variables in information systems research even though these variables are 
considered important for users’ behaviour. Consequently, our next two 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H7. Injunctive norms positively influence precautionary online behavioural 
intention. 
H8. Descriptive norms positively influence precautionary online behavioural 
intention. 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) describe perceived behavioural control as perceptions 
about being capable of or having control over the target behaviour. Perceived 
behavioural control is viewed as a combination of self-efficacy (also found in 
PMT, H4) and locus of control (Workman et al., 2008). Rather than selecting the 
single construct of perceived behavioural control, we have chosen to adopt these 
two constructs because they are distinct (Bandura, 1977). Locus of control is 
either internal or external (Rotter, 1966; Workman et al., 2008). End users who 
have a high level of internal locus of control believe that they are in control of 
the outcomes of a certain event. In this context, internal locus of control can 
translate into proactive behaviour by end users, taking responsibility for their 
online safety. End users who are characterized by external locus of control 
believe that the outcome is controlled by powerful others or by fate. This could 
translate into reactive behaviour, leaving responsibility to others – expectedly, 
their bank. This leads us to our final hypothesis: 
H9. Internal locus of control positively influences precautionary online 
behavioural intention. 
6.2.3 Precautionary online behaviour 
The recommended actions that banks want their customers to take are found in 
the so-called uniform safety rules for online banking. These rules are defined in 
the general terms and conditions of all banks in The Netherlands and are in 
effect as of January 1, 2014. The items of the outcome variable of this study are 
based on these rules. The five rules for safe online banking comprise of the 
following: (a) keep your security codes secret; (b) make sure that your debit 
card is not used by others; (c) secure the devices you use for online banking 
properly; (d) check your bank account regularly; and (e) report incidents 
directly to your bank. In summary, precautionary online behaviour includes both 
technical and non-technical measures against security threats. 
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The dependent variable thus consists of items that refer to multiple actions. 
Although this approach is sometimes criticised (Blythe, Coventry, & Little, 2015) 
– because predictor variables might influence protection motivation for one 
behaviour, but not for another – others (Crossler & Bélanger, 2014) defend this 
approach, stating that precautionary behaviour against online threats constitutes 
taking multiple actions. Based on this notion and certain practical considerations 
(lack of validated scales for precautionary online behaviour and length of 
questionnaire), we chose to ask participants questions about their intentions to 
adhere to the uniform safety rules, as intentions are acknowledged to be the 
most immediate predictor of actual behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). 
Moreover, we followed the work of others in constructing the dependent 
variable, who also measured intentions that signified various actions (Anderson 
& Agarwal, 2010; Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012). In conclusion, we justify 
our approach with our aim to gain insight into the safety and security intentions 
of end users, based on the totality of rules presented to them by Dutch banks. 
6.3 Method 
In this section, we describe the methods used to test the hypotheses and 
evaluate which model is most effective in predicting users’ motivation for 
precautionary online behaviour. First, we discuss the survey questionnaire and 
procedure (Section 6.3.1). Second, we provide details on the survey participants 
(Section 6.3.2). We then discuss data analysis, validity and reliability of 
measures (Section 6.3.3). 
6.3.1 Survey questionnaire and procedure 
Based on literature study, using international databases – ACM Digital Library, 
ScienceDirect and Web of Science – we developed a questionnaire. We based 
the questionnaire items on the work of Anderson and Agarwal (2010), Herath 
and Rao (2009), Ifinedo (2012), Ng et al. (2009), Witte (1996) and Workman et 
al. (2008). The items used a five-point Likert-scale (ranging from totally 
disagree to totally agree), were translated in Dutch, programmed in LimeSurvey 
(an open-source online survey tool) and presented in random order. All predictor 
variables were measured by three items and precautionary online behaviour was 
measured by four items. Two examples of the items adopted are: ‘the uniform 
safety rules help in preventing online banking fraud’ (RE1) and ‘it is my intention 
to comply with the uniform safety rules’ (PM4). The full questionnaire is 
available in Appendix III. Before the participants were presented with these 
items, the uniform safety rules were explicitly defined, to ensure that 
participants have a common understanding of these rules as far as possible. 
A draft version and an interactive online version of the questionnaire were pre-
tested qualitatively by 12 individuals from the target population, major figures 
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from the banking sector and academic peers. Based on the results of pre-
testing, some minor revisions – such as clarifying instructions and specifying 
terms and concepts – were made to the questionnaire. The interactive online 
version was also pre-tested quantitatively by 34 students. Some adjustments 
needed to be made regarding the wording of the items, since three scales 
showed low reliability (self-efficacy, response costs and locus of control). For the 
main study, participants were recruited by an external recruitment service of 
online survey panels. The questionnaire was online in May-June 2015. 
6.3.2 Survey participants 
In total, 1,200 Dutch users of online banking services completely filled out the 
online questionnaire. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 85 years (M = 49, SD 
= 14.5) and the gender distribution was 55% female and 45% male. 
Participants had completed at most: lower secondary education (15%), upper 
secondary education (32%) or higher education (53%) and were employed 
(54%), self-employed (7%), retired (19%) or had a different work status (20%) 
such as student and unemployed. 
They were experienced internet users as more than half of the participants 
indicated that they having made use of it for over 15 years (53%) and about a 
third between 11-15 years (30%). One in 25 indicated as having used the 
internet for five years or less (4%) and one in eight for 6-10 years (13%). 
Besides online banking, they used the internet for various purposes, most 
notably for e-mail (98%), searching for information (90%), buying products or 
services (80%), reading news (79%) and social networking (66%). The majority 
of participants were frequently online, that is, more than 20 hours a week (39%) 
and between 10-20 hours a week (29%). About one in ten was less than 3 hours 
online per week (9%) and about a quarter between 3-10 hours (24%). 
Participants were reasonably experienced users of online banking. The largest 
group had 6-10 years of experience with online banking (44%). About a third 
was more experienced, having used it for 11-15 years (22%) and over 15 years 
(12%). Just below 1% had less than a year’s experience with online banking and 
22% had 1-5 years of experience. Online banking is frequently used to check 
the account balance. About a quarter of participants did this on a daily basis 
(24%) and over a third on a weekly basis (38%). The remaining participants did 
this once every two weeks (18%), once a month (12%) and less than once a 
month (8%). Making payments via online banking was done less frequently. 
Most participants did this once every week (30%) or once every two weeks 
(35%). The remainder of the participants reported doing this daily (4%), 
monthly (23%) or less than once a month (8%). 
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6.3.3 Data analysis, validity and reliability 
Partial least squares path modelling (PLS), using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, 
& Will, 2005), has been used for data analysis. PLS can be described as a class 
of multivariate techniques to study relationships between measured variables 
and latent variables and relationships between latent variables (Hair, Hult, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). PLS is compatible with multiple regression analysis, 
analysis of variance and unrelated t-tests, the results of which are special cases 
of the results of PLS, but which do not account for measurement error, while PLS 
does. As recommended by Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics (2009), we have 
used a standard bootstrapping procedure (N = 5,000) to test the significance of 
the model parameters. 
Component loadings of the individual items, except one item of response costs 
(RC3) which was subsequently deleted, loaded highly (≥ .70) on the 
corresponding component, providing evidence for uni-dimensionality of the 
items. However, we had to remove two self-efficacy (SE1 and SE3) and attitude 
(AT2 and AT3) items, because these items loaded high on protection motivation 
as well (see Table 6.1). Therefore, both constructs have been represented by 
only one item in the structural models, posing a potential threat to reliability. We 
chose to retain these constructs since these are important components in PMT 
and RAA respectively. Construct reliability has been assessed using the 
composite reliability co-efficient; for all items, the cut-off point of .70 was 
exceeded (see Table 6.2). 
Convergent validity was assessed using the average variance extracted (AVE) by 
a construct from its indicators, which for all, except for locus of control (.65), 
exceeded the cut-off point of .70. However, we chose to retain this construct as 
more variability in the items of locus of control was accounted for by its 
component than not. Discriminant validity was assessed by analysing the square 
root of AVE by each indicator’s construct, which should be greater than its 
correlation with the remaining constructs (Fornell–Larcker criterion). All values 
met this condition (see Table 6.3). Additional SPSS analysis showed lack of 
multicollinearity. 
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Table 6.1: Component loadings – original measurement model (full) 
 PV PS RE SE RC IN DN AT LoC PM 
PV1 0.89 0.17 -0.26 -0.24 0.24 0.17 -0.02 -0.15 -0.27 -0.17 
PV2 0.91 0.22 -0.28 -0.28 0.28 0.22 0.02 -0.18 -0.29 -0.20 
PV3 0.72 0.21 -0.17 -0.15 0.12 0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.20 -0.09 
PS1 0.22 0.86 0.06 0.16 -0.04 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.22 
PS2 0.13 0.87 0.11 0.25 -0.11 -0.05 0.09 0.31 0.09 0.28 
PS3 0.26 0.88 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.25 0.03 0.21 
RE1 -0.25 0.08 0.89 0.60 -0.32 0.00 0.33 0.65 0.59 0.64 
RE2 -0.23 0.03 0.77 0.47 -0.17 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.56 0.48 
RE3 -0.25 0.10 0.88 0.59 -0.33 -0.02 0.33 0.65 0.61 0.66 
SE1 -0.24 0.19 0.58 0.89 -0.46 -0.13 0.21 0.64 0.54 0.71 
SE2 -0.24 0.18 0.57 0.87 -0.42 -0.08 0.25 0.65 0.51 0.65 
SE3 -0.24 0.20 0.61 0.91 -0.51 -0.10 0.30 0.67 0.58 0.75 
RC1 0.23 -0.07 -0.29 -0.49 0.90 0.31 -0.02 -0.40 -0.31 -0.40 
RC2 0.24 0.00 -0.25 -0.40 0.85 0.34 -0.02 -0.27 -0.23 -0.30 
RC3 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.14 
IN1 0.17 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.25 0.88 0.20 -0.01 0.06 0.01 
IN2 0.20 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 0.36 0.87 0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 
IN3 0.17 0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.30 0.90 0.18 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 
DN1 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.28 -0.06 0.12 0.87 0.29 0.27 0.31 
DN2 0.00 0.09 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.19 0.86 0.27 0.29 0.29 
DN3 -0.03 0.10 0.34 0.27 -0.04 0.19 0.88 0.30 0.30 0.33 
AT1 -0.17 0.23 0.65 0.65 -0.37 -0.04 0.27 0.87 0.50 0.68 
AT2 -0.11 0.30 0.64 0.63 -0.33 -0.02 0.34 0.90 0.51 0.75 
AT3 -0.16 0.29 0.67 0.70 -0.38 -0.06 0.29 0.92 0.55 0.82 
LoC1 -0.26 0.13 0.61 0.56 -0.30 -0.02 0.26 0.54 0.83 0.56 
LoC2 -0.27 0.04 0.56 0.53 -0.25 0.03 0.28 0.46 0.81 0.49 
LoC3 -0.17 0.02 0.52 0.39 -0.19 0.08 0.29 0.41 0.77 0.41 
PM1 -0.14 0.22 0.58 0.66 -0.36 -0.03 0.32 0.71 0.49 0.88 
PM2 -0.19 0.25 0.65 0.69 -0.36 -0.02 0.32 0.72 0.53 0.90 
PM3 -0.18 0.26 0.64 0.76 -0.40 -0.04 0.34 0.73 0.56 0.90 
PM4 -0.16 0.25 0.66 0.72 -0.39 -0.07 0.29 0.83 0.55 0.90 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. RE: response efficacy. SE: self-
efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive norms. DN: descriptive norms. AT: attitude. 
LoC: locus of control. PM: protection motivation. 
 
Table 6.2: Descriptives and coefficients of reliability and convergent validity 
 Mean 
(M) 
Standard 
deviation (SD) 
Average variance  
extracted (AVE) 
Composite  
Reliability (CR) 
Perceived vulnerability 2.61 0.71 0.71 0.88 
Perceived severity 3.96 0.76 0.76 0.90 
Response efficacy 4.18 0.67 0.72 0.88 
Self-efficacy 4.38 0.70 1.00 1.00 
Response costs 2.12 0.86 0.77 0.87 
Attitude 4.49 0.67 1.00 1.00 
Injunctive norms 2.59 1.02 0.65 0.84 
Descriptive norms 3.60 0.74 0.76 0.90 
Locus of control 4.04 0.71 0.64 0.84 
Protection motivation 4.38 0.64 0.80 0.94 
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Table 6.3: Coefficients of discriminant validity 
 PV PS RE SE RC AT IN DN LoC PM 
PV 0.84          
PS 0.22 0.87         
RE -0.29 0.09 0.85        
SE -0.24 0.18 0.57 1.00       
RC 0.27 -0.05 -0.31 -0.40 0.88      
AT -0.18 0.24 0.64 0.60 -0.36 1.00     
IN 0.21 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.38 -0.05 0.81    
DN 0.00 0.12 0.37 0.25 -0.03 0.27 0.14 0.87   
LoC -0.30 0.09 0.70 0.52 -0.30 0.51 -0.01 0.34 0.80  
PM -0.19 0.28 0.71 0.65 -0.40 0.68 -0.09 0.36 0.61 0.89 
Note. Off-diagonal values are correlations. Diagonal values are square root of average 
extracted variances. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. RE: response 
efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. AT: attitude. IN: injunctive norms. DN: 
descriptive norms. LoC: locus of control. PM: protection motivation. 
6.4 Results 
The structural models with the test results are presented in Figures 6.1-6.3. The 
asterisks indicate a significance level of p < .001 and ‘ns’ stands for not 
significant. We evaluated the significance of the model predictors of 
precautionary online behaviour. 
In total, 64% of variance in precautionary online behaviour is explained by 
PMT’s predictors perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy, 
self-efficacy and response costs (Figure 6.1). The strongest positive predictor is 
response efficacy, followed by self-efficacy and perceived severity and the 
negative predictor response costs. Perceived vulnerability has no significant 
effect on precautionary online behaviour. 
Further, 63% of variance in precautionary online behaviour is explained by 
RAA’s predictors attitude, injunctive norms, descriptive norms, self-efficacy and 
locus of control (Figure 6.2). The strongest positive predictor is attitude, 
followed by self-efficacy, locus of control (internal) and descriptive norms. 
Injunctive norms have no significant effect on precautionary online behaviour. 
In addition to evaluating the explained variance of both structural models, we 
also calculated the effect size. According to Hair et al. (2014), this provides 
information on how substantive the impact is of both the models. In terms of the 
effect size f2, the additional variance explained by PMT over and above RAA (f2 
= .16) and the additional variance explained by RAA over and above PMT (f2 
= .13), both represent an approximately medium effect (f2 = .15 [Hair et al., 
2014]). 
  
 Chapter 6 
 
129 
Figure 6.1: Structural model PMT variables Figure 6.2: Structural model RAA variables 
  
 
In the integrated model, explained variance of 68% is highest (Figure 6.3). The 
PMT variables perceived severity, response efficacy and response costs, the RAA 
variables attitude, descriptive norms and locus of control, and self-efficacy from 
both models are significant predictors of precautionary online behaviour (see 
Figures 6.1-6.3). Therefore, all hypotheses are accepted, except for H1 and H7 – 
thus, perceived vulnerability and injunctive norms are not significant predictors. 
Figure 6.3: Structural model PMT-RAA variables 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion and discussion 
Our study has some limitations. First, the attitude construct contains one item 
only for hypotheses-testing, which potentially threatens reliability. Only three 
items were included in the questionnaire to measure this rather complex 
construct. Although the scale itself was reliable, two items loaded too heavily on 
protection motivation. Future research could make use of a more robust 
measure of attitude, as its explanatory power is often shown (Ifinedo, 2012, 
2014; Venkatesh et al., 2003). However, Herath and Rao (2009) found no 
significant relationship between attitude and security policy compliance. They 
attributed this result to factors such as context, sample and other extraneous 
factors. Furthermore, they argue that the predictive power of attitude might be 
reduced by the inclusion of other constructs, such as self-efficacy and norms. 
Hence, the precise effect of attitude in this regard is an interesting topic for 
future research. 
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A second limitation can be attributed to the self-efficacy construct, which is 
represented by only one item for hypotheses-testing as well, also possibly 
threatening reliability. Similar to the attitude scale, the self-efficacy scale itself 
was reliable, but again two items loaded too heavily on protection motivation. 
Future research needs to address this limitation by using a more robust 
measure. Specifically, multiple-item measures lead towards higher predictive 
validity (Hair et al., 2014), which could mean that self-efficacy could be an even 
a stronger predictor than it already is. 
Third, we relied on self-reported behavioural intention, which could be 
considered a limitation. Therefore, we recommend observing actual behaviour in 
future studies, particularly to overcome the intention-behaviour gap (see also 
Boss et al.’s [2015] commentary on PMT studies and Crossler et al.’s [2013] 
agenda for future behavioural information security research). 
The aim of our study was to evaluate the usefulness of PMT and RAA in 
explaining precautionary online behaviour. PMT and RAA both show good 
explanatory power, which indicates that both seem valuable in explaining this 
kind of behaviour. A main contribution of the combined model is that it shows 
that the individual predictors of the two constituent models (PMT and RAA) 
remain significant, thereby potentially providing practitioners more opportunities 
for prevention through increasing people’s precautionary behaviour. Significant 
predictors should, for example, be emphasised in prevention campaigns in an 
effort to achieve behavioural change. Increased precautionary behaviour of end 
users is beneficial for banks, as it might reduce the number of online banking 
fraud incidents. 
Among the predictor variables of PMT, response efficacy and self-efficacy are 
most important. This means that the more effective a measure is perceived to 
be and the better the perceived ability of carrying out a measure, the more 
likely precautionary behaviour is, which concurs with previous studies (Crossler, 
2010; Ifinedo, 2012; Lee, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Workman et al., 2008). In 
contrast to Sommestad et al.’s (2015) findings, our results show that coping 
response (from PMT) is significant in explaining variance. Attitude, from RAA, 
can also be considered a primary predictor variable. The more positive the 
attitude towards precautionary online behaviour, the more likely such behaviour 
is, which has also been demonstrated in earlier studies (Anderson & Agarwal, 
2010; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; Venkatesh et al., 2003). Scholars and 
practitioners should acknowledge these primary variables when developing 
prevention campaigns. 
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Secondary determinants of explaining precautionary online behaviour, which 
behave in accordance with literature, are: perceived severity (Chenoweth et al., 
2009; Gurung, Luo, & Liao, 2009; Lee, 2011; Vance et al., 2012; Workman et 
al., 2008) and locus of control (Ifinedo, 2014; Workman et al., 2008). If end 
users evaluate the impact of a threat as high and believe that threat prevention 
is something they are in control of (internal locus of control), they will be more 
likely to adopt a recommended coping measure. Therefore, these variables 
should also be considered when implementing prevention strategies. Moreover, 
underscoring personal responsibility is found to be an important aspect in 
stimulating protection motivation (Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, & Cotten, 
2015; Shillair et al., 2015). 
The final two constructs that are significant predictors of protection motivation 
are: the negative predictor response costs and the positive predictor descriptive 
norms. Both are in the proposed direction, as was expected based on literature 
(Chenoweth et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; Lee, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; 
Vance et al., 2012). This means that when end users consider the costs of a 
measure as not outweighing its benefits and believe that others are taking 
precautions, they are likely to (also) perform precautionary online behaviour. 
The former is important for banks, as this means that they should find a 
favourable balance between the usability of their services and the tangible and 
intangible costs of precautionary measures. The latter could, for example, be 
achieved by showing in prevention campaigns how others are taking 
precautionary measures. 
Perceived vulnerability has no significant effect on protection motivation. Earlier 
studies found mixed results for this construct. Gurung et al. (2009) and Vance et 
al. (2012) also reported a non-significant relationship. However, Chenoweth et 
al. (2009), Lee (2011) and Workman et al. (2008) found a positive relationship 
between perceived vulnerability and protection motivation. Crossler’s (2010) 
study on the other hand, revealed a negative relationship. He explains that 
different outcomes can be attributed to the specific threats and behaviours 
studied and that future research is necessary to determine its true relationship. 
Injunctive norms are non-significant as well, contradicting earlier studies 
(Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012, 2014). However, contrary to our study, 
these studies took place in organisations, while security of online banking may 
be seen as an individual rather than a social issue. It is probably not a subject 
that is often addressed in social conversations. 
Although there seems to be overlap between the models, it is important to 
stress that theory is advanced by testing the usefulness of these theories in the 
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study of online behaviours. However, considering the advancement of theory, 
Ogden (2003) argues that this is problematic due to the unspecific nature of the 
constructs involved. Indeed, though the scales we used and the relationships we 
found were predetermined based on theory, the questionnaire items needed to 
be specified to the online domain in general and specifically to the online 
banking context. Another problem Ogden (2003) identifies is that social 
cognitive models often rely on analytic truths instead of synthetic truths. 
Qualitative exploratory research is recommended to identify predictor variables 
that are accountable for the variance we were not able to explain. 
For now, it seems that the integrated model is most effective in explaining 
variance. This conclusion is consistent with the work of Herath and Rao (2009) 
and Ifinedo (2012). However, as explained by Lippke and Ziegelmann (2008), 
one theory can be more suitable for explaining a specific behaviour across 
populations and another for explaining diverse behaviours in a specific 
population. It is uncertain to what extent the results are generalizable to other 
countries, since different countries have different payment cultures. For 
example, the uptake of online banking is high in The Netherlands and Nordic 
countries as compared to other European countries (Eurostat, 2016). 
Additionally, other cultural differences, such as uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance – both within and between countries – could have an influence on 
precautionary online behaviour (Crossler et al., 2013). Besides, the political and 
economic situation of a country (Aldás-Manzano, Lassala-Navarré, Ruiz-Mafé, & 
Sanz-Blas, 2009) could also have an impact, for example, on risk perceptions. 
Future research is needed – across different domains, behaviours and 
populations – to advance our knowledge in behavioural information security and 
to understand which of these (or competing) models best explains precautionary 
online behaviour of end users. 
In conclusion, our recommendations for enhancing precautionary online 
behaviour should be tested in practice. A fruitful way forward might be using 
experimental manipulations of PMT and RAA variables, as recommended by 
Shillair et al. (2015), to find the most promising strategies. To our knowledge, 
studies that investigate the power of either model’s predictors to create 
preventative measures are lacking. Additionally, future studies could benefit 
from including measurement of fear and the effect of using fear appeal 
manipulations to enhance such strategies (Boss et al., 2015). Furthermore, it is 
important to find out how and how often end users should be presented with 
such information, to most effectively promote precautionary online behaviour. 
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7.1 Introduction 
As networked technology becomes increasing pervasive in our world, the 
burdens and responsibilities of people who use networked technology rise. 
Individuals need to protect their confidential information, such as passwords and 
credentials used for online banking services. Once third parties get a hold of 
such information, they can take over people’s (online) identities and access their 
online bank accounts. This is undesirable since it can seriously damage people’s 
lives and lower their level of trust in online financial transactions, which are 
essential in our economy. However, behaving safe online and being adequately 
protected against online threats is not easy. 
Technology alone is unable to protect people against online threats, which 
makes human behaviour of crucial importance (Furnell, Jusoh, & Katsabas, 
2006; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 
2009). Although people are often referred to as the weakest link in information 
security (Moore & Anderson, 2011) they can play an essential role in 
safeguarding information. According to Huang, Rau, and Salvendy (2010), it 
becomes increasingly clear that the human factor is the Achilles heel of 
information security. Therefore, a socio-technical or behavioural approach to 
security seems desirable (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010). 
This study focusses on the safety and security of a particular online service, 
namely online banking. With online banking, users have access to various 
banking services via the internet, such as viewing account balances and paying 
bills. Users can access their bank accounts online through a graphical user-
interface – facilitated by a web browser or app – on a device selected by the 
customer, such as PC, laptop, smartphone and tablet. 
Banks cannot control customer behaviour nor the devices customers use for 
online banking. This means that customers themselves have certain 
responsibilities regarding the safety and security of online banking. Moreover, 
customers’ behaviour is often the cause for online banking fraud victimization 
(Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2015). Consequently, customers should be able to cope 
with threats aimed at online banking. Therefore, customers should be aware of 
threats, try to prevent them, and when a threat manifests itself recognize it and 
act accordingly (Jansen, 2015). One way of preventing threats is taking 
precautionary measures. The question relevant to this study is how online 
banking customers can be motivated to take such measures. A better 
understanding of user motivations is required to enhance safe online banking 
behaviour. 
  Chapter 7 
 
135 
The aim of our study is to gain insight into factors that influence customers to 
take measures to protect themselves against online threats. We do this by 
developing a research model and then testing this. The threat central to our 
study is online banking fraud, which can be established in different ways, for 
example by phishing and malware attacks. The commonality is that a security 
incident occurred that involves the deception of a customer or a system used for 
online banking in order to obtain user-credentials and/or to gain control over a 
customer’s device which can be used by criminals for financial gain (Jansen & 
Leukfeldt, 2016). 
This study contributes to a better understanding of precautionary behaviour by 
customers of online banking.40 Precautionary or safe behaviour includes both 
technical measures and behavioural measures related to computer and internet 
usage, such as anti-virus software and conscious care behaviour (Rhee et al., 
2009). Research in this area is still limited (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Liang & 
Xue, 2010), also with regard to behavioural change (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; 
Ng et al., 2009). Moreover, little is known about security awareness and security 
behaviours of end-users using technology for financial transactions (Davinson & 
Sillence, 2014). The results can be used by scholars and practitioners when 
designing security education, training and awareness campaigns aimed at safe 
online banking, thereby empowering online banking customers to better protect 
themselves against online threats. 
Our study includes various unique features. First, our model includes the 
concept of trust. Second, unlike other similar models, the model we propose has 
not yet been applied to the context of online banking. Third, this study benefits 
from a large dataset of the Dutch population. Fourth, we test the model on 
different subgroups, which is often neglected in online-security research, but is 
recommended to further differentiate the findings by demographics (Hair, Hult, 
Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Indeed, this is a major topic in behavioural research, 
for example in marketing (Blackwell, Miniard, & Engel, 2001), but is also 
important in online security. Specifically, a practical reason for investigating 
demographic differences is that it could be particularly meaningful in that it 
sheds some light on how to raise precautionary online behaviour for different 
kinds of people. It could also provide opportunities to better understand which 
groups of people to target regarding online threats and preventive measures. 
                                               
40 In this chapter, precautionary online behaviour refers to the adherence to the safety 
rules of online banking and is operationalized as protection motivation, i.e., behavioural 
intentions. Note that these terms are used interchangeably. 
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Note that this study builds on existing research of Jansen and Van Schaik (2017) 
who evaluated protection motivation theory, the reasoned action approach and a 
combination of the two on their effectiveness of explaining precautionary online 
behavioural intentions in the domain of online banking. And also partly on the 
work of Jansen, Kop, and Stol (2017) who studied end-user perceptions of the 
safety and security of online banking. 
7.2 Theory 
The current study uses protection motivation theory (henceforth PMT) as a basis 
for developing our research model. PMT (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975) 
is a social-cognitive model that predicts behaviour and is often used in health-
related research, trying to predict and explain detection and prevention 
behaviour (Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). Although the original purpose of 
PMT is to clarify fear appeals, it has since been adopted as a more general 
model to study decisions related to risk (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). After several 
modifications, PMT has become one of the best explanatory theories for 
predicting one’s intention for protective behaviour (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & 
Rogers, 2000). 
PMT has increasingly gained attention in information security research (Boss, 
Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012). It 
provides a good foundation for studies within this area of study (Herath & Rao, 
2009; Liang & Xue, 2009) and is deemed applicable in the domain of online 
banking (Jansen, 2015). The focus of earlier studies who adopted PMT ranges 
from compliance with information systems security policy (Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Ifinedo, 2012, 2014; Vance et al., 2012) to the adoption of anti-spyware 
software (Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009; Gurung, Luo, & Liao, 2009; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010) and from backing up data 
(Crossler, 2010) to protective behaviour towards identity theft (Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 
2012). 
According to PMT, two cognitive processes take a central place; threat appraisal 
and coping appraisal, which both influence protection motivation, the outcome 
variable of PMT. Threat appraisal process is performed initially (Floyd et al., 
2000; Liang & Xue, 2009), in which an individual evaluates the likelihood and 
impact of a threat. Customers need to be aware of a threat first and assess this 
accordingly. Thereafter, coping appraisal process starts, in which an individual 
evaluates possible coping strategies aimed at lowering and/or mitigating the 
threat. 
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7.2.1 Precautionary behaviour 
In PMT, the outcome variable is the intention to proceed, continue or avoid 
certain behaviour (Floyd et al., 2000). Taking precautionary measures aimed at 
safe online banking is the subject of the current study. 
7.2.2 Threat appraisal 
In the threat appraisal process, a user evaluates the level of danger linked to a 
security event (Crossler, 2010). Following the work of Liang and Xue (2010), 
this process is constituted by perceived risk, which in turn is influenced by 
perceived vulnerability and perceived severity. We have added trust in online 
banking as another predictor of perceived risk, as it might improve explanatory 
power of the model. Indeed, Yousafzai, Foxall, and Pallister (2010) 
demonstrated the importance of trust in understanding online banking 
behaviour. 
Perceived risk. Perceived risk, in the case of online banking, is the perceived 
potential of loss as a consequence of using the service (Yousafzai, Pallister, & 
Foxall, 2003). Individuals will change their behaviour based on how much risk 
they are willing to take that is associated with a certain action (Workman, 
Bommer, & Straub, 2008). Specifically, 
H1. Perceived risk positively influences precautionary online behaviour. 
Perceived vulnerability. Perceived vulnerability is a user’s evaluation of the 
probability that a threatening security event will happen to them (Crossler, 
2010). In this case, the extent to which a customer believes that he will be 
victimized by online banking fraud. According to PMT, perceived vulnerability is a 
direct predictor of protection motivation as well. Consequently, 
H2a. Perceived vulnerability positively influences perceived risk. 
H2b. Perceived vulnerability positively influences precautionary online 
behaviour. 
Perceived severity. Perceived severity is a user’s evaluation of the severity of the 
consequences of a threatening security event happening to them (Crossler, 
2010). In this case, the perceived seriousness of consequences due to online 
banking fraud. According to PMT, perceived severity is also a direct predictor of 
protection motivation. Hence, 
H3a. Perceived severity positively influences perceived risk. 
H3b. Perceived severity positively influences precautionary online behaviour. 
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Trust in online banking. Trust in online banking is ‘a psychological state which 
leads to the willingness of customers to perform banking transactions on the 
internet, expecting that the bank will fulfil its obligations, irrespective of 
customer’s ability to monitor or control bank’s actions’ (Yousafzai et al., 2003, p. 
849). Studies into online banking adoption have shown that perceived risk is 
lowered when an individual possesses a higher level of trust (Davinson & 
Sillence, 2014; Yousafzai, Pallister, & Foxall, 2009). However, too much trust 
can lead to over-confidence and over-confidence may, according to Furnell 
(2008a), result in careless behaviour. Thus, 
H4a. Trust in online banking negatively influences perceived risk. 
H4b. Trust in online banking negatively influences precautionary online 
behaviour. 
7.2.3 Coping appraisal 
In the coping appraisal process, a user evaluates a given coping strategy to 
mitigate or avert a threatening security event (Crossler, 2010). According to 
PMT, this process encompasses response efficacy, self-efficacy and response 
costs. Based on existing behavioural research in information security, we have 
added three variables to the coping appraisal process: locus of control, 
injunctive norms and descriptive norms. 
Response efficacy. Response efficacy is the perceived effectiveness of a coping 
response in reducing a threat (Milne et al., 2000). Our assumption is that if 
individuals are sufficiently convinced that a precaution will work, they are more 
likely to take it. Consequently, according to PMT, 
H5. Response efficacy positively influences precautionary online behaviour. 
Self-efficacy. We adopt the definition of Rhee et al. (2009) of self-efficacy in 
information security which is a user’s belief in being capable to protect his 
information and information systems. Individuals who believe they are able to 
take certain precautions are more inclined to take such precautions as compared 
with individuals who have less confidence in themselves (see also Bandura 
[1977]). Therefore, according to PMT, 
H6. Self-efficacy positively influences precautionary online behaviour. 
Response costs. Response costs are a user’s beliefs about how costly performing 
the coping response will be to the them (Milne et al., 2000). According to 
Crossler (2010), countermeasures are not taken when the costs, both tangible 
and intangible, outweigh the loss of a particular threat. Thus, according to PMT, 
H7. Response costs negatively influences precautionary online behaviour. 
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Locus of control. Whereas the emphasis of self-efficacy is on whether individuals 
feel they have the right skills and capabilities to achieve a goal, locus of control 
comprises a more interactive expression of the relationship between an 
individual and his or her environment (Tu & Yuan, 2012; Workman et al., 2008). 
According to Workman et al. (2008), this construct – which they see as part of 
the coping appraisal process – influences whether individuals take responsibility 
themselves (internal locus of control), in this case taking precautionary 
measures, or leave responsibility to another entity (external locus of control), in 
this case their bank. Based on these notions, 
H8. Internal locus of control positively influences precautionary online behaviour. 
Norms. Anderson and Agarwal (2010) stress the importance of studying norms 
as a predictor of security behaviour. In order to acknowledge this issue, we 
include the constructs of injunctive norms and descriptive norms in our study 
and place them – like Ifinedo (2012) – within the coping appraisal process. 
Injunctive norms are perceptions regarding what should or ought to be done, 
whereas descriptive norms are perceptions whether others are or are not 
performing the target behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Therefore, 
H9. Injunctive norms positively influence precautionary online behaviour. 
H10. Descriptive norms positively influence precautionary online behaviour. 
Based on the discussion above, the research model is presented in Figure 7.1. 
Incorporating all hypotheses, we expect protection motivation to be a positive 
function of perceived risk, perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy, locus of control, injunctive norms and descriptive norms, 
and a negative function of trust in online banking and response costs. Similarly, 
we expect perceived risk to be a positive function of perceived vulnerability and 
perceived severity and a negative function of trust in online banking. 
Figure 7.1: Research model 
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7.3 Method 
7.3.1 Design 
A survey design was used with outcome variables risk perception and protection 
motivation. The predictors included both variables from existing theory, in 
particular protection motivation theory, namely perceived vulnerability, 
perceived severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs, and the 
reasoned action approach (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), namely injunctive norms 
and descriptive norms, as well as demographic variables that could be influential 
on protection motivation. 
7.3.2 Participants 
Sampling was done by an external recruitment service of online survey panels. 
They first sent out an invitation e-mail, including a hyperlink to the 
questionnaire, to a small batch of respondents. This was done to check whether 
the invitation and survey systems were appropriately linked. Thereafter, two 
larger batches were sent out in order to achieve a full response of 1,200 
respondents. The aim was to achieve a representative sample of the Dutch 
population by means of stratified random sampling (by gender and age). As an 
incentive for their voluntary participation, the research participants received 
panel points that can be used for discounts at web shops or for donations to 
charities. 
In total, 1,850 people visited the online questionnaire. The responses of 36 
people were filtered out by the first question, because they did not belong to the 
target group; 14 mentioned to have online banking managed by someone else 
and 22 did not make use of online banking services at all. Finally, 614 did not 
(completely) fill in the questionnaire and were therefore excluded from the 
analysis. We were unable to obtain any additional information on the 
background characteristics of these people. The data were gathered in the 
months May and June of 2015. 
The data of 1,200 Dutch citizens who used online banking were analysed (658 
female, 542 male; mean age = 49.02, SD = 14.53). Respondents had 
completed primary or lower secondary education (15%), upper secondary 
education (32%) or higher education (53%). They were self-employed (7%), 
employed (54%), retired (19%), or had a different (work) status (20%), such as 
student, homemaker or unemployed. Seven in ten respondents considered 
themselves experienced users of online banking (70%) whereas one in eight did 
not (14%). The remainder of the respondents had a neutral opinion on their 
self-assessed experience (16%). 
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7.3.3 Survey questionnaire and procedure 
In order to develop the questionnaire, a literature study was performed, using 
the following international databases of scientific publications: ACM Digital 
Library, ScienceDirect, and Web of Science. Moreover, a search for relevant 
literature was performed in reference lists of useful articles. For the 
development of the questionnaire we were particularly interested in validated 
scales. The scales that we used and the sources we based them on can be found 
in Appendix III. 
The operationalization of the dependent variable provided a challenge, since 
there is no validated scale for safe online banking behaviour. For this study, we 
chose to base the dependent variable items on the so-called uniform safety rules 
for online banking, which are included in the General Terms and Conditions of all 
Dutch banks since the beginning of 2014. Before the respondents were 
presented with items to measure the dependent and independent variables, the 
safety rules were explicitly defined, to allow respondents to develop a common 
understanding of these rules. The five rules are (a) keep your security codes 
secret; (b) make sure that your debit card is not used by others; (c) secure the 
devices you use for online banking properly; (d) check your bank account 
regularly; and (e) report incidents directly to your bank.  
The items of the outcome variable thus represent multiple actions. Crossler and 
Bélanger (2014) argue, however, that this is not a concern, considering that 
precautionary behaviour against threats constitutes taking multiple actions. 
Moreover, we believe that this approach is justified by our aim to gain insight 
into users’ motivations for taking protective measures considering the safety and 
security of online banking, based on the totality of the safety advice given to 
them by the banks. In addition, we chose to refer to these rules, since they are 
relevant for Dutch online banking. 
Individuals can choose to adhere to the safety rules (i.e., adaptive response), 
potentially protecting themselves to threats associated with online banking or to 
neglect them (i.e., maladaptive response), leaving themselves potentially 
vulnerable. Respondents were asked to answer questions about their intentions 
to adhere to the five uniform safety rules. Intentions are presumed to be the 
most immediate predictor of actual behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In line 
with this reasoning, it is worthwhile to study people’s behavioural intentions, 
since influencing behaviour can be accomplished by influencing people’s 
intentions (O’Keefe, 2016). We adapted the scales from Anderson and Agarwal 
(2010), Herath and Rao (2009) and Ifinedo (2012), whose operationalisation of 
the intention measure also represented multiple actions. 
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The items of the pre-existing scales were applied to the current context and 
translated to Dutch, since the questionnaire needed to be filled in by Dutch 
respondents. The items of the constructs were presented in random order and 
used a 5-point Likert-scale, ranging from totally disagree to totally agree. The 
questionnaire was qualitatively pretested by the target group, academic peers 
and key informants from the banking sector (N = 9). After the required changes 
had been made, the questionnaire was programmed in LimeSurvey, an open-
source online survey tool. Examples of changes include making the instructions 
clearer, simplifying use of language and specifying terms and concepts. The 
online version of the questionnaire was also qualitatively pretested by academic 
peers and key informants from the banking sector (N = 5) and then 
quantitatively by 34 students, primarily to check scale reliability and completion 
time, leading to minor adjustments. Four scales were adjusted (trust, self-
efficacy, response costs and locus of control), mainly in wording, because they 
showed low reliability. 
We have addressed potential common method bias in several ways (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). First, anonymity was guaranteed in the 
instructions to reduce the likelihood of social desirability in the answers of the 
participants. Second, we instructed the participants that there are no right or 
wrong answers. In addition, we tested our data by performing Harman’s single-
factor test which indicated that common method bias was not a problem. 
7.3.4 Data analysis 
Partial-least-squares path-modelling – PLS for short – was used for data analysis 
using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). PLS was chosen over 
covariance-based structural equation modelling (henceforth CBSEM) because of 
the exploratory nature of the current study focussing on theory building and the 
predictive application instead of theory testing or confirmation (Barroso, Carrión, 
& Roldán, 2010; Hair et al., 2014). In addition, PLS does not require some of the 
assumptions imposed by CBSEM – including those of large sample size, and 
univariate and multivariate normality. Recent simulation studies have 
demonstrated that PLS performs at least as well as and, under various 
conditions, is superior to CBSEM in terms of bias, root mean square error and 
mean absolute deviation (Hulland, Ryan, & Rayner, 2010; Vilares, Almeida, & 
Coelho, 2010). In the analyses, a standard PLS bootstrapping procedure (N = 
5,000, as Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics [2009] recommend) was used to test 
the significance of model parameters. 
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7.4 Results  
We start by analysing the psychometric properties of the measurement 
instruments. We then analyse the structural model. 
7.4.1 Measurement Model 
Because of high cross-loadings with protection motivation, the items Self-
efficacy 1 and Self-efficacy 3 were removed. The item Response Costs 3 was 
also removed since it loaded low on the factor response costs (see Appendix 
III). Component loadings of the final measurement model are presented in Table 
7.1. Each item loaded highly on its corresponding component and considerably 
Table 7.1: Component loadings – final measurement model 
 PV PS PR TR RE SE RC IN DN LoC PM 
PV1 0.89 0.17 0.63 -0.33 -0.26 -0.21 0.24 0.17 -0.02 -0.26 -0.17 
PV2 0.91 0.22 0.69 -0.35 -0.28 -0.24 0.28 0.22 0.02 -0.28 -0.20 
PV3 0.73 0.21 0.55 -0.24 -0.17 -0.14 0.12 0.11 -0.01 -0.19 -0.09 
PS1 0.22 0.87 0.27 -0.08 0.06 0.13 -0.03 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.22 
PS2 0.13 0.86 0.20 -0.03 0.11 0.22 -0.10 -0.05 0.09 0.10 0.28 
PS3 0.26 0.89 0.37 -0.12 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.21 
PR1 0.60 0.31 0.85 -0.38 -0.23 -0.18 0.28 0.21 0.05 -0.22 -0.09 
PR2 0.68 0.22 0.81 -0.36 -0.32 -0.22 0.26 0.16 -0.03 -0.28 -0.20 
PR3 0.61 0.30 0.87 -0.40 -0.26 -0.22 0.26 0.16 0.01 -0.29 -0.13 
TR1 -0.35 -0.12 -0.45 0.90 0.40 0.24 -0.19 -0.02 0.15 0.41 0.24 
TR2 -0.26 -0.01 -0.29 0.82 0.43 0.24 -0.18 0.01 0.22 0.45 0.29 
TR3 -0.33 -0.10 -0.41 0.83 0.36 0.19 -0.14 0.01 0.16 0.35 0.19 
RE1 -0.25 0.08 -0.29 0.39 0.88 0.48 -0.30 0.01 0.33 0.60 0.64 
RE2 -0.23 0.03 -0.24 0.43 0.77 0.48 -0.15 0.08 0.28 0.57 0.48 
RE3 -0.25 0.10 -0.28 0.36 0.88 0.49 -0.31 -0.02 0.33 0.62 0.66 
SE2 -0.24 0.17 -0.24 0.26 0.57 1.00 -0.40 -0.08 0.25 0.52 0.65 
RC1 0.23 -0.07 0.25 -0.19 -0.29 -0.38 0.90 0.31 -0.02 -0.30 -0.40 
RC2 0.24 0.01 0.30 -0.17 -0.25 -0.33 0.87 0.33 -0.02 -0.22 -0.30 
IN1 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.27 0.89 0.21 0.07 0.01 
IN2 0.20 0.03 0.22 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 0.37 0.86 0.13 -0.02 -0.09 
IN3 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.31 0.90 0.19 0.04 -0.03 
DN1 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.18 0.32 0.23 -0.05 0.13 0.87 0.28 0.31 
DN2 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.17 0.30 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.86 0.30 0.29 
DN3 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.19 0.34 0.23 -0.03 0.19 0.88 0.31 0.33 
LoC1 -0.26 0.13 -0.27 0.41 0.61 0.45 -0.29 -0.02 0.26 0.83 0.56 
LoC2 -0.27 0.04 -0.28 0.39 0.56 0.46 -0.23 0.03 0.28 0.81 0.49 
LoC3 -0.17 0.02 -0.20 0.35 0.52 0.32 -0.18 0.08 0.29 0.77 0.41 
PM1 -0.14 0.21 -0.12 0.22 0.58 0.57 -0.34 -0.03 0.32 0.50 0.88 
PM2 -0.19 0.25 -0.16 0.26 0.65 0.56 -0.34 -0.02 0.32 0.54 0.90 
PM3 -0.18 0.26 -0.15 0.26 0.64 0.61 -0.39 -0.04 0.34 0.57 0.90 
PM4 -0.16 0.25 -0.16 0.26 0.66 0.60 -0.37 -0.07 0.29 0.57 0.89 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity.PR: perceived risk. TR: trust. RE: 
response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive norms. DN: 
descriptive norms. LoC: locus of control. PM: protection motivation.  
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lower on the remaining components, thereby providing evidence for 
unidimensionality of the items. Although self-efficacy is represented by one 
item, we retained this construct, because it is an important component in PMT. 
In testing the measurement model, reliability was analysed (Table 7.2), and 
convergent and discriminant validity were assessed (Table 7.3). The reliability of 
each individual reflective item is assessed by its loading on the construct of 
which it is an indicator, which should be 0.70 or higher (Henseler et al., 2009). 
All loadings met this condition and were statistically significant, p < .001. At the 
construct level, reliability was analysed using the composite-reliability co-
efficient, which needs to be 0.70 or higher. All the co-efficients exceeded this 
cut-off point. 
Table 7.2: Coefficients of reliability and convergent validity 
 Loading AVE CR SE ta 
Perceived vulnerability 0.71 0.88   
- PV1 0.89   0.01 87.05 
- PV2 0.91   0.01 158.63 
- PV3 0.73   0.02 36.75 
Perceived severity 0.76 0.90   
- PS1 0.87   0.01 70.69 
- PS2 0.86   0.02 51.30 
- PS3 0.89   0.01 85.07 
Perceived risk  0.72 0.88   
- PR1 0.85   0.01 77.50 
- PR2 0.81   0.01 58.27 
- PR3 0.87   0.01 105.50 
Trust  0.72 0.89   
- TR1 0.90   0.01 94.52 
- TR2 0.82   0.01 56.77 
- TR3 0.83   0.02 52.36 
Response efficacy 0.72 0.88    
- RE1 0.88   0.01 119.83 
- RE2 0.77   0.02 50.35 
- RE3 0.88   0.01 106.24 
Self-efficacy  1.00 1.00   
- SE2 1.00   NA NA 
Response costs  0.78 0.87   
- RC1 0.90   0.01 98.14 
- RC2 0.87   0.01 68.15 
Injunctive norms  0.78 0.91   
- IN1 0.89   0.01 79.20 
- IN2 0.86   0.01 78.18 
- IN3 0.90   0.01 92.89 
Note. AVE: average variance extracted. CR: composite reliability. 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000.  
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Table 7.2 (continued): Coefficients of reliability and convergent validity 
 Loading AVE CR SE ta 
Descriptive norms  0.76 0.90   
- DN1 0.87   0.01 68.24 
- DN2 0.86   0.01 70.97 
- DN3 0.88   0.01 85.58 
Locus of control  0.64 0.84   
- LoC1 0.83   0.01 61.29 
- LoC2 0.81   0.01 55.82 
- LoC3 0.77   0.02 42.13 
Protection motivation 0.80 0.94   
- PM1 0.88   0.01 70.66 
- PM2 0.90   0.01 93.92 
- PM3 0.90   0.01 125.07 
- PM4 0.89   0.01 89.16 
Note. AVE: average variance extracted. CR: composite reliability. 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000. 
 
Table 7.3: Coefficients of discriminant validity 
 PV PS PR TR RE SE RC IN DN LoC PM 
PV 0.84           
PS 0.24 0.87          
PR 0.75 0.33 0.85         
TR -0.37 -0.09 -0.45 0.85        
RE -0.29 0.08 -0.32 0.46 0.85       
SE -0.24 0.17 -0.24 0.26 0.57 1.00      
RC 0.26 -0.04 0.31 -0.20 -0.31 -0.40 0.88     
IN 0.20 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.36 0.88    
DN 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.21 0.37 0.25 -0.03 0.19 0.87   
LoC -0.29 0.08 -0.31 0.48 0.70 0.52 -0.29 0.03 0.34 0.80  
PM -0.19 0.27 -0.16 0.28 0.71 0.65 -0.40 -0.04 0.36 0.61 0.89 
Note. Off-diagonal values are correlations. Diagonal values are square root of average 
extracted variances. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity.PR: perceived risk. 
TR: trust. RE: response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive 
norms. DN: descriptive norms. LoC: locus of control. PM: protection motivation. 
Convergent validity – the extent of consistency among the items measuring a 
particular construct – was analysed using the average variance extracted (AVE) 
by a construct from its indicators, which should be 0.70 or higher (Henseler et 
al., 2009). All values exceeded this cut-off point with one exception: locus of 
control (AVE = 0.64); however, the AVE values exceeded 0.50, so – on average 
– more variability in the items of this scale was accounted for by its component 
than was not. Discriminant validity – the extent to which a measure of a 
particular construct differs from measures of other constructs – was assessed by 
analysing the square root of AVE by each construct from its indicators, which – 
according to the Fornell-Larcker-criterion – should be greater than its correlation 
with the remaining constructs. All values met this condition. Tolerance values 
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were well above 0.10 and VIF values were well below 10, indicating a lack of 
multicollinearity.41 In conclusion, the reliability, and the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the multi-item constructs were confirmed. Per 
participant, a composite score was created for each of the factors, using the PLS 
weighted-average algorithm. 
7.4.2 Structural Model 
Descriptive statistics of the latent variables (Table 7.4) show that model 
variables with the highest mean scores (between ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ on 
the response scale) were protection motivation, response efficacy and locus of 
control (the higher the score on locus of control the greater the internal control). 
Next-highest mean scores (between ‘neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘agree’ on 
the response scale) were for perceived severity, online-banking experience, 
trust, and descriptive norms. Variables with even lower mean scores (between 
‘disagree’ and ‘neither agree nor disagree’) were perceived vulnerability, 
injunctive norms, perceived risk, and response costs. 
Table 7.4: Descriptives and confidence intervals of model variables 
 Mean BCa 95% CI(mean) SD 
  Lower Limit Upper Limit  
Perceived vulnerability 2.61 2.57 2.65 0.71 
Perceived severity 3.96 3.92 4.00 0.76 
Perceived risk 2.59 2.55 2.64 0.79 
Trust 3.68 3.64 3.72 0.70 
Response efficacy 4.18 4.14 4.22 0.67 
Response costs 2.12 2.07 2.17 0.86 
Injunctive norms 2.59 2.53 2.65 1.02 
Descriptive norms 3.60 3.56 3.64 0.74 
Locus of control 4.04 4.00 4.08 0.71 
Protection motivation 4.38 4.35 4.42 0.64 
Online-banking experience 3.83 3.77 3.89 1.09 
Age 49.02 48.17 49.83 14.53 
Note. BCa: bias-corrected and accelerated, N = 5,000. 
The model variables and a selection of demographic variables were included in 
tests of the structural model. Demographic variables were selected if their 
correlation with protection motivation was at least .10 (small effect size for r; 
Cohen [1988]). Both online-banking experience and age met this condition and 
were therefore included. The results of testing the final structural model are 
presented in Table 7.5. Sixty-two per cent of variance in risk perception was 
explained by the predictors perceived vulnerability, perceived severity and trust. 
The strongest positive predictor was perceived vulnerability, followed by the 
                                               
41 Analysed with SPSS (version 23). 
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negative predictor trust, and the positive predictor perceived severity. Sixty-six 
per cent of variance in protection motivation was accounted for by the remaining 
variables. The strongest positive predictors were response efficacy and self-
efficacy, followed by locus of control, perceived severity (direct effect) and the 
negative predictor response costs. A further significant predictor was risk 
perception, as were descriptive norms, trust (negative direct and indirect effect), 
perceived vulnerability (indirect effect), online-banking experience and perceived 
severity (indirect effect). 
Table 7.5: Test results of the final structural model 
Outcome 
variable 
R2 Predictor  Mediator Beta Standard 
error 
ta 
Risk  0.62 Perceived vulnerability  0.63 0.02 29.64 
perception  Perceived severity  0.16 0.02 8.00 
  Trust  -0.21 0.02 8.86 
Protection 0.66 Risk perception  0.09 0.03 2.78 
motivation  Response efficacy  0.40 0.03 12.81 
  Self-efficacy  0.26 0.03 9.03 
  Response costs  -0.13 0.02 6.54 
  Injunctive norms  -0.03 0.02 1.26 
  Descriptive norms  0.08 0.02 4.15 
  Locus of control  0.15 0.03 4.80 
  Age  0.03 0.02 1.78 
  Online-banking experience 0.05 0.02 2.91 
  Perceived vulnerability  -0.03 0.03 1.25 
  Perceived vulnerability Risk perception 0.05 0.02 2.77 
  Perceived severity  0.14 0.02 6.48 
  Perceived severity Risk perception 0.01 0.01 2.63 
  Trust  -0.06 0.02 2.52 
  Trust Risk perception -0.02 0.01 -2.60 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000. 
Multi-group equivalence of structural model 
Subgroups in a population may differ on the effect of predictors on outcomes. 
Any differences may have implications for security education, training and 
awareness campaigns, in which particular variables that are especially influential 
in a subgroup may be emphasized. Therefore, the equality of model parameters 
between different groups, defined by gender, age, and education level, was 
tested with Henseler et al.’s (2009) procedure. 
Equivalence by gender. The results split by gender (Table 7.6) demonstrate 
significant differences between women and men on the predictors descriptive 
norms and age for the outcome variable protection motivation. First, the 
significant positive influence of the predictor descriptive norms was stronger in 
women than its non-significant positive influence in men. Therefore, women’s 
protection motivation was more influenced by the extent they believe that other 
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people take precautions against security threats posed by online banking than is 
true for men. Second, the significant positive influence of the predictor age was 
stronger in women than its non-significant negative influence in men. Thus, with 
increasing age women’s protection motivation increased, but this was not true 
for men. 
Table 7.6: Analysis of model parameters by gender 
Outcome 
variable 
R2  Predictor  Mediator Female  Male  p(|female-
male|) 
 Female Male  Beta Standard 
error 
ta Beta Standard 
error 
ta  
Risk  0.59 0.65 PV  0.62 0.03 20.78 0.64 0.03 20.93 0.73 
percep-   PS  0.15 0.03 5.44 0.16 0.03 4.64 0.65 
tion   TR  -0.22 0.03 6.70 -0.20 0.04 1.98 0.61 
Protec-  0.68 0.66 PR  0.10 0.04 2.65 0.07 0.05 1.51 0.34 
tion mo-   RE  0.42 0.04 10.67 0.37 0.05 7.32 0.24 
tivation   SE  0.26 0.04 7.03 0.26 0.05 5.54 0.49 
   RC  -0.15 0.03 5.31 -0.13 0.03 3.85 0.68 
   IN  -0.01 0.02 0.48 -0.05 0.05 0.91 0.51 
   DN  0.11 0.03 4.26 0.04 0.03 1.43 0.05 
   LoC  0.11 0.04 2.71 0.21 0.05 4.40 0.94 
   Age  0.07 0.02 2.96 -0.02 0.03 0.54 0.01 
   OBX  0.03 0.02 1.16 0.07 0.03 2.65 0.91 
   PV  -0.04 0.04 1.01 -0.04 0.04 0.82 0.53 
   PV PR 0.06 0.02 2.61 0.05 0.03 1.51 0.37 
   PS  0.12 0.03 4.60 0.15 0.03 4.64 0.72 
   PS PR 0.01 0.01 2.34 0.01 0.01 1.49 0.39 
   TR  -0.04 0.03 1.63 -0.08 0.04 1.98 0.22 
   TR PR -0.02 0.01 -2.45 -0.02 0.01 -1.42 0.68 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. PR: perceived risk. TR: trust. RE: 
response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive norms. DN: 
descriptive norms. LoC: locus of control. OBX: online-banking experience. 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000. 
Equivalence by age. The results split by age (Table 7.7) show no significant 
differences between people age 50 or under and people aged over 50 on the 
predictors of risk perception or protection motivation. The age of 50 was used as 
the yardstick, as we wanted to test age groups of equal size but that also seem 
logical (672 ≤ 50 years, 528 ˃ 50 years). Although differences between the 
groups were not significant, it is notable that the positive predictor risk 
perception in those over 50 was significant, but considerably smaller and not 
significant in those aged 50 or under. 
Equivalence by education level. The results split by education level (Table 7.8) 
demonstrate significant differences between those with (N = 630) and without 
(N = 570) higher education on one predictor of risk perception – trust –, and 
two predictors of protection motivation – norms and trust (the latter with risk 
perception as mediator). First, the significant negative influence of the predictor 
trust on risk perception was stronger in those with higher education than its  
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Table 7.7: Analysis of model parameters by age 
Outcome 
variable 
R2  Predictor  Mediator Age ≤50  Age ˃50  p(|Age≤50-
˃50|) 
 Age 
≤50 
Age 
˃50 
 Beta Standard 
error 
ta Beta Standard 
error 
ta  
Risk  0.64 0.59 PV  0.64 0.03 23.37 0.62 0.03 18.31 0.37 
percep-   PS  0.16 0.03 6.44 0.16 0.04 2.66 0.49 
tion   TR  -0.23 0.03 7.83 -0.18 0.04 0.06 0.83 
Protec-  0.70 0.61 PR  0.04 0.04 1.15 0.13 0.05 2.56 0.91 
tion mo-   RE  0.39 0.04 9.49 0.42 0.05 9.02 0.68 
tivation   SE  0.29 0.04 8.22 0.21 0.05 4.35 0.10 
   RC  -0.15 0.03 5.82 -0.11 0.03 3.10 0.83 
   IN  -0.04 0.02 1.58 -0.03 0.04 0.72 0.73 
   DN  0.08 0.03 2.72 0.09 0.03 3.20 0.62 
   LoC  0.16 0.04 3.91 0.15 0.05 3.20 0.46 
   OBX  0.06 0.02 2.72 0.05 0.03 1.77 0.34 
   PV  0.00 0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.05 1.32 0.16 
   PV PR 0.03 0.02 1.14 0.08 0.03 2.54 0.90 
   PS  0.16 0.03 6.09 0.10 0.04 2.66 0.07 
   PS PR 0.01 0.01 1.10 0.02 0.01 2.36 0.89 
   TR  -0.11 0.03 3.46 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.98 
   TR PR -0.01 0.01 -1.11 -0.02 0.01 -2.11 0.17 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. PR: perceived risk. TR: trust. RE: 
response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive norms. DN: 
descriptive norms. LoC: locus of control. OBX: online-banking experience. 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000. 
 
Table 7.8: Analysis of model parameters by education 
Outcome 
variable 
R2  Predictor  Mediator Higher education  No higher 
education 
 p(|HE-
no 
HE|) 
 HE No  
HE 
 Beta Standard 
error 
ta Beta Standard 
error 
ta  
Risk  0.62 0.62 PV  0.60 0.03 19.67 0.66 0.03 21.73 0.09 
percep-   PS  0.14 0.03 5.21 0.16 0.03 5.57 0.34 
tion   TR  -0.25 0.03 8.28 -0.17 0.04 4.66 0.04 
Protec-  0.64 0.70 PR  0.12 0.04 2.88 0.03 0.04 0.86 0.93 
tion mo-   RE  0.43 0.04 10.97 0.37 0.05 7.32 0.82 
tivation   SE  0.28 0.04 6.91 0.25 0.04 5.90 0.72 
   RC  -0.12 0.03 3.99 -0.14 0.03 4.94 0.67 
   IN  -0.03 0.05 0.67 -0.04 0.03 1.49 0.72 
   DN  0.04 0.03 1.64 0.12 0.03 4.02 0.02 
   LoC  0.13 0.04 3.06 0.16 0.05 3.52 0.27 
   Age  0.03 0.03 1.12 0.03 0.02 1.05 0.60 
   OBX  0.03 0.02 1.37 0.07 0.03 2.60 0.15 
   PV  -0.07 0.04 1.69 0.01 0.03 5.17 0.08 
   PV PR 0.07 0.03 2.86 0.02 0.03 0.85 0.91 
   PS  0.12 0.03 4.13 0.15 0.04 0.86 0.26 
   PS PR 0.02 0.01 2.56 0.01 0.01 0.83 0.89 
   TR  -0.05 0.03 1.40 -0.07 0.04 1.89 0.66 
   TR PR -0.03 0.01 -2.63 -0.01 0.01 -0.82 0.04 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. PR: perceived risk. TR: trust. RE: 
response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive norms. DN: 
descriptive norms. LoC: locus of control. OBX: online-banking experience. 
aBootstrap, N = 5,000. 
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significant negative influence in those without higher education. Therefore, in 
those with higher education risk perception was more strongly negatively 
influenced by the extent to which they had trust in online banking than was true 
for those without higher education. Second, the significant positive influence of 
the predictor descriptive norms of protection motivation was stronger in those 
without higher education than its non-significant positive influence in those with 
higher education. Therefore, protection motivation of those without higher 
education was more influenced by the extent they believe that other people take 
precautions against security threats posed by online banking than was true for 
those with higher education. Third, the significant negative influence of the 
predictor trust, mediated by risk perception, on protection motivation was 
stronger in those with higher education than its non-significant negative 
influence in those without higher education. Therefore, in those with higher 
education protection motivation was more strongly negatively influenced by the 
extent to which they had trust in online banking (by reducing risk perception, 
which then decreased protection motivation), than was true for those without 
higher education. 
7.5 Conclusion and discussion 
7.5.1 Exploration of main findings in relation to existing work 
Overall, our model shows a large amount of explained variance for both risk 
perception and protection motivation. Explained variance of over 60 per cent is 
not exceptional in studies that have used PMT – or an extension of PMT – as 
their outcome variable (Ifinedo, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009). In Figure 7.2, the 
main findings are summarized. Except for H2b and H9, all hypotheses are 
supported, which indicates that the model has good explanatory power. 
Considering risk perception, all measured predictor variables were significant 
and in the proposed direction, thus supporting H2a, H3a and H4a. This implies 
that when an online banking customer evaluates his chances to be defrauded as 
high – the most important predictor – and the potential impact of a fraud as 
high, he will perceive a higher level of risk. Conversely, if a customer has high 
levels of trust in online banking, then the level of risk perception is reduced. 
These findings are consistent with other studies on risk perception. Liang and 
Xue (2010), for example, found significant effects for the link from perceived 
vulnerability and perceived severity to perceived threat. Higher levels of trust 
leading to lower levels of risk perception is also found in earlier studies (Aldás-
Manzano, Lassala-Navarré, Ruiz-Mafé, & Sanz-Blas, 2009; Grabner-Kräuter & 
Faullant, 2008; Yousafzai et al., 2009). The negative impact of trust on risk 
perception was strongest amongst highly educated respondents. 
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Figure 7.2: Summary of the results (final structural model) 
 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, ns (not significant, i.e., p > .05), path-coefficients between 
brackets are mediated effects. 
Perceived threat has a positive influence on protection motivation, meaning that 
higher levels of perceived risk lead to the intention of precautionary online 
behaviour.42 This is in accordance with literature (Liang & Xue, 2010), and leads 
us to support H1. However, the strength of perceived risk on protection 
motivation is modest. We interpret effect-sizes as proposed by Cohen (1988); 
small (.02), medium (.15) and large (.35). This outcome is consistent with the 
conclusions of a meta-analysis by Floyd et al. (2000), who mention that, in 
general, coping variables show a more strong and consistent relation with 
protection motivation than threat variables. 
We also analysed effects of the predictors of perceived risk on protection 
motivation, both direct and mediated through perceived risk. Perceived 
vulnerability has a small, significant indirect effect and a non-significant direct 
effect on protection motivation, not supporting H2b. We found two studies who 
                                               
42 Unexpectedly, the correlation between perceived risk and protection motivation is 
negative, whereas the path-coefficient is positive. Liang and Xue (2010), who 
operationalized threat appraisal in a similar fashion, reported in their study a positive 
correlation and a positive path-coefficient. From studies that measured the effect of 
predictors of perceived threat – perceived vulnerability and perceived severity – directly on 
protection motivation and that included a correlation matrix, we observe both correlations 
and paths being positive (Ifinedo, 2012; Lee, 2011; Vance et al., 2012). Our result could 
be interpreted as effect reversal, a type of suppressive recast mediation (Koeske & 
Koeske, 2006). Based on additional analysis, it seems that response efficacy is responsible 
for the effect reversal. 
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also reported a non-significant direct linkage between perceived vulnerability 
and protection motivation (Gurung et al., 2009; Vance et al., 2012), whereby 
the first study reported that this outcome might be explained by a lack of 
knowledge of security measures by their respondents. However, other studies, 
such as those of Chenoweth et al. (2009), Lee (2011) and Workman et al. 
(2008), did find a positive direct linkage between these variables. Crossler 
(2010), who found a negative linkage between perceived vulnerability and 
backing up data, reasons that explanation of precautionary behaviour depends 
on the threats and behaviours studied and that future studies are needed to 
determine the true relationship of these constructs. 
Perceived severity has a moderate, direct influence and a small, though 
significant, indirect influence on protection motivation, supporting H3b. Several 
studies who measured a direct linkage between perceived severity and 
protection motivation also found this relationship (Chenoweth et al., 2009; 
Gurung et al., 2009; Lee, 2011; Vance et al., 2012; Workman et al., 2008). 
The significant negative (direct and moderated) effect of trust in online banking 
on protection motivation also seems logical, thereby supporting H4b. This means 
that when an individual puts a high level of trust in online banking, he or she is 
less inclined to take precautions.43 This effect was again strongest amongst 
highly educated respondents. 
The two most influential predictor variables for protection motivation are 
response efficacy and self-efficacy. Thus, the more effective a measure is 
perceived, and the higher one’s confidence in his ability to take the measure, the 
more likely the intention to adopt this measure. These findings provide support 
of H5 and H6. These relations are supported by various studies (Crossler, 2010; 
Ifinedo, 2012; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Lai et al., 2012; Lee, 2011; Liang & 
Xue, 2010; Workman et al., 2008). The meta-analyses of Floyd et al. (2000) 
and Milne et al. (2000) also found these two variables to have the strongest 
predictive power for protection motivation. 
                                               
43 A similar unexpected change to the one before occurred between the variables trust and 
protection motivation, i.e., a positive correlation and a negative path-coefficient. Although 
this might indicate a multi-collinearity issue, we could not find any evidence for this from 
our results. Moreover, a unique feature of our model is the inclusion of the variable trust. 
In particular, we theoretically derived two hypotheses linking trust as a predictor to 
perceived risk and precautionary online behaviour as outcomes. However, our review of 
the literature showed no existing published peer-reviewed research that studied trust in 
relation to protection motivation. Therefore, future research is needed to find out whether 
trust can be considered a useful predictor of protection motivation. 
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Response costs have a negative relation with protection motivation, which in this 
case implies that when individuals consider the costs of a measure outweighs its 
benefits they are unlikely to perform precautionary online behaviour. This leads 
to the support of H7. This outcome is also supported by previous studies who 
have adopted PMT as a theoretical framework (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Lee, 
2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Vance et al., 2012). 
The further coping variables also add explanatory power to the structural model, 
with (internal) locus of control amongst the strongest, supporting H8. When an 
individual believes that he is in control of the safety and security of online 
banking, he is more willingly to perform precautionary online behaviour. This is 
consistent with research of Ifinedo (2014) and Workman et al. (2008) who found 
a significant effect for locus of control on protection motivation. Customers must 
evaluate a threat as something that is within their control to prevent. 
Considering social norms, only descriptive norms has a significant effect on 
protection motivation, implying that when individuals believe that others are 
taking precautions, they will actually do so as well. Herath and Rao (2009) found 
a similar effect. However, this relationship is only significant for the female 
population, not for the male population and for people without higher education 
as opposed to those with higher education. Injunctive norms were unsuccessful 
in explaining precautionary online behaviour. This contradicts with earlier studies 
(Herath & Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012, 2014). However, the earlier studies 
measured norms within a business setting, whereas our study measured norms 
within a social setting. Our non-significant finding might be due to the 
behaviours studied or that safe online banking is not a topic frequently 
addressed in social conversations. Hence, apart from the small influence of 
descriptive norms, precautionary online behaviour related to online banking 
seems more an individual matter than a social issue. In sum, H10 is supported 
and H9 not. 
Finally, two control variables are included in the final structural model. Although 
age was not a significant predictor variable for precautionary online behaviour, 
the influence of age differs between male and female respondents. With 
increasing age, women are more inclined to perform precautionary behaviour 
towards online banking than men, although the effect sizes are small in both 
conditions. The other control variable, online-banking experience, has a 
significant, though small, effect on protection motivation. This means that the 
longer a customer has made use of online banking services, the more inclined he 
is to have taken security measures. This finding may be related to Mannan and 
Van Oorschot’s (2008) work; according to them, people who have adopted 
online banking later in life are less technically literate. Chen and Bansal (2010) 
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claim that previous experience can have an impact on individuals’ security 
choices. This implies that more experienced online banking customers possibly 
better understand security issues and therefore are more motivated to behave 
cautiously. 
7.5.2 Implications of the research model and future work 
The first implication of our study is that the research model we proposed – 
which integrates additional variables within the PMT framework – is tested within 
the online banking context, making it a valuable tool for researchers studying 
protective behaviours in this context and for practitioners designing security 
education, training and awareness campaigns. Like others (Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Ifinedo, 2012), our study shows that it is fruitful to integrate theoretical 
perspectives from different domains. However, our work uniquely demonstrates 
this in the domain of online banking. 
Second, from a practical point of view, this study broadens our knowledge 
regarding behavioural intention of customers to take precautions against online 
threats and what influences that behaviour. By these means, prevention 
programs can be enhanced. Current campaigns often focus on recommending to 
take basic measures, not considering underlying cognitive dimensions. An 
interesting approach in improving security education, training and awareness 
campaigns lies within the coping appraisal process. From our results, the most 
important variables to consider when designing education and training material 
and campaigns are response efficacy and self-efficacy. This implies that the 
efficacy of precautionary measures promoting safe online banking behaviour 
should be clearly communicated and that these measures are easy to apply, for 
example by presenting clear instructions or by showing how others – people with 
whom target groups can identify with – apply these measures. Furthermore, the 
costs of the precautions – both tangible and intangible – should be kept low. 
Hence, it is important for banks to find an optimal balance between the security 
and usability of their services. However, note that cross-sectional research 
cannot provide definitive answers about causality. Longitudinal or experimental 
research designs are required to explicitly define how the relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables work. 
Locus of control is also considered an important variable predicting protection 
motivation. Therefore, banks should communicate that incidents related to 
online banking, such as phishing and malware victimization can be prevented, 
especially by efforts of customers themselves. When expectations are managed 
effectively, we expect customers to feel more in control about their online safety 
and, consequently, to take protective measures more easily. Moreover, stressing 
personal responsibility in communications to promote precautionary online 
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behaviour is supported by other research (Boehmer et al., 2015; Shillair et al., 
2015). 
Based on our results, security education, training and awareness campaigns 
could be more effective when the behaviours concerned are presented as the 
norm of what everyone does, especially for female customers and customers 
without higher education. Additionally, it might be beneficial to target efforts 
towards customers who have recently adopted online banking services, since 
online-banking experience also affects protection motivation but – by definition 
– new customers have limited experience. 
Although the effect of the coping appraisal variables on protection motivation is 
large, attention should still be paid to threat appraisal variables, since they do 
provide explanatory power. Hence, when customers perceive risk to be low or 
are unaware of threats, they are less likely to behave precautionary online. 
Moreover, as proposed by PMT, the threat appraisal process is deemed essential 
for starting the coping appraisal process. 
The outcomes regarding threat appraisal provide a paradoxical challenge for 
banks. For banks it is important that their target group is putting high levels of 
trust in their services since it reduces customers’ security concerns. At the same 
time, banks have to educate customers about threats targeting online banking 
services, in order for them to take precautionary measures. Banks themselves 
have limited control over the safety and security of the online banking process. 
They can protect their own systems and can provide their customers a secure 
connection, but they have no control over customers’ behaviour nor the 
(security of the) devices these customers use. We believe that customers should 
have or maintain a healthy dose of distrust or at least be adequately aware of 
the threats aimed at online banking, which also benefits banks. The challenge 
for banks is that they should inform and advise their customers in such a fashion 
that their customers become more resilient, but not evasive to using online 
banking services. 
Regarding trust, we found that high levels of trust lead towards less protection 
motivation, especially for highly educated respondents. A plausible explanation 
for this finding might be that highly educated end users are confident in their 
own ability to get reimbursed by their bank when an incident does occur. Our 
reasoning follows a finding of Van Wilsem, Van der Meulen, and Kunst (2013), 
who found a linkage between education and successfully claiming losses from 
unjustified money transfers from banks. From this perspective, it seems that 
highly educated end users have reasons to trust online banking rather than 
worrying about risks. 
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The study also presents some limitations. We encountered problems with the 
self-efficacy scale. Although the scale itself was reliable, two of the three items 
loaded too heavily on protection motivation. Because of the demonstrated value 
of the self-efficacy construct in previous PMT-studies, we chose to include it, 
with only one item remaining, which limits its reliability. Moreover, single-item 
measures lead to lower predictive validity (Hair et al., 2014). Therefore, future 
research could benefit when including a more comprehensive set of items for 
this construct. 
Another interesting issue is the relation between intention and actual behaviour. 
Our study focusses on intention. Although the linkage between intention and 
actual behaviour is evaluated as strong, consistent and theoretically grounded 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 2010), it is interesting to investigate this further, since 
there is often some discrepancy between what people report and what people do 
(Workman et al., 2008), that is the intention-behaviour gap. Sheeran (2002) 
argues, based on a meta-analysis of meta-analyses, that intentional behaviour 
on average explains future behaviour for 28 per cent. This may seem low, but 
the mean correlation Sheeran calculated between behavioural intention and 
actual behaviour is .53, which can be interpreted as a large effect size, 
indicating good explanatory power. Still, intentional behaviour and actual 
behaviour do not correlate perfectly. The intention-behaviour gap may be 
attributed to various causes such as the actual skills of people and 
environmental factors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Another factor that might 
influence behaviour – that is not mediated through intention – is habits or 
routines (O’Keefe, 2016). 
Consequently, it might be informative to observe people’s actual online 
precautionary behaviour, preferably over longer periods of time, for example by 
means of customer log-files in bank systems, diary research, eye-tracking 
studies or by analysing the software people have installed on their devices at 
their homes. Such efforts could furthermore rule out possible social desirability 
bias which is often found in survey studies. Obtaining actual behavioural data is, 
however, a challenge in behavioural information security research (Crossler et 
al., 2013). In addition, it might be relevant to study people’s mental models 
about online banking threats and how those relate to precautionary measures 
(see e.g., Wash [2010]). This could be done by means of in-depth interviews 
and might increase our understanding on people’s knowledge, intentions and 
actual behaviour and how these are related to each other. 
Finally, the implications that are sketched in this section need to be tested in 
practice. This goes especially for the integrated variables outside PMT, because 
the beta coefficients regarding trust, social norms and demographics displayed 
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small effect sizes (i.e., well below .15). Although theory integration seems 
profitable, future research needs to test how meaningful the implications are 
when applied to practice. Having said that, Shillair et al. (2015) recommend 
experimental manipulations of PMT variables in order to convince individuals to 
protect themselves online. In agreement with this, Boss et al. (2015) 
recommend using fear appeals to enhance such behaviour. We believe that such 
studies are relevant in demonstrating the practical applicability of PMT. This 
could assist banks, for example, when launching new security applications. 
7.5.3 Concluding remarks 
The safety of online banking cannot be guaranteed solely by technical solutions, 
the human factor is important as well. If online banking customers do not take 
precautions, the safety of online banking may be easily compromised. This study 
developed and tested a model of precautionary online behaviour to explain why 
online banking customers take measures to protect themselves against online 
banking fraud. Our results show strong support for the model, not only for 
precautionary online behaviour but also for risk perception. 
The most important conclusion of our study is that customers should have 
confidence in the efficacy of precautionary measures and in their own ability to 
actually perform a measure. These are the two most important factors leading to 
precautionary online behavioural intention. Moreover, both cognitive processes 
from PMT – threat and coping appraisal – are significant predictors of the 
intention to take precautionary measures. In sum, our study suggests that 
customer’s precautionary online behaviour, ensuring a safer online-banking 
experience, can be enhanced by acknowledging these dimensions in security 
education, training and awareness campaigns. 
The cognitive behavioural approach that we have taken in our study seems to be 
of added value of studying our research problem. It can help to improve the 
effectiveness of prevention efforts (Liang & Xue, 2010). We demonstrate that 
PMT – extended with additional, context-specific variables – can be a useful 
theory to apply to the online banking context, as proposed by Jansen (2015). 
Future (cross-cultural) research should further validate this model (Straub, 
1989), both within and beyond the online banking context. 
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8.1 Introduction 
In today’s society, the internet is becoming increasingly important for 
conducting business. Similar to the physical world, in the online world 
businesses need to deal with threats. In this study, we limited businesses to 
self-employed entrepreneurs, that is, own-account workers. Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS, 2014) reports that in Q2 of 2014, over 800,000 self-
employed entrepreneurs were active in the Netherlands. This kind of 
entrepreneurship is on the rise, considering that the figure was 330,000 in 1996. 
Henceforth, we use the term entrepreneur to refer to self-employed 
entrepreneurs. 
The internet has provided many opportunities for entrepreneurs. They use it for 
different purposes such as selling goods, gathering and storing data, 
communicating with clients and transferring money. The online sales volume in 
the Netherlands grew from 2.8 billion euros in 2003 to 10.6 billion euros in 2013 
(www.thuiswinkel.org). At the same time, entrepreneurs are facing online 
threats as the internet attracts criminals. Entrepreneurs, like citizens, suffer 
from cybercrime. However, it is difficult to substantiate this claim with actual 
figures, since incidents are not likely to be reported to the police. 
Cybercrime victim surveys in the Netherlands show that the percentage of 
crimes reported to the police is low for both citizens (13.4%; Domenie, 
Leukfeldt, Van Wilsem, Jansen, and Stol [2013]) and entrepreneurs (12.8%; 
Veenstra, Zuurveen, and Stol [2015]). Entrepreneurs may be reluctant to report 
incidents for several reasons, including the lack of financial damage, and 
perceptions that the incident is not serious enough or that the police are unable 
to solve the incident, and that the aftermath will result in reputation damage 
(Choo, 2011; Veenstra et al., 2015). These studies also point to the possibility 
that entrepreneurs may simply be unaware of the occurrence of online security 
incidents, and that incidents will be dealt with internally. Furthermore, 
cybercrime statistics in general are considered to be insufficient and fragmented 
(Anderson et al., 2012), and scientific research on cybercrime against 
businesses is scarce (Veenstra et al., 2015). Moreover, it is claimed that the 
current level of knowledge on crimes committed against micro, small and 
medium-sized businesses on the whole is limited (Schaper & Weber, 2012). 
Veenstra et al. (2015) studied the extent to which entrepreneurs were victimised 
by 18 different forms of cybercrime, ranging from malware attacks to online 
extortion. They found that 28% of entrepreneurs in the Netherlands were victim 
of at least one type of cybercrime during the year prior to the study. From 
research into traditional forms of crime targeted against (all types of) Dutch 
businesses, it is known that 31% was victimised in the year prior to the study 
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(WODC & TNS NIPO, 2011). Although the target groups of both studies differ, 
the above implies that guarding against online risks, like offline risks, should be 
an important part of entrepreneurship. However, small businesses in general do 
not spend large amounts of time, effort or money on crime prevention strategies 
(Schaper & Weber, 2012). An earlier study among small and medium-sized 
enterprises in and around Amsterdam, for example, found that security 
expenses comprise around 1.0% of sales (Masurel, 2004). The same goes for 
cybercrime prevention strategies (Dimopoulos, Furnell, Jennex, & Kritharas, 
2004; Gupta & Hammond, 2005; Sharma, Singh, & Sharma, 2009). It is also 
claimed that small businesses often have little or no IT security experience 
(Harris & Patten, 2014). 
Since more and more business is taking place online, entrepreneurs quite often 
(28%) fall victim to cybercrime and entrepreneurs tend not to invest much in 
crime prevention strategies, it is essential to determine how entrepreneurs can 
be motivated to protect themselves against online threats. We are contributing 
to the literature by studying a target group that is often neglected in information 
security research, namely self-employed entrepreneurs. Currently, there is a 
lack of understanding on how and why entrepreneurs actually protect 
themselves against cybercrime. Based on secondary analyses of data from a 
large, representative sample of Dutch entrepreneurs (N = 1,622) (Veenstra et 
al., 2015), our aim is to gain insight into what protective measures 
entrepreneurs take in order to protect themselves against online threats and 
what motivates them to do so. We use protection motivation theory (PMT) as a 
theoretical lens to study the research problem. The justification for this approach 
is that a better understanding of motivations is a requirement to enhance 
awareness and prevention campaigns which address the problem of online 
threats (Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008). The remainder of this chapter is outlined as 
follows. We present PMT in Section 8.2, followed by our methodology in Section 
8.3. We outline the results in Section 8.4, followed by a discussion and 
conclusions in Section 8.5. 
8.2 Theory 
PMT (Rogers, 1975) is a social cognitive model that predicts behaviour (Milne, 
Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). With its basis in the health domain, PMT has recently 
been used to predict and explain the motivation for applying protective 
measures in information systems (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Johnston & 
Warkentin, 2010; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012) both in home and in 
business settings (Jansen, 2015). 
The dependent variable in PMT research is protection motivation, that is, the 
intention to proceed, continue or avoid certain (protective) behaviour (Floyd, 
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Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). In this study, PMT is applied to explain why 
entrepreneurs take protective measures to guard against online threats. The 
measures are divided into technical coping measures, such as installing anti-
virus software, and personal coping measures, such as establishing rules for 
handling sensitive data. Instead of measuring ‘intentional behaviour’ as the 
dependent variable, as PMT suggests, we rely on ‘self-reported actual behaviour’ 
data gleaned from our dataset. 
Two cognitive processes play an important part in explaining protection 
motivation, namely the threat appraisal process and the coping appraisal 
process. The first process constitutes an individual making an evaluation of the 
likelihood and severity of a threat. This process is performed initially, since a 
threat must be observed first before one can take actions against it (Floyd et al., 
2000; Liang & Xue, 2009). The second process constitutes an individual making 
an evaluation of possible coping strategies. 
8.2.1 Threat appraisal 
PMT posits that when individuals perceive a threat, they will adjust their 
behaviour to the amount of risk they are willing to accept (Workman, Bommer, 
& Straub, 2008). As a result, we expect that perceived risk positively influences 
taking protective measures against cybercrime. Earlier studies on PMT have 
revealed this correlation (Lee & Larsen, 2009; Lee, 2011; Workman et al., 2008; 
Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2009). 
8.2.2 Coping appraisal 
The predictor variables regarding coping appraisal are, according to PMT, 
response efficacy, self-efficacy and response costs. Response costs, however, 
are not operationalised in the study by Veenstra et al. (2015), and are therefore 
excluded from our study. 
Response efficacy is the extent to which an individual believes a certain measure 
will be effective in reducing a threat (Milne et al., 2000). If an individual 
considers a measure to be effective, he or she will be more likely to implement 
it. We therefore reason that response efficacy positively influences taking 
protective measures. This relationship has been shown in several studies 
(Ifinedo, 2012; Lai, Li, & Hsieh, 2012; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Lee, 2011; Liang & 
Xue, 2010; Workman et al., 2008, 2009). 
Self-efficacy ‘concerns an individual’s beliefs about whether he or she is able to 
perform the recommended coping response’ (Milne et al., 2000, p. 109). The 
study by Veenstra et al. (2015) measured computer self-efficacy, which can be 
defined as ‘an individual’s perceptions of his or her ability to use computers in 
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the accomplishment of a task […]’ (Compeau & Higgins, 1995, p. 191). For this 
study, we assume that computer self-efficacy is an indicator for self-efficacy in 
information security. Accordingly, if an individual possesses the required skills, 
he or she will be likely to implement protective measures. Thus, self-efficacy is 
expected to positively influence taking protective measures. This assumption is 
supported by previous studies (Ifinedo, 2012; Lai et al., 2012; Lee, 2011; Vance 
et al., 2012; Workman et al., 2008, 2009). 
Based on the available data, we have added two additional variables to the 
coping appraisal process, namely attitude and locus of control, which may 
influence the outcome of the dependent variable. According to Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975), attitudes are positive or negative feelings towards certain 
behaviour. In this study, it is hypothesised that a positive attitude towards 
measures positively influences taking protective measures. The relationship 
between attitude and behaviour is often revealed in information systems 
research (Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, & Davis, 2003). 
Locus of control is the extent to which individuals believe certain outcomes are 
controlled by themselves (internal) or by others (external). Considering the 
safety and security of information (systems), people who perceive not being in 
control might assign responsibility to other parties, such as software developers, 
internet service providers or banks. External locus of control is undesirable since 
it is claimed that users themselves are vital for achieving online security 
(Davinson & Sillence, 2010; Liang & Xue, 2010). When people believe that 
safety and security are controlled by themselves and attribute responsibility to 
themselves accordingly, they are more likely to actively try to prevent online 
incidents from occurring (Workman et al., 2008). Consequently, we assume that 
internal locus of control influences the coping appraisal process by increasing the 
likelihood of taking protective measures. Studies by Workman et al. (2008, 
2009) produced some evidence supporting this assumption. Research by 
Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, and Cotten (2015) and Shillair et al. (2015), 
who both tested a concept similar to internal locus of control, namely personal 
responsibility, also found proof for this hypothesis. 
8.2.3 Control variables 
Finally, we include several control variables which might also be relevant in 
explaining the use of protective measures. The first one is ‘experiences’, which 
consists of one’s internet experience (average time of use per day) and prior 
victimization. Chen and Bansal (2010), for example, argue that experienced 
internet users might have a better understanding of online security threats and, 
therefore, are more motivated to protect themselves. It is also claimed in the 
literature that individuals who are victimised once think they could easily be 
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victimised again (Workman et al., 2008), which might lead to greater motivation 
to protect oneself. The dataset provides us with information on prior 
victimization in phishing and malware attacks, two common schemes that are 
used to attack entrepreneurs’ online banking services, for example. These are 
the most common attack types confronting entrepreneurs (Veenstra et al., 
2015). 
The second control variable is ‘entrepreneur demographics’, which consists of 
gender, age and educational level. These variables might be relevant in 
explaining which groups of entrepreneurs do a good – or not so good – job in 
protecting themselves against online threats. 
The final control variables are two ‘business characteristics’: dependence on IT 
and the amount of confidential information stored. Our assumption is that 
entrepreneurs who perceive that their business is highly dependent on IT are 
more inclined to take protective measures related to information systems than 
entrepreneurs who are not dependent on IT. Similarly, entrepreneurs who store 
large amounts of confidential data in their systems, such as customer data, are 
more inclined to take protective measures than entrepreneurs who do not use 
their systems to store such confidential information. 
8.3 Method 
Prior research regarding online threats has focused on the general public or 
specific groups, such as youngsters. Knowledge regarding cybercrime is scarce 
among businesses. In 2014–2015, Veenstra et al. (2015) conducted a study on 
cybercrime victimization among entrepreneurs to augment the body of 
knowledge in this underdeveloped field of academic endeavour. Their study was 
commissioned by the Dutch National Police and its main goal was to gain insight 
into the nature and extent of cybercrime victimization. The methods used in the 
original study include a literature review, an online survey and interviews. We 
used only the data gathered in the online survey for our secondary analysis. 
8.3.1 Data 
Veenstra et al. (2015) used a questionnaire based on desk research, interviews 
with stakeholders, people from academia and cybercrime experts. The 
instrument was thoroughly pretested, both qualitatively (by scientific peers, an 
external advisory group of stakeholders, and entrepreneurs) and quantitatively, 
before the final version was put to use. 
The Dutch Chamber of Commerce drew a sample of 10,277 entrepreneurs from 
their systems. They selected every 43rd entrepreneur from their alphabetically 
ordered database (N = 441,911). It is important to note that they could only 
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derive the addresses of entrepreneurs who had not opted out. Hence, not all 
Dutch entrepreneurs could be selected from this system. The researchers then 
entered the selected addresses in SPSS and randomly selected 10,000 
addresses. 
The selected entrepreneurs received a letter (followed by a reminder if they 
failed to respond) in which they were asked to participate in the study. The 
letter was sent in the name of the Dutch Police and included a unique log-in 
code giving entrepreneurs access to the online survey (which was available from 
2 June to 1 July 2014, and hosted via a secure connection), and the possibility 
to complete it just once. In addition, an announcement of the study was put 
online on the website of the Dutch Police and on the websites of several special 
interest groups in order to convince entrepreneurs of the legitimacy of the 
study. Respondent characteristics are presented in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics (N = 1,622) 
Respondent characteristics Count Percentage 
Gender   
Female 477 29.4 
Male 1,145 70.6 
Age   
  < 25 years 18 1.1 
25-35 years 166 10.2 
36-45 years 352 21.7 
46-55 years 510 31.4 
56-65 years 403 24.8 
  > 65 years 173 10.7 
Education   
Low (no, primary or lower secondary educationa) 276 17,0 
Medium (upper secondary educationb) 514 31.7 
High (higher educationc) 832 51.3 
Note. aNo education, primary education, lower vocational education and lower general 
secondary education. bHigher general secondary education, pre-university education and 
secondary vocational education. cHigher professional education and university education. 
Ultimately, 9,893 entrepreneurs received the invitation letter; 107 were 
returned to the sender. Of the 2,088 entrepreneurs who started the 
questionnaire, 1,976 completely filled it in. Of these, 354 completed 
questionnaires were excluded afterwards, because these respondents did not 
belong to the intended target group, that is, entrepreneurs with employees, 
inactive entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not use the internet. The 
results reported in this chapter are thus based on the answers provided by 
1,622 entrepreneurs, a response rate of 16.4%. 
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8.3.2 Secondary analyses 
The aim of this study is to gain insight into the extent to which entrepreneurs 
protect themselves against online threats and what motivates them to do so. 
Since the data are derived from a study that did not use PMT as a theoretical 
lens, the opportunities to operationalise the central concepts of the theory are 
limited. Appendix IV includes a description of how PMT variables were 
operationalised within the scope of the dataset. In addition, means and standard 
deviations are presented for each item. Self-efficacy was operationalised as a 
multi-item construct (ɑ = .96). 
IBM SPSS Statistics version 21 was used to conduct the analyses. Because the 
dependent variables are dichotomous (i.e., taking all technical coping measures 
[yes/no] and taking all personal coping measures [yes/no]), we made use of 
logistic regression analyses. The predictive ability of all independent variables 
was assessed via the Forced Entry Method, while controlling for the effects of 
other independent variables in the model. We chose for a default procedure of 
logistic regression analyses because of the exploratory nature of our study. We 
disregarded other techniques such as stepwise procedures, because they can be 
biased by random variation in the data (Pallant, 2013). 
Before running the analyses, the independent variables were checked for 
multicollinearity by means of standard multiple regression analyses. Correlations 
and collinearity diagnostics showed no signs of multicollinearity, meaning that 
the independent variables were not strongly correlated (see Appendix IV). 
Bivariate correlations between predictor variables and the dependent variable in 
both models did not exceed the cut-off point of .70. Collinearity diagnostics 
provided tolerance values well above .10 and VIF (variance inflation factor) 
values well below 10 (Pallant, 2013). 
8.4 Results 
This section presents results regarding protection against online threats. First, 
we discuss the protective measures entrepreneurs take against online threats 
(8.4.1). Second, we present the regression models and we outline the results 
regarding predictor variables (8.4.2). 
8.4.1 Protective measures 
The literature suggests that the adoption of protective measures to combat 
cybercrime is important. However, this poses a challenge particularly for small 
businesses due to a lack of resources (Gupta & Hammond 2005; Schaper & 
Weber 2012; Sharma et al., 2009). Entrepreneurs were, therefore, asked to 
what extent they take measures in order to cope with online risks. They 
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responded to four technical coping measures and four personal coping 
measures. 
Almost all of the entrepreneurs have taken one or more technical coping 
measures. Most entrepreneurs use anti-virus software (92.7%), up-to-date 
software (91.2%), a secure network (91.0%) and a firewall (89.5%). Some 
76.0% of the entrepreneurs have taken all four technical coping measures. 
Eleven entrepreneurs (0.7%) indicate not having taken any of the technical 
coping measures queried. 
More than 90% of the entrepreneurs apply rules for opening potentially 
unreliable files (93.2%) and for providing data to third parties (91.9%). In 
addition, the majority of the entrepreneurs adopt rules for dealing with 
confidential information (82.6%) and making digital payments (81.8%). In all, 
72.9% of the entrepreneurs take all four personal coping measures. In total, 63 
entrepreneurs (5.0%) indicate not having taken any of the personal coping 
measures queried. 
In summary, entrepreneurs take various measures to protect themselves 
against online threats. 
8.4.2 Regression models 
Direct logistic regression was performed to evaluate the impact of a number of 
factors on the likelihood that entrepreneurs will take protective measures. The 
first model explains 21.1% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in taking technical 
coping measures (Table 8.2). The second model explains 19.3% (Nagelkerke R2) 
of the variance in taking personal coping measures (Table 8.3). 
As shown in Tables 8.2 and 8.3, all coping variables make a statistically 
significant contribution to the models (response efficacy, self-efficacy, attitude 
and locus of control). The demographic variables of age and education level are 
also significant predictors in both models. It can be concluded that prior 
victimization (Table 8.2) and having stored confidential information (Table 8.3) 
significantly contribute to explaining entrepreneurs’ motivation for taking 
protective measures. 
Regarding threat appraisal, 70.6% of the entrepreneurs indicate being worried 
about online risks to a (very) large extent. However, we did not find any 
evidence that worry begets action in the sense of taking technical and personal 
coping measures. 
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Table 8.2: Regression model for technical coping measures 
 B S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant*** -6.414 0.606 0.002 
Threat appraisal    
Perceived risk 0.116 0.092 1.123 
Coping appraisal    
Response efficacy*** 0.673 0.105 1.961 
Self-efficacy*** 0.832 0.118 2.299 
Attitude*** 0.321 0.086 1.379 
Locus of control*** 0.307 0.081 1.360 
Prior experience    
Internet -0.087 0.064 0.917 
Victimization** 0.568 0.186 1.765 
Entrepreneur demographics    
Gender (ref. male) 0.132 0.139 1.141 
Age** 0.157 0.058 1.170 
Education (ref. high)*** -0.521 0.145 0.594 
Business characteristics    
IT dependence -0.081 0.053 0.922 
Confidential information 0.033 0.050 1.034 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01 
Table 8.3: Regression model for personal coping measures 
 B S.E. Exp(B) 
Constant*** -5.917 0.577 0.856 
Threat appraisal    
Perceived risk 0.037 0.087 1.037 
Coping appraisal    
Response efficacy*** 0.532 0.099 1.702 
Self-efficacy*** 0.748 0.113 2.113 
Attitude*** 0.395 0.083 1.484 
Locus of control*** 0.358 0.078 1.430 
Prior experience    
Internet -0.011 0.060 0.989 
Victimization -0.146 0.160 0.864 
Entrepreneur demographics    
Gender (ref. male) 0.094 0.133 1.099 
Age*** 0.242 0.055 1.274 
Education (ref. high)*** -0.497 0.138 0.608 
Business characteristics    
IT dependence -0.057 0.051 0.945 
Confidential information** -0.155 0.050 0.856 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01 
Regarding coping appraisal, it is clear that more than half of the entrepreneurs 
is (very) much confident in the efficacy of measures (53.7%); 4.0% has (very) 
little or no confidence. Both regression models show a positive significant 
relationship between having confidence in measures and taking measures. 
Furthermore, entrepreneurs tend to report having the required skills to use 
computer and online technologies. The mean score was 3.0 on a 4-point Likert 
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scale. We observe from the regression models that self-efficacy is positively 
related to having taken both technical and personal coping measures. In fact, it 
is the strongest predictor variable in both models. 
Regarding attitude, 67.6% of the entrepreneurs find information security (very) 
important for their business, while 5.6% thinks this information security is 
(very) unimportant. It can be observed in both models that a positive attitude 
has a significant relationship with the implementation of the protective measures 
queried. 
In total, 89.7% of the entrepreneurs feel that they are responsible for keeping 
their information systems safe. Both regression models indicate the assumed 
relationship between internal locus of control and taking protective measures. 
About one-third (34.8%) of the entrepreneurs use the internet on a limited 
basis, that is, less than 2 hours a day. This includes internet usage for both 
private and corporate purposes. In all, 10% of the entrepreneurs indicate using 
the internet over 8 hours a day. The regression analyses show no significant 
relationship between internet usage and taking protective measures. 
Regarding prior experiences, we also asked whether entrepreneurs have been 
the victim of malware and phishing attacks. In total, 14.2% of the entrepreneurs 
indicated being victimised at least once by a malware attack, and 4.7% have 
been confronted with a successful phishing attack at least once. In order to filter 
out respondents who, for example, received a message from their anti-virus 
software that a malware threat had been successfully countered, or who simply 
received a phishing e-mail that they immediately deleted, Veenstra et al. (2015) 
explicitly differentiated between being victimised and having encountered an 
(unsuccessful) attempt. In total, 16.6% of entrepreneurs were considered a 
victim of a malware and/or phishing attack. Results show that prior victimization 
is a significant predictor for taking technical coping measures. 
When taking into account the demographic characteristics of entrepreneurs, we 
notice two significant predictor variables in both regression models. The first 
predictor variable is age. Our analyses show that the older the entrepreneur, the 
more likely it is that he or she will have taken technical and personal coping 
measures. The second predictor variable is educational level (high vs. low and 
medium). We observe here, in both models, that the higher the entrepreneurs’ 
level of education, the less inclined they are to take protective measures. 
Finally, we observe two kinds of business characteristics, namely IT dependency 
and level of confidential information stored. Nearly two-thirds of the 
entrepreneurs report being fully or to a (very) large extent dependent on 
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information technology (63.3%). In 45.1% of the cases, entrepreneurs store 
confidential information on their computer systems to a (very) large extent. We 
found one significant relationship in this regard, namely a negative relationship 
between having stored confidential information and taking personal coping 
measures. 
8.5 Conclusion and discussion 
For entrepreneurs, it is important that their IT systems are secure and function 
properly, especially considering the fact that almost two-thirds of the 
entrepreneurs depend on IT to a very large extent. Keeping IT systems secure 
involves both technology and people (Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010). We note 
that most entrepreneurs take one or more technical and personal coping 
measures in order to prevent online incidents. This leads to the conclusion that 
entrepreneurs in general do a decent job of protecting themselves against online 
threats. A limitation here is that only eight coping measures were studied. A 
study among IT practitioners in five different countries concludes that 
businesses across all company-sizes and industries do too little to prevent 
cybercrime (Ponemon Institute, 2012), especially when it comes to more 
advanced precautionary measures. It can be assumed that this also holds for 
entrepreneurs. Future research should include additional coping measures or 
more specific ones in order to paint a more complete picture of how 
entrepreneurs protect themselves against online threats. 
A less optimistic picture emerges when we critically evaluate the response rate. 
Although a response rate of 16.4% is sufficiently large to make valid 
statements, entrepreneurs’ interest in cybersecurity may not reliably be 
represented. It is quite possible that entrepreneurs were more likely to respond 
if they had a greater interest in this topic and/or if they had been victim of one 
or more forms of cybercrime at some point in the past. Those who did not 
respond may be less interested in cybersecurity and may not be likely to take 
adequate precautions against online threats. The main reason for not 
participating, based on a small non-response study (N = 26), however, was a 
lack of time – as time is money (Veenstra et al., 2015). Thus, this study cannot 
address the scope of inadequate online protection. 
In addition, although the majority of entrepreneurs who responded to our study 
take measures against online threats, about a quarter still reports being 
victimised by cybercrime. This implies that there is still room for improvement 
and consequently that it is important to educate entrepreneurs and encourage 
them to take (additional and/or more effective) measures to protect their 
systems and data. 
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We found self-efficacy to be the strongest predictor variable for the application 
of protective measures. Self-efficacy has a strong impact on protection 
motivation, which is in line with various PMT studies (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et 
al., 2000). Thus, having confidence in possessing adequate skills increases the 
odds of taking protective measures. This implies that education and/or training 
in this area could be of added value to entrepreneurs when it comes to 
safeguarding their business. 
Another significant predictor for taking protective measures is response efficacy, 
meaning that increased confidence in the deterrent effect of measures increases 
the likelihood that the individual will take those measures. This means that 
entrepreneurs should be made aware of the efficacy of measures and learn more 
about how they work. 
In line with the above, entrepreneurs should be made aware of the importance 
of measures, because having a positive attitude towards taking protective 
measures increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs will actually take them. In 
addition, it is advisable to communicate to entrepreneurs that they are in control 
of their own online security and that threats can be mitigated by means of their 
own efforts, hence emphasising their own responsibility. If an entrepreneur is 
confident that he or she is in control of the situation and feels responsible for his 
or her own online security (internal locus of control), the likelihood of taking 
measures increases. 
The importance of encouraging personal responsibility has been demonstrated in 
recent studies (Boehmer et al., 2015; Shillair et al., 2015). Shillair et al. (2015) 
recommend, based on an experimental study among a representative sample of 
internet users, emphasising personal responsibility towards users with little 
knowledge about online protective measures in order to strengthen protection 
motivation. More experienced users benefit from an emphasis on shared 
responsibility. Thus, they stress the importance of using a segmented approach 
based on prior knowledge. Boehmer et al. (2015), who conducted a study 
among university students, mention that online safety messages addressing 
personal responsibility help motivate users to take precautionary measures, but 
could backfire when presented to users who are uninvolved in security issues 
and who demonstrate low levels of self-efficacy. The findings above may be 
important for the entrepreneur population as well, and they provide an 
interesting perspective for future research. 
Generally speaking, educating entrepreneurs about the PMT coping appraisal 
process would seem to be called for. All measured variables in this cognitive 
process are significant predictors for taking protective measures. This means 
  
172 
that in prevention campaigns, information should be provided about the 
effectiveness of security measures and how to apply them, for example, by 
presenting clear instructions, providing information on why protecting systems 
and data are essential and emphasising the level of control entrepreneurs have 
in this regard. 
We also found that entrepreneurs who had been victimised by a malware and/or 
a phishing attack were more likely to have adopted technical security measures. 
This finding could be used to perform digital penetration tests on entrepreneurs’ 
computer systems or simulated social engineering attacks on entrepreneurs 
themselves. Once entrepreneurs are confronted with a security problem, they 
might feel the urge to protect themselves. 
In addition, it might be relevant to study to what extent measures were adopted 
at the time entrepreneurs were victimised. Perhaps not all measures are 
effective in preventing incidents. Our study started with the assumption that 
there is a positive relationship between taking protective measures and 
maintaining online safety and security. In order to test this assumption, it would 
be beneficial to conduct effect studies of individual or combined protective 
measures. However, it will be difficult to determine the exact effects of these 
measures, because internet applications and online threats are constantly 
changing. Furthermore, the current data give no insight into the cause-and-
effect sequence. Longitudinal research and in-depth analyses into this area 
might reveal important insights into revictimization as well. 
Considering demographic variables, we noticed that older entrepreneurs take 
measures to protect their IT systems and data to a greater extent than their 
younger counterparts. Perhaps older entrepreneurs are more aware of their 
relative incompetence regarding online security and are, therefore, more likely 
to take measures to protect themselves. Additional analysis of variance showed 
that entrepreneurs in the older age categories (56–65 years, M = 2.8; >65 
years, M = 2.6) reported having the lowest levels of self-efficacy compared to 
entrepreneurs in the younger age categories. Another possibility is that, perhaps 
because of their age, older entrepreneurs are simply more cautious than their 
younger colleagues. This corresponds to studies that show that younger adults 
are more careless regarding online security issues (Boehmer et al., 2015; 
Furnell, 2008b). We also found that the adoption of the measures queried 
decreases as the level of education increases. Perhaps highly educated 
entrepreneurs overestimate themselves, and are convinced that they will not fall 
victim to online scams or that their systems will not be compromised. Future 
research is needed to reveal if these claims are true. 
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Regarding business characteristics, we made a peculiar observation: the more 
confidential data an entrepreneur has stored on his or her system, the less likely 
he or she is to have adopted personal coping measures. We do not have a direct 
explanation for this outcome. Perhaps these entrepreneurs rely fully on their 
technical coping measures as opposed to their personal measures when it comes 
to securing such information. Another explanation might be that they feel 
beyond a doubt that confidential data should be treated diligently and that they, 
therefore, do not relate to this security need by taking personal measures. 
Accordingly, this issue is both interesting and concerning, and is worthy of 
further research. 
Supplementary socio-demographic and business characteristics (e.g., prior 
knowledge, online security involvement, business sector and revenue) might be 
included in future studies in order to increase the predictive power of the 
models. Moreover, such characteristics could potentially be used to target 
particular prevention campaigns at specific groups of entrepreneurs as discussed 
earlier. 
Over two-thirds of the entrepreneurs worry about their online security. However, 
perceived risk was not a predictor variable for taking protective measures. We 
believe that this might have to do with survey questioning. Only one item was 
included in the original study that could be translated into risk perception to 
some extent. Future research could perhaps find a relationship between 
perceived risk and taking measures when operationalised in a different, more 
reliable fashion, for example, by differentiating between perceived vulnerability 
and perceived severity. After all, PMT posits that the threat appraisal process 
initiates the coping appraisal process. Internet experience was also not a 
predictor variable for taking measures. 
Overall, entrepreneurs generally tend to take measures against online threats as 
things stand. However, much still needs to be done to enhance their resilience to 
online threats. Raising awareness and training are therefore essential. 
Governmental agencies or professional associations for entrepreneurs may have 
a key role to play in this respect. Schaper and Weber (2012, p. 353) state in this 
regard: ‘The most vigilant community is often the best-educated community’. 
PMT offers a useful starting point to enhance current prevention programs. 
The present study makes an effort in this regard, although the design of the 
original study presents some limitations. Because the original study was 
exploratory in nature, focusing on a wide range of topics and was not developed 
with PMT in mind, most of the variables we tested, self-efficacy excluded, were 
operationalised as a single item. This limits the reliability of the results. 
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Therefore, the results should be interpreted with some caution, as they merely 
present an exploratory observation on the problem. Although self-efficacy was 
included as a scale variable, it measured competence in the use of computers 
and online technologies (Sam, Othman, & Nordin, 2005; Torkzadeh & Koufteros, 
1994), rather than skills related to applying security measures, which could have 
increased its predictive value (Rhee, Kim, & Ryu, 2009). Likewise, locus of 
control is reflected by a single item explicitly relating to responsibility, neglecting 
items regarding the entrepreneurs’ level of control for outcomes. 
Future research should include validated PMT scales (e.g., Witte, 1996) for a 
more reliable investigation of the problem. Response costs should be included as 
well, because these are considered to be an important predictor variable in PMT 
and an important factor in business strategies. If a measure’s costs are higher 
than an entrepreneur’s perception of the measure’s effects, protection 
motivation may suffer. 
In conclusion, the importance of online safety and security for entrepreneurs 
cannot be understated and in fact merits greater emphasis. Our study indicates 
that PMT provides a valuable approach in studying precautionary online 
behaviour and helping to improve entrepreneurs’ security practices. More 
empirical studies should be carried out in order for PMT to achieve its full 
explanatory and/or predictive potential in this context. 
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9.1 Introduction 
End-users’ information security practices play an essential role in mitigating 
threats such as phishing scams, malicious software and distributed denial-of-
service attacks within modern, networked society. As more services are offered 
online and personal data are increasingly stored by digital means, people 
become more technology-dependent, but also more susceptible to security 
incidents (Furnell, Bryant, & Phippen, 2007). It is recognized that precautionary 
online behaviour by end users is important in safeguarding the online domain, 
because they play a central role in achieving online security (Furnell, Jusoh, & 
Katsabas, 2006; Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). This study 
investigates to what extent fear appeals can persuade end users to perform safe 
online behaviour. Attention to fear and fear appeals is currently lacking in the 
information security domain (Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015), but is 
gaining in popularity (Wall & Buche, 2017). Moreover, as stated by Briggs, 
Jeske, and Coventry (2016), the work on behaviour change interventions for 
cybersecurity is just getting started. 
Michie, Van Stralen, and West (2011, p. 2) define behaviour change 
interventions as ‘coordinated sets of activities designed to change specified 
behaviour patterns’. Interventions aimed at behavioural change are quite 
common in human-computer interaction studies, but less common in the field of 
information security (Coventry, Briggs, Jeske, & Van Moorsel, 2014). Persuading 
end users to adequately cope with cyber-threats will, however, not be an easy 
task. As noted by Fransen, Smit, and Verlegh (2015), persuasion plays a 
prominent role in everyday life, but persuasion efforts in themselves often have 
limited impact. They state that perhaps the most important reason for this is 
that individuals do not want to be influenced. Another potential reason is that 
people normally strive to reduce (mental) effort by relying on fast information-
processing (‘System 1’) rather than on deliberate processing (‘System 2’) 
(Kahneman, 2011). 
The current study focusses on protection against a specific online threat, namely 
phishing attacks, the process of retrieving personal information using deception 
through impersonation (Lastdrager, 2014). Phishing is considered dangerous to 
end users (Arachchilage, Love, & Beznosov, 2016; Arachchilage & Love, 2014; 
Hong, 2012; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012) and forms a world-wide problem (APWG, 
2015) for different sectors, such as the retail industry and banking 
organizations. For online banking for instance, it seems that everyone is 
susceptible to phishing to some degree (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2015). However, it 
is argued that, ‘an educated, informed and alert customer could play an 
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important role in improving online banking security and be better prepared 
against phishing attacks’ (Purkait, 2012, p. 406). 
Roughly four different types of intervention can be distinguished in promoting 
precautionary online behaviour by end users: security education, training, 
awareness-raising and design (Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012; Posey, Roberts, & 
Lowry, 2015; Van Schaik et al., 2017). Education involves developing knowledge 
and understanding of online threats and ways to mitigate threats, while training 
typically involves developing skills in information security. The aim of increased 
knowledge and skills is that they transfer to adequate levels of precautionary 
online behaviour (Van Schaik et al., 2017). Awareness-raising is involved with 
agenda-setting – or warning users – and focusses attention on threats and 
countermeasures. Effective security design should facilitate desirable user 
behaviour (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). Design might involve nudges in 
the environment that gently push an end user, without too much mental effort, 
to perform the right behaviour (Coventry et al., 2014; French, 2011; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2009), for instance by manipulating a default setting to protect user 
data (Briggs et al., 2016). 
Technical and legal solutions to combat phishing have been proposed as well 
(Purkait, 2012). Examples of technical solutions include automated phishing 
tools, e-mail filters and blacklists (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Hong, 2012; Ludl, 
McAllister, Kirda, & Kruegel, 2007), but these solutions provide certain 
drawbacks, such as false positives, false negatives and usability issues. In 
addition, safety cues tend to be ignored by end users (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 
2006) and are also quite easy to manipulate by hackers (Downs, Holbrook, & 
Cranor, 2006). An eye-tracking experiment by Alsharnouby, Alaca, and Chiasson 
(2015) showed that their participants spend only 6% of the time looking at 
security indicators and 85% at the content of the webpage when deciding 
whether a website is legitimate or not. Other research also demonstrated that 
end users are more focussed on looking for signs that demonstrate 
trustworthiness than signs that prove security (Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012). In 
conclusion, technology alone cannot provide the complete security solution; 
human aspects are essential to address (Furnell & Clarke, 2012). 
Although interventions are deemed important, the effectiveness of interventions 
is yet to be determined. In this study, we will focus on a combination of security 
education and awareness-raising, an approach which finds support from current 
literature on phishing (Arachchilage & Love, 2014; Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 
2007; Purkait, 2012; Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010). 
Educating end users and implementation – and proper application – of 
precautionary online behaviour are critical in protecting against phishing attacks 
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(Butler, 2007; Purkait, 2012). Although education has its limitations, given the 
complexity of the problem and a lack of interest by non-specialist internet users 
(Jakobsson, 2007), and will not solve the phishing problem on its own 
(Alsharnouby et al., 2015), aware and vigilant end users who practice 
precautionary online behaviour are believed to better identify phishing attempts 
(Purkait, Kumar De, & Suar, 2014). 
In this study, we focus on one type of behavioural context, that is sharing or 
disclosing personal information online. Personal information includes personally 
identifying, financial and demographic information (Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 
2007). Putting personal information online makes it easy for criminals to take 
advantage of that information (Shillair et al., 2015). Sharing personal 
information, like e-mail address, telephone number, employer, insurance details, 
birthday, social security number, name and address, (publicly) online might 
provide fraudsters with opportunities to (spear) phish someone. An experimental 
study in an organizational setting by Rocha Flores, Holm, Svensson, and 
Ericsson (2014) showed that when more target information was added to an 
attack the likelihood of an organization employee falling for that attack 
increased. In addition, studies on phishing have demonstrated that an essential 
part in a fraudulent scheme to be effective is end users give away their personal 
information, for example user credentials (Hong, 2012; Jansen & Leukfeldt, 
2015; Purkait, 2012). Therefore, demonstrating vigilant behaviour towards 
personal information sharing online is important to (a) prevent being attacked 
by means of phishing and (b) to prevent phishing attacks from succeeding. 
The goal of our study is to gain insight into the effects of fear appeal 
manipulations on end-users’ cognitions and subsequently on danger control 
(attitude, intentions and behaviour) and on fear control (resistance and 
avoidance). A novel contribution of this work is a focus on both danger control 
and fear control, which is ignored in most information security studies that focus 
solely on danger control (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; Wall & 
Buche, 2017). Additionally, testing the effects of fear appeals in three 
experimental conditions is rare in information security studies. Furthermore, 
most studies within the information security domain focus on behavioural 
intention only which is considered a drawback (Boss et al., 2015; Crossler et al., 
2013). Therefore, we investigate both behaviour and behavioural intention. 
Moreover, we examine the effects of fear appeals at two points in time, while 
most studies examine these at just one point in time (Wall & Buche, 2017). 
Finally, this study benefits from a large, non-student research sample. 
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9.2 Theory 
9.2.1 Protection motivation theory 
The leading theoretical framework used for this study is protection motivation 
theory (Maddux & Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975), henceforth PMT, originally 
developed to study disease prevention and health promotion (Floyd, Prentice-
Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). Although the original purpose of PMT is to clarify fear 
appeals, it has been used as a more general model to study decisions related to 
risk (Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Recently, PMT has been applied to the 
information security domain (e.g., Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, & Cotten, 
2015; Boss et al., 2015; Jansen & Van Schaik, 2017; Johnston et al., 2015) 
providing opportunities to study end-users’ motivation to perform precautionary 
online behaviour, a major focus in current (behavioural) information security 
literature (Boss et al., 2015). 
9.2.2 Threat appraisal 
Protection motivation is initiated by two appraisal processes. The first one is 
called threat appraisal, a process in which a person evaluates threats triggered 
by a fear appeal. More specifically, the person evaluates the vulnerability or 
probability of a threat occurring to him- or herself and the severity or impact of 
a threat. 
PMT studies that examine motivations of end users performing precautionary 
online behaviour have found mixed results for the threat appraisal process. 
Some studies found both threat appraisal variables to be significant positive 
predictors (e.g., Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Lee, 
2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2009). However, one 
study found both threat appraisal variables to be significant, but negative 
predictors (Crossler, 2010) and in another study perceived vulnerability had a 
positive influence whereas perceived severity had a negative influence (Ifinedo, 
2012). In other cases, only one of two threat appraisal variables were found to 
be significant predictors (e.g., Gurung, Luo, & Liao, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Jansen & Van Schaik, 2017; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012; Yoon, Hwang, & 
Kim, 2012). 
Considering that the above mentioned studies focused on different kinds of 
protective behaviour within different contexts, it seems that the predictive ability 
of precautionary behaviour by threat appraisal depends on the threats and 
behaviours studied (see also Crossler [2010]). Johnston et al. (2015) attribute 
conflicting outcomes of PMT-variables to the misuse or misspecification of PMT in 
an information security context, for example by not paying adequate attention 
to the requirement that fear appeals must be personally relevant to a receiver, 
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or the fact that fear appeals were entirely missing from a study’s 
operationalization. 
Personal relevance or issue involvement is deemed essential in communications 
about information security (Johnston et al., 2015). This factor is especially 
important since the involvement of the audience in a certain topic determines to 
what extent one will focus on, elaborate on and comprehend a message (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986), thus potentially influencing the effect of a fear appeal 
(Johnston et al., 2015). Besides issue involvement, other factors that have an 
effect on the investment of cognitive resources include time pressure, skill level 
and distractions (Luo, Zhang, Burd, & Seazzu, 2012). 
9.2.3 Coping appraisal 
The second appraisal process is called coping appraisal, a process in which a 
person evaluates components of a fear appeal that relate to possible strategies 
to prevent threats or to minimize their impact. More specifically, it deals with the 
person’s evaluation of the perceived effectiveness of the recommended response 
(response efficacy), the perceived ability or skills of oneself to perform the 
recommended response (self-efficacy) and the perceived barriers in performing 
the recommended response (response costs), for instance time and expenses 
(Milne, Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). 
Previous work on determinants of precautionary online behaviour shows that 
response efficacy and self-efficacy are the most influential predictor variables 
(Boehmer et al., 2015; Crossler, 2010; Ifinedo, 2012; Jansen & Van Schaik, 
2017; Lee, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). This 
is also true for studies in the health domain. Indeed, the meta-analyses of Floyd 
et al. (2000) and Milne et al. (2000) of empirical PMT research and the meta-
analysis of Witte and Allen (2000) of empirical research on fear appeals indicate 
that, in general, the coping variables show stronger relations with adaptive 
behaviours than the threat variables do. 
Response costs have been found to be a significant (negative) predictor of 
precautionary online behaviour (Chenoweth et al., 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Jansen & Van Schaik, 2017; Lee, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Vance et al., 2012) 
and may play an important part in making security-convenience trade-offs. 
Herley (2009) argues that end users make an implicit calculation of costs versus 
benefits when deciding to follow a certain piece of advice. He claims, however, 
that security advice often suffers from a poor trade-off and will therefore be 
neglected by end users. 
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9.2.4 Interventions based on protection motivation theory 
When PMT is used as a theoretical basis for interventions, the focus is on the 
operation of fear appeals, which are ‘informative communication[s] about a 
threat to an individual’s well-being’ (Milne et al., 2000, p. 107). Such 
communications also contain information on and promote perceptions of 
efficacy. Therefore, it would seem meaningful to speak of ‘threat and efficacy 
appeals’. However, we will use the term ‘fear appeals’, as this is consistent with 
the literature. Fear appeals thus include elements to raise perceived threat and 
increase perceived efficacy of a recommended response. The latter seems an 
important requirement for fear appeals because threat messages in themselves, 
under low efficacy conditions, have almost no or even negative effects on 
behaviour (Kok, Bartholomew, Parcel, Gottlieb, & Fernández, 2014; Peters, 
Ruiter, & Kok, 2014). Witte and Allen (2000) also stress that fear appeals will 
only work when complemented by an equally strong efficacy message. 
9.2.5 Protection motivation theory in relation to other theories 
Other theories of fear-arousing communications include the parallel process 
model (Leventhal, 1970), the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992), 
henceforth EPPM, and the stage model of processing of fear-arousing 
communications (Das, De Wit, & Stroebe, 2003; De Hoog, Stroebe, & De Wit, 
2005). A difference between these theories and PMT is that the latter focusses 
on danger control responses only, that is an individual performing actions to 
mitigate a threat. In contrast, the other theories mentioned also focus on fear 
control responses, that is actions that do not affect the danger, such as 
avoidance and emotional coping strategies (De Hoog et al., 2005). In addition, 
the EPPM also focusses on non-responses and the stage model also considers 
modes and motives of information processing and additional outcome measures, 
namely attitudes, behavioural intention and behaviour. 
Although PMT is the leading framework in the current study, we apply two 
additional components of the other theories to provide a more comprehensive 
view on the effects of the fear appeals studied. The first addition is that we 
study attitudes – both as an outcome variable and as a predictor of behavioural 
intention (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). This addition is consistent with the EPMM 
and with previous cybersecurity research using PMT (Jansen & Van Schaik, 
2017). The second addition is that we study fear control. According to Witte and 
Allen (2000), fear appeals often target two types of outcome. Outcomes of the 
first type are related to message acceptance (danger control), measured in 
terms of attitude, intentions and behaviours. However, fear appeals might have 
a counterproductive effect in terms of outcomes of the second type, message 
rejection (fear control), such as avoidance, reactance and denial. Boss et al. 
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(2015) stress that it is important to study such possible effects as well. We 
adopt two types of message rejection: avoidance or risk denial (i.e., efforts to 
direct attention away from stress [Green, Choi, & Kane, 2010]) and resistance 
(i.e., reservations towards the behaviour that is aimed to be changed [Van 
Offenbeek, Boonstra, & Seo, 2013]). It could be that the results of acceptance 
and resistance contradict each other. We adopt the viewpoint of Van Offenbeek 
et al. (2013) who conceptualize acceptance and resistance as two separate 
dimensions rather than an opposite ends of a continuum. By studying both 
outcome types, our study provides a unique contribution to behavioural 
information security research. 
9.2.6 Fear appeal manipulation 
A meta-analysis on fear appeals by Witte and Allen (2000) shows that medium 
to strong effects were achieved by fear manipulations on perceived vulnerability, 
perceived severity, response efficacy and self-efficacy. When predictor variables 
of PMT were manipulated, small significant effects were found for attitudes, 
behavioural intentions and behaviours. However, the effects on subsequent 
behaviour are often limited (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000). For the 
information security context, studies have demonstrated that fear appeals are 
effective in promoting precautionary motivations and behaviours (Wall & Buche, 
2017). 
It is not precisely known which components or types of information in a fear 
appeal are effective (De Hoog et al., 2005; De Hoog, Stroebe, & de Wit, 2007), 
although response efficacy and self-efficacy seem more important than raising 
levels of risk and fear (Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014). It is also not yet 
clear how fear appeals specifically impact end-user behaviour within the 
information security context (Johnston et al., 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010). However, a meta-analysis by Sheeran, Harris, and Epton (2014) 
regarding experimental studies on risk appraisals demonstrates that the largest 
effect sizes were observed for behavioural intention and behaviour when threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal variables were simultaneously heightened. 
9.2.7 Research questions 
The current study addresses the following research questions.44 
  
                                               
44 In this chapter, precautionary online behaviour and precautionary online behavioural 
intentions refer to demonstrating vigilance towards online information-sharing. Note that 
the latter is used synonymously with protection motivation. 
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RQ1: To what extent do end users share their personal information online? 
RQ2: What effect do fear appeals have on end-users’ cognitions (perceived 
vulnerability, perceived severity, fear, response efficacy, self-efficacy and 
response costs)? 
RQ3: What effect do fear appeals have on end-users’ attitudes towards 
precautionary online behaviour? 
RQ4: What effect do fear appeals have on end-users’ precautionary online 
behavioural intentions? 
RQ5: To what extent is the effect of fear appeals, if any, stable over time? 
RQ6: What effect do fear appeals have on end-users’ precautionary online 
behaviour? 
9.3 Method 
9.3.1 Design 
According to Milne et al. (2000) fear appeal intervention studies often comprise 
between a strong and a weak manipulation. This is because manipulations of 
argument strength are expected to have an effective impact on message 
processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).45 Furthermore, it is argued that argument 
quality – when processed via the central route – has a positive influence on 
attitudes (Bhattacherjee & Sanford, 2006; Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke, 2001). In 
contrast, Johnston et al. (2015) argue that in information security studies, there 
is a strong tradition of presenting one (or more than one) treatment to one 
group and no treatment to a control condition. Our study combined these 
viewpoints. Therefore we included the following three conditions: a strong 
intervention (strong fear appeal), a weak intervention (weak fear appeal) and no 
intervention (control condition). We chose to use an independent-measures 
design (one group for each condition) because this potentially increases external 
validity. In addition, it only requires one set of data per participant, making data 
collection convenient. The possible downside is that individual differences occur 
                                               
45 The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) assumes that 
attitudes are formed by a dual route. When individuals are involved with a certain topic the 
central route is followed (systematic processing). In that case, individuals actively process 
a message, because they are motivated and mentally capable of doing so. This might lead 
to long-term changes in attitudes and, consequently, possibly in behavioural change as 
well. When individuals lack the aforementioned characteristics, a peripheral route of 
information-processing is followed, which requires less effort (automated processing). The 
peripheral route will only lead to temporary attitude change. The content of a message, 
strong argumentation for example, is not relevant in this case, but the way in which it is 
presented to an individual, such as attractiveness of the message and reputation of the 
sender. Thus, the route being followed, or the means in which a message is processed, 
determines the response. 
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between the groups, potentially threatening the internal validity. However, this 
was limited by using a large sample and a stratified sampling method 
(controlling for gender and age). 
We chose to collect data across two different periods of time. This is because the 
outcomes of an intervention should be stable over time (Milne, Orbell, & 
Sheeran, 2002). In order to establish this, a decision had to be made about the 
time between the two measurements. Davinson and Sillence (2010), for 
example, used a one-week interval for an experimental study on phishing, 
resulting in positive changes in both intentions and behaviour. Bullée, Montoya 
Morales, Junger, and Hartel (2016) demonstrated that the effects of an 
information campaign on social engineering attacks dissipated already after two 
weeks. However, a fear-appeal study by Milne et al. (2002) showed that the 
effects of a PMT-intervention lasted over two weeks. A study on phishing 
training by Kumaraguru et al. (2009) showed that knowledge retention lasted at 
least for 28 days. We argue that a timeframe of four weeks is reasonable and 
also necessary for participants in order to not remember exactly the answers 
they gave on the first measurement. Furthermore, we believe that a more 
frequent presentation of a fear appeal message, for example every two weeks, 
might cause end users information overload. Moreover, by using a four-week 
period, participants were more likely to encounter situations in which they had 
to make decisions related to personal information-sharing online. 
At the first measurement (Time 1 [T1]), participants received a strong fear 
appeal message, a weak fear appeal message or no message, and they all filled 
out the same questionnaire immediately afterwards. This gave us the 
opportunity to analyse whether user-perceptions were elevated by means of the 
(strength of the) fear appeal. We decided not to use a baseline measurement, 
since it was expected that the study participants already had some beliefs on 
phishing and on the recommended response. As noted by Johnston and 
Warkentin (2010), fear appeals may reinforce or elevate these beliefs, but in 
any case users will take action if adequately motivated. The purpose of our 
study was to investigate the strength of this reaction, justifying our decision to 
not include a baseline survey. In any case, our control condition provided a 
baseline comparison with the two experimental groups. 
At the second measurement (Time 2 [T2]), participants received a similar 
questionnaire, including all PMT-related items from the previous questionnaire 
and their information-sharing behaviour in the past month. This was done to 
study whether possible effect of the fear appeal would last over time and 
whether intentions were acted upon. 
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Fear-appeal design 
A meta-analysis of empirical fear appeals research by De Hoog et al. (2007) 
showed no significant differences between fear appeals that used vivid images 
and fear appeals that used written information only. Therefore, our study 
involved the manipulation of a written communication, targeting particular PMT-
variables. Following the advice of Kirlappos and Sasse (2012), we focused on 
equipping ‘users to assess the potential risks and benefits correctly’, rather than 
telling them to completely avoid certain kind of behaviour. In addition, we 
followed their advice in making the fear appeal threat-specific. 
The fear appeals were presented by means of a self-developed text, which 
participants were required to read. The text contained factual information on 
phishing (victimization) and the effects of sharing personal information online – 
based on results from Bursztein et al. (2014) and Kloosterman (2015) – and was 
presented digitally to the participants – within the survey environment. We 
followed a similar approach like that of De Hoog et al. (2005), by designing a 
fear appeal with strong arguments and a fear appeal with weak arguments. The 
PMT-variables perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy and 
self-efficacy were targeted in the fear appeals, as the combined manipulation of 
threat appraisal and coping appraisal variables showed the largest effect on the 
outcomes (Sheeran et al., 2014). We also followed a recommendation of Ruiter 
et al. (2014) by making no emotional statements about threat severity. 
Because PMT posits that threat appraisal occurs first (Floyd et al., 2000), the 
fear appeal messages started by highlighting information regarding phishing 
vulnerability and severity. We tried to evoke personal relevance by means of 
perceived vulnerability, addressing the potential of being personally victimized. 
The emphasis of perceived vulnerability in the strong fear appeal was on the 
extreme, being almost unable to escape from phishing attacks, whereas the 
weak fear appeal nuanced the chance of victimization by a phishing attack. 
According to PMT, coping appraisal takes place after a threat has been 
evaluated. Thus, the fear appeal messages continued with information on 
response efficacy and self-efficacy. Therefore, arguments needed to be 
constructed that promote the effectiveness and usability of the measure. We 
primarily focussed on arguments regarding response efficacy, because this 
variable showed strongest predictive ability in previous research. The emphasis 
of response efficacy in the strong fear appeal was framed as being very 
effective, that is not sharing personal information online will lead to not being 
attacked by phishing and any phishing attack that may happen not being 
successful. In contrast, in the weak fear appeal the level of efficacy was 
downgraded. 
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After the fear appeals were constructed, they were critically reviewed by four of 
our colleagues who are experts in online safety and security. Brown and Whiting 
(2014) argue that self-assessment or a review by colleagues is an adequate 
means for ethical review when fear appeals comprise the mere release of 
information to a general population. The expert review led to three main 
changes: (1) a more active phrasing of sentences, (2) balancing the number of 
arguments in both fear appeals, and (3) shortening the length of the fear 
appeals. The fear appeal messages can be found in Appendix V. 
Survey questionnaire and procedure 
A questionnaire was developed based on a review of the literature, using the 
following international databases: ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect and Web of 
Science. We included items that represent PMT’s core predictor variables: 
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy and 
response costs. The outcome variables were attitude towards behaviour, fear, 
behavioural intention, online information-sharing behaviour and message 
rejection (i.e., resistance and avoidance). Attitude and fear were also identified 
as predictors of intentions. 
The questionnaire items were based on the work of Anderson and Agarwal 
(2010), Brouwers and Sorrentino (1993), Davis (1993), Ifinedo (2012), 
Johnston et al. (2015), Milne et al. (2002), Ng et al. (2009), Witte (1994; 
1996), and Witte, Berkowitz, Cameron, and McKeon (1998). The items used a 5-
point Likert scale (totally disagree – totally agree), with the exception of attitude 
which used a 5-point semantic differential scale, were translated in Dutch and 
were presented in random order. The questionnaire items and the sources we 
based them on can be found in Appendix V. In order to counter possible memory 
effects, the order of the items was changed at T2. Before the participants were 
presented with the items, a definition of phishing was given, to ensure that 
participants would have a common understanding of this threat. The questions 
regarding behavioural intention and online information-sharing behaviour 
included a timeframe of four weeks, since time is an important element of 
behaviour – in addition to action (not sharing or disclosing), target (personal 
information) and context (online) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). Accordingly, the 
post-test was conducted four weeks after the pre-test. 
The measures related to online information-sharing behaviour were included in 
both measurements, thus also prior to the intervention (T1), to assess previous 
information-sharing behaviour (Milne et al., 2002). This was to address a 
limitation of PMT studies that assume that end users do not already adopt the 
target coping response (Tanner, Hunt, & Eppright, 1991). Online information-
sharing behaviour was measured by means of self-report. The measures on 
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resistance and avoidance were also included in both measurements. We added 
two additional items for avoidance at T2, because according to Witte (1994), 
although avoidance occurs immediately, delayed measurements are needed to 
truly assess avoidance patterns.46 
We also added some supplementary questions, for example, for the purpose of 
checking validity of the fear appeals (T1). Questions were included to measure 
message involvement (Shillair et al., 2015) to check whether respondents had 
read the fear appeal and whether they consider the information as relevant. In 
addition, information on demographic characteristics, internet experience and 
phishing awareness were collected. It was sufficient to do this at T1 only 
because we were able to link the answers of individual participants from both 
measurements. 
Before the data were collected, we conducted a pilot study. First-year bachelor 
students from NHL University of Applied Sciences who followed courses in 
research methods were participants. This was to rectify potential problems 
before the main study was conducted. The pilot study took place in December 
2016 and was conducted on paper. In total, 65 students participated in the pilot 
of which 33 received the strong manipulation and the other 32 the weak 
manipulation. All students filled out a supplementary questionnaire with 13 
items representing PMT’s core variables, 4 items measuring fear, 5 items 
measuring message rejection and 12 questions regarding the validity of the fear 
appeals, that is message involvement, argument quality (De Hoog et al., 2005), 
and also issue derogation and perceived manipulation (Witte et al., 1998). With 
the exception of message involvement, these constructs were only included in 
the pilot. All measures used a 5-point Likert scale (1 totally disagree – 5 totally 
agree); see also Appendix V. 
The pilot study resulted in a positive evaluation on the fear appeals. In terms of 
argument quality the strong and weak fear appeal scored reasonably well, 
respectively 3.7 and 3.5. The mean scores of issue derogation (M = 2.3 in both 
cases) and perceived manipulation (M = 2.5 and M = 2.2) can be considered 
good indicators of the fear appeals not being viewed as overblown or misleading. 
Reliability scores of the variables were adequate, with the exception of message 
rejection. We made some adjustments regarding the wording of the items and 
added an item to improve this. Moreover, instead of measuring message 
rejection as a single construct, we measured it by means of two constructs in 
the final questionnaire, namely resistance and avoidance. 
                                               
46 In the further analysis, we use two avoidance constructs: avoidance (measured at T1) 
and delayed avoidance (measured at T2). See also Section 9.3.3. 
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An external recruitment service of online panels handled the sampling procedure 
of participants of the main study. The participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the experimental conditions (strong fear appeal, weak fear appeal and 
control condition). By means of stratified random sampling for each condition, 
we aimed to recruit a representative sample of the Dutch population (by gender 
and age). We presented the study to the participants as an investigation of 
internet users’ attitudes and behaviours towards information sharing online and 
phishing. Anonymity was guaranteed to reduce the likelihood of social 
desirability in the answers of the participants (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). Data collection took place in 2017, between February 28 and 
March 13 (T1) and the follow-up measurement between April 4 and April 21 
(T2). As an incentive, the research participants received for their voluntary 
participation panel points that can be used for discounts at web shops or for 
donations to charities. 
9.3.2 Participants 
In total, 1,219 respondents filled out the questionnaire at T1 and 880 at T2, a 
retention rate of 72%. We anticipated that fewer participants would partake in 
the post-test as participation was voluntary. However, measures were taken to 
enhance the response of the second measurement, for example, by presenting 
the study as consisting of two parts and by giving participants extra points for 
their continued participation. The average completion time of the questionnaire 
for both studies – across the three variants – was 8 minutes and 21 seconds at 
T1 and 6 minutes and 13 seconds at T2. 
Eighteen responses at T1 were excluded from data analysis, reducing the set of 
respondents to 1,201. One was excluded by means of a registration error 
(recording their age to be 107), ten because of filling out two variants of the 
questionnaire, two because they had no reference number for comparisons 
between the datasets, and five because reliability of their answers was in 
doubt.47 For T2, the same procedure was carried out, resulting in the exclusion 
of ten respondents because of filling out two variants of the questionnaire, 
seventy-four because they had a reference numbers not occurring in T148, one 
                                               
47 So-called validator scores (ranging from 0–100) were calculated based on how fast 
respondents completed the questionnaire, the way grid questions were filled out and how 
open-ended questions were completed (DataIM, 2008). Scores lower than 50 were closely 
examined which resulted in leaving participants out when scores were 40 or below. In 
general, these respondents filled out the questionnaire in just two minutes and/or mostly 
filled out the neutral option in the grid questions. 
48 These participants were able to participate in T2 due to an error in the invitation process 
for T2. So-called screen-outs – people that had visited the questionnaire in T1, but could 
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because of a missing reference number and twelve responses due to doubtful 
reliability. Thus, the net response frequency was reduced to 786, with a net 
retention rate of 65%. The participant characteristics for each measurement are 
enclosed in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Descriptive statistics 
  Time 1 (N = 1,201)  Time 2 (N = 786) 
 Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Gender     
 Female 608 50.6 382 48.6 
 Male 593 49.4 404 51.4 
Agea     
 18–34 years 333 27.7 182 23.2 
 35–49 years 334 27.8 218 27.7 
 ≥50 years 534 44.5 386 49.1 
Education     
 Low 151 12.6 110 14.0 
 Medium 421 35.1 263 33.5 
 High 629 52.4 413 52.5 
Work status     
 Employed 674 56.1 444 56.5 
 Not-employed 527 43.9 342 43.5 
aAge distribution T1 (M = 47.65, SD = 16.21); T2 (M = 49.54, SD = 15.83). The age 
range was in both measurements 19–76 years. 
We compared our figures (T1) with those of the Dutch population in 2016, as 
measured by Dutch Statistics’ Statline. The gender distribution did not deviate 
from the Dutch population (2 [1, 1200] = 0.30; p = .863) (Statline, 2017c). 
Considering age, our sample deviates slightly from the Dutch population (2 [2, 
1199] = 6.10; p = .047), with the age group of 40–64 years being somewhat 
under represented (Statline, 2017c). The age groups that we tested for this 
comparison were 20–39 (in which we included eleven 19-year olds), 40–64 and 
65–80 years. Note that this categorization (from Statline) differs from the one 
presented in Table 1 (from the response panel). The levels of education differed 
significantly (2 [2, 1199] = 387.70; p < .001), with the lowest level of 
education being largely under represented and the highest level of education 
being largely over represented in our dataset (Statline, 2017b). Regarding work 
status, participants were more likely to belong to the working population and 
less likely to the non-working population than the Dutch population (2 [1, 1200] 
= 54.48; p < .001) (Statline, 2017a). We found no significant differences for 
demographics between the three measurement groups, in both T1 and T2. 
                                                                                                                       
not complete it because the questionnaire had enough participants for certain 
stratifications – were erroneously also invited for Time 2 (N = 128). 
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In addition, based on the measurements at T1 (N = 1,201) , the participants can 
be considered experienced internet users, with two-thirds having used it over 15 
years (62.9%) and using it for more than 10 hours a week (64.0%). 
Additionally, 70.1% agreed or largely agreed to the statement that they were 
experienced internet users. Participants reported to have a rather good 
understanding of phishing. Three in five (60.1%) claimed to know what phishing 
is and what can be done to prevent victimization and over a quarter (27.8%) 
also asserted to know what it entails, but was not sure what can be done against 
it. One in ten (10.1%) had heard of it, but did not fully understand the details 
and 2.0% was unaware of its existence. Finally, participants filled out a 
statement on whether they themselves are primarily responsible for their online 
safety. Of the participants, 81.2% have agreed or fully agreed with this 
statement. A neutral opinion was expressed by 11.2% and 7.7% did not (at all) 
agree. 
9.3.3 Data analysis, validity and reliability 
The robustness of the data is tested with reflective and formative measurement 
models (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Note that the measurement 
models are tested with T1 data of both experimental conditions (N = 512), 
excluding the data of the control condition (N = 274). The rationale for this is 
that the control condition did not contain data on the resistance and avoidance 
constructs. Exceptions are the two items representing the delayed avoidance 
construct (AV4 and AV5), which were measured at T2 only. 
Component loadings of the individual items, except three items of the avoidance 
construct, loaded highly (≥ .70) on the corresponding component, providing 
evidence for uni-dimensionality of the items. However, we had to remove one 
item of protection motivation (PM3), because this item loaded high on self-
efficacy as well (see Table 9.2). 
Instead of using one avoidance construct, we continue with two avoidance 
constructs, i.e., avoidance and delayed avoidance. We made this distinction 
guided by (a) the results the full measurement model and (b) because the 
avoidance construct contained items measured at two different data collection 
moments (T1 [AV1, AV2, AV3] and T2 [AV4, AV5]), as was suggested by Witte 
(1994). The item AV2 needed to be removed because it loaded too low on its 
construct (< .70). The final measurement model (excluding PM3 and AV2) is 
presented in Table 9.3. 
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Table 9.2: Full measurement model (N = 512) 
 PV PS FE RE SE RC AT PM RS AV 
PV1 0.91 0.15 0.48 -0.10 -0.09 0.38 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.36 
PV2 0.86 0.16 0.39 0.00 -0.09 0.32 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.30 
PV3 0.90 0.13 0.49 -0.05 -0.13 0.44 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.42 
PS1 0.13 0.88 0.31 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.21 0.22 -0.19 0.10 
PS2 0.15 0.93 0.37 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.26 -0.20 0.13 
PS3 0.16 0.92 0.40 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.21 -0.23 0.12 
FE1 0.40 0.37 0.88 0.07 0.02 0.32 0.18 0.18 -0.15 0.42 
FE2 0.41 0.38 0.91 0.07 -0.01 0.38 0.18 0.15 -0.16 0.43 
FE3 0.52 0.35 0.92 0.02 -0.02 0.36 0.16 0.16 -0.18 0.41 
FE4 0.52 0.35 0.91 0.04 -0.03 0.37 0.18 0.14 -0.18 0.41 
RE1 -0.04 0.15 0.01 0.74 0.26 -0.05 0.19 0.22 -0.22 -0.07 
RE2 -0.02 0.13 0.08 0.80 0.36 -0.06 0.26 0.35 -0.24 0.00 
RE3 -0.08 0.23 0.03 0.86 0.36 -0.10 0.34 0.34 -0.24 -0.02 
SE1 0.05 0.24 0.13 0.48 0.84 -0.19 0.42 0.64 -0.30 0.14 
SE2 -0.19 0.03 -0.10 0.29 0.89 -0.46 0.38 0.59 -0.24 -0.01 
SE3 -0.16 0.09 -0.06 0.32 0.90 -0.47 0.45 0.69 -0.27 0.01 
RC1 0.23 0.03 0.17 -0.15 -0.51 0.72 -0.29 0.14 0.14 0.09 
RC2 0.35 0.07 0.37 -0.04 -0.22 0.77 -0.05 0.05 0.05 0.35 
RC3 0.35 0.15 0.37 -0.04 -0.28 0.81 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.29 
RC4 0.40 0.05 0.32 -0.07 -0.32 0.82 -0.12 0.10 0.10 0.34 
AT1 0.00 0.20 0.16 0.33 0.42 -0.11 0.88 0.50 -0.30 0.17 
AT2 -0.01 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.42 -0.16 0.86 0.46 -0.29 0.13 
AT3 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.40 -0.14 0.90 0.46 -0.27 0.17 
AT4 0.04 0.23 0.20 0.36 0.43 -0.12 0.88 0.51 -0.34 0.16 
AT5 0.01 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.45 -0.17 0.92 0.51 -0.33 0.18 
PM1 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.33 0.59 -0.13 0.48 0.88 -0.39 0.15 
PM2 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.35 0.66 -0.21 0.48 0.93 -0.43 0.17 
PM3 0.00 0.18 0.13 0.33 0.72 -0.25 0.50 0.91 -0.42 0.21 
PM4 0.05 0.27 0.16 0.41 0.69 -0.18 0.53 0.92 -0.41 0.20 
RS1 -0.07 -0.21 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29 0.11 -0.35 -0.38 0.85 0.02 
RS2 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.26 -0.27 0.06 -0.29 -0.44 0.83 -0.07 
RS3 -0.12 -0.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 0.05 -0.17 -0.25 0.73 0.11 
AV1 0.28 0.02 0.27 -0.06 -0.06 0.35 -0.01 0.00 0.17 0.63 
AV2 0.20 0.12 0.27 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.23 -0.04 0.59 
AV3 0.23 0.03 0.25 -0.07 -0.06 0.27 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.63 
AV4 0.34 0.12 0.38 -0.03 0.08 0.23 0.21 0.22 -0.11 0.79 
AV5 0.34 0.14 0.39 -0.02 0.07 0.21 0.22 0.21 -0.11 0.79 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability; PS: perceived severity; FE: Fear; RE: response efficacy; 
SE: self-efficacy; RC: response costs; AT: attitude; PM: protection motivation; RS: 
Resistance; AV: Avoidance. 
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Table 9.3: Final measurement model (N = 512) 
 PV PS FE RE SE RC AT PM RS AV AVd 
PV1 0.91 0.15 0.48 -0.10 -0.09 0.38 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.24 0.33 
PV2 0.86 0.16 0.39 0.00 -0.09 0.32 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.22 0.27 
PV3 0.90 0.13 0.49 -0.05 -0.12 0.44 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.31 0.34 
PS1 0.13 0.88 0.31 0.19 0.15 0.04 0.21 0.23 -0.19 0.00 0.12 
PS2 0.15 0.93 0.37 0.20 0.13 0.08 0.22 0.27 -0.21 0.03 0.13 
PS3 0.16 0.92 0.40 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.22 -0.23 0.04 0.12 
FE1 0.40 0.37 0.88 0.07 0.02 0.33 0.18 0.19 -0.15 0.30 0.34 
FE2 0.41 0.38 0.91 0.07 -0.01 0.38 0.18 0.16 -0.16 0.27 0.37 
FE3 0.52 0.35 0.92 0.02 -0.02 0.36 0.16 0.17 -0.18 0.25 0.37 
FE4 0.52 0.35 0.91 0.04 -0.03 0.37 0.18 0.14 -0.18 0.27 0.37 
RE1 -0.04 0.15 0.01 0.74 0.26 -0.05 0.19 0.24 -0.22 -0.11 -0.04 
RE2 -0.02 0.13 0.08 0.80 0.36 -0.06 0.26 0.35 -0.24 -0.05 0.01 
RE3 -0.08 0.23 0.03 0.85 0.36 -0.10 0.34 0.34 -0.24 -0.04 -0.04 
SE1 0.05 0.24 0.13 0.48 0.84 -0.18 0.42 0.63 -0.30 0.02 0.15 
SE2 -0.19 0.03 -0.10 0.29 0.89 -0.46 0.39 0.56 -0.24 -0.09 0.01 
SE3 -0.16 0.09 -0.06 0.32 0.90 -0.46 0.45 0.65 -0.27 -0.10 0.04 
RC1 0.23 0.03 0.17 -0.14 -0.51 0.71 -0.29 -0.32 0.14 0.17 0.04 
RC2 0.35 0.07 0.37 -0.04 -0.22 0.77 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.31 0.25 
RC3 0.35 0.15 0.37 -0.04 -0.28 0.81 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 0.30 0.19 
RC4 0.40 0.05 0.32 -0.07 -0.32 0.82 -0.12 -0.14 0.10 0.33 0.24 
AT1 0.00 0.20 0.16 0.33 0.42 -0.11 0.88 0.48 -0.30 -0.02 0.21 
AT2 -0.01 0.20 0.14 0.28 0.42 -0.16 0.86 0.46 -0.28 0.00 0.15 
AT3 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.40 -0.13 0.90 0.45 -0.27 0.00 0.21 
AT4 0.04 0.23 0.20 0.36 0.43 -0.11 0.88 0.50 -0.33 0.00 0.19 
AT5 0.01 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.45 -0.16 0.92 0.50 -0.33 0.00 0.23 
PM1 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.33 0.59 -0.12 0.48 0.90 -0.39 -0.01 0.18 
PM2 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.35 0.66 -0.20 0.48 0.93 -0.43 -0.01 0.21 
PM4 0.05 0.27 0.16 0.41 0.69 -0.18 0.53 0.93 -0.41 0.02 0.21 
RS1 -0.07 -0.21 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29 0.11 -0.35 -0.37 0.85 0.15 -0.07 
RS2 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.26 -0.27 0.06 -0.29 -0.43 0.83 0.13 -0.17 
RS3 -0.12 -0.23 -0.16 -0.16 -0.18 0.05 -0.17 -0.25 0.74 0.21 -0.01 
AV1 0.28 0.02 0.27 -0.06 -0.06 0.35 -0.01 0.00 0.17 0.88 0.24 
AV3 0.23 0.03 0.25 -0.07 -0.06 0.27 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.85 0.24 
AV4 0.34 0.12 0.38 -0.03 0.08 0.23 0.21 0.21 -0.11 0.26 0.96 
AV5 0.34 0.14 0.39 -0.02 0.07 0.21 0.22 0.20 -0.10 0.27 0.96 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability; PS: perceived severity; FE: Fear; RE: response efficacy; 
SE: self-efficacy; RC: response costs; AT: attitude; PM: protection motivation; RS: 
Resistance; AV: Avoidance; AVd: Delayed avoidance. 
Convergent validity was analysed using the average variance extracted (AVE) by 
a construct from its indicators, which should be 0.70 or higher (Henseler, Ringle, 
& Sinkovics, 2009). Except response efficacy (AVE = 0.64), response costs (AVE 
= 0.61) and resistance (AVE = 0.65), all values exceeded this cut-off point. 
Because the AVE values of these three constructs still exceeded 0.50, they were 
retained in their current form, because more variability in the items of these 
constructs was accounted for by its component than was not. Construct 
reliability was assessed using the composite reliability co-efficient. All constructs 
showed good reliability (≥ .84). 
Discriminant validity was positively evaluated according the Fornell-Larcker-
criterion. This holds that the square root of AVE by each construct from its 
indicators was greater than its correlation with the remaining constructs (see 
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Table 9.4). Finally, no multicollinearity issues were observed when testing for 
this in SPSS; tolerance values were well above 0.10 and VIF values were well 
below 10. 
Table 9.4: Coefficients of discriminant validity (N = 512) 
 PV PS FE RE SE RC AT PM RS AV AVd 
PV 0.89           
PS 0.16 0.91          
FE 0.51 0.40 0.91         
RE -0.06 0.22 0.05 0.80        
SE -0.12 0.14 -0.01 0.42 0.87       
RC 0.43 0.10 0.40 -0.09 -0.42 0.78      
AT 0.01 0.23 0.19 0.34 0.48 -0.15 0.89     
PM 0.03 0.27 0.18 0.40 0.70 -0.18 0.54 0.92    
RS -0.10 -0.23 -0.19 -0.29 -0.31 0.09 -0.34 -0.44 0.81   
AV 0.29 0.03 0.30 -0.08 -0.07 0.36 -0.01 0.00 0.20 0.87  
AVd 0.35 0.13 0.40 -0.03 0.08 0.23 0.22 0.22 -0.11 0.28 0.96 
Note. Off-diagonal values are correlations. Diagonal values are square root of average 
extracted variances. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity. FE: fear. RE: 
response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. AT: attitude. PM: protection 
motivation. RS: resistance. AV: Avoidance. AVd: Delayed avoidance. 
We used SPSS (version 23) for conducting analysis of variance (ANOVA). First, 
we used one-way between-groups ANOVA to determine the mean differences on 
the dependent variables across the three different groups (T1). Additional post-
hoc tests were used to determine where the differences occurred. Second, we 
used a mixed-measures ANOVA to determine whether the effect of fear appeals 
is stable over time (T2 in comparison with T1). These analyses were to answer 
Research Questions 2-5.  
Third, we used the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2016) to conduct multi-
categorical mediation analyses (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). Mediation analysis 
provides information on how effects occur (Hayes, 2014). The idea of mediation 
in this study is to determine if the effect of the manipulation at T2 runs through 
the effect at T1. It answers the question whether the effect at T1 is the reason 
for the effect at T2. If this is not the case (i.e., when a non-significant indirect 
effect is found), then the effect at T2 cannot be attributed to the effect at T1. 
We tested this for outcome variables attitude and protection motivation and the 
predictor variables that were included in the fear appeals: perceived 
vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy and self-efficacy. This type of 
analysis provides additional evidence for answering Research Question 5. 
Fourth, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used to investigate the difference in online 
information-sharing behaviour across the three conditions for T2, providing an 
answer to Research Question 6. 
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9.4 Results 
Before presenting the results of the one-way between-groups ANOVA, the 
mixed-measures ANOVA and mediation analysis, we first analyse the 
participants’ internet behaviour. 
9.4.1 Internet and online information sharing behaviour 
We asked the participants on a dichotomous scale (yes/no) whether they made 
use of the following six online services (T1, N = 1,201): e-mail (99.8%); online 
banking (96.7%); buying products on online marketplaces and/or web shops 
(93.7%); instant messaging (e.g., WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger) 
(87.1%); social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram and LinkedIn) (84.4%); and 
selling products on online marketplaces and/or web shops (57.8%). 
Next, we asked participants to indicate to what extent they had shared six types 
of personal information online in the previous year (see Table 9.5) and in the 
previous month. The participants were told beforehand that online information 
sharing can be done both actively (e.g., through social media and e-mail) and 
passively (e.g., by including contact information on a personal website or on a 
public social media profile). Here, information-sharing does not include activities 
such as logging in to an e-mail account or online banking environment. 
Table 9.5: Online information sharing behaviour in the previous year (N = 1,201) 
 No Once More than once Do not know 
E-mail address 14.7 29.6 52.8 2.8 
Home address 37.4 36.1 22.5 4.1 
Bank account number 58.8 27.7 11.1 2.4 
Citizen service number 79.1 16.8 1.7 2.4 
Log-in credentials 92.9 2.7 1.7 2.6 
PIN codes / security codes 96.2 1.2 0.6 2.1 
 
Of the 990 participants who had shared their e-mail address, 71.7% indicated to 
have done this at least once in the previous month. Of the 703 participants who 
had shared their physical address the figure was 61.6%. Bank account number 
was shared in the previous month at least once by 53.7% of 466 participants 
and the citizen service number by 44.1% of 222 participants. The 54 
participants, who had shared their log-in credentials in the previous year, had 
done this in 53.7% of the cases at least once in the previous month. Finally, of 
the 21 participants who had shared their PIN codes and/or security codes at 
least once in the previous year, 57.2% had done this in the previous month. In 
total, 180 participants (15.5%) indicated that they did not share any of the 
requested information online in the previous year, rising to 411 (34.2%) for 
sharing in the previous month. 
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We were also interested in how participants shared their personal information 
online. They could choose from multiple pre-determined methods (N = 1,021): 
by e-mail (62.7%); on web shops (47.9%); on websites (e.g., to register, to 
receive a discount, to download a file or to get a prize) (28.9%); by instant 
messaging (26.4%); on corporate websites (9.3%); by social media messages 
(6.2%); on personal websites/social media profiles (5.1%); and other (5.3%). 
The final step regarding sharing personal information online was to check with 
the participants to what extent they had done so on trustworthy locations or to 
trustworthy parties. These results apply to active information-sharing only. 
Because participants could have shared their information to both familiar and 
unfamiliar sources the percentages presented next do not precisely add up to 
100. Those who had shared personal information online by means of e-mail (N = 
660), 75.8% indicated to had sent it to someone they knew personally and 
28.5% to have sent it to someone they do not know personally. Of the 
participants who had shared their details on web shops (N = 489), 40.7% had 
done this on those they were familiar with and 62.4% on web shops they were 
not familiar with. For websites (N = 295), the figures were 34.6% and 70.2%. 
Regarding sharing personal information via instant messaging (N = 270) and 
social media messages (N = 63), 94.4% and 82.5% (respectively) did this with 
people they were well familiar with and 7.4% and 23.8% (respectively) with 
people they were not familiar with. 
9.4.2 The effect of fear appeals on outcomes 
The participants in the fear appeal conditions were asked about their message 
involvement – after completing the PMT-items. In the strong-fear appeal 
condition (N = 249), 69.9% (strongly) agreed to the statement of having 
carefully read the fear appeal message. In the weak fear appeal (N = 263), this 
percentage was 73.0. Respectively 18.1% and 19.0% were neutral and 12.0% 
and 8.0% (strongly) disagreed with this statement. The second statement 
regarding message involvement was ‘the text contains relevant information for 
me’. In the strong fear appeal, 49.3% (strongly) agreed, 34.9% was neutral and 
15.7% (strongly) disagreed with this statement. For the weak fear appeal, these 
numbers were respectively 50.2%, 33.1% and 16.7%. Considering message 
involvement, t-tests showed no significant differences between both fear appeal 
conditions. 
A one-way between-groups ANOVA was conducted to explore the impact of fear 
appeals on cognitions, attitude and online behavioural intentions at T1. Note 
that the results represent only those respondents who completed both 
questionnaires (N = 786). First, we checked if the assumption of homogeneity 
was not violated. This was not the case, because the Levene’s test produced 
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results well above the threshold of .05. Although significant effects are visible 
between the conditions (see Table 9.6), the actual difference in the mean scores 
is quite small for all variables. Indeed, the effect sizes, calculated using partial 
eta squared, were small: p
2 = .02 for self-efficacy, .01 for perceived 
vulnerability, response efficacy, attitude and protection motivation and < .01 for 
the remaining variables. Effect sizes are interpreted according to Cohen’s (1988) 
classification scheme (i.e., .01 = small; .06 = medium; .14 = large). 
Table 9.6: Results from one-way between groups ANOVA (N = 786) 
Constructs F (2, 783) p p
2  Mean, SD 
Perceived vulnerability 4.39 .013 .01 0) 
1) 
2) 
2.54, .74 
2.40, .76 
2.60, .85 
Perceived severity 1.73 .178 .00 0) 
1) 
2) 
3.58, .81 
3.68, .78 
3.70, .77 
Fear 0.68 .509 .00 0) 
1) 
2) 
2.85, .94 
2.79, .97 
2.88, .95 
Response efficacy 3.74 .024 .01 0) 
1) 
2) 
3.70, .75 
3.83, .71 
3.86, .75 
Self-efficacy 7.49 .001 .02 0) 
1) 
2) 
3.26, .94 
3.51, .84 
3.52, .88 
Response costs 1.06 .347 .00 0) 
1) 
2) 
2.98, .84 
2.88, .83 
2.95, .86 
Attitude 5.64 .004 .01 0) 
1) 
2) 
3.60, .81 
3.79, .80 
3.82, .80 
Protection motivation 5.96 .003 .01 0) 
1) 
2) 
3.34, .95 
3.57, .93 
3.59, .94 
Note. 0: control condition. 1: weak fear appeal. 2: strong fear appeal. 
There were significant differences between the conditions on perceived 
vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, attitude and protection motivation. 
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the higher mean 
scores for the strong fear appeal on perceived vulnerability differed significantly 
from the weak fear appeal (p < .05); the control condition did not differ 
significantly from either fear appeal conditions. With regard to response efficacy, 
the higher mean of the strong fear appeal differed significantly from that of the 
control condition (p < .05); the weak fear appeal did not differ significantly from 
the other two conditions. Considering self-efficacy, the lower mean score of 
control condition differed significantly (p < .01) from that of the strong fear 
appeal and weak fear appeal; the fear appeal conditions did not differ 
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significantly from each other. A similar pattern was noticeable for attitude and 
protection motivation. In both instances the mean score of the control condition 
was significantly lower than the mean scores of the strong fear appeal (p < .01) 
and the weak fear appeal (p < .05). 
We conducted a mixed-measures ANOVA to explore whether the effect of fear 
appeals was stable over time (see Table 9.7). The main effect of condition was 
significant for self-efficacy, attitude and protection motivation and marginally 
significant for response efficacy. There was a positive small effect of time on 
most dependent variables and a moderate effect on others (attitude and 
perceived vulnerability), but not on fear and protection motivation. Only for 
perceived vulnerability was the main effect of time qualified by a significant 
interaction effect. This main effect was moderate for weak fear appeal (d = .31), 
small for the control condition (d = .20) and very small for strong fear appeal (d 
= .09). 
Table 9.7: Results from a mixed-measures ANOVA (N = 786) 
Constructs  F (df) p p
2  M (SD) 
(T1) 
M (SD) 
(T2) 
Perceived vulnerability C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
2.00 
39.95 
3.70 
.136 
< .001 
.025 
.01 
.05 
.01 
0) 
1) 
2) 
2.54 (.74) 
2.40 (.76) 
2.60 (.85) 
2.68 (.76) 
2.64 (.79) 
2.68 (.85) 
Perceived severity C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
0.77 
5.12 
1.49 
.462 
.024 
.225 
.00 
.01 
.00 
0) 
1) 
2) 
3.58 (.81) 
3.68 (.78) 
3.70 (.77) 
3.70 (.78) 
3.70 (.76) 
3.73 (.75) 
Fear C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
0.28 
1.50 
1.65 
.756 
.220 
.192 
.00 
.00 
.00 
0) 
1) 
2) 
2.85 (.94) 
2.79 (.97) 
2.88 (.95) 
2.85 (.94) 
2.80 (.97) 
2.78 (1.01) 
Response efficacy C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
2.53 
14.11 
2.78 
.081 
< .001 
.062 
.01 
.02 
.01 
0) 
1) 
2) 
3.70 (.75) 
3.83 (.71) 
3.86 (.75) 
3.85 (.75) 
3.95 (.69) 
3.86 (.78) 
Self-efficacy C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
5.36 
7.29 
2.76 
.005 
< .010 
.064 
.01 
.01 
.01 
0) 
1) 
2) 
3.26 (.94) 
3.51 (.84) 
3.52 (.88) 
3.42 (.94) 
3.59 (.86) 
3.52 (.92) 
Response costs C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
0.99 
18.45 
0.13 
.373 
< .001 
.880 
.00 
.02 
.00 
0) 
1) 
2) 
2.98 (.84) 
2.88 (.83) 
2.95 (.86) 
2.86 (.88) 
2.78 (.80) 
2.82 (.98) 
Attitude C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
6.71 
59.11 
0.14 
.001 
< .001 
.866 
.02 
.07 
.00 
0) 
1) 
2) 
3.60 (.81) 
3.79 (.80) 
3.82 (.80) 
3.82 (.89) 
4.03 (.83) 
4.02 (.88) 
Protection motivation C 
T 
T*C 
(2, 783) =  
(1, 784) =  
(2, 783) =  
4.41 
1.31 
2.39 
.012 
.252 
.092 
.01 
.00 
.01 
0) 
1) 
2) 
3.34 (.95) 
3.57 (.93) 
3.59 (.94) 
3.44 (1.03) 
3.63 (.98) 
3.53 (1.03) 
Note. C: condition. T: time. T*C: time  condition. 0: control condition. 1: weak fear 
appeal. 2: strong fear appeal. 
Any differences between the two fear appeal conditions on message rejection 
variables were small: resistance (T1; strong fear appeal, M = 2.4, SD = .79; 
weak fear appeal, M = 2.4, SD = .80), avoidance (T1; strong fear appeal, M = 
2.6, SD = .91; weak fear appeal, M = 2.5, SD = .87), and delayed avoidance 
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(T2; strong fear appeal, M = 2.1, SD = .98; weak fear appeal, M = 2.2, SD 
= .94). The t-tests showed no significant differences between both fear appeal 
conditions for these three variables, with effect sizes d = 0.00, 0.08, and 0.10, 
respectively. 
9.4.3 Mediation analysis 
Multi-categorical mediation analyses were conducted to test the outcome 
variables attitude and protection motivation (T1) as a mediator of attitude and 
protection motivation (T2), respectively. Because we have three conditions, 
dummy variables were created (i.e., D1 represents the weak fear appeal and D2 
the strong fear appeal, both in comparison with the control condition). Figures 
9.1–9.2 present the results of mediation analyses. 
In the first two analyses (Figure 9.1/9.2), the experimental condition was 
significant as an indirect positive predictor of attitude/protection motivation 
(T2), mediated by attitude/protection motivation (T1). However, experimental 
condition was not significant as a direct predictor of attitude (T2). According to 
the decision tree of Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010), these results can be 
interpreted as indirect-only mediation. 
Figure 9.1: Model of fear appeal condition as a predictor of attitude (T2) mediated by 
attitude (T1). 
 
  
Attitude
(T1)
Attitude
(T2)
Experimental condition
beta = .60, p < .001
D1 beta = .18, p = .008
D2 beta = .22, p = .002
(Relative) direct effects: D1 beta = .10, p = .128
D2 beta = .07, p = .265
(Relative) indirect effects: D1 beta = .11, 95% CI [.03; .20]
D2 beta = .13, 95% CI [.05; .22]
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Figure 9.2: Model of fear appeal condition as a predictor of protection motivation (T2) 
mediated by protection motivation (T1). 
 
We also conducted mediation analysis for the cognition variables present in the 
fear appeals (Figures 9.3-9.6). This is important because the mixed-measures 
ANOVA is only useful to demonstrate any potential interaction effect between 
time and condition. However, unlike the mediation analysis, this does not 
address the effect of the manipulation at T2 with the measurement at T1 held 
constant and as a potential mediator. 
Figure 9.3: Model of fear appeal condition as a predictor of perceived vulnerability (T2) 
mediated by perceived vulnerability (T1). 
 
Protection motivation
(T1)
Protection motivation
(T2)
Experimental condition
beta = .67, p < .001
D1 beta = .23, p = .005
D2 beta = .25, p = .002
(Relative) direct effects: D1 beta = .04, p = .576
D2 beta = -.07, p = .288
(Relative) indirect effects: D1 beta = .16, 95% CI [.05; .27]
D2 beta = .17, 95% CI [.06; .29]
Perceived vulnerability 
(T1)
Perceived vulnerability 
(T2)
Experimental condition
beta = .65, p < .001
D1 beta = -.14, p = .040
D2 beta = .06, p = .383
(Relative) direct effects: D1 beta = .05, p = .370
D2 beta = -.04, p = .435
(Relative) indirect effects: D1 beta = -.09, 95% CI [-.17; -.01]
D2 beta = .04, 95% CI [-.05; .13]
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Figure 9.4: Model of fear appeal condition as a predictor of perceived severity (T2) 
mediated by perceived severity (T1). 
 
Figure 9.5: Model of fear appeal condition as a predictor of response efficacy (T2) 
mediated by response efficacy (T1). 
 
 
  
Perceived severity (T1)
Perceived severity (T2)Experimental condition
beta = .53, p < .001
D1 beta = .09, p = .167
D2 beta = .12, p = .080
(Relative) direct effects: D1 beta = -.05, p = .353
D2 beta = -.04, p = .494
(Relative) indirect effects: D1 beta = .05, 95% CI [-.02; .12]
D2 beta = .06, 95% CI [-.01; .14]
Response efficacy (T1)
Response efficacy (T2)Experimental condition
beta = .54, p < .001
D1 beta = .13, p = .045
D2 beta = .17, p = .010
(Relative) direct effects: D1 beta = .04, p = .500
D2 beta = -.06, p = .266
(Relative) indirect effects: D1 beta = .07, 95% CI [.00; .14]
D2 beta = .09, 95% CI [.02; .16]
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Figure 9.6: Model of fear appeal condition as a predictor of self-efficacy (T2) mediated by 
self-efficacy (T1). 
 
We observe that, similar to attitude and protection motivation, experimental 
condition was significant as an indirect positive predictor of the coping variables 
response efficacy and self-efficacy (T2), mediated by respectively response 
efficacy and self-efficacy (T1), see Figures 9.5-9.6. Furthermore, experimental 
condition was not significant as a direct predictor in both cases. Thus, these 
results can be interpreted as indirect-only mediation. 
The results from mediation analysis regarding the threat variables perceived 
vulnerability and perceived severity were less clear, because the lower limits and 
upper limits included the number of zero in three of four instances, see Figures 
9.3-9.4. This corresponds with a non-significant test result. However, for 
perceived vulnerability the relative indirect effects of condition (strong fear 
appeal versus control) was different from zero, which supports the conclusion 
that M (perceived vulnerability T1) mediates the effect of X (experimental 
condition) on Y (perceived vulnerability T2) (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). 
9.4.4 Effects on online information-sharing behaviour 
Finally, we tested if there was a difference in online information-sharing 
behaviour across the three conditions at T2. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed no 
significant effect of intervention (strong fear appeal, N = 249, weak fear appeal, 
N = 263 and control, N = 274), 2 (2, 786) = 1.14, p
2 = 0.00, p = .567. 
Moreover, more than half of all the participants (58.1%) indicated to have 
shared their personal information both a month prior to T1 and a month prior to 
T2. 
Self-efficacy 
(T1)
Self-efficacy 
(T2)
Experimental condition
beta = .59, p < .001
D1 beta = .26, p < .001
D2 beta = .26, p < .001
(Relative) direct effects: D1 beta = .01, p = .830
D2 beta = -.06, p = .337
(Relative) indirect effects: D1 beta = .15, 95% CI [.06; .24]
D2 beta = .15, 95% CI [.06; .25]
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We also tested the level of variance explained for online information-sharing 
behaviour – using logistic regression. Predictor variables were protection 
motivation and previous online information-sharing behaviour.49 The likelihood 
ratio (R2L) is around .10 in all three conditions.
50 We find that previous 
behaviour better predicts behaviour than intentions do in all three conditions. 
Only in the strong-fear appeal condition was protection motivation a marginally 
significant predictor of actual behaviour (p = .085). 
9.5 Conclusion and discussion 
We first answer Research Question 1: To what extent do end users share their 
personal information online? Based on the data gathered at T1, it became clear 
that the participants often share their personal information online. This primarily 
goes for address details, which is unsurprising since people need to find each 
other in this way, especially on the internet. More sensitive data are shared to a 
lesser extent, that is bank account numbers and citizen service numbers. Again, 
these are often necessary for instance to buy products or to make use of 
governmental services. However, it also became clear that respondents share 
log-in credentials (4.4%) and PIN codes or security codes (1.8%). It could be 
that participants have not properly read the instructions before answering this 
question, but these results indicate that a number of participants engage in 
potentially harmful online behaviour. This is also true for participants that share 
these and other personal information on unfamiliar online locations or to 
unfamiliar parties or individuals, which commonly occurred. 
Next, we turn to answering Research Question 2: What effect do fear appeals 
have on end-users’ cognitions? We observed from the one-way between-groups 
ANOVA that the strong-fear appeal message provided highest mean scores for 
all predictor variables. The exception was response costs, as predicted, because 
response costs were not explicitly addressed within the messages, so an effect 
might not be expected indeed.51 The scores were, however, only significant for 
                                               
49 Only online information-sharing behaviour in the previous month (measured at T1) was 
used as an additional explanatory variable for online information-sharing behaviour 
(measured at T2), because the correlation was well above the threshold of .10. Other 
potential predictor variables, i.e., demographic variables, internet experience, knowledge 
on phishing and level of responsibility did not meet this criterion. 
50 For the strong fear appeal and weak fear appeal conditions, we tested whether the 
explained variance for behaviour would increase when adding the message rejection 
variables as additional explanatory variables for self-reported online information-sharing 
behaviour (measured at T2). This was, however, not the case as it only increased by one 
hundredth. Only delayed avoidance was a marginally significant predictor of not sharing 
personal information online (beta = .37, p = .053). 
51 Response costs were tested to determine specificity. 
 Chapter 9 
 
203 
perceived vulnerability in comparison with the weak fear appeal, and for 
response efficacy and self-efficacy in comparison with the control condition. 
These results imply that end-users’ cognitions can be elevated by means of a 
fear appeal message, especially when strong arguments are used. 
Research Questions 3 and 4 were formulated as follows. What effect do fear 
appeals have on end-users’ (a) attitudes towards precautionary online, and (b) 
precautionary online behavioural intentions? Again the strong fear appeal 
produced the highest scores. However, note that the scores were significantly 
higher only in comparison with the control condition, not the weak fear appeal. 
This implies that attitudes and behavioural intentions can be raised by making 
internet users aware of threats and simultaneously providing behavioural advice 
on how to mitigate these. Protection motivation was heightened, while perceived 
vulnerability was low, which is a central indicator for personal relevance, and 
thus an important aspect for how a message is processed. However, according 
to De Hoog et al. (2007), individuals might still have processed the fear appeal 
message systematically, because the threat was depicted as severe. They 
continue by explaining that individuals might find it useful to be well informed, 
even when the threat is not imminent. 
Besides examining protection motivation (danger control), we also looked at 
three types of fear control (resistance and two avoidance constructs). These 
constructs were scored low. This is probably due to the low scores on fear as 
well. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) stress that emotion-focused forms of coping – 
where fear control can be placed under – tend to be adopted when threat or fear 
levels are perceived to be high. 
We now examine the extent to which the effect of fear appeals was stable over 
time (Research Question 5). We answer this question first by examining the 
results from the mixed-measures ANOVA. The results show significant 
differences in overall mean scores between T1 and T2 for all constructs, except 
fear and protection motivation. All differences were in the positive direction. 
Most improvement is found for the constructs perceived vulnerability and 
attitude. Perhaps, the participants gave the topic at hand (phishing-related 
security) some thought or spoke about it with others. As a result, they may have 
realised that one is at risk for falling for phishing scams and sharing personal 
information online poses avoidable dangers. This positive effect might also be 
explained by the possibility that filling out a questionnaire such as this one has 
an awareness-raising effect, since the scores of the control condition were also 
higher. 
  
204 
The second part of our answer to Research Question 5 is from the results from 
the mediation analyses. The mediation analyses showed that the fear appeal 
messages had a significant indirect effect on the second measurement (T2) of 
outcome variables attitude and protection motivation and PMT variables 
perceived vulnerability, response efficacy and self-efficacy. This means that the 
effect of fear appeals at T2 can be attributed to its effect already achieved at T1. 
For perceived severity no significant indirect effect was observed. Similar to 
previous studies, the threat-specific variables provide some inconsistencies with 
what the theory would predict (Wall & Buche, 2017). 
Finally, we answer Research Question 6: What effect do fear appeals have on 
end-users’ precautionary online information-sharing behaviour? The results from 
the Kruskal-Wallis Test indicate that there was no such effect. The finding that 
the effects on subsequent behaviour are minor corresponds with results from 
previous studies (Floyd et al., 2000; Milne et al., 2000). This finding is also in 
line with previous research in the information security domain in which it is 
demonstrated that people’s positive attitudes towards information security 
practices do not always correspond with their actual information security 
behaviour (Spiekermann, Grossklags, & Berendt, 2001). Perhaps the fear 
appeals would have had more effect on behaviour if threat was perceived higher 
(Boss et al., 2015). Furthermore, we find that previous behaviour better predicts 
behaviour than intentions do, which is also pointed out by Norman, Boer, and 
Seydel (2005). According to Liang and Xue (2009), people are motivated to 
repeat previous actions that led to positive outcomes and avoid behaviour that 
led to negative outcomes. 
Moreover, over half of the participants indicated to have shared their personal 
information online a month prior to both T1 and T2. In addition, Maloney, 
Lapinski, and Witte (2011) propose that if perceived threat is too low to produce 
fear, end users will take no action instigated by the fear appeal, which might 
further explain our finding that behaviour did not follow intentions. This is also 
illustrated by De Hoog et al. (2007, p. 263) who state ‘[…], why should anyone 
invest effort into avoiding a risk, if one does not feel personally at risk?’ Follow-
up research on fear appeals is needed to find out how behaviour will be 
impacted when threats do become more personally relevant (i.e., when 
perceived vulnerability is sufficiently heightened). 
A possible limitation here, that might have affected the results, is that the 
behaviour of interest was phrased generally (i.e., not sharing personal 
information online). Perhaps this behaviour should have been further specified 
(e.g., not sharing personal information online on unfamiliar locations or to 
unfamiliar parties or individuals). However, it should be noted that participants 
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reported sharing their information with parties that were both trusted and 
unfamiliar. Therefore, future research is necessary to find out whether fear 
appeals would truly modify behaviour. In addition, stronger results might have 
been found if one-off behaviour was investigated, such as installing anti-virus 
software, than repeated behaviours such as in our study (Tannenbaum et al., 
2015). 
According to our results, end-users’ cognitions can potentially be influenced by 
means of fear appeals. We use the term ‘potential’, because although some of 
the group differences were significant, the effect sizes were small. An 
explanation might be that phishing is a well-known threat to Dutch internet 
users and it is common knowledge that vigilance is required when sharing 
personal information online; therefore, the variation was low between the 
groups. In addition, more variation might have been found if 7-point scales were 
used. The use of 5-point scales can therefore be seen as a possible limitation of 
our study. 
Because our study took place within participants’ social context, we created a 
realistic setting in which end users read a fear appeal message and answered 
questions about their cognitions, attitudes and behaviours. This implies, 
however, that we could not control for the effect of other messages related to 
safe online practices which were not part of intervention, but which participants 
may have encountered in their day-to-day use of the internet. Furthermore, we 
only tested two fear appeal variants, one with strong arguments and one with 
weak arguments regarding threat and coping appraisal. Future studies could 
benefit from testing more variants (e.g., strong threat-weak coping, weak 
threat-strong coping, threat-only and coping-only alternatives). Another issue 
that needs to be taken into consideration is that we provided the fear appeals 
within an experimental setting. In real-world situations, these may receive less 
attention (Wall & Buche, 2017). 
To conclude, we acknowledge the fact that other factors can influence the way 
people process information, for instance communicator factors, such as source 
credibility and liking of the communicator (O’Keefe, 2016). Briggs et al. (2016) 
address this point, stating that messenger effects have often been ignored in the 
cybersecurity domain. Furthermore, other message factors were not addressed, 
such as personalisation (Davinson & Sillence, 2010), visual elements and 
humour (Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012). Hence, factors being relevant to a peripheral 
route of information-processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) were lacking. Future 
research could focus on such aspects as well, potentially motivating less 
security-minded internet users to perform precautionary online behaviour. 
However, the peripheral route is believed to produce only short-lived effects. 
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This would imply that interventions targeting this route would need to be 
repeated continuously. In addition, recipient-related individual-difference factors 
like self-control were not included, which could also have an influence on the 
outcomes (Michie et al., 2011). However, these factors were outside the scope 
of the present investigation. 
Concluding remarks 
It is important to note that fear appeals are one of several types of intervention 
to promote security behaviour against phishing to end users. As noted by 
Maloney et al. (2011), in the domain of health behaviours, fear appeals might 
not always be the most appropriate means to do so. Nevertheless, this study 
demonstrated that fear appeals seem to work for the current context, especially 
for heightening end-user cognitions, attitudes and behavioural intentions. Fear 
appeal messages using strong arguments seem to be most efficacious overall, 
which is also highlighted by the study of Boss et al. (2015), but weak arguments 
still demonstrate efficacy to some extent. Nevertheless, future studies are 
needed to find out how subsequent behaviour can be improved, as results on 
this crucial aspect seem to lag behind. Qualitative studies focussing on 
understanding perceptions and reactions to fear appeals might complement the 
methods presented in this chapter. Moreover, follow-up studies are needed to 
critically evaluate how fear appeals affect end users in the information security 
domain. 
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10.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigated online banking fraud victimization and precautionary 
online behaviour. Specifically, human aspects were the focus of this research. 
Apparently it is easier, cheaper and more successful for criminals to attack end 
users using psychology rather than the technology surrounding online banking. 
Hence, even the best security engineers cannot stop end users from giving away 
their one-time passwords. Therefore, it makes sense to also use psychology to 
defend against online banking attacks. This is especially the case for attacks 
using social engineering, but to some extent also for attacks using technical 
engineering. As will become clear in this chapter, good security is in people’s 
heads. Considering the further digitization of our society and the increasing 
dependence on information systems, the case is made that people have to 
‘bend’ with these developments and become resilient when online. This is 
necessary to stop people from ‘breaking’ and potentially becoming victims of 
online banking fraud, or cybercrimes in general. 
The general conclusions of this thesis are presented in this chapter. The 
conclusions are linked to the main research questions outlined in Chapter 1. The 
main research questions are: 
1: What are the perceptions of end users on the safety and security of online 
banking? 
2: How can online banking fraud victimization be explained from an end-user 
perspective? 
3: How can precautionary online behaviour of end users be explained and 
improved? 
The research questions are answered in Sections 10.2 to 10.4 respectively and 
are needed to form an answer to the central question of this thesis: To what 
extent can the safety and security of online banking be improved from an end-
user perspective? This chapter continues with the theoretical and practical 
implications, which are discussed in Section 10.5 and provides an answer to the 
central question (10.5.5). In Section 10.6, the limitations of the studies are 
reflected upon. Finally, some concluding remarks are highlighted in Section 
10.7. 
10.2 What are the perceptions of end users regarding the safety and 
security of online banking? 
The first research question and its sub-questions are answered by means of the 
survey study on risk perceptions presented in Chapter 2. The first sub-question 
that was addressed is the following: 1a) What are the perceptions of end users 
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regarding threats to online banking? In order to understand how end users react 
to attacks targeting online banking, it was necessary to investigate how they 
feel about it. Online banking users do not consider online banking fraud to be a 
major problem. They estimate the likelihood of falling for fraudulent schemes 
involving online banking to be low and the chances of others being victimized by 
these threats to be higher. On the other hand, online banking users do perceive 
the ‘impact’ to be high if online banking fraud does occur. 
The second sub-question dealt with predictors of perceived risk: 1b) What 
factors determine end-users’ risk perceptions of threats to online banking? Three 
factors can be distilled that contribute most to explaining risk perception; these 
factors correspond with the literature (e.g., Garland, 2003; Griffin, Neuwirth, 
Dunwoody, & Giese, 2004). The most important factor predicting risk perception 
is perceived vulnerability or the perceived likelihood of becoming an online 
banking fraud victim. Secondary determinants of risk perception are perceived 
severity or the impact of a threat and the levels of trust in online banking. The 
latter is characterized by a negative relationship. Factors related to direct or 
indirect experiences with victimization (self, the social environment and the 
media) and demographic attributes (gender, age, level of education and work 
status) had almost no influence on risk perception. 
The third sub-question was as follows: 1c) To what extent do end users trust 
online banking? Based on the survey results, it is fair to say that online banking 
users, in general, have reasonable levels of trust in online banking. If the levels 
of trust were divided in high, medium and low, it would translate in two-thirds 
experiencing high levels of trust in online banking, a quarter having a medium or 
neutral level of trust and one-in-eight perceiving low levels of trust in online 
banking. 
The final sub-question concerned experiences of end users with online banking 
fraud: 1d) How are end users confronted with online banking threats? 
‘Confronted’ is delimited in this thesis to self-experienced victimization, indirect 
victimization (in the social environment) and having heard about or read stories 
in the media about online banking fraud victimization. Based on the survey 
results, it can be concluded that three-quarters of online banking users hear 
about online banking fraud victimization through media coverage. To a lesser 
extent, they experience indirect victimization in their social environment. Nearly 
one-third of end users know someone personally that has been victimized by a 
phishing and/or a malware attack on online banking. In conclusion, only few 
(direct) online banking fraud victims could be identified, namely ten phishing 
and twenty malware victims – in total, 27 individual victims – whilst some 35% 
had been confronted with phishing attempts on online banking and 15% with 
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fraudulent attempts using malware. These 27 victims represent 2.3% of the 
online banking users. This statistic comes as no surprise when compared to 
figures from Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2015b), which are similar. 
10.3 How can online banking fraud victimization be explained? 
The second research question and its sub-questions are answered based on the 
studies presented in Chapters 3 to 5. These include the case analyses on 600 
real-world bank files and the interviews with 30 online banking fraud victims. 
The first sub-question that was addressed is the following: 2a) How and why do 
end users become victims of online banking fraud? In order to answer this 
question, case analyses and semi-structured interviews were conducted. At its 
most basic form, the ‘how-question’ for phishing victimization can be answered 
as follows: end users give their personal information to fraudsters. This often 
started by replying to an e-mail (e.g., clicking on a hyperlink) or by filling out 
information on a phishing website. In some cases, a perpetrator called end users 
and asked them to disclose personal information, including online banking 
credentials. In case of malware victimization, the devices used for online 
banking were infected with malicious software that was used to manipulate 
online banking sessions. How the infections took place was unclear from the 
case analyses study, because there was no detailed information on this in the 
bank’s incident database. However, the interview study revealed that most 
victims’ devices were automatically infected when surfing to websites with 
outdated security. Finally, the perpetrator monetized the stolen information. 
These steps are similar to what is known from the literature (e.g., Hong, 2012). 
The answer on the ‘why-question’ is similar for phishing and malware attacks on 
online banking. End users complied with the malicious instructions they saw on 
their screens or that were instigated by the perpetrator. Cooperation was 
achieved because the social or technical engineering techniques used were 
successful, for instance, because the messages were perceived to be 
professional and trustworthy. Such messages typically respond to actuality, 
convey a sense of urgency and appeal to trust and authority. These factors are 
similar to what is found in the literature (e.g., Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, 
& Rao, 2011). Furthermore, end users seemed insufficiently suspicious about 
what was going on. Even though end users did not always trust the intentions of 
the perpetrator, they were mentally unable to stop the fraudulent process. 
Underlying reasons for cooperating with the perpetrator include, not being aware 
of how fraudulent schemes manifest in practice, not being alert at the right 
moment and having insufficient knowledge of online banking procedures and 
precautionary measures. 
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Besides providing insight into how and why end users became victims of online 
banking fraud – through their understanding of the situation (cognitions) and 
behaviour – it was interesting to investigate whether evidence could be found for 
certain characteristics of victims making them more prone to fall for such 
attacks. Because previous quantitative cybercrime studies failed to agree on 
universal characteristics, this thesis adopted a qualitative approach. Hence, the 
following sub-question was formulated: 2b) What end-user characteristics can 
be identified that increase the chance of online banking fraud victimization? 
The suitability factors from the routine activity approach that were tested – 
value, visibility and accessibility – did not seem to affect online banking fraud 
victimization. In addition, victims were distributed across genders, age 
categories and levels of education. The conclusion, based on the current 
findings, is that everyone is susceptible to phishing and malware attacks to 
some extent. In other words, no specific characteristics of end users could be 
identified that increase the chance of online banking fraud victimization. 
The impact of online banking fraud victimization was included in the third sub-
question: 2c) What are the effects and impact of online banking fraud 
victimization? The interview study highlighted that besides (initial) financial 
effects (most victims tended to be reimbursed), there were also other different 
types of psychological and emotional effects. Examples include feeling awful, 
stupid and stressed and losing trust in banks and/or online banking, people in 
general and in themselves. The effects were mostly present during the first 
moments after victims became aware of what had happened to them. However, 
some of these effects were also evident in the long term. Furthermore, 
secondary effects were felt that were either instigated by the contact victims had 
with their bank or with the police in reporting and handling the incident, for 
instance time loss and having no direct access to money because the person’s 
bank account was blocked. Nonetheless, some of the victims were satisfied with 
the ways the banks and the police handled their case. Concerning the impact of 
incidents, responses ranged from no or little impact to severe impact. 
The fourth sub-question was formulated as follows: 2d) How do victims cope 
with online banking fraud victimization? Victims had various cognitive and 
behavioural coping strategies to deal with their victimization. Cognitive 
strategies mainly concerned with reducing psychological and emotional distress 
and increasing online resilience regarding future attacks, i.e., having learned 
from the experience. The main behavioural strategies that were identified were 
reporting the incident to the bank and the police and seeking support from the 
social environment. This is, however, logical because the victims were identified 
based on police reports. In addition, various actions were taken regarding 
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installing new or additional technical protective measures on devices, being 
more alert or aware of fraudulent schemes, being more careful or precise when 
using online banking, making changes with regard to bank accounts and 
becoming more suspicious of e-mails. However, it was observed that some of 
these actions were only of limited duration. Some also adopted avoidance 
behaviours, for instance, using online banking services less. Victims who 
suffered financial damage as a result rationalized the incident, thereby 
minimizing victimization for themselves. 
10.4 How can precautionary online behaviour of end users be explained 
and improved? 
The third and final research question is answered based on evidence collected 
from Chapters 6 to 9. These chapters include the survey based on a sample of 
1,200 online banking users, the secondary analysis of survey data based on a 
sample of 1,622 self-employed entrepreneurs and the experimental study about 
fear appeals involving 786 internet users. 
The first sub-question dealt with the theoretical foundation of Part II of this 
thesis: 3a) What theoretical models can explain precautionary online behaviour? 
As shown in Chapter 6, several models may explain this type of behaviour. It 
was found, however, that protection motivation theory stood out, not only 
because of its predictive ability, but also because of its applicability for 
interventions. Nevertheless, the reasoned action approach was also useful for 
explaining precautionary online behavioural intentions. Hence, the integrated 
model explained most variance in protection motivation, i.e., behavioural 
intention. 
The second sub-question that was addressed is the following: 3b) What are the 
predictors of precautionary online behaviour? The most important predictors are 
response efficacy, i.e., perceptions of how effective a protective measure is in 
reducing or mitigating a threat, and self-efficacy, i.e., perceptions of one’s ability 
in carrying out the protective measure. This finding is similar to the studies on 
private and corporate end users that are described in this thesis. This is also 
consistent with results found in previous studies of the information security 
domain (Boehmer, LaRose, Rifon, Alhabash, & Cotten, 2015; Crossler, 2010; 
Ifinedo, 2012; Lee, 2011; Liang & Xue, 2010; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 
2008) and beyond this domain (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000; Milne, 
Sheeran, & Orbell, 2000). Attitude towards performing precautionary online 
behaviour was also found to be an important predictor. Secondary determinants 
were perceived severity, i.e., the perceived impact of a threat occurring, and 
internal locus of control, i.e., the extent to which an end user believes that he or 
she is mainly responsible for preventing an attack from being successful. 
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The third sub-question was formulated as follows: 3c) To what extent do the 
predictors of precautionary online behaviour differ between subgroups (gender, 
age, and education level)? For private end users, there were significant 
differences between women and men. First, women’s protection motivation was 
more influenced by the extent they believe that other people take precautions 
against security threats posed by online banking than is true for men. Second, 
with increasing age, women’s protection motivation is stronger, but this was not 
true for men. Apart from this gender-related age difference, no significant 
differences were directly observed for age per se. Regarding education level, two 
differences could be identified regarding precautionary behaviour. First, the 
protection motivation of those without higher levels of education was more 
influenced by the extent they believe that other people take precautions against 
security threats posed by online banking than those with higher levels of 
education. Second, the protection motivation was more strongly negatively 
influenced for those with higher levels education by the extent to which they 
trust online banking (by reducing the perception of risk, which then decreased 
protection motivation), as opposed to those without higher levels of education. 
For corporate end users, differences in precautionary behaviour were related to 
age and education level. The results indicate that older self-employed 
entrepreneurs take measures to protect their IT systems and data to a greater 
extent than their younger counterparts do. Furthermore, the results show that 
precautionary behaviour decreases as the level of education increases. 
After having studied a range of aspects in order to ‘understand’ the phenomena 
at hand, effort was made to ‘improve’ the online resilience of end users. This 
was the central theme of the fourth sub-question: 3d) To what extent can 
predictors of precautionary online behaviour be influenced in order to improve 
end-user behaviour? According to Wijn, Van den Berg, Wetzer, and Broekman 
(2016) two strategies can be used to influence user behaviour: increasing 
precautionary behaviour or decreasing risky behaviour. As opposed to previous 
studies that focussed on promoting precautionary behaviour (Chapters 6 to 8), 
the study presented in Chapter 9 examined whether internet users could be 
dissuaded from sharing personal information online through fear appeals so that 
susceptibility to phishing attacks could be reduced. This pre-test post-test study 
demonstrates that fear appeals have positive effects on heightening end-users’ 
cognitions, attitudes and behavioural intentions. However, direct effects on 
subsequent security behaviour were not directly observed. 
10.5 Theoretical and practical implications 
In this section, the findings are discussed and the scientific and practical values 
are presented. This section includes implications for risk perceptions (10.5.1), 
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online banking fraud victimization (10.5.2), precautionary online behaviour 
(10.5.3) and general implications (10.5.4). The section then continues with an 
overview of the most important recommendations and provides an answer to the 
central question of this thesis (10.5.5). 
10.5.1 Risk perception 
More insight was gained in risk perceptions and predictors for risk perception in 
the online domain, specifically into the safety and security of online banking. 
End users perceive the potential impact of online banking fraud to be severe, but 
the chances of being victimized themselves to be slim. This is not a strange 
conclusion, because most online banking transactions do not go amiss. 
Furthermore, end users have relatively good levels of trust in online banking. 
From a bank’s perspective this is promising, as it will not stop people from using 
online banking services. However, there is a potential downside to it. 
The literature has shown a correlation between risk perception and 
communicating the advantages of (high-risk) activities (Finucane, Alhakami, 
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). The greater the level of trust or the advantage of a 
certain activity, the lower the perception of risk and vice versa. Therefore, it is 
important for banks to find the right balance between the convenience and the 
security of their services.52 This applies not only to using online banking 
services, but also to communicating about these services. 
Indeed, underestimating risks can encourage people to behave unsafely, which 
ultimately increases risk (Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011). 
Hale (1996), for example, argues that having some degree of concern when it 
comes to crime is a good thing, so that people guard against it. However, 
overestimating risk can also have negative consequences, such as avoiding 
behaviour, e.g., not using online banking services as much. Thus, although 
increased awareness of fraudulent schemes should reinforce the ability of both 
private and corporate customers to recognize fraudulent schemes and act 
accordingly, it must not lead to customers becoming unhappy and distrustful. A 
quote from Frank Crane sums this up really well: ‘You may be deceived if you 
trust too much, but you will live in torment if you don’t trust enough’. The 
bottom line is that customers should only engage in online banking practices if 
things go exactly as planned and expected. When communicating about risk, the 
results of this research reveal that the most important predictor to consider is 
perceived vulnerability, which appeals to personal relevance. However, as we 
                                               
52 This balance or trade-off between convenience (easy access to your money) and 
security (wanting your money to be absolutely safe and secure) is basically the essence of 
cybersecurity in online banking. 
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will see later, it is important to also include information on coping measures 
against threats in that particular communication. 
Furthermore, end users perceive the chance that others will fall victim to online 
banking fraud to be higher than their own chances. This can be justified by the 
following (Bragdon, 2008). People operate on the basis of assumptions and 
personal beliefs that enable them to set goals, plan activities, and so on. Over 
time, this ‘conceptual system’ evolves and offers them expectations about their 
surroundings. People act based on this conceptual system of assumptions 
without having any evidence for it. One of these assumptions is the belief in 
personal invulnerability. For example, people acknowledge that crimes occur a 
lot, but at the same time, they believe that it will not happen to them. They 
underestimate their own risks and overestimate others’ (Workman et al., 2008). 
Generally speaking, people are not very good at assessing risk (West, 2008). 
Trust is an important aspect in online banking. In this thesis, trust is studied on 
a general level – as a (moderate) predictor of perceived risk. Future studies 
could adopt a more specific focus on trust in online banking. Knowing how online 
trust develops and how an optimal level of trust can be maintained is a 
necessary requirement when organisations, such as banks, become more 
dependent on online service delivery (Beldad, De Jong, & Steehouder, 2010). 
Furthermore, although more is known about trust in online banking in general, it 
would be interesting for future research to study how trust applies to different 
online payment products, such as iDeal, PayPal, AfterPay and credit cards. 
Which would banking customers choose, in which cases and why? And perhaps 
with regard to crypto currencies too, which are becoming increasingly popular.53 
An aspect that was lacking in the literature on what constitutes perceived risk in 
the online context was victimization. In this thesis, three types of victimization 
were included to examine whether they affected risk perception. However, these 
variables proved to be of less value in explaining risk perception as opposed to 
the more robust measures of perceived vulnerability, perceived severity and 
trust in online banking. Although 64% of the variance for risk perceptions of 
online banking fraud was explained, future studies are needed to further 
understand how risk perceptions are formed. Applying the psychometric 
paradigm to online risks (e.g., Garg & Camp, 2012; Van Schaik et al., 2017) and 
including additional characteristics of end users, such as personality traits (e.g., 
                                               
53 Maartens, L. (2017). De onweerstaanbare opkomst van Bitcoin [The unstoppable rise of 
Bitcoin]. Retrieved from https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/302759/de-onweerstaanbare-
opkomst-van-bitcoin 
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Borwell, Jansen, & Stol, 2018; Halevi, Lewis, & Memon, 2013; Parsons, 
McCormac, Butavicius, & Ferguson, 2010) are options. 
In conclusion, locus of control was added as a potential predictor variable of 
perceived threat. Although significant, the effects were minimal. It can be 
argued, also in relation to the studies described in Chapters 6 and 7, that locus 
of control is more concerned with assessing coping mechanisms than it is for 
threat assessment. Therefore, future studies should test perceived personal 
control (Griffin et al., 2004; Hajli & Lin, 2016) on risk perceptions as this more 
specific construct has better predictive ability for risk perceptions. 
10.5.2 Online banking fraud victimization 
More light has been shed on online banking fraud victimization. Real-world data, 
gathered from a bank’s information system, and interview data were used to 
explain online banking fraud victimization. This section is divided into the 
following sub-sections: the victimization process, victim characteristics and 
coping with victimization. 
The victimization process 
It can be concluded that end users have an unintended and subconscious yet 
active role in their own victimization. This counts primarily for phishing 
victimization, but to a certain extent also for malware victimization. Although 
malware can be considered a type of technical engineering, end users still had to 
act for some of these attacks to be successful. Hence, both attack types are 
similar in many ways. Leukfeldt, Kleemans, and Stol (2017) also demonstrate 
that the goal of phishing and malware attacks (i.e., stealing money from online 
bank accounts) and the modus operandi of both attack types (i.e., intercepting 
login credentials, intercepting one time transaction authentication codes, wiring 
the money to money mule accounts and cashing the money) are quite similar. A 
difference between the two attack types is that phishing attacks often involve 
direct contact between the victim and the perpetrator, while the contact for 
malware attacks was indirect, i.e., mediated by technology. 
The importance of trust is not limited to risk perceptions, but includes also 
actions of online banking users. Sometimes trust stops people from adequately 
countering phishing or malware attacks. As Luo, Zhang, Burd, and Seazzu 
(2012) argue, phishing attacks often succeed because cognitive biases in human 
thinking are exploited, rather than because the perpetrators take advantage of 
technological loopholes. Phishing victimization is largely caused through heuristic 
processing. Victims trust the perpetrator when asked to perform actions with 
fraudulent outcomes over the phone, they trust the deceitful message that pops 
up their computer screen, and they trust the phishing e-mail they have received. 
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They were tricked into doing so using the psychology of persuasion, mainly 
because perpetrators appeal to trust and authority.54 Recently, phishing 
messages have started to appear on mobile phones via SMS.55 
A relevant question concerning e-mails is whether banks should continue to use 
e-mails – to private e-mail accounts – as a communications channel. The 
disadvantage of banks sending e-mails to private addresses is that the phishing 
crime script often starts by sending an e-mail. This is even more the case since 
phishing e-mails are becoming increasingly professional, which means that they 
are more difficult to distinguish from legitimate ones. If banks were to stop 
sending e-mails to private (or business) addresses, and limit sending e-mails to 
the secure online banking environment of their customers, then customers 
would not have to decide whether the e-mail was legitimate or not. However, 
commercial reasons will probably preclude such a measure from being taken. 
Yet, from a customer perspective, this could reduce the risk of falling for 
phishing scams. 
In addition, some victims mentioned that during the attack their gut feeling told 
them that something was wrong. However, they were mentally unable to stop 
the fraudulent process. Somehow, end users do not dare to explicitly doubt that 
it is the bank that is on the phone. Alternatively, they were simply not paying 
enough attention at that particular moment. Future research should identify 
which signals in particular trigger this unsafe feeling and how that feeling can be 
empowered so people will act upon to it, i.e., start trusting their instincts. It is 
the same as driving a car; if in doubt, do not overtake. 
It is also advisable to inform users – at least in general – how perpetrators 
operate in fraudulent schemes, for example, what security codes entail, what 
happens when they fall into the wrong hands and which trust indicators 
perpetrators use in their advantage. The data showed that some victims were 
unfamiliar with the modus operandi (and influencing techniques) used in online 
banking fraud schemes or tended to have a lack of knowledge about information 
security practices. This is not remarkable, since information security is an 
abstract concept for many.  
While the costs of implementing security measures are real and direct, they 
often have – in the case of online security – no visible outcome and the threats 
                                               
54 Clicking on a hyperlink in a phishing e-mail can be the result of habits, such as the habit 
of being deferential to people in authority (Bullée, 2017). 
55 ING (n.d.). Phishing via SMS. Retrieved from https://www.ing.nl/de-ing/veilig-
bankieren/belangrijke-mededelingen/phishing-per-sms.html 
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they guard against are also often invisible (West, 2008). Therefore, explanations 
should be on a general level. To draw an analogy to driving a car again, people 
do not need to understand how everything works under the bonnet, but they 
have to know the basics so that they can avoid break downs. 
An example of a general warning is: ‘We never call you’. A crime script that was 
encountered often while working on this thesis clearly shows that criminals not 
only use fake e-mails and websites that appear to be sent by banks, they also 
call victims to intercept the necessary transaction codes. In this crime script, 
phone calls are a crucial part of the phishing attempt. The phishing e-mail 
and/or website may provide accesses to the victim’s bank account, but 
perpetrators are still unable to transfer money. To actually transfer money, they 
require codes that have to be generated by the victim. Prevention campaigns 
should not only make customers aware of the fact that phishers are looking for 
these credentials, but also that they actually call people to get their hands on 
these codes. The campaign message can be simple and clear: ‘no one ever asks 
for your transaction codes – not by phone either’. 
A higher level of abstraction is also prudent when taking into account different 
online banking systems and procedures – used by different banks – and all of 
the other online threats end users are confronted with. It is not feasible to act 
against each specific threat if all are presented as being equally important. In 
addition, if they focus on one threat, people might become more vulnerable to 
another; it is impossible to warn online banking customers – or the broader 
internet population – about everything. It is even more complicated for 
corporate customers, as they have to be informed about new threats and coping 
measures, while not compromising on productivity. 
Victim characteristics 
Characteristics of end users that lead to higher chances of being victimized 
through online banking fraud could not be identified in this research. A 
qualitative approach using the routine activity approach was insufficient. 
Perhaps this is due to online activities not being distinctive anymore, because of 
their increased usage. Another option is that characteristics were not set-off 
against the non-victim population. Follow-up studies should also include a non-
victim sample, so that comparisons between characteristics of victims and non-
victims can be made. The lack of explanatory power of the routine activity 
approach could also be linked to the dragnet method that perpetrators usually 
use to target their victims. Leukfeldt (2015), who conducted a quantitative study 
using the same theoretical approach to study the same online threats, presented 
a similar explanation. It is possible that this conclusion only counts for online 
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banking fraud, and not for other types of cybercrime, such as CEO fraud, for 
which perpetrators have to delve into someone’s background. 
Online banking fraud victims are not selected because of their suitability factors 
or routine activities; instead attempts are made to reach them by sending out 
untargeted bulk e-mails in the hope that someone will bite. This is a cost-
effective method for perpetrators, which pays-off even if a small percentage falls 
for it (Jones, Towse, & Race, 2015; Parrish Jr, Bailey, & Courtney, 2009). The 
contents of the attacks are continually adjusted to be in line with recent events 
and succeed in gaining the trust of end users. This thesis found no hard 
evidence that spear phishing – a more labour-intensive type of social 
engineering – is being applied in online banking attacks. This is an indication 
that target suitability is probably not that important to perpetrators when it 
comes to online banking, even though the perception is that this kind of phishing 
attack has a higher success rate (Bursztein et al., 2014). 
Attacks on online banking using malware can be instigated using various 
methods. In the interview study, it became clear that victims’ devices were 
automatically infected with malware when visiting a website with outdated 
security. However, malware infections can also be spread using social 
engineering tactics, for example, by convincing a user to open an infected 
attachment in a fraudulent e-mail. Concerning infected websites, it is important 
to consider the role of website owners or hosting companies in combatting 
malware attacks on online banking since customers themselves seem to be quite 
defenceless against such schemes. This conclusion is drawn because victims 
noticed nothing out of the ordinary and their security systems did not pick up 
anything malicious when conducting bank activities online. In such a case, end 
users can hardly be considered the weakest link. 
Besides the routine activity approach, data were also available on victims’ 
demographics. No differences in victims’ demographic attributes were evident in 
the fraud cases studied at banks, in the interviews conducted with victims or in 
the survey presented in Chapter 2. In other words, victims were equally likely to 
be male or female, young or old and levels of education made no difference. 
This leads to the conclusion that the victim population is very diverse. This is 
contrary to previous studies that suggested that scam victims are more likely to 
be older (e.g., Grimes, Hough, & Signorella, 2007). 
This finding suggests that potential victims of online banking fraud are difficult 
to identify because people are all equally likely to fall victim. It could be that 
victimization is not a coincidence and that victims do have unique characteristics 
or behaviour patterns or are exposed to certain circumstances. In that case, 
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other variables predicting victimization should be studied or other means of data 
collection should be used when applying the routine activity approach. It would 
be useful to analyse real-world data in terms of online behaviour, for instance 
based on log files or information from online databases in which victims’ contact 
information is stored. Additionally, it would be interesting to find out if there are 
any differences between online banking fraud victims and victims of phishing 
and malware attacks within other contexts. 
An important implication, at least as it stands now, is that it may be potentially 
more worthwhile to carry on investing in prevention for the whole online banking 
population rather than for specific groups of customers, as it is not yet clear if 
there are subpopulations that run greater risks of being targeted. Indeed, 
victims are a heterogeneous target group. Alternatively, it may be more 
effective to disrupt the crime scripts that perpetrators use (Leukfeldt, 2016). 
Perhaps a two-pronged approach targeting user behaviour and perpetrator 
methods would be most effective in reducing online banking fraud victimization. 
In line with the reasoning above, mainly based on observations beyond the 
context of the individual studies, banks should continue to invest in their own 
detection systems in order to stop fraudulent attacks from succeeding. Banks 
continually develop their detection systems, but it is essential to emphasize the 
importance of this here, especially because it is not clear how some of the 
malware attacks described in this thesis took place. Another recommendation 
that banks might consider is to build in a delay in money transfers, for example, 
if money is transferred to bank accounts used for the first time. The delay could 
for instance be 48 hours. Then both banks and customers have potentially more 
time to reveal fraudulent transaction attempts. By doing so, transactions can be 
declined so that virtually no damage occurs, benefiting both parties. Another 
option would be to process transfers during office hours only so that 
departments responsible for monitoring and detection can effectively anticipate 
fraud attempts. However, this is at odds with the speed that the economy 
demands, i.e., real-time transactions. Again, the incontrovertible fact is that not 
all fraudulent transactions can be stopped. 
Coping with victimization 
The conclusion that the target group of victims is heterogeneous also has 
implications concerning how to help victims recover from their victimization. This 
thesis has shown that victims deal differently with their victimization. The study 
on the effects and impact of online banking fraud revealed that the monetary 
aspect is not the only important one. For some, the incident had far-reaching 
psychological and emotional consequences that must not be ignored. This means 
that the actors involved, such as banks and law enforcement agencies, need to 
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understand that each individual victim has a range of needs that have to be 
attended to (Cross, Richards, & Smith, 2016) and they must respond adequately 
to those needs. When victims report incidents, an important starting point is 
that their victimization is recognized and that they are treated sensitively. The 
Dutch Ministry of Safety and Justice (2013) acknowledges this in their vision 
document on doing justice to victims. Not only is this important for the victim’s 
recovery, it is also desirable from an ethical perspective. 
An important finding is the value of discussing incidents with others, especially 
the social environment. This is important for coping with online banking fraud 
incidents. There still seems to be a stigma surrounding (online) fraud 
victimization, as victims themselves are sometimes seen as (partly) responsible 
for their victimization (Button, Lewis, & Tapley, 2009a; Cross et al., 2016). To 
remove that stigma, it is important that victims are reassured that they need 
not be embarrassed and that they are encouraged to talk more openly about 
it.56 This may also benefit the willingness of victims to report such incidents to 
the police (Cross et al., 2016). 
An observation that is interesting for banks as well as the police is providing 
feedback to victims on how the victimization took place. The assumption is that 
victims are then better able to learn from the actions that lead to victimization. 
This is especially the case for aspects that concern security, because unwise 
actions do not always translate directly into obvious negative outcomes, and 
that makes learning more difficult (West, 2008). Giving feedback about how the 
case is handled is also advisable, because it may help to restore a victim’s trust. 
Providing insight into the factors underlying victim responses to phishing and 
malware incidents was beyond the scope of this research, but it could be 
interesting for follow-up studies. Personal and situational factors affect appraisal 
processes. Personal factors include commitments and beliefs, in particular beliefs 
about personal control and existential beliefs. Situational factors involve novelty, 
predictability and event uncertainty, but also temporal factors including 
imminence, duration and temporal uncertainty and, ambiguity and the timing of 
a stressful event in the person’s life course (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). For 
secondary appraisal in particular, the resources that are readily available to 
individuals also play an important role. Examples of these include knowledge, 
money, tools, people to help and skills (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Insight into 
                                               
56 Turrill, K. (2017). Have YOU been a victim of fraud? A third of UK adults have fallen for 
a scam TWICE. Retrieved from https://www.express.co.uk/life-style/life/870986/action-
fraud-benefit-uk-email-online-barclays 
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these phenomena would benefit our understanding of the victims’ coping 
processes and the differences between them. 
10.5.3 Precautionary online behaviour 
More insight has been gained into precautionary online behaviour. Survey data 
gathered from online banking users, self-employed entrepreneurs and general 
internet users were used to explain this type of behaviour. This section is divided 
into the following sub-sections: theoretical basis for studying precautionary 
behaviour, predictors of precautionary behaviour and behavioural change. 
Theoretical basis for studying precautionary behaviour 
The way end users make decisions related to information security is what 
Parsons et al. (2010) call a dynamic and complex matter. Decisions are, for 
example, influenced by end-users’ cognitive abilities and biases in their thinking. 
End users also have different learning strategies and there are various strategies 
for protecting end users against online threats. Alsharnouby, Alaca, and 
Chiasson (2015) describe four complementary strategies to protect end users 
against phishing: (1) automated phishing detection; (2) manual phishing 
detection (user interface cues); (3) education on precautionary behaviour; and 
(4) designing protection mechanisms by understanding end-user’s susceptibility 
to phishing. 
This thesis tested which theoretical model best explains precautionary online 
behaviour in the case of online banking. The protection motivation theory (PMT) 
and the reasoned action approach (RAA) both explain a significant amount of 
variance for behavioural intention. Moreover, the integrated model explained the 
highest levels of variance, giving practitioners potentially more options when it 
comes to prevention campaigns, because the variables that were significant 
predictors in the individual models remained significant when studied in 
combination. This conclusion is consistent with the work of Herath and Rao 
(2009) and Ifinedo (2012). 
In line with previous studies that have adopted PMT as their theoretical 
framework, the studies in Chapters 6 to 8 adopted PMT as a theory of behaviour, 
even though it can be argued that PMT is a theory of behavioural change rather 
than a theory of behaviour (Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015). However, 
this thesis demonstrates that PMT is useful as a theory of behaviour as well, one 
which can be used to understand which drivers for precautionary behaviour are 
most important for specific contexts. Hence, the results from Chapters 6 to 8 
provided additional grounds for the manipulation of particular variables in the 
fear appeals study in Chapter 9. 
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Predictors of precautionary behaviour 
More insight was gained into what motivates end users to take precautionary 
measures for safe and secure online banking, and into what motivates self-
employed entrepreneurs to take technical and personal precautionary measures. 
The studies in this thesis showed that, for private and corporate end users alike, 
response efficacy and self-efficacy were the most important predictors for 
precautionary online behaviour. This finding has implications for security 
education, training and awareness (SETA) campaigns. Hence, the focus of such 
campaigns should theoretically be on these aspects, for instance, promoting the 
effectiveness and ease of use of a measure in mitigating a certain treat; what is 
the right behaviour and what does it aim to solve or prevent. That measures 
should be easy to use is also demonstrated by the fact that security is perceived 
to be a secondary task by most end users (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). 
Threat variables did not seem to explain much of the variance in the models. 
There is a theoretical explanation for why threat variables do not seem to be 
strong predictors of protection motivation. Milne et al. (2000) indicate that the 
weaker association of threat variables with protection motivation may be due to 
statistical interpretations and operationalization. This is because risk may have a 
positive and a negative relationship with behaviour. There is a positive 
relationship when someone feels vulnerable to a certain risk and therefore 
adopts precautionary behaviour. If precautionary behaviour has already been 
adopted, an individual may no longer feel vulnerable and therefore the 
relationship is negative. Longitudinal research might provide an explanation for 
how this relationship works. Nonetheless, besides explaining the effectiveness 
and usability of a particular coping measure, focus should also be on threat 
awareness, as it is believed that threat appraisal initiates the coping appraisal 
process. Adams and Sasse (1999) showed some 20 years ago that people are 
motivated to take precautionary measures as long as they are perceived to be 
necessary, for instance, because there is a clear external threat or the 
information is sensitive and needs to be safeguarded. The heart of the matter is 
that instead of trying to remove the risk, people should be made aware of how 
to manage the risk. 
Furthermore, the studies described in Part II of this thesis showed that response 
costs should be kept low, in terms of money as well as time. Thus, an optimal 
balance must be found and maintained between usability and security. One way 
to characterize how users value information security is to quantify how they 
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make trade-offs related to cybersecurity.57 For instance, how much loss of 
legitimate online content are users willing to incur to reduce the likelihood of a 
successful phishing attack? Or how much inconvenience are users willing to 
tolerate to reduce the chance of a phishing attack? These are interesting leads 
for further study. 
In addition, end users should be made aware that they have a personal 
responsibility in keeping their online banking sessions safe and secure, so an 
appeal should be made to their internal locus of control. In addition, customers 
should also realize that security is never completed; it is an ongoing fact of life. 
If money is up for grabs, perpetrators will be looking to get their hands on it. 
Perpetrators will therefore continuously come up with new ways to crack the 
weakest link. In summary, customers should be made aware of what may 
happen, but also of what they can do to protect themselves. Moreover, safety 
and security requires the joint effort of banks and customers alike. This means 
that customers should be treated as peers in this endeavour. This also implies 
that banks should communicate about what they are doing to play their part for 
online banking safety and security. 
This thesis provided insight in the drivers of precautionary behaviour and how 
these insights can be applied in practice. However, in order to better understand 
the drivers, it is fruitful to qualitatively explore how these drivers are formed in 
people’s minds; Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) refer to these as beliefs. This is 
important, because a deeper understanding of beliefs might provide insight into 
how to influence the drivers more effectively and – indirectly – the target 
behaviour and its intentions. Priority could be given to investigating the beliefs 
that constitute response efficiency and self-efficacy, because these are the 
strongest predictors. Following this line of reasoning, an interesting possibility 
for future research would be to study mental models of customers concerning 
online banking fraud risks and how these relate to taking precautionary 
measures. This could improve our understanding of customer knowledge, 
attitudes and behaviours, and, possibly, how to influence these. Hence, it might 
help to explain the as-yet unaccounted for variance of the models in this thesis. 
Qualitative approaches are useful because there is a tendency to analyse 
behaviour on a population basis even though users are different, i.e., they do 
not all act in the same way. 
Although the inclusion of a study on corporate end users in this thesis – in this 
case self-employed entrepreneurs – may be considered a unique component in 
                                               
57 Schneier, B. (2008). The psychology of security (Part I). Retrieved from https:// 
www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2008/01/the_psychology_of_se.html 
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information security research, more research into this target group as well as 
into small- and medium-sized enterprises and larger organizations, such as 
municipalities and hospitals, is required. In the media, stories are circulating 
about data being inadequately protected or even worse, being accessed (e.g., 
via discarded computers) or stolen using digital or online means.58,59 In addition, 
corporate target groups have their own unique problems, such as CEO fraud and 
invoice scams. Precautionary online behaviour should extend across all layers of 
society and thus more research should be conducted into these target groups as 
well. 
Behavioural change 
When all is said and done, people’s protection motivation or behavioural 
intention is just the starting point (Milne, Orbell, & Sheeran, 2002), because 
motivations have to be followed up by real actions. In order to understand 
whether theoretical recommendations work in practice, an experimental study 
on fear appeals was conducted. Fear appeals are a type of intervention that is 
receiving increasing attention in behavioural information security research (Wall 
& Buche, 2017). Protection motivation theory was chosen as the primary model. 
Variables concerning attitude and message rejection, i.e., resistance and two 
avoidance constructs, were included. These constructs are adopted from the 
extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992) and the stage model of 
processing of fear-arousing communications (De Hoog, Stroebe, & De Wit, 
2005). 
The study described in Chapter 9 demonstrates that fear appeals have positive 
effects on heightening end-users’ cognitions, attitudes and intentions. However, 
effects on subsequent security behaviour were not directly observed. Thus, fear 
appeals have great potential to promote security behaviour by making end users 
aware of threats and simultaneously providing behavioural advice on how to 
mitigate these threats, but future research is needed to test how this can 
successfully transfer to the right behaviour, which is a crucial aspect in 
information security. Other research also demonstrates that fear appeals can be 
effective in promoting precautionary behaviour, although some inconsistencies 
remain which need to be resolved by future research (Wall & Buche, 2017). In 
                                               
58 Voort, S. van (2017). Ziekenhuis meldt datalek na diefstal van laptop met 
patiëntgegevens [Hospital reports data leak after laptop theft with patient data]. Retrieved 
from https://tweakers.net/nieuws/120469/ziekenhuis-meldt-datalek-na-diefstal-van- 
laptop-met-patientgegevens.html 
59 Nu.nl (2016). Privédata duizenden inwoners Rotterdam en Oegstgeest gelekt [Private 
data leaked of thousands of Rotterdam and Oegstgeest residents]. Retrieved from 
https://www.nu.nl/internet/4227550/privedata-duizenden-inwoners-rotterdam-en-
oegstgeest-gelekt.html 
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order to understand why intentions are or are not followed by actions it is 
worthwhile investigating factors in this relationship, such as actual skills or 
abilities and environmental factors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In addition, the 
situational context, for instance, controlling for the mood of end users, e.g., 
being in a hurry, feeling tired and having experienced a traumatic life-event, is 
also an interesting lead for follow-up studies. 
Although the intervention was set up realistically, it was still part of a study and 
participants were aware of this. The extent to which the results apply to real 
practice – making end users resilient when it comes to cyberattacks – needs to 
be more thoroughly examined in follow-up research. Myers and Abraham (2005) 
wrote a paper about the extent to which people adhere to advice given by 
healthcare professionals. They state (p. 680) that ‘anything from 15 per cent to 
93 per cent’ of patients do not act on various recommendations and about 50 
per cent do not take prescribed treatments, and this applies to both minor and 
major health conditions. Reasons for non-adherence include not remembering to 
take the treatment, not understanding it, not knowing how to follow it, but also 
disagreeing with diagnoses or medication regimen. They conclude that, although 
healthcare professionals have the right expertise, make accurate diagnoses and 
provide effective treatments, a substantial part of medical consultations has little 
or no impact on patients’ health. If people do not care about their own personal 
health, or are not able to invest in it, what are they willing and able to do about 
their online safety and safeguarding it? 
In conclusion, the results presented in this thesis are applied to the Dutch online 
banking context, but seem relevant to other contexts as well. For instance, they 
may be relevant when new security measures are implemented. Cross-sectional 
research is required to strengthen the applicability of the presented models and 
to test the results for robustness. Although cross-sectional research cannot 
provide definitive answers about causality, it does provide evidence that 
corresponds to causal hypotheses, for instance to those that are formulated in 
this thesis. However, finding true evidence for cause-and-effect-sequences calls 
for longitudinal research approaches. In addition, perceptions are not constant. 
The studies presented in this thesis provide a snapshot of perceptions at a 
particular point in time; that said, this is a common problem in social scientific 
studies. Therefore, it is advisable to repeat such studies in a few years’ time. 
10.5.4 General implications 
The studies also have some implications at a higher level of abstraction; these 
are presented in this section. This section is divided into the following sub-
sections: online banking system, online safety communications and final 
consideration. 
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Online banking system 
Despite all the measures that one might take, there will always be a risk of 
losing money. The way in which online banking is currently designed, takes on 
the risk that it can be interpreted in different ways by different people. As stated 
in Chapter 3, if a fraudulent attempt is in line with the image that a customer 
has of reality, the risk of becoming a victim increases. This reality concerns, for 
example, an understanding of the online banking system and its processes, but 
it is also about knowing how an attack works, seeing one’s own vulnerability and 
seeing how this vulnerability can be reduced or mitigated. Of course, customers 
cannot be aware of everything, and even if they could it would be a burden 
because there is so much that they need to know already. However, basic 
principles such as banks never deal with security issues by e-mail or telephone, 
what security codes entail and what happens when they fall into the wrong 
hands, are still called for. This thesis observed that crime scripts often use the 
topic of improving online banking security. If customers are better informed 
about perpetrators using this excuse to get their hands on customers’ 
credentials, perpetrators will no longer be able to appeal to customers’ concerns 
about safety and security. A potential difficulty here is that banks sometimes do 
call customers if there is any suspicion of fraud related to a money transaction. 
Furthermore, it is also advisable to emphasize in prevention campaigns that 
customers must rely on their own intuition; if something does not seem right, it 
probably is not. 
The challenge is to create a reality that cannot be manipulated when spinning a 
fraudulent story. This would allow customers to recognize an anomaly more 
quickly, making them more capable of preventing fraud. Nevertheless, running 
risks online is comparable to running risks in the offline world. However, in the 
real world, some personal risk mitigation measures can be taken, for example, 
deciding how much cash to carry around. This kind of measure could also be 
taken online; in fact it is already being applied to some extent, e.g., setting 
maximum transfer limits and blocking debit cards from being used outside 
Europe. A variation in limits and usage options makes it potentially more difficult 
for perpetrators to commit fraud on a large scale. 
Still, banks could go a step further, for example, by letting customers block 
functionality in their online banking that they are not using and by letting them 
increase the levels of technical security. This may give customers the feeling of 
being more in control of their online safety, and by doing so they can determine 
their own risk profile. Anecdotal evidence for this suggestion was gathered from 
interviews in which participants mentioned that they would be willing to make 
more effort so that they can have extra security. Moreover, such a solution 
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might be beneficial, since a one-size-fits-all solution probably does not exist. 
This suggestion could provide insight into what customers see as risks, as well 
as shedding light on where they experience obstacles in their online banking 
experience. End users, for example, disregard security practices in favour of 
convenience or because they think that harm will not befall them (Tam, 
Glassman, & Vandenwauver, 2010), but also do so to achieve other, more 
relevant objectives. 
However, this solution will not suit everyone because the majority of customers 
will probably choose the path of least resistance when it comes to security 
efforts (West, 2008). A possible downside is that it will become too complex for 
end users; the more choices they have, the more difficult it is to understand 
their impact. As stated by Parsons et al. (2010, p. III) ‘security functions need 
to be meaningful, easy to locate, visible and convenient to use’. As mentioned 
earlier, future research needs to find out where the boundary lies between what 
customers find acceptable – taking time, actions and options attributed to 
security in consideration – and the usability (or complexity) of online banking. 
This is because ‘usable security’ might be a part of the solution for improving the 
safety and security of online banking for end users (Kiljan, 2017). 
In conclusion, it seems that fraud shifts when new technologies are introduced. 
For instance, whereas previously attacks targeted ATMs and the cloning of 
magnetic stripes on debit and credit cards, now the attacks on the banking 
systems focus on (or are committed via) online banking (apps).60 If the 
presented recommendations – or new (technical) improvements – sort out into 
the proposed direction, and fraudulent attacks on online banking fraud 
consequently continue to decrease, the question then is where threats and 
perpetrators will shift towards. Will they move to other online services, diverge 
to other countries or will they use more physical types of attacks against 
(vulnerable) customers? This also implies a threat to risk interventions, because 
perpetrators will shift their focus. SIDN, the administrator of the .nl domain 
names, observed that organizations in the financial sector were less popular 
targets of criminal phishing campaigns in 2017. Instead, airline, construction 
and media companies were increasingly becoming the targets of phishing 
activities.61 
                                               
60 Nu.nl (2017). Tieners opgepakt voor diefstal via Tikkie-phishingsite [Teenagers arrested 
for theft via Tikkie-phishing website]. Retrieved from https://www.nu.nl/internet/ 
4978703/tieners-opgepakt-diefstal-via-tikkie-phishingsite.html 
61 SIDN (2017). Aantal phishingsites met Nederlandse topmerken ruim 40% toegenomen 
[Number of phishing websites using top Dutch brands increased by more than 40%]. 
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Online safety communications 
An observation during the research project – not necessarily a finding from this 
research – was that the main communication concerning online banking safety 
and security is a one-size-fits-all message for the whole target group, covering 
all ages, education levels, preferences, and the like. The communication efforts 
of individual banks also seem to target their whole customer base, except of 
course those for special meetings for elderly customers and those organized at 
schools (e.g., seminars on preventing young people from becoming money 
mules). This implies – intuitively – that the current communication efforts are 
probably not effective per se, because specific target groups have different 
levels of risk perceptions (Tan & Sagala Aguilar, 2012), because individual needs 
are not accounted for (Parsons et al., 2010), and because the design and 
contents of a message might influence information processing (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Anecdotal evidence from the interview study showed that 
some victims indicated that awareness campaigns had not reached them, 
because they do not watch television, do not read newspapers or do not actively 
look online for such information on their own initiative. This is of course also 
applicable to education and training efforts. 
Future research should therefore focus on the social psychology of 
communications between banks and their customers. Marketing research has 
shown that interventions are more effective if targeted or segmented 
approaches aimed at specific groups are used (French, 2011). It is important to 
understand the audience and their preferences, because messages may 
otherwise be ineffective. However, a meta-analysis on fear appeals – a specific 
type of intervention – conducted by Witte and Allen (2000) shows that, in 
general, individual differences do not appear to influence the processing of fear 
appeal messages. Therefore, it would be interesting to conduct studies on how 
effective security-related messages could be designed for the various target 
groups; via which channels they should be communicated and at what times; 
and what the value would be of such an approach compared to a one-size-fits-all 
approach. 
Myers and Abraham (2005) provide some evidence of aspects in 
communications that might positively influence the intention to adhere to advice 
from healthcare professionals, which might be useful for practitioners when 
designing SETA campaigns. They state that written information increases 
adherence. Recall of oral information, on the other hand, is weak. Other aspects 
                                                                                                                       
Retrieved from https://www.sidn.nl/a/veilig-internet/aantal-phishingsites-met-
nederlandse-topmerken-ruim-40-toegenomen- 
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that enhance recall of information and instructions, and subsequently 
adherence, are repetition, explaining beforehand what you are about to tell, 
stressing the importance and being specific. Personalisation of the information 
and presenting it positively also have an impact on adherence. Needless to say, 
communications must be presented in ways that customers understand. 
Communicating about security can be difficult because security is an abstract 
concept for many. Since security is viewed as an abstract concept, perhaps it 
would be better to speak of safety when addressing end users. Security can be 
viewed as a topic that does not concern end users, but is instead an issue for 
others, such as service providers, software developers and computer scientist. 
Perhaps people can relate more to the concept of safety as something they can 
do something about rather than security. Follow-up research should investigate 
the extent to which this suggestion is actually meaningful. For banks, it would be 
important then to emphasize to their customers that safety is something that 
they can influence. This may present a challenge since customers in general 
expect online banking to be safe – and secure. 
Final consideration 
While this thesis obtained relevant information on how safety and security of 
online banking can be improved from an end-user perspective, it should be 
noted that end users, not only online but also in the offline world, are confronted 
with numerous potential threats. It is a fantasy to believe that people can 
protect themselves against all threats and be vigilant about all aspects of life 
24/7. This would simply make living impossible. People have limited capacity for 
information processing and so they multitask routinely. As a result, few tasks or 
decisions are given full attention. Generally, people tend to make decisions 
based on learned rules and heuristics (Davinson & Sillence, 2010; West, 2008) 
and fraudsters take advantage of this. Although this decision-making method is 
not perfect, it is extremely efficient. Therefore, we have to accept that bad 
things will continue to happen online, but optimistically they can be kept to a 
minimum when the suggested recommendations are applied to practice. 
10.5.5 Overview of recommendations 
To conclude this section, that is to answer the central question of this thesis: To 
what extent can the safety and security of online banking be improved from an 
end-user perspective?, the most important recommendations are summed up 
below. 
1. Continue to invest in security education, training and awareness campaigns 
concerning threats aimed at online banking. 
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Security training, training and awareness (SETA) are ‘some of the most effective 
countermeasures against the human factor threats to information security’ 
(Parsons et al., 2010, p. 31). The safety and security of end users can be 
improved by making them more aware of the threats in the first place, for 
instance, by making the issue personally relevant. This thesis found, amongst 
other things, that it is important to make it clear to customers how perpetrators 
work and which trust indicators they misuse. Because people face different kinds 
of threats every day and threats continue to evolve, it would be wise to focus 
primarily on general modus operandi. Another important aspect to focus on is 
the gut feeling of customers. Some customers got an uncomfortable feeling both 
during and shortly after the fraudulent activity, but still fell victim. This suggests 
that they acted against their own better judgment. Intervention programs could 
focus on encouraging customers to trusting their instinct when it comes to these 
kinds of scams. 
Notably, awareness or threat perception needs to be accompanied by a coping 
strategy that is both effective and feasible for customers. Indeed, effort should 
not be invested in turning customers – who are often not specialists when it 
comes to security – into security experts. However, they should be educated so 
that they have the necessary skills and competencies (Parsons et al., 2010). 
According to them, education comprises the output from awareness and training 
and should ideally lead to end users making the right decisions or at least being 
aware of the consequences of threats and the consequences of their own 
(unsafe) behaviour. Thus, SETA programs should not only increase awareness, 
knowledge and the right attitude towards information security; they should 
ultimately be about acting correctly at the right time. 
Moreover, it is important to test SETA campaigns on their effectiveness and 
apply those that work best (possibly in a segmented fashion), because it is not 
yet clear which interventions work best (for which target groups and for which 
threats). This thesis tested fear appeals in a phishing setting and found that this 
type of intervention has some potential to enhance internet users’ precautionary 
behaviour, as it raised end-user cognitions, attitudes and behavioural intentions. 
However, a critical note needs to be made. This study showed that intentions or 
motivations for behaviour did not subsequently affect actual behaviour.  
In addition, evidence was found that prior victimization increases motivation for 
precautionary behaviour, which makes a case for applying simulated attacks as 
a form of learning. Although experiential learning is important, i.e., end users 
will then be prompted to action, it should be noted that the learning effect, i.e., 
adopting certain kinds of precautionary online behaviour, might wane with time. 
This was reported in the interview study described in this thesis, but also in a 
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recent dissertation on social engineering. That dissertation found that a person 
who has been warned may be less prone to falling for scams, but that the effect 
is only temporal (Bullée, 2017). Therefore, future studies also need to take 
retention time into account, preferably over longer periods of time, e.g., more 
than six months as Purkait (2012) recommends. 
A study by Alsharnouby et al. (2015) advocates that as much as possible should 
be automated or computerised to combat phishing attacks. Their argument is 
that improved browser security indicators and awareness campaigns resulted in 
only a 6% increase of phishing detection rates in comparison with Dhamija, 
Tygar, and Hearst’s (2006) study nearly twenty years later. Moreover, they 
stress that alert and vigilant users are not better at reliably detecting phishing 
attack, which is contrary to Vishwanath et al.’s (2011) proposition. Although I 
agree that we should also invest in computerised techniques as a first line of 
defence, we still need SETA, because end users will continuously be confronted 
with phishing and other types of fraudulent cyberattacks that cannot be stopped 
by technical measures. Moreover, if SETA efforts should not focus on detecting 
fake e-mails and fake websites, it should at least focus on proper or 
precautionary online behaviour, for instance how individuals should handle their 
private information online. 
2. Focus on underlying cognitive dimensions in security education, training and 
awareness campaigns, most notably on response efficacy and self-efficacy. 
In this thesis, a case is made that good security is more about people – and 
what is in their heads – than about technology. Technology plays an important 
part in defending against threats, but when the attacks find loopholes in 
technology or work around it, people play the leading role. Therefore, in order to 
strengthen the role of customers in the safety and security of online banking, 
threat appraisals as well as coping appraisals should be improved. It is essential 
to adopt a value-based approach; customers should perform the right behaviour 
because they believe that it makes a difference (response efficacy). 
Furthermore, customers should be able to perform the right behaviour (self-
efficacy). If these aspects are in place, then it is likely that end users will adopt 
precautionary behaviour and become a strong link in the information security 
chain, i.e., their online resilience will be enhanced. Additionally, information 
related to threat appraisal should be part of communications to customers as 
well, because it starts coping appraisal. This thesis provides evidence that 
perceived vulnerability is the most important predictor of threat appraisal – and 
that it appeals to personal relevance – but it needs to be handled carefully. 
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3. Make clear that banks and customers are partners in keeping online banking 
safe and secure. 
The safety and security of online banking is not one party’s responsibility, 
instead it is a joint responsibility of several parties, primarily banks and 
customers. This means that banks have to uphold their end of the bargain, 
keeping their systems safe and providing a secure internet connection between 
customer devices and their systems. In addition, there are some general 
recommendations that end users themselves should follow, such as the uniform 
safety rules for online banking62 and (other) basic security hygiene rules63. 
These recommendations count for both private and corporate end users, 
although the impact within corporate settings may be higher if security is 
compromised, that is, the mistake of one employee can shut down the whole 
organizational network. 
In the discussion about implementing these recommendations, one should not 
speak of compliance with such rules, but rather of adherence. As Myers and 
Abraham (2005) argue, adherence suggests a collaborative involvement, in this 
case between banks and their customers. Compliance on the other hand implies 
that customers should do what they are told by banks. If customers fail to do so, 
it is their own responsibility. Angela Sasse stresses that security should be 
considered to be team sport.64 Another way of viewing it is treating security as 
part of customer care. The question then is how banks can build a caring 
relationship with their customers. After all, customers falling for a fraudulent 
attack is inevitable and a fixed group of potential victims cannot easily be 
identified. As a starting point, however, banks will have to start from a 
                                               
62 The safety rules are: (1) keep your security codes secret; (2) make sure that your debit 
card is not used by others; (3) secure the devices you use for online banking properly; (4) 
check your bank account regularly; and (5) report incidents directly to your bank. Note 
that incidents should also be reported to the police. If more cases are collected, the 
chance increases that the police will tackle the issue. 
63 Although safety cues were evaluated as ineffective, other good practices might still 
relevant to lowering the chances of becoming an online banking fraud victim, such as (1) 
do not think that you are not an interesting target for perpetrators, instead be aware of 
the threats; (2) never respond to spam or e-mails from unfamiliar sources; (3) never open 
or execute attachments, unless you know precisely what is in them; (4) do not be tempted 
to respond to pop-up messages asking for personal information or wanting to install 
applications from untrustworthy sources; and (5) listen to your gut feeling: when the 
unexpected happens or is asked for, or something is too good to be true, stop using online 
banking and/or terminate the conversation. Note that these recommendations, although 
supported by the current research, are examples and do not pretend to be novel and/or 
comprehensive. 
64 Cyber Risk Summer School (personal communication, June 22, 2016). 
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cooperative perspective, rather than from the perspective of imposing what to 
do or not do. 
Finally, end users may not always be at fault when falling victim to online 
banking fraud. In a number of malware attacks, customer devices were 
automatically infected when visiting websites that were somehow compromised. 
In such cases, it cannot be concluded that end users are the weakest link. 
Hence, customers can be told to take action to prevent malware infections, such 
as installing anti-malware software, but what if regular websites have infected 
ads on them? Although coping measures must be included in communications 
about risks, for malware too, it is not always easy to come up with effective 
solutions. Hence, the objective effectiveness of (single and combined) security 
measures is hard to determine, if at all feasible. Therefore, it is better to also 
involve other (responsible) parties, such as website owners and hosting 
companies. Thus, to improve the safety and security of end users, users 
themselves and banks are not the only important players; all parties that have a 
role in the online banking fraud process are involved. 
4. Facilitate victims in their recovery process, primarily by providing feedback. 
Because online banking customers are continually confronted with phishing and 
malware attacks and online banking fraud victimization cannot be completely 
prevented, it is important to invest in helping victims to recover from the harm 
that is done to them. This goes further than administrative procedures, such as 
restoring the bank account and reimbursing the amount that was stolen. It is 
important to provide victims with feedback on how the attack occurred and what 
made it succeed. This can make the incident a more meaningful learning 
experience and it strengthens the online resilience of the bank’s customers, 
rendering repeated victimization less likely. This is a task for banks and the 
police, possibly in conjunction depending on the complexity of the attack. In 
addition, it is necessary to recognize their victimization, to treat them carefully 
and to provide feedback on the handling of the incident. Victim support the 
Netherlands, an organization that assists in the processing of victimization, may 
also play an important role in this regard. 
5. Continue with research on the human aspects of online banking safety and 
security. 
A challenge for adequate information security behaviour is how to educate and 
train end users properly. The theoretical principles that were developed need to 
be tested in order to find out what works. This thesis tested one way of doing 
this based on fear appeals. The question remains whether this is a good or 
effective approach or that other methods would be more effective, such as 
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embedded training and simulated social engineering and technical engineering 
attacks. The study on corporate customers found that, when people are 
confronted with an attack, they are more inclined to take action. This was also 
mentioned in the stories of some of the online banking fraud victims that were 
interviewed. However, this recommendation might be difficult to follow up 
because of the ethical and practical issues associated with such interventions. 
It is also necessary to find out on what scale and frequency SETA initiatives 
should be rolled out and how they should be designed. Would a one-time course 
or a yearly exam suffice? Should awareness and knowledge be updated each 
month? Or should these initiatives be done on an ad-hoc basis when new threats 
emerge (real-time education)? It is important to ensure that customers are 
cautious and alert in their behaviour, and continue to be so, also with regard to 
new developments and types of attack on online banking. 
An answer should be found to the question of who is responsible for making end 
users resilient online. Are the individual banks responsible? Should it be 
arranged centrally, for instance, by the Dutch Banking Association or the Dutch 
Payments Organization? Should government take on this role given that the 
threats discussed are beyond the scope of online banking? Or is it the remit of 
end users themselves, who are expected to be self-reliant in this day and age? 
Since online banking fraud is waning in the Netherlands according to the 
statistics65, the question is to what extent banks will be prepared to extend their 
responsibility, especially taking into account the efforts that they have already 
made. Another important question is how these efforts in making end user 
online resilient should be organized. Currently, there are many (non-coherent) 
initiatives in this area. The question is whether this creates the desired effect? 
Perhaps it is more sensible and beneficial that one (or a few) key actor(s) take 
on a coordinating role in this. 
Another fruitful area to explore when it comes to changing behaviour for the 
better might be the area of ‘choice architecture’, especially the concept of 
‘nudge’. This topic was only briefly touched upon in this thesis, but deserves a 
mention. Perhaps it is good to use nudges on bank cards (e.g., ‘beware of 
scams, don’t give me to strangers’) or on authentication devices (e.g., ‘don’t 
disclose my codes over the phone’). Future research could explore this concept 
and complementary options from social marketing (see e.g., French [2011]). 
                                               
65 NVB (2017). Fraude met internetbankieren gedaald. Totale fraude in het 
betalingsverkeer toegenomen [Online banking fraud has dropped. Total fraud in the 
payment system increased]. Retrieved from https://www.nvb.nl/nieuws/2712/fraude-met-
internetbankieren-gedaald-totale-fraude-in-het-betalingsverkeer-toegenomen.html 
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10.6 Limitations 
This section mainly deals with the limitations of the studies presented in this 
thesis. Because all individual chapters described the limitations of the particular 
methodology applied, this section mainly covers overarching research 
limitations. In addition, research directions that were planned, but could not be 
followed through are discussed. Furthermore, possibilities for new research 
directions are proposed as options for dealing with these limitations and 
shortcomings. 
An issue in this thesis regards the definition of phishing. In Chapters 3 and 4, a 
deviating definition of phishing is used: ‘a scalable act of deception whereby 
impersonation is used to obtain information from a target’ (Lastdrager, 2014, p. 
8). The deviating part concerns the term ‘scalable’, which was problematic in 
some debates. This was particular the case, when the phishing modus operandi 
included phone calls, i.e., one-to-one communication. Therefore, the term 
‘scalable’ was abandoned in the phishing definitions used in the other chapters. 
In the Netherlands, mobile banking is on the increase. Mobile banking differs 
from online banking on ‘fixed’ devices in terms of (reduced) functionality. For 
instance transfer limits are lower and money can only be transferred to known 
accounts. Moreover, up until now, online banking fraud has not targeted mobile 
devices as much. Because there might be differences in users’ perceptions 
regarding online banking on fixed devices versus mobile devices, it would be 
interesting to investigate whether differences are observed in risk perceptions 
and precautionary online behaviour. From the survey sample (N = 1,200) – see 
Chapters 2, 6 and 7 – only 34 participants could be considered mobile-only 
bankers, so the sample size was considered too small for comparison with 
participants exclusively using fixed devices for online banking (N = 659). A 
question relevant for future research is whether ‘mobile users’ and ‘fixed users’ 
differ in their perceptions of online threats, and their drivers for and the actual 
uptake of precautionary behaviour. Moreover, it would be interesting to control 
for the platform mobile users have adopted, especially for malware-related 
attacks. It may be that iOS-users have a different sense of security as they use 
a more closed platform as opposed to Android-users who use a more open 
platform. In addition, it is important to investigate whether new (types of) risks 
will be associated with the mobile platform, particularly because the expectation 
is that mobile devices will be used even more in the near future. 
One of the research directions that could not be acted upon, concerns the 
victimization aspect. It would have been interesting to investigate the extent to 
which prior victimization has an influence on precautionary behaviour. However, 
the sample of victims in the data file (Chapters 6 and 7) was too small to carry 
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out additional analyses (N = 27). Nevertheless, the impact of this possible 
predictor was to some extent tested in Chapter 8. In that particular study, prior 
victimization significantly predicted motivations for taking technical coping 
measures. 
Furthermore, it would have been interesting to study possible underlying causes 
for victimization based on the survey data, for example based on attitudes, 
behaviour or respondent characteristics. Moreover, besides the 2.3% that 
experienced online banking fraud victimization themselves, about 35% had been 
confronted with attempted phishing attacks on online banking and about 15% 
with attempted attacks using malware. An interesting direction for follow-up 
studies is what prevents people who are confronted with online threats from not 
becoming victims, and therefore more resilient to online banking threats. 
A shortcoming considering the survey study, especially with regard to Chapter 7, 
is that the variable ‘habit’ could not be included in the analysis. This potential 
predictor correlated too strongly with self-efficacy and protection motivation. As 
a result, it could not be included in the analysis, because self-efficacy and 
protection motivation belong to PMT’s core nomology. Future research should 
investigate the value of this variable in the context of precautionary behaviour 
on online banking. Evidence for the importance of this variable – at least in an 
organizational setting – is provided by studies of Vance, Siponen, and Pahnila 
(2012) and Vishwanath, Harrison, and Ng (2016). Frank Crane’s quote is also 
pertinent here: ‘Habits are safer than rules; you don’t have to watch them. And 
you don’t have to keep them either. They keep you.’ 
User perceptions of bank reimbursement policies or ‘perceived financial 
compensation’ when fraud occurs could not be tested either on protection 
motivation. The newly constructed scale was not reliable for further analysis. 
Although it may be interesting to include this variable in follow-up research, it 
must be noted that although reimbursement can restore most of the financial 
damages to customers in cases of fraud, they still experience hindrance. For 
example, the bank can block the bank account from being accessed online, 
which makes it more difficult for customers to access their money. Perhaps the 
experience that something went wrong does not compensate for the damage 
being compensated. Furthermore, customers lose time when communicating 
with the bank about the incident and the handling of it, and when visiting the 
police to report the incident. They may also suffer psychological and emotional 
damage because someone accessed their bank account. In this sense, 
customers are committed to keeping online banking as safe as possible and to 
taking measures even if they are reimbursed. The same applies to the concept 
of insurance. Even though one is insured for a whole range of possible incidents, 
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one tries to make sure that none of these incidents will happen. In spite of this, 
the hypothesis remains, partly considering the discussion about reimbursement 
practices and policies related to online banking fraud. 
In addition, on the subject of improving the safety and security from an end-
user perspective, future research should consider investigating customer 
perceptions of responsibilities. In the context of online banking, some authors 
argue that banks implement technical measures with the purpose of shifting the 
responsibility onto their customers (Murdoch, Drimer, Anderson, & Bond, 2010). 
This is also addressed by Davinson and Sillence (2014, p. 156): ‘If the bank can 
show that a customer has been “grossly negligent” (a term the bank is free to 
define themselves) then the full liability shifts to the consumer’. This does not, 
however, change the risks of online banking, as the risks are still in the system. 
Besides a focus on threat perception and precautionary behaviour, new studies 
should therefore also consider the extent to which customers understand their 
own responsibility in relation to online banking (Davinson & Sillence, 2014), a 
topic that is only briefly examined in this thesis. 
A challenge for researchers is to conduct research in cooperation with banks on 
bank systems. For the studies in this thesis, bank data could be accessed only 
once (see Chapter 3). Banks have a lot of data at their disposal to enable such 
analyses, especially in terms of background features and online banking 
behaviour. Perhaps it would be possible to compare customer behaviour before 
and after incidents, and whether they fall back into old patterns or habits after 
having adopted precautionary measures. The advantage of doing this kind of 
research at banks is that they are in a better position to identify victims or 
disadvantaged customers than is possible based on survey research. However, 
obtaining the right data might be quite laborious, because bank systems and 
how these systems are used are not always unambiguous. Academia might be 
able to help banks with getting more meaningful data out of their systems based 
on how this data is recorded. 
Moreover, future cooperation with banks could also focus on how to implement 
measures that focus on the human aspects of cybersecurity. It is relatively easy 
to quantify the achievements of technical security measures. For example, it is 
possible to generate reports on how much traffic or attacks a firewall has 
blocked. For social interventions, it will be more difficult to build a (business) 
case. An important question to answer is how to measure the success of these 
‘soft’ types of interventions. 
Finally, from an outsider’s perspective, a potential threat to the current research 
is that not all could be said and done, given the involvement of organizations 
 Chapter 10 
 
241 
who funded the project and the context being investigated. However, formal 
agreements were reached in advance making it possible for the researchers who 
were involved in the research program to publish their findings. As a result, the 
research was able to adopt a critical and independent view on the matters 
discussed. This means that the views expressed in this thesis are not necessarily 
those of the project’s funders. 
10.7 Concluding remarks 
This thesis investigated risk perceptions of and victimization involving online 
banking fraud. It also developed and tested a model of precautionary online 
behaviour, mainly guided by the protection motivation theory. In addition, it 
tried to improve precautionary online behaviour of internet users using fear 
appeals. The findings indicate, among other things, that it is important to focus 
on cognitive processes in order to adequately protect against online banking 
fraud. This means that it is essential to address the human aspects of online 
banking safety and security, especially when it involves attacks using social 
engineering, but to some extent also when it involves attacks using technical 
engineering. Consequently, solutions should be sought in what Bruce Schneier 
calls the ‘people problem’, and thus not in the ‘math problem’.66 Implications of 
the study results were discussed and opportunities for follow-up research 
presented. 
Combatting online banking fraud and cybercrimes in general continues to be an 
arms race that probably will not be won by the good guys anytime soon. It is 
important to be aware of the fact that, even though people can be made more 
aware of and resilient to cyberattacks, there will always be people that fall for a 
scam or catch some malware; no amount of preventive techniques will be able 
to stop this entirely. It is not feasible to expect people to be alert at all times. 
For example, in the Netherlands, 1,300 online banking transfers went wrong 
each month in 2016, mainly because people were sloppy when checking bank 
account numbers.67 Therefore, having one hundred per cent security would be a 
utopia. If we are able to accept this as a fact of life, it will make our lives more 
optimistic rather than pessimistic. And if something does go wrong, it does not 
necessarily mean that it was done on purpose or that someone is to blame for it. 
                                               
66 Schneier, B. (2000). Semantic attacks: The third wave of network attacks. Retrieved 
from https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2000/1015.html#1 
67 Scheres, P. (2017). Slordig: Zo vaak gaat geld overmaken fout [Sloppy: Money 
transfers go wrong this often]. Retrieved from https://www.rtlz.nl/finance/personal-
finance/slordig-zo-vaak-gaat-geld-overmaken-fout 
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However, if end users are more vigilant about what they do online and are more 
aware of how others can abuse the advantages of the internet, the lives of 
perpetrators will be made more difficult. Or at least the impact caused by these 
attacks may be reduced. Therefore, security education, training and awareness 
remain an important priority, especially for combatting social risks. Hence, 
information security practices should become part of our general skill set as 
people. This is a necessary requirement, also in view of future developments 
regarding the ‘Internet of Things’ and the ‘Internet of Everything’. 
Furthermore, it is important to arrive at a situation that is fair to people, also for 
those who do not understand how technology and protective measures work 
and/or those who have not chosen to use them in the first place. Therefore, 
potential solutions might also be found in the area of usable security, especially 
for non-savvy internet users. If vital decisions can be made, or common errors 
can be prevented, through secure usability design and by default settings that 
have the user’s interest at heart – thus not through human decisions – it would 
seem that fewer errors will be made, leading to less victimization. Moreover, 
probably fewer investments need to be done in educating and training end 
users. 
In conclusion, fortunately most online banking practices and most online 
activities go right in most cases. The internet is flourishing, which is evident 
from the millions of interactions and transactions that simultaneously take place 
every day between citizens, businesses and governments (Wall, 2008). We need 
to make sure that this will continue in the future. An important requirement for 
a safer and more secure internet is that the human factor is given a central 
place. I believe that behavioural information security studies – in conjunction 
with other scientific fields – can make a great contribution to a safer and more 
secure internet for all. 
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Appendix I: Outline research program 
 
The Dutch Research Program on Safety and Security of Online Banking started 
in April 2012 and ended on October 2017, and was funded by the Dutch Banking 
Association, the Police Academy of the Netherlands and the Dutch National 
Police. The goals of this multidisciplinary research program were to contribute to 
the safety and security of online banking and to advance scientific knowledge 
and theory in this area. A multidisciplinary perspective was necessary because 
online banking fraud is a complex, societal problem that cannot be solved by a 
simple, monodisciplinary solution.68 
Within the research program, four different perspectives were taken on tackling 
the problem of online banking fraud. All were designed as PhD studies. The first 
study, which is presented in this thesis, is conducted from a behavioural 
information security perspective and dealt with the question of how end users 
can be made more resilient to online banking fraud. The second study, which 
took a criminology perspective, dealt with the question how cybercriminal 
networks that carry out phishing and malware attacks can be disrupted.69 The 
third study adopted a technical security approach and dealt with the question of 
how online banking transactions can most effectively be secured from a 
technical and usable perspective.70 The fourth and final study was conducted 
from a socio-legal perspective and was concerned with detection, investigation 
and prosecution of online banking fraud. In particular, it dealt with the question 
of how the public-private fight against online banking fraud can be designed 
effectively.71 
The knowledge institutes involved with the research program are the 
Cybersafety Research Group from NHL Stenden University of Applied Sciences 
and the Police Academy of the Netherlands, and the Open University of the 
Netherlands. 
  
                                               
68 Stol, W. Ph., Eekelen, M. van, Stamhuis, E., & Kop, N. (2011). Veiligheid digitaal 
betalingsverkeer: Presentatie van een verbetergericht kennisprogramma [Improving the 
safety and security of digital payment systems: Presentation of a knowledge program]. 
Leeuwarden: Open University of the Netherlands, NHL Stenden University of Applied 
Sciences and the Police Academy of the Netherlands. 
69 Leukfeldt, E. R. (2016). Cybercriminal networks: Origin, growth and criminal 
capabilities. The Hague: Eleven International (PhD thesis). 
70 Kiljan, S. (2017). Exploring, expanding and evaluating usable security in online banking. 
Heerlen: Open University of the Netherlands (PhD thesis). 
71 Boes, S. (work in progress). See for updates: https://cybersciencecenter.nl 
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Appendix II: Interview data 
 
Table AII.1: Short summary of the interviews 
Inter-
view 
Gender Age 
(years) 
Level of 
education 
Victim 
type 
Fraud 
type 
Damage 
(euros) 
Reimbursed 
01 Female 58 Medium Private Phishing 13,000 Yes 
02 Female 79 Medium Private Phishing 2,000 Yes 
03 Male 45 Medium Private Phishing 11,000 Yes 
04 Male 89 High Private Phishing 2,000(a) N/a 
05 Male 73 Medium Private Phishing 8,000 Yes 
06 Female 59 High Private Phishing 3,600 1,000 
07 Male 77 Low Private Phishing 10,000(a)  N/a 
08 Female 70 High Private Phishing 50,000 Yes 
09 Male 36 Medium Corporate Malware 1,300 Yes 
10 Male 68 Medium Corporate Phishing 900 Yes 
11 Male 23 High Private Phishing 7,000 Yes 
12 Female 74 Low Private Phishing 1,200 No 
13 Female 73 Low Private Phishing 1,800 No 
14 Male 80 High Private Phishing 4,800 Yes (-150) 
15 Female 74 High Private Phishing 50,000 No 
16 Male 67 Medium Private Phishing 2,500 Yes (-150) 
17 Male 71 Medium Private Phishing 5,700 No 
18 Female 61 High Private Phishing 20,000 Yes (-150) 
19 Male 38 High Corporate Malware M.w.(a) N/a 
20 Female 64 Medium Corporate Malware 6,900 Yes 
21 Male 29 Medium Corporate Malware 10,00 Yes 
22 Female 57 Medium Corporate Malware 5,000 Yes 
23 Female 46 Medium Corporate Malware 4,700 Yes 
24 Male 64 High Corporate Malware 3,000 Yes 
25* Female 56 High Corporate Malware 5,000 Yes 
26 Male 31 Medium Private Malware 3,500 Yes 
27 Male 30 Medium Corporate Malware 4,700 Yes 
28* Male 63 High Corporate Malware 5,000 Yes 
29 Male 50 High Corporate Malware 3,700 Yes 
30 Female 51 Medium Corporate Malware N.t. Yes 
Note. *: not the actual victim. a: attempt. m.w.: about a monthly wage. n.t.: not told. 
n/a: not applicable. -150: minus mandatory own risk (i.e., 150 euros). 
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Appendix III: Instrument private customers 
 
Table A.III.1: Instrument (translated from Dutch) 
Construct (sources) Items 
Perceived  PV1:  I am at risk for being victimized by online banking fraud 
vulnerability PV2:  It is likely that I will become victim of online banking fraud 
(Witte, 1996) PV3:  It is possible that I will become victim of online banking 
fraud 
Perceived  PS1:  I believe that online banking fraud is a severe problem 
severity PS2:  I believe that online banking fraud is a serious problem 
(Witte, 1996) PS3:  I believe that online banking fraud is a significant problem 
Perceived risk PR1:  I am afraid of being victimized by online banking fraud 
(Grabner-Kräuter & 
Faullant, 2008) 
PR2:  I believe it can rather easily happen that criminals steal 
money during online banking sessions 
 PR3:  I am afraid that others can access my online bank account 
without my permission 
Trust in online  TR1:  I trust online banking 
Banking (Yousaf- TR2:  I trust my bank 
-zai et al., 2009) TR3:  I trust the internet for banking transactions 
Response efficacy 
(Witte, 1996) 
RE1:  The uniform safety rules help in preventing online banking 
fraud 
 RE2: Complying with the uniform safety rules is effective in 
preventing online banking fraud 
 RE3:  If I follow the uniform safety rules, I am less likely to be 
victimized by online banking fraud 
Self-efficacy SE1:  I am able to comply with the uniform safety rules 
(Witte, 1996) SE2:  The uniform safety rules are easy to follow 
 SE3:  Following the uniform safety rules is convenient 
Response costs  RC1:  Following the uniform safety rules is time-consuming 
(Ng et al., 2009) RC2:  Complying with the uniform safety rules requires a lot of 
mental effort 
 RC3:  Complying with the uniform safety rules would require 
starting a new habit 
Injunctive norms  
(Anderson & Agarwal, 
2010) 
IN1:  Friends who influence my behaviour would think that I 
should take safety measures to protect myself against 
online banking fraud 
 IN2:  Significant others who are important to me would think that 
I should take safety measures to protect myself against 
online banking fraud 
 IN3:  My peers would think that I should take safety measures to 
protect myself against online banking fraud 
Descriptive norms 
(Anderson & Agarwal,  
DN1:  I believe other people implement security measures to 
protect themselves against online banking fraud 
2010; Herath & Rao, 
2009) 
DN2:  I am convinced other people take security measures to 
protect themselves against online banking fraud 
 DN3:  The majority of people who make use of online banking 
take security measures to protect themselves against online 
banking fraud 
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Table A.III.1 (continued): Instrument (translated from Dutch) 
Construct 
(sources) 
Items  
Locus of control  LoC1:  Keeping online banking safe is within my control 
(Workman et al., 
2008, 2009) 
LoC2:  I believe that it is within my control to protect myself against 
online banking fraud 
 LoC3: The primary responsibility for protecting me against online 
banking fraud belongs to me 
Protection 
motivation 
PM1:  I am likely to follow the uniform safety rules to protect myself 
against online banking fraud 
(Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010;  
PM2:  I am willing to comply with the uniform safety rules to protect 
myself against online banking fraud 
Herath & Rao, 
2009; Ifinedo,  
PM3: I am certain that I will follow the uniform safety rules to 
protect myself against online banking fraud 
2012) PM4:  It is my intention to comply with the uniform safety rules 
Online banking 
experience 
(Corbitt et al.,  
OBX1:  I have been using online banking for: (less than 1 
year/between 1 and 5 years/between 6 and 10 years/between 
11 and 15 years/more than 15 years) 
2003) OBX2:  I use online banking to check my account balance 
approximately: ((almost) daily/ at least once per week/ at 
least twice per week/ at least once per month/less than once a 
month) 
 OBX3:  I use online banking to make payments to third parties 
approximately: ((almost) daily/ at least once per week/ at 
least twice per week/ at least once per month/less than once a 
month) 
 OBX4:  I perceive myself experienced at using online banking (1 
strongly disagree – 5 strongly agree) 
Note. Only OBX4 was used as a measure for online-banking experience in the structural 
models. 
Factor loadings – original measurement model (Chapter 7) 
The factor loadings are presented in Table A.III.2 and show that most items 
loaded on their corresponding factor and had no cross-loadings. Exceptions were 
the items Attitude 2 and Attitude 3 (loading highly on om the factor protection 
motivation), Habit 1 (loading highly on the factor protection motivation), Habit 2 
(with a low loading on the factor habit), Protection Motivation 1-4 (loading 
highly on the factor attitude), Response Costs 3 (with a poor loading on the 
factor response costs), Self-efficacy 1 (loading highly on the factor protection 
motivation) and Self-efficacy 3 (loading highly on the factors protection 
motivation and habit). Because of these results, the factors attitude and habit as 
well as their items (see Table A.III.2) were removed from any subsequent 
analysis. The factor self-efficacy was retained, as it is an important component 
in protection motivation theory. However, because of their cross-loadings, the 
items Self-efficacy 1 and Self-efficacy 3 were removed. Because of low loadings, 
the item Response Costs 3 was also removed. The items for attitude and habit 
are presented in Table A.III.3. 
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Table A.III.2: Component loadings – original measurement model 
Note. PV: perceived vulnerability. PS: perceived severity.PR: perceived risk. TR: trust. 
RE: response efficacy. SE: self-efficacy. RC: response costs. IN: injunctive norms. DN: 
descriptive norms. AT: attitude. LoC: locus of control. PM: protection motivation. HA: 
habit. 
  
 PV PS PR TR RE SE RC IN DN AT LoC PM HA 
PV1 0.89 0.17 0.63 -0.33 -0.26 -0.24 0.24 0.17 -0.02 -0.15 -0.27 -0.17 -0.19 
PV2 0.91 0.22 0.69 -0.35 -0.28 -0.28 0.28 0.22 0.02 -0.18 -0.29 -0.20 -0.20 
PV3 0.72 0.21 0.55 -0.24 -0.17 -0.15 0.12 0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.20 -0.09 -0.17 
PS1 0.22 0.86 0.27 -0.08 0.06 0.16 -0.04 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.22 0.17 
PS2 0.13 0.87 0.20 -0.03 0.11 0.25 -0.11 -0.05 0.09 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.21 
PS3 0.26 0.88 0.37 -0.12 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.25 0.03 0.21 0.15 
PR1 0.60 0.30 0.85 -0.38 -0.23 -0.21 0.27 0.21 0.05 -0.08 -0.23 -0.09 -0.17 
PR2 0.68 0.21 0.81 -0.37 -0.32 -0.26 0.25 0.16 -0.03 -0.19 -0.29 -0.20 -0.21 
PR3 0.61 0.30 0.87 -0.40 -0.26 -0.25 0.25 0.16 0.01 -0.11 -0.30 -0.13 -0.20 
TR1 -0.35 -0.11 -0.45 0.90 0.40 0.29 -0.19 -0.03 0.15 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.22 
TR2 -0.26 -0.01 -0.29 0.82 0.43 0.28 -0.20 0.01 0.22 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.23 
TR3 -0.33 -0.10 -0.41 0.83 0.35 0.23 -0.14 0.01 0.16 0.18 0.35 0.19 0.18 
RE1 -0.25 0.08 -0.29 0.39 0.89 0.60 -0.32 0.00 0.33 0.65 0.59 0.64 0.48 
RE2 -0.23 0.03 -0.24 0.43 0.77 0.47 -0.17 0.08 0.28 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.38 
RE3 -0.25 0.10 -0.28 0.36 0.88 0.59 -0.33 -0.02 0.33 0.65 0.61 0.66 0.52 
SE1 -0.24 0.19 -0.26 0.29 0.58 0.89 -0.46 -0.13 0.21 0.64 0.54 0.71 0.65 
SE2 -0.24 0.18 -0.24 0.26 0.57 0.87 -0.42 -0.08 0.25 0.65 0.51 0.65 0.65 
SE3 -0.24 0.20 -0.25 0.29 0.61 0.91 -0.51 -0.10 0.30 0.67 0.58 0.75 0.79 
RC1 0.23 -0.07 0.25 -0.19 -0.29 -0.49 0.90 0.31 -0.02 -0.40 -0.31 -0.40 -0.39 
RC2 0.24 0.00 0.30 -0.17 -0.25 -0.40 0.85 0.34 -0.02 -0.27 -0.23 -0.30 -0.29 
RC3 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.01 
IN1 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.25 0.88 0.20 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 
IN2 0.20 0.02 0.22 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14 0.36 0.87 0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 
IN3 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.03 -0.09 0.30 0.90 0.18 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
DN1 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.32 0.28 -0.06 0.12 0.87 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.28 
DN2 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.30 0.20 0.00 0.19 0.86 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.25 
DN3 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.19 0.34 0.27 -0.04 0.19 0.88 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.32 
AT1 -0.17 0.23 -0.15 0.28 0.65 0.65 -0.37 -0.04 0.27 0.87 0.50 0.68 0.50 
AT2 -0.11 0.30 -0.09 0.19 0.64 0.63 -0.33 -0.02 0.34 0.90 0.51 0.75 0.60 
AT3 -0.16 0.29 -0.16 0.27 0.67 0.70 -0.38 -0.06 0.29 0.92 0.55 0.82 0.62 
LoC1 -0.26 0.13 -0.27 0.40 0.61 0.56 -0.30 -0.02 0.26 0.54 0.83 0.56 0.47 
LoC2 -0.27 0.04 -0.28 0.39 0.56 0.53 -0.25 0.03 0.28 0.46 0.81 0.49 0.47 
LoC3 -0.17 0.02 -0.20 0.35 0.52 0.39 -0.19 0.08 0.29 0.41 0.77 0.41 0.36 
PM1 -0.14 0.22 -0.12 0.22 0.58 0.66 -0.36 -0.03 0.32 0.71 0.49 0.88 0.60 
PM2 -0.19 0.25 -0.16 0.26 0.65 0.69 -0.36 -0.02 0.32 0.72 0.53 0.90 0.61 
PM3 -0.18 0.26 -0.15 0.26 0.64 0.76 -0.40 -0.04 0.34 0.73 0.56 0.90 0.75 
PM4 -0.16 0.25 -0.16 0.26 0.66 0.72 -0.39 -0.07 0.29 0.83 0.55 0.90 0.65 
HA1 -0.19 0.19 -0.20 0.24 0.53 0.76 -0.40 -0.05 0.30 0.63 0.50 0.72 0.92 
HA2 -0.10 0.08 -0.13 0.11 0.20 0.35 -0.17 -0.03 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.30 0.60 
HA3 -0.22 0.20 -0.22 0.23 0.53 0.73 -0.36 -0.03 0.30 0.60 0.52 0.68 0.90 
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Table A.III.3: Additional items from initial instrument (translated from Dutch) 
Construct / sources Items 
Attitude  AT1:  Following the uniform safety rules is a good idea 
(Anderson & Agarwal,  AT2:  Complying with the uniform safety rules is a necessity 
2010; Ifinedo, 2012) AT3:  Following the uniform safety rules is important 
Habit  
(Vance et al., 2012) 
HA1:  Complying with the uniform safety rules is something I 
do automatically 
 HA2:  Complying with the uniform safety rules is something I 
do without having to consciously remember to do so 
 HA3:  Complying with the uniform safety rules is something 
that belongs to my routine 
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Appendix IV: Instrument corporate customers 
 
Table A.IV.1: Questionnaire items, scales, means, and standard deviations (translated 
from Dutch; N = 1,622) 
Variables Items Scale M SD 
Protection motivation     
Technical coping 
measures 
 
-The business computer(s) is equipped 
with anti-virus software 
-The business computer(s) is equipped 
with a firewall 
-The (wireless) network connecting the 
business computer(s) is secured 
-The software running on the business 
computer(s) is continuously updated 
(1) yes, (2) 
no, (3) do not 
know 
1.09 
 
1.16 
 
1.15 
 
1.13 
.342 
 
.501 
 
.502 
 
.448 
Personal coping 
measures 
-I have adopted rules for safe online 
banking 
-I have adopted rules for handling 
sensitive data (such as customer data) 
-I have adopted rules for opening 
potentially untrusted files (such as e-mail 
attachments) 
-I have adopted rules for sharing sensitive 
information to third parties 
(1) yes, (2) 
no, (3) do not 
know 
1.21 
 
1.21 
 
1.08 
 
 
1.10 
.461 
 
.481 
 
.327 
 
 
.343 
Threat appraisal     
Perceived risk -I am worried about online threats (1) totally 
disagree – (4) 
totally agree 
2.15 .753 
Coping appraisal PMT     
Response efficacy 
 
-How confident are you in the measures 
taken to prevent online threats 
(1) very little/ 
no confidence 
– (5) a lot of 
confidence 
2.44 .686 
Self-efficacy To what extent do you poses the following 
digital skills: 
-I can organise and manage computer files 
(open, save, copy, move, organise them in 
folders) 
-I can find files using the search function 
on my computer 
-I know most of the software functions on 
the computer 
-I can install software 
-I can boot software on my computer 
-I can use most software on my computer, 
like Word, Excel and PowerPoint  
-If a program is not working, I understand 
why 
-I can solve computer problems 
-I know most of the hardware functions on 
my computer 
-I can use computer (related) hardware, 
such as CD / DVD drives, USB ports, 
scanners and printers 
-I can use a web browser, for example, to 
search for information 
(1) to a very 
small extent – 
(4) to a very 
large extent 
 
 
3.43 
 
 
3.47 
 
3.09 
 
3.02 
3.28 
3.32 
 
2.63 
 
2.49 
2.69 
 
3.26 
 
 
3.48 
 
 
 
.830 
 
 
.731 
 
.907 
 
1.059 
.875 
.867 
 
.976 
 
.994 
1.001 
 
.845 
 
 
.711 
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Table A.IV.1 (continued): Questionnaire items, scales, means, and standard deviations 
(translated from Dutch; N = 1,622) 
Variables Items Scale M SD 
Self-efficacy 
(continued) 
To what extent do you poses the following 
digital skills: 
-I can communicate with others via the 
internet, for example, by e-mail or via 
chat applications 
-I can create a web page 
-I can use programming languages 
(1) to a very 
small extent – 
(4) to a very 
large extent 
 
 
3.49 
 
 
2.17 
1.65 
 
 
.718 
 
 
1.211 
1.027 
Coping appraisal 
added 
    
Attitude 
 
-How important is information security for 
your business? 
(1) very unim-
portant – (5) 
very important 
2.12 .895 
Locus of control 
 
-I am responsible for my own online safety  (1) totally 
disagree – (5) 
totally agree 
1.67 .773 
Additional variables     
Prior internet 
experience 
 
-On average, how many hours a day do 
you spent online (private and business 
purposes combined)? 
(1) 0-2 hours 
– (5) more 
than 8 hours 
2.32 1.307 
Prior victimization 
 
-Has your business ever been victim of a 
malware attack? 
-Has your business ever been victim of a 
phishing attack? 
(1) do not 
know, (2) no, 
(3) one or 
more failed 
attempts, (4) 
victimized 
once, (5) 
victimized 
several times 
2.55 
 
2.50 
.959 
 
.773 
IT dependence -How dependent is your business of 
computers and internet (IT)? 
(1) not at all 
dependent – 
(7) completely 
dependent 
3.02 1.690 
Confidential 
information 
 
-To what extent is confidential information 
(such as customer data) stored on your 
business computer(s)? 
(1) none – (6) 
to a very large 
extent 
2.99 1.581 
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Appendix V: Instrument internet users 
 
Text box A.V.1: Strong-fear appeal message (translated from Dutch) 
Phishing is increasingly prevalent in the Netherlands and is a common form of 
online fraud. Research by Statistics Netherlands shows that phishing 
victimization in the Netherlands occurs in walks of life. Recent scientific 
research reveals that up to 45% of all people fall for phishing attacks. The 
chances of getting phished – or already having experienced it – are thus very 
real. 
Phishing attacks are becoming more sophisticated and thus appear more 
credible. Whereas phishing e-mails could previously be recognized by spelling 
mistakes, now-a-days, they look very much like the original mails that are sent 
by the organization that criminals imitate, are written in proper Dutch and are 
more personalized. This means that it becomes more difficult to recognize 
phishing attempts and, therefore, more probable to fall victim to it. When 
criminals acquire your personal information, they take over your identity with 
which they perform all kinds of harmful practices such as robbing your bank 
account and purchasing products on your behalf for which they do not pay. 
A phishing attack often starts with receiving a phishing e-mail. A simple and 
effective way to counter phishing is to be extra careful when handing over your 
personal information so that you are not at risk of receiving phishing e-mails. A 
specific measure that you can take is that you do not share this information 
online with others, for example, on social media (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), on 
your personal website or when a website asks for it. Research has shown that 
by taking this simple measure you can prevent a phishing attack on your 
behalf, or an attack on you will be in vain. Of course, you may need to share 
such information, for example, when making purchases on a trusted web shop. 
The fact remains that you have to deal with your personal information carefully. 
After all, when you do not meet the recommended measure, you run a very 
high risk of getting phished. 
 
Text box A.V.2: Weak-fear appeal message (translated from Dutch) 
Phishing is a type of online fraud in which people are scammed. Research by 
Statistics Netherlands shows that 0.4% of the Dutch population has been a 
victim of phishing in the previous year. Recent scientific research reveals that 
at least 3% of all people fall for phishing attacks. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that you will also get phished or that you already have experienced 
it. 
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Criminals always find new phishing methods to gain personal information. When 
criminals acquire such data, they can take over one’s identity, for example, to 
plunder bank accounts or purchase products for which they do not pay. 
Although the risk of becoming a victim of phishing is small according to 
research, this can have adverse consequences. 
A phishing attack often starts with receiving a phishing e-mail. A simple and 
effective way to counter phishing is to be extra careful when handing over your 
personal information so that you are not at risk of receiving phishing e-mails. A 
specific measure that you can take is that you do not share this information 
online with others, for example, on social media (Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), on 
your personal website or when a website asks for it. Research has shown that 
by taking this simple measure you can prevent a phishing attack on your 
behalf, or an attack on you will be in vain. Of course, you may need to share 
such information, for example, when making purchases on a trusted web shop. 
The fact remains that you have to deal with your personal information carefully. 
After all, when you do not meet the recommended measure, there is a chance 
of getting phished. 
 
Table A.V.1: Instrument (translated from Dutch) 
Construct (sources) Items  
Perceived vulnerability 
(Witte, 1996) 
PV1: It is likely that I will become victim of phishing  
PV2: I am at risk for being victimized by phishing 
PV3: It is possible that I will become victim of phishing 
Perceived severity 
(Johnston et al., 2015; 
Witte, 1996) 
PS1: If I was a victim of phishing, the consequences would be 
severe 
PS2: If I was a victim of phishing, the consequences would be 
serious 
PS3: If I was a victim of phishing, the consequences would be 
significant 
Fear  
(Milne et al., 2002) 
FE1: The thought of becoming a phishing victim makes me 
feel frightened 
FE2: The thought of becoming a phishing victim makes me 
scared 
FE3: I am anxious about the prospect of becoming a victim of 
phishing 
FE4: I am worried about the prospect of becoming a victim of 
phishing 
Response efficacy 
(Witte, 1996) 
RE1: If I do no share personal information online, then that 
helps to prevent phishing 
RE2: I think that not sharing personal information online is an 
effective means to counter phishing attacks 
RE3: If I do no share personal information online, then I think 
the chance decreases of becoming a victim of phishing 
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Table A.V.1 (continued): Instrument (translated from Dutch) 
Construct (sources) Items  
Self-efficacy 
(Witte, 1996) 
SE1: I am able to apply the measure of not sharing personal 
information online to my internet behaviour in order to 
prevent phishing 
SE2: The measure of not sharing personal information online 
is easy to use to prevent phishing 
SE3: Using the recommended measure to not share personal 
information online to prevent phishing is convenient 
Response costs RC1: Not sharing personal information online is inconvenient 
(Ng et al., 2009) RC2: Exercising care when deciding whether or not to share 
personal information online is time-consuming 
RC3: Not sharing personal information online requires a lot of 
mental effort 
RC4: Not sharing personal information online would require 
starting a new habit, which is difficult 
Protection motivation 
(Anderson & Agarwal, 
2010; Ifinedo, 2012) 
PM1: I am likely to take the measure of not sharing personal 
information online to protect myself against phishing 
attacks, for the next month 
PM2: I would follow the measure of not sharing personal 
information online to protect myself against phishing 
attacks, for the next month 
PM3: I am certain to take the measure of not sharing personal 
information online to protect myself against phishing 
attacks, for the next month 
PM4: It is my intention to take the measure of not sharing 
personal information online, for the next month 
Resistance  
(Witte, 1994; Witte et 
al., 1998) 
RS1: Based on what I have read, I do not think it is necessary 
to protect myself against phishing 
RS2: After reading the text, I had no inclination to do 
something against phishing 
RS3: I think it is unnecessary to protect myself from phishing, 
even after reading the text 
Avoidance  
(Brouwers & 
Sorrentino, 1993; 
Witte et al., 1998)  
AV1: When I read the text, my first instinct was to not want 
to think about the possibility of being a victim of 
phishing 
AV2: If I can avoid thinking of being a victim of phishing, I 
will do that 
AV3: I try to avoid thinking about the possibility of becoming 
a victim of phishing 
Delayed avoidance 
(Witte et al., 1998) 
AV4: In the past month, I have often thought back to the text 
that I read 
AV5: I have been thinking a lot about the text I have read 
over the past month 
Message involvement 
(Shillair et al., 2015) 
MI1: I have read the text carefully 
MI2: The text contains relevant information for me 
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Table B2: Pretest items (translated from Dutch) 
Construct (sources) Items  
Argument quality  
(De Hoog et al., 2005) 
AQ1: Strong arguments are used in the information provided 
AQ2: The arguments used in the information provided are 
persuasive 
AQ3: The information provided contains meaningful 
arguments 
Issue derogation 
(Witte et al., 1998) 
ID1: The information in the text is exaggerated 
ID2: The information in the text is overblown 
Perceived manipulation 
(Witte et al., 1998) 
MA1: I feel that the information provided is manipulative 
MA2: The information provided is misleading 
 
The items of attitude are measured on a semantic differential scale based on the 
work of Davis (1993) and are operationalized as follows: The online sharing of 
personal information is: good (1) – bad (5); beneficial (1) – harmful (5); 
positive (1) – negative (5); wise (1) – foolish (5); favourable (1) – unfavourable 
(5). 
Prior knowledge of phishing is based on the work of Shillair et al. (2015) and is 
asked as follows: To what extent are you familiar with phishing? Participants 
could answer this question in the following ways: I never heard of phishing; I 
have heard of phishing, but I do not understand the details; I know what 
phishing is, but I do not know what to do about it; I know what phishing is and 
how to protect myself against it. 
Finally, we based the questions on internet experience and personal 
responsibility on previous work of Corbitt et al. (2003) and Boehmer et al. 
(2015) respectively. Internet experience was asked for by three different 
questions: (a) I have been using the internet for: less than 1 year; between 1 
and 5 years; between 5 and 10 years; between 10 and 15 years; more than 15 
years, (b) I use the internet approximately: less than 1 hour per week; between 
1 and 3 hour per week; between 3 and 10 hours per week; between 10 and 20 
hours per week; more than 20 hours per week, and (c) I perceive myself 
experienced at using the internet: 1 strongly disagree – 5 strongly agree. 
Personal responsibility was also measured on a 5-point Likert scale and was 
formulated as follows: I am primarily responsible for my safety on the internet. 
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Summary 
 
This doctoral thesis is about the human aspects of online banking safety and 
security. Preparations for this thesis, part of The Dutch Research Program on 
Safety and Security of Online Banking, started when online banking fraud figures 
were relatively high in the Netherlands. In this thesis, online banking fraud is 
limited to phishing and malware attacks. This thesis investigated a specific part 
of the issue of how to reduce this type of fraud, namely the extent to which the 
safety and security of online banking can be improved from an end-user 
perspective. Hence, it examined how the online resilience of end users can be 
enhanced; making them better able to protect themselves against online 
banking fraud. Next to the practical goal of this thesis, it also aimed to 
contribute to scientific theory in the behavioural information security domain. 
This thesis starts with an introductory Chapter (1) in which the context of study 
is described and the goal and research questions are highlighted. The empirical 
part of this thesis is divided into two smaller parts. In order to get a 
comprehensive overview of the human aspects of online banking safety and 
security, it is important to study the threats as well as people-focussed 
safeguards. Therefore, Part I (Chapters 2 to 5) deals with studies on end-users’ 
perceptions of and victimization due to online banking fraud. Learning more 
about risk perceptions, how and why victimization takes place, victim 
characteristics and how victims recover from incidents may lead to more 
knowledge on how to combat online banking fraud effectively. Part II of this 
thesis (Chapters 6 to 9) consequently deals with studies on precautionary online 
behaviour of end users and how that behaviour can be improved. Knowledge on 
this subject may contribute to strengthening one of the most essential links in 
the safety and security of online banking: the end user. The concluding Chapter 
(10) provides an answer to the central and main research questions and deals 
with the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. The main research 
questions are: 
1: What are the perceptions of end users regarding the safety and security of 
online banking? 
2: How can online banking fraud victimization be explained from an end-user 
perspective? 
3: How can precautionary online behaviour of end users be explained and 
improved? 
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To answer these questions, several studies were conducted; these are 
elaborated in Part I and Part II of this thesis. The contents of the chapters are 
outlined below. 
In Chapter 2, end-user risk perceptions of online bank fraud are studied. 
Secondary analysis of data based on a survey among 1,200 Dutch online 
banking users shows that online banking fraud is not considered to be a major 
risk. End users perceive the potential impact of online banking fraud to be 
severe, but the chances of falling victim themselves to be slim. However, they 
estimate the chances of others being victimized to be higher. Furthermore, 
online banking customers mainly come into contact with online banking fraud 
through media communications. Indirect victimization in the social environment 
and direct victimization were less common. In addition, online banking users, in 
general, have reasonable levels of trust in online banking. Finally, this chapter 
reveals – using partial least squares path modelling – that risk perceptions are 
mainly affected by the estimated chance of becoming a victim of online banking 
fraud. The perceived impact of online banking fraud and the degree of trust in 
online banking affected risk perception to some extent. Direct and indirect 
victimization and demographic characteristics hardly affected risk perceptions. 
In Chapter 3, an analysis of 600 phishing and malware incidents obtained from a 
Dutch bank is presented. The goal of this chapter is to shed light on the 
circumstances in which bank customers are victimized in phishing and malware 
attacks and how these attacks manifest in practice. This chapter shows that an 
essential step in the fraudulent process entails customers giving away their 
personal information to fraudsters. Phishing victimization mainly occurred by 
responding to a fraudulent e-mail, a fraudulent phone call or a combination of 
these. Malware victimization primarily occurred by responding to a malicious 
pop-up and by installing a malicious application on a mobile device. Customers 
cooperated because the fraudulent messages were perceived to be professional 
and trustworthy and because customers were not sufficiently suspicious of what 
was happening. The results suggest that victims have an unintended and 
subconscious, but active role in the fraudulent process. An interesting finding is 
that the victims did not always seem to trust the fraudster’s intentions, but were 
mentally unable to stop the process. Reasons for this include not being aware of 
how fraudulent schemes manifest in practice, not being alert at the right 
moment and having insufficient knowledge of online banking procedures and 
precautionary measures.  
Chapter 4 explores factors that may explain online banking fraud victimization 
based on interviews with 30 victims using the routine activity approach and 
protection motivation theory as theoretical lenses. A qualitative approach was 
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chosen because previous quantitative studies failed to identify such factors. The 
interview data were analysed using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software. This chapter demonstrates that no specific factors from the routine 
activity approach and protection motivation theory that increase the chance of 
online banking fraud victimization could be identified. Moreover, victims were 
distributed across genders, age categories and levels of education. Ultimately, 
end-user attributes that lead to higher chances of being victimized through 
online banking fraud could not be identified. This suggests that everyone is 
susceptible to online banking fraud victimization to some degree. 
In order to find out whether victims adequately recover from phishing and 
malware incidents, it is important to gain insight into its effects and impact on 
victims first. However, there was not much literature available on the impact of 
these cybercrimes. This gap is addressed in Chapter 5, in which interview data 
from the above mentioned 30 victims are analysed again. Besides (initial) 
financial effects (most victims were reimbursed), victims also described various 
kinds of psychological and emotional effects, such as feeling awful and stressed, 
and various kinds of secondary impact, such as time loss and not being treated 
properly during the handling of the incident. Furthermore, this chapter 
demonstrates that the level of impact varies among victims, ranging from little 
or no impact to severe impact. Moreover, while some victims were only affected 
for a few days, some felt the effects in the long term. The impact of these 
fraudulent schemes on victims should therefore not be underestimated.  
In addition, the interview data provided insight into cognitive and behavioural 
change in order to cope with the incident. Cognitive strategies were mainly 
concerned with reducing psychological and emotional distress, and increasing 
online resilience to future attacks. The main behavioural strategies that were 
identified are reporting the incident to the bank and the police and seeking 
support from the social environment. Furthermore, various other actions were 
taken, such as enhancing the safety and security of devices and being more 
attentive during online banking sessions. However, it was observed that some of 
these actions were only of limited duration. Some victims adopted avoidance 
behaviours, such as making less use of online banking services. Victims who 
were left with financial damages rationalized the incident, thereby minimizing 
victimization for themselves. Chapter 5 concludes that the coping approach that 
was applied provides a useful framework to study the effects and impact of 
cybercrime victimization and how victims recover from it. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, survey data on 1,200 Dutch online banking users are 
examined and analysed using partial least squares path modelling. In Chapter 6, 
three social cognitive models are compared with respect to their ability to 
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explain the intentions of precautionary online behaviour. The models are: 
protection motivation theory, the reasoned action approach and an integrated 
model comprising variables of these models. The three models were successfully 
applied to online banking. The individual models equally explain much of the 
variance in precautionary online behaviour. In the integrated model, the 
significant predictors of the two models remained significant and the level of 
explained variance was highest. Precautionary online behaviour is largely driven 
by response efficacy, self-efficacy and attitude towards that behaviour. This 
chapter concludes that both protection motivation theory and the reasoned 
action approach make a unique contribution in explaining variance for 
precautionary online behavioural intention. The integrated model explained most 
variance in protection motivation, which means that integrating theoretical 
perspectives from different domains is worthwhile. However, protection 
motivation theory is used as the main theoretical basis in the following chapters, 
because of its applicability to interventions. 
Chapter 7 builds on the preceding chapter and continues to study a model of 
precautionary behaviour in the domain of online banking. The aim was to gain 
insight into factors that encourage customers to take measures to protect 
themselves against online threats. The analyses that were conducted for this 
chapter provided support for most of the hypothesized relationships and showed 
that the model explains high levels of variance for precautionary online 
behaviour as well as for risk perception. Threat and coping appraisal successfully 
predicted the protection motivation of online banking users; in particular, 
response efficacy and self-efficacy were the most important predictors for taking 
precautions. Secondary predictors include locus of control, perceived severity 
(direct effect) and the negative predictor response costs. Finally, some 
differences in precautionary online behavioural intentions were observed based 
on gender and level of education. 
In Chapter 8, insight is gained into what protective measures self-employed 
entrepreneurs take in order to protect themselves against online threats and 
what motivates them to do so. Information technology is becoming increasingly 
important for entrepreneurs. Protecting their technical infrastructure and stored 
data is, therefore, also growing in importance. Nevertheless, research into the 
safety and security of entrepreneurs in general, and online threats targeted at 
entrepreneurs in particular, are still limited. Based on secondary analyses on 
data collected from 1,622 Dutch entrepreneurs, it was observed that the 
majority implement technical and personal coping measures. Entrepreneurs are 
likely to implement protective measures if they believe a measure is effective, if 
they are capable of using internet technology, if their attitude towards 
information security is positive and if they believe they are responsible for their 
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own online security. These findings are similar to those of private users outlined 
in Chapters 6 and 7. Finally, some differences in precautionary online behaviour 
were observed based on age and education level. 
Chapter 9 examines the impact of fear appeal messages on user cognitions, 
attitudes, behavioural attentions and precautionary behaviour regarding online 
information-sharing to protect against the threat of phishing attacks. A pre-test 
post-test design was used in which 768 internet users filled out an online 
questionnaire. Participants were grouped in one of three fear appeal conditions: 
strong-fear appeal, weak-fear appeal and control condition. Claims regarding 
vulnerability of phishing attacks and claims concerning response efficacy of 
protective online information-sharing behaviour were manipulated in the fear 
appeal messages. This chapter demonstrates positive effects of fear appeals on 
heightening end-users’ cognitions, attitudes and behavioural intentions. 
However, future studies are needed to determine how subsequent security 
behaviour can be promoted, as the effects on this crucial aspect were not 
directly observed. Nonetheless, fear appeals have great potential for promoting 
security behaviour by making end users aware of threats and simultaneously 
providing behavioural advice on how to mitigate these threats. 
All things considered, this thesis investigated online banking fraud victimization 
and precautionary online behaviour. Specifically, human aspects were the focus 
of the present research. This thesis demonstrates that good security is in 
people’s heads. It seems easier, cheaper and more successful for criminals to 
attack end users using psychology rather than the technology surrounding online 
banking. Hence, even the best security engineers cannot stop end users from 
giving away their security codes. Therefore, using psychology to defend against 
online banking attacks also makes sense. This is especially the case for attacks 
using social engineering (phishing), but to some extent also for attacks using 
technical engineering (malware). Considering the further digitization of our 
society and the increasing dependability on information systems, the case is 
made that people have to ‘bend’ with these developments and become resilient 
when online. This is necessary to stop people from ‘breaking’ and potentially 
becoming victims of online banking fraud. 
While this thesis obtained information on how safety and security of online 
banking can be improved from an end-user perspective, it should be noted that 
end users will always be confronted with numerous potential threats. It is 
unrealistic to believe that people can protect themselves against all threats at all 
times. Therefore, we have to accept that bad things will continue to happen 
online, but optimistically they can be kept to a minimum if end users are more 
vigilant about what they do online and are aware of how some people abuse the 
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advantages that the internet offers. At the very least, the impact of these 
attacks can be reduced. The following main recommendations from this thesis 
may be helpful: 
1: Continue to invest in security education, training and awareness campaigns 
concerning threats aimed at online banking. 
2: Focus on underlying cognitive dimensions in security education, training and 
awareness campaigns, most notably on response efficacy and self-efficacy. 
3: Make clear that banks and customers are partners in keeping online banking 
safe and secure. 
4: Facilitate victims in their recovery process, primarily by providing feedback. 
5: Continue with research on the human aspects of online banking safety and 
security. 
In conclusion, security education, training and awareness remain an important 
priority, especially for combatting social risks. It is very important to promote 
online resilience. The research indicates that in order to strengthen the role of 
customers in the safety and security of online banking, threat appraisals as well 
as coping appraisals should be improved. If customers or end users believe that 
protective measures make a difference (response efficacy) and if they are able 
to perform these measures (self-efficacy), it is likely that end users will adopt 
precautionary behaviour and become a strong link in the information security 
chain. Proper information security practices should become part of our general 
skill set as people in this day and age. However, it should not be forgotten that 
safety and security is something that should be worked on together, with all 
parties involved. And when things do go wrong, we need to help one another to 
recover from it. All in all, an important requirement for a safer and more secure 
internet is that the human factor takes a central place in information security. 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Buigen of barsten? Online bankfraude voorkomen door online weerbaarheid 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de menselijke aspecten van de veiligheid van 
internetbankieren. De voorbereidingen voor dit proefschrift, onderdeel van het 
Kennisprogramma Veiligheid Digitaal Betalingsverkeer, zijn begonnen toen de 
online bankfraudecijfers relatief hoog waren in Nederland. Fraude met 
internetbankieren is hier beperkt tot phishing- en malware-aanvallen. In dit 
proefschrift is een specifiek deel onderzocht van de kwestie hoe dit type fraude 
te bestrijden, namelijk in welke mate de veiligheid van internetbankieren kan 
worden verbeterd vanuit het perspectief van de eindgebruiker. Of met andere 
woorden, hoe de online weerbaarheid van eindgebruikers kan worden vergroot; 
waardoor ze beter in staat zijn zichzelf te beschermen tegen online bankfraude. 
Het proefschrift begint met een inleidend hoofdstuk (1) waarin de context van 
de studie wordt beschreven en de doelstelling en onderzoeksvragen worden 
belicht. Om een omvattend beeld te krijgen van de menselijke aspecten van de 
veiligheid van internetbankieren, is het belangrijk om zowel de risico’s als 
mensgerichte veiligheidsmaatregelen te bestuderen. Derhalve is het empirische 
deel van dit proefschrift opgedeeld in twee delen. In Deel I (hoofdstukken 2 t/m 
5) staan percepties van eindgebruikers over risico’s van internetbankieren en 
slachtofferschap van online bankfraude centraal. Meer kennis over risico-
percepties, hoe en waarom slachtofferschap plaatsvindt, slachtofferkenmerken 
en hoe slachtoffers herstellen van incidenten geeft meer inzicht in hoe online 
bankfraude effectief kan worden bestreden. In Deel II (hoofdstukken 6 t/m 9) 
worden studies over veilig online gedrag van eindgebruikers behandeld en hoe 
dit gedrag kan worden verbeterd. Kennis over dit onderwerp draagt bij aan het 
versterken van een van de meest essentiële schakels in de veiligheidsketen van 
internetbankieren: de mens. In het afsluitende hoofdstuk (10) worden de 
onderzoeksvragen beantwoord en wordt stil gestaan bij de theoretische en 
praktische implicaties van de bevindingen. De belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen in 
dit onderzoek zijn: 
1: Wat zijn de percepties van eindgebruikers over de veiligheid van 
internetbankieren? 
2: Hoe kan slachtofferschap van online bankfraude worden verklaard vanuit een 
gebruikersperspectief? 
3: Hoe kan veilig online gedrag van eindgebruikers worden verklaard en 
verbeterd? 
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Om deze vragen te beantwoorden, zijn verschillende onderzoeken uitgevoerd; 
ondergebracht in Deel I en Deel II van dit proefschrift. De inhoud van de 
hoofdstukken is hieronder nader uitgewerkt. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden risicopercepties van eindgebruikers met betrekking tot 
online bankfraude bestudeerd. Secundaire analyse van vragenlijstdata van 
1.200 Nederlandse gebruikers van internetbankieren laat zien dat fraude met 
internetbankieren niet als een groot risico wordt ervaren. Eindgebruikers ervaren 
de mogelijke impact van online bankfraude als ernstig, maar de kans om zelf 
slachtoffer ervan te worden als klein. Ze schatten de kans dat anderen slacht-
offer worden hoger in. Daarnaast horen gebruikers van internetbankieren vooral 
in de media over online bankfraude. Indirect slachtofferschap in de sociale 
omgeving en direct slachtofferschap komen minder vaak voor. Bovendien 
hebben gebruikers van internetbankieren over het algemeen een behoorlijke 
mate van vertrouwen in internetbankieren. Tot slot laat dit hoofdstuk zien – 
door middel van padanalyse – dat risicopercepties vooral worden beïnvloed door 
de ingeschatte kans om slachtoffer te worden van fraude met internetbankieren. 
De waargenomen impact van online bankfraude en de mate van vertrouwen in 
internetbankieren beïnvloeden de risicoperceptie tot op zekere hoogte. Direct en 
indirect slachtofferschap en demografische kenmerken beïnvloeden de risico-
perceptie nauwelijks. 
In hoofdstuk 3 zijn 600 phishing- en malwarezaken van een Nederlandse bank 
geanalyseerd. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om inzicht te krijgen in de 
omstandigheden rond bankklanten die het slachtoffer zijn van phishing- en 
malware-aanvallen en hoe deze aanvallen zich in de praktijk manifesteren. Dit 
hoofdstuk laat zien dat een essentiële stap in het frauduleuze proces is dat 
klanten hun persoonlijke informatie weggeven aan fraudeurs. Het gaat daarbij 
voornamelijk om beveiligingscodes. Slachtofferschap van phishing vindt voor-
namelijk plaats door te reageren op een valse e-mail, een frauduleus telefoontje 
of een combinatie hiervan. Malware-slachtofferschap vindt veelal plaats door te 
reageren op een valse pop-up en door een kwaadaardige applicatie op een 
mobiel apparaat te installeren. Klanten reageerden hierop omdat de frauduleuze 
berichten professioneel en betrouwbaar overkwamen en omdat ze niet 
voldoende achterdochtig waren voor wat er gebeurde. De resultaten suggereren 
dat slachtoffers een onbedoelde en onbewuste, maar actieve rol hebben in het 
frauduleuze proces. Een interessante bevinding is dat de slachtoffers niet altijd 
de intentie van de fraudeur leken te vertrouwen, maar mentaal niet in staat 
waren om het proces te stoppen. Redenen hiervoor zijn het zich niet bewust zijn 
van hoe frauduleuze handelingen zich in de praktijk voltrekken, niet alert zijn op 
het juiste moment en onvoldoende kennis hebben van procedures voor internet-
bankieren en van beschermende maatregelen. 
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In hoofdstuk 4 is aan de hand van interviews met 30 slachtoffers onderzoek 
gedaan naar factoren die het slachtofferschap van online bankfraude kunnen 
verklaren. Hiervoor zijn de routine activity approach en de protection motivation 
theory als theoretische kapstok gebruikt. Er is gekozen voor een kwalitatieve 
benadering, omdat eerdere kwantitatieve studies dergelijke factoren niet konden 
identificeren. De interviewdata zijn geanalyseerd met behulp van kwalitatieve 
data-analysesoftware. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat er geen specifieke factoren uit 
de toegepaste theorieën kunnen worden geïdentificeerd die de kans vergroten 
op slachtofferschap van online bankfraude. Bovendien zijn slachtoffers verdeeld 
over sekse, leeftijd en opleidingsniveau. Uiteindelijk kunnen kenmerken van 
eindgebruikers die leiden tot een grotere kans om slachtoffer te worden van 
fraude met internetbankieren niet worden geïdentificeerd. Dit suggereert dat 
iedereen tot op zekere hoogte gevoelig is voor slachtofferschap van online 
bankfraude. 
Om erachter te komen of slachtoffers adequaat herstellen van phishing- en 
malware-incidenten, is het van belang om eerst inzicht te krijgen in de effecten 
en impact op slachtoffers. Literatuur over de impact van deze vormen van 
cybercriminaliteit is echter schaars. Dit hiaat wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 5, 
waarin interviewgegevens van dezelfde 30 slachtoffers nader zijn geanalyseerd. 
Naast (aanvankelijke) financiële gevolgen (de meeste slachtoffers werden 
schadeloos gesteld) beschreven slachtoffers ook verschillende vormen van 
psychologische en emotionele effecten, zoals zich beschaamd en gestrests 
voelen, en verschillende soorten secundaire gevolgen, zoals tijdverlies en niet 
goed worden behandeld bij de afhandeling van het incident. Verder laat dit 
hoofdstuk zien dat de mate van impact die slachtoffers ervaren varieert van 
weinig of geen impact tot zeer veel impact. Bovendien komt naar voren dat 
sommige slachtoffers slechts een paar dagen last hadden van dergelijke effecten 
terwijl sommigen nadelige gevolgen ondervonden op de lange termijn. De 
impact van frauduleuze incidenten op slachtoffers moet daarom niet worden 
onderschat. 
Verder wordt in dit hoofdstuk inzicht gegeven in veranderingen die slachtoffers 
doormaken naar aanleiding van het incident. Cognitieve strategieën hebben 
vooral betrekking op het verminderen van psychologische en emotionele stress 
en het vergroten van online weerbaarheid met betrekking tot toekomstige 
aanvallen. De belangrijkste gedragsstrategieën die zijn geïdentificeerd zijn het 
rapporteren van het incident aan de bank en de politie en het zoeken van steun 
vanuit de sociale omgeving. Verder zijn verschillende andere acties ondernomen 
door de slachtoffers, zoals het verbeteren van de beveiliging op de apparaten 
die gebruikt worden voor internetbankieren en het meer alert zijn tijdens 
internetbankiersessies. Echter, sommige van deze acties waren slechts van korte 
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duur. Daarnaast gaven sommige slachtoffers aan vermijdingsgedrag te 
vertonen, zoals het minder gebruik maken van internetbankieren. Slachtoffers 
waarvan de financiële schade niet werd gecompenseerd, rationaliseerden het 
incident en minimaliseerden daarmee het slachtofferschap voor zichzelf. In 
hoofdstuk 5 wordt geconcludeerd dat de toegepaste coping-aanpak een 
bruikbaar kader biedt voor het bestuderen van de effecten en impact van 
cybercrimeslachtofferschap en hoe slachtoffers daarvan herstellen. 
In hoofdstukken 6 en 7 zijn vragenlijstdata van 1.200 Nederlandse gebruikers 
van internetbankieren geanalyseerd met behulp van padanalyse. In hoofdstuk 6 
zijn drie sociaal-cognitieve modellen vergeleken in hun vermogen om de 
intenties van veilig online gedrag te verklaren. De modellen zijn: protection 
motivation theory, reasoned action approach en een geïntegreerd model met 
variabelen uit deze modellen. De drie modellen zijn met succes toegepast op de 
internetbankieren-context. De individuele modellen verklaren ongeveer evenveel 
van de variantie in veilig online gedrag. In het geïntegreerde model bleven de 
voorspellers van de twee modellen significant en was het niveau van de 
verklaarde variantie het hoogst. Veilig online gedrag wordt grotendeels bepaald 
door de ingeschatte responseffectiviteit, zelfeffectiviteit en de houding ten 
opzichte van dat gedrag. In dit hoofdstuk wordt geconcludeerd dat zowel de 
protection motivation theory als de reasoned action approach een unieke 
bijdrage leveren aan het verklaren van de variantie voor veilig gedrag op 
internet. In de volgende hoofdstukken wordt de protection motivation theory als 
belangrijkste theoretische basis gebruikt vanwege de toepasbaarheid ervan op 
interventies. 
Hoofdstuk 7 bouwt voort op het vorige hoofdstuk en werkt verder aan een 
model van veilig online gedrag op het gebied van internetbankieren. Het doel 
was om inzicht te krijgen in factoren die klanten beïnvloeden om beschermende 
maatregelen te treffen tegen online dreigingen. De analyses die voor dit 
hoofdstuk zijn uitgevoerd, ondersteunen de meeste hypothesen en laten een 
hoge mate van verklaarde variantie zien voor zowel veilig online gedrag als voor 
risicoperceptie. Beide cognitieve processen die centraal staan in de protection 
motivation theory, namelijk threat appraisal (evaluatie van de ingeschatte 
dreiging) en coping appraisal (evaluatie van mogelijke strategieën om met een 
dreiging om te gaan) voorspellen de protectiemotivatie van eindgebruikers. De 
belangrijkste voorspellers voor veilig online gedrag zijn responseffectiviteit en 
zelfeffectiviteit. Secundaire voorspellers zijn locus of control, gepercipieerde 
impact (direct effect) en responskosten. Ten slotte werden enkele verschillen in 
motivaties voor veilig online gedrag waargenomen met betrekking tot sekse en 
opleidingsniveau. 
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In hoofdstuk 8 wordt inzichtelijk gemaakt welke maatregelen zelfstandigen 
zonder personeel (hierna: ondernemers) nemen om zichzelf te beschermen 
tegen online dreigingen en wat hen motiveert om dit te doen. Informatie-
technologie wordt steeds belangrijker voor ondernemers. Het beschermen van 
hun technische infrastructuur en bedrijfsgegevens worden daarmee ook steeds 
belangrijker. Desalniettemin is onderzoek onder ondernemers naar de veiligheid 
of beveiliging in het algemeen en online dreigingen in het bijzonder schaars. Op 
basis van een secundaire analyse van vragenlijstdata van 1.622 Nederlandse 
ondernemers, is inzichtelijk gemaakt dat de meerderheid van de ondernemers 
technische en persoonlijke coping-maatregelen treft. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat 
de waarschijnlijkheid dat ondernemers beschermende maatregelen treffen het 
hoogst is wanneer zij menen dat een maatregel effectief is, wanneer zij in staat 
zijn om internettechnologie te gebruiken, wanneer hun houding tegenover 
informatiebeveiliging positief is en wanneer zij geloven dat zij verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor hun eigen online veiligheid. Deze bevindingen zijn vergelijkbaar met 
die van de particuliere doelgroep in hoofdstukken 6 en 7. Ten slotte zijn enkele 
verschillen in veilig gedrag waargenomen met betrekking tot leeftijd en 
opleidingsniveau. 
In hoofdstuk 9 wordt verslag gedaan van een onderzoek naar de impact van fear 
appeals op cognities, attitudes, intenties en gedrag van internetgebruikers met 
betrekking tot het online delen van informatie ter bescherming tegen phishing-
aanvallen. Een pre-test post-test design is toegepast waarbij 768 internet-
gebruikers een online vragenlijst invulden. Deelnemers werden gegroepeerd in 
een van de drie fear appeal condities: een conditie met sterke argumenten, een 
conditie met zwakke argumenten en een controle conditie; zonder fear appeal. 
Argumenten gericht op persoonlijke kwetsbaarheid van phishing-aanvallen en 
argumenten gericht op de responseffectiviteit van veilig gedrag met betrekking 
tot het online delen van persoonlijke informatie werden gemanipuleerd in de fear 
appeal berichten. Dit hoofdstuk laat positieve effecten van fear appeals zien op 
het verhogen van de cognities, attitudes en gedragsintenties van internet-
gebruikers. Vervolgonderzoek is echter nodig om te bepalen hoe het 
daadwerkelijke gedrag kan worden bevorderd, omdat de effecten op dit cruciale 
aspect niet direct werden waargenomen. Desalniettemin hebben fear appeals 
een groot potentieel om veilig online gedrag te bevorderen door internet-
gebruikers bewust te maken van dreigingen en tegelijkertijd een concreet advies 
te geven over hoe deze dreigingen kunnen worden beperkt. 
In dit proefschrift is onderzoek gedaan naar slachtofferschap van online 
bankfraude en veilig online gedrag. Specifiek waren menselijke aspecten de 
focus van het huidige onderzoek. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat goede beveiliging 
in de hoofden van mensen zit. Het lijkt eenvoudiger, goedkoper en succesvoller 
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voor criminelen te zijn om eindgebruikers aan te vallen met behulp van 
psychologie in plaats van de technologie rondom internetbankieren. De knapste 
koppen op het gebied van informatiebeveiliging kunnen niet voorkomen dat 
eindgebruikers hun beveiligingscodes weggeven. Daarom is het logisch om in de 
verdediging tegen aanvallen op internetbankieren ook gebruik te maken van 
psychologie. Dit is vooral het geval voor social engineering aanvallen (phishing), 
maar in zekere mate ook voor technical engineering aanvallen (malware). 
Gezien de verdere digitalisering van onze samenleving en de toenemende 
afhankelijkheid van informatiesystemen, is het zaak dat mensen mee ‘buigen’ 
met deze ontwikkelingen en online weerbaar worden. Dit is nodig om te 
voorkomen dat mensen ‘barsten’ en mogelijk het slachtoffer worden van fraude 
met internetbankieren. 
Hoewel met dit proefschrift inzicht is verkregen in hoe de veiligheid van 
internetbankieren kan worden verbeterd vanuit het perspectief van de 
eindgebruiker, moet worden opgemerkt dat eindgebruikers voortdurend worden 
geconfronteerd met tal van potentiële dreigingen. Het is een utopie om te 
geloven dat mensen zich te allen tijde kunnen beschermen tegen alle 
dreigingen. Daarom moeten we accepteren dat slachtofferschap van online 
bankfraude zal blijven bestaan, maar – vanuit een optimistische kijk op de zaak 
– wel tot een minimum kan worden beperkt. Met name wanneer eindgebruikers 
meer alert zijn op wat ze doen online en zich bewust zijn van hoe sommige 
mensen de mogelijkheden van het internet misbruiken. Op zijn minst kan de 
impact die door deze aanvallen wordt veroorzaakt worden verminderd. De 
volgende hoofdaanbevelingen uit dit proefschrift kunnen hieraan bijdragen: 
1: Blijf investeren in educatie, training en bewustwordingscampagnes rond 
dreigingen gericht op internetbankieren. 
2: Focus op onderliggende cognitieve dimensies in educatie, training en 
bewustwordingscampagnes, met name op responseffectiviteit en 
zelfeffectiviteit. 
3: Maak duidelijk dat banken en klanten partners zijn in het veilig houden van 
internetbankieren. 
4: Faciliteer slachtoffers in hun herstelproces, voornamelijk door feedback te 
geven. 
5: Ga door met onderzoek naar de menselijke aspecten van de veiligheid van 
internetbankieren. 
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Concluderend, veiligheidseducatie, training en het vergroten van awareness 
blijven een prioriteit, vooral voor het bestrijden van sociale risico’s. Het is 
belangrijk om online weerbaarheid te stimuleren. Uit onderhavig onderzoek 
blijkt dat om de rol van eindgebruikers in de veiligheid van internetbankieren te 
versterken zowel de threat appraisal als de coping appraisal moet worden 
aangewakkerd. Wanneer bankklanten of eindgebruikers zich bewust zijn van een 
dreiging en geloven dat beschermende maatregelen daadwerkelijk een verschil 
maken (responseffectiviteit) en ze in staat zijn om deze maatregelen uit te 
voeren (zelfeffectiviteit) dan is het waarschijnlijk dat eindgebruikers voorzorgs-
maatregelen zullen treffen en een sterke schakel vormen in de informatie-
beveiligingsketen. Gezien de huidige tijdsgeest zou goed informatiebeveiligings-
gedrag deel moeten uitmaken van onze algemene vaardigheden. We mogen 
echter niet vergeten dat (online) veiligheid een onderwerp is dat samen met alle 
betrokken partijen moeten worden aangepakt. En wanneer er toch iets fout 
gaat, dan moeten we elkaar helpen om daarvan te herstellen. Al met al is een 
belangrijke vereiste voor een veiliger internet dat de menselijke factor een 
centrale plaats inneemt in de informatiebeveiliging. 
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This thesis is about the human aspects of online banking safe-
ty and security. End users are a central link in the information 
security chain, for online banking too. Despite technical se-
curity measures, security codes sometimes unintentionally 
fall into the hands of perpetrators, for instance, through suc-
cessful phishing and malware attacks. This allows perpetra-
tors to steal money from private and corporate bank accounts. 
Therefore, it is important to make end users resilient when 
online, in an effort to combat these attacks on online banking.
This thesis presents several studies that contribute to making 
end users online resilient and is divided into two empirical 
parts. The first part describes four studies that investigated 
risk perceptions and online banking fraud victimization. The 
second part describes four studies that investigated precau-
tionary online behaviour and how that behaviour can be in-
fluenced for the better. Researchers in the field of behavioural 
information security and practitioners in the field of security 
education, training and awareness can use the insights from 
this thesis in their line of work, to examine the issues more 
thoroughly and to maximize the effectiveness of security 
campaigns respectively.
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